- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Detweiler clone at WS
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

R.>The down side was that licensing was mentioned as the first recourse R.>from the state. When we complained of the financial hit, the talk R.>turned to registration. But the sense was clearly toward proactive R.>state control. Are these people mentally retarded or what. A BBS is a publication. The 1st Amendment was specifically written to outlaw the British licensing of publications. No risk. DCF --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

4 5

The 800 number requested
by bart＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The outfit was called "Full Disclosure" and was at 800 235 1414. I haven't tried it for a long time so, no guarantee its still active.

1 0

(Fwd) What motivates Cryp
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

J >I got PGP running on my machine a few weeks ago because I liked J >the idea of being able to communicate privately if I wanted, The major motivation. Crypto gives you the power to carve out a "zone of privacy" at will and say to the whole world, "This part of my life is mine alone." J >It may seem that I am being particularly naive in being J >surprised by this but I am from the UK where libertarian views J >of this kind are not so widely held. Though they *were* largely invented there... J >Similarly my motivations for J >using cryptography come simply from a desire for privacy from J >Govt. and other snooping but NOT from the 'cyber-survivalist' J >inclinations that seem to motivate some in the US at least. Distinguish "desire for privacy from Govt." and "'cyber-survivalist' inclinations" -- seems like the identical motive. It *is* government that digital volunteerists (a friendlier term) seek privacy from. J >I read some stuff on Vince Cate's WWW site by Tim May about how J >crypto was going to bring down governments due to (legal?) tax J >evasion by those who are computer literate . I have to say that J >I think this is highly unlikely I think Tim uses the term "collapse of governments." Most of us are just making predictions about the sort of institutional changes that will occur as people discover that they have more choices. Since controlling people by threatening to kill them if they disobey (the Political Means) only works if you can carry out your threat, if people can erect "unbreakable" barriers against States, their power is reduced. One doesn't have to overthrow them. They are overthrown by a change in their tactical capabilities. J >general herald an age of 'survival of the fittest' where those J >clued up about computers will be able to take advantage and do J >better due to paying less taxes etc. J >Personally I have no desire to evade tax since I quite like J >being able to drive on tarmac without holes, and having J >schooling and health care provided for all with the richer J >folk subsidising the poorer folk. And here I thought "lefties" were opposed to coercive monopolies. J >I'd never come across a right-wing anarchist before reading the J >crypto groups - weird! We're everywhere! DCF "Libertarian anarchist since Steve B. gave him a copy of Lysander Spooner's 'No Treason -- the Constitution of No Authority' in 1970." --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

1 0

(FWD) WHAT MOTIVATES FORWARDERS?
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Actually, no, it's not really a forward of anything at all. It's just that this forwarding business is *really* getting out of hand. For Christ's sake guys, if *you* can read stuff on other groups, credit us with the intelligence of being able to find it too. If this keeps up we'll have the who 20Mb/day of usenet funnelling through cypherpunks. How about in future just saying "Hey, anyone who doesn't know about talk.politics.crypto, go have a look at it on usenet. By the way there's an interesting thread going on just now about blah blah blah."? G

5 4

someone clue me in about USACM..
by sommerfeld＠orchard.medford.ma.us 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could someone explain to me the difference, if any, between the "USACM" and the panel of luminaries who put out the "Codes, Keys, and Conflicts" paper? The paper was downright bland in tone, while the one-page USACM position in the press release is clearly hostile towards the EES. Who is the USACM? How big is it, who can join, and who has? - Bill

1 0

What was the House Rules Committee vote?
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The House Rules Committee was supposed to vote on the General Export Administration Act HR 3937 yesterday. Anybody know the result of the vote? Did they mark the bill "open"? Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

1 0

USACM Calls for Clipper Withdrawal (fwd)
by NetSurfer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 30 Jun 1994 16:35:37 +0000 From: "US ACM, DC Office" <usacm_dc(a)acm.org> To: "usacm_dc(a)acm.org" <distribution.list(a)acm.org> Subject: USACM Calls for Clipper Withdrawal U S A C M Association for Computing Machinery, U.S. Public Policy Committee * PRESS RELEASE * Thursday, June 30, 1994 Contact: Barbara Simons (408) 463-5661, simons(a)acm.org (e-mail) Jim Horning (415) 853-2216, horning(a)src.dec.com (e-mail) Rob Kling (714) 856-5955, kling(a)ics.uci.edu (e-mail) COMPUTER POLICY COMMITTEE CALLS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF CLIPPER COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY "TOO IMPORTANT" FOR SECRET DECISION-MAKING WASHINGTON, DC The public policy arm of the oldest and largest international computing society today urged the White House to withdraw the controversial "Clipper Chip" encryption proposal. Noting that the "security and privacy of electronic communications are vital to the development of national and international information infrastructures," the Association for Computing Machinery's U.S. Public Policy Committee (USACM) added its voice to the growing debate over encryption and privacy policy. In a position statement released at a press conference on Capitol Hill, the USACM said that "communications security is too important to be left to secret processes and classified algorithms." The Clipper technology was developed by the National Security Agency, which classified the cryptographic algorithm that underlies the encryption device. The USACM believes that Clipper "will put U.S. manufacturers at a disadvantage in the global market and will adversely affect technological development within the United States." The technology has been championed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the NSA, which claim that "non-escrowed" encryption technology threatens law enforcement and national security. "As a body concerned with the development of government technology policy, USACM is troubled by the process that gave rise to the Clipper initiative," said Dr. Barbara Simons, a computer scientist with IBM who chairs the USACM. "It is vitally important that privacy protections for our communications networks be developed openly and with full public participation." The USACM position statement was issued after completion of a comprehensive study of cryptography policy sponsored by the ACM (see companion release). The study, "Codes, Keys and Conflicts: Issues in U.S Crypto Policy," was prepared by a panel of experts representing various constituencies involved in the debate over encryption. The ACM, founded in 1947, is a 85,000 member non-profit educational and scientific society dedicated to the development and use of information technology, and to addressing the impact of that technology on the world's major social challenges. USACM was created by ACM to provide a means for presenting and discussing technological issues to and with U.S. policymakers and the general public. For further information on USACM, please call (202) 298- 0842. ============================================================= USACM Position on the Escrowed Encryption Standard The ACM study "Codes, Keys and Conflicts: Issues in U.S Crypto Policy" sets forth the complex technical and social issues underlying the current debate over widespread use of encryption. The importance of encryption, and the need for appropriate policies, will increase as networked communication grows. Security and privacy of electronic communications are vital to the development of national and international information infrastructures. The Clipper Chip, or "Escrowed Encryption Standard" (EES) Initiative, raises fundamental policy issues that must be fully addressed and publicly debated. After reviewing the ACM study, which provides a balanced discussion of the issues, the U.S. Public Policy Committee of ACM (USACM) makes the following recommendations. 1. The USACM supports the development of public policies and technical standards for communications security in open forums in which all stakeholders -- government, industry, and the public -- participate. Because we are moving rapidly to open networks, a prerequisite for the success of those networks must be standards for which there is widespread consensus, including international acceptance. The USACM believes that communications security is too important to be left to secret processes and classified algorithms. We support the principles underlying the Computer Security Act of 1987, in which Congress expressed its preference for the development of open and unclassified security standards. 2. The USACM recommends that any encryption standard adopted by the U.S. government not place U.S. manufacturers at a disadvantage in the global market or adversely affect technological development within the United States. Few other nations are likely to adopt a standard that includes a classified algorithm and keys escrowed with the U.S. government. 3. The USACM supports changes in the process of developing Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) employed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. This process is currently predicated on the use of such standards solely to support Federal procurement. Increasingly, the standards set through the FIPS process directly affect non-federal organizations and the public at large. In the case of the EES, the vast majority of comments solicited by NIST opposed the standard, but were openly ignored. The USACM recommends that the standards process be placed under the Administrative Procedures Act so that citizens may have the same opportunity to challenge government actions in the area of information processing standards as they do in other important aspects of Federal agency policy making. 4. The USACM urges the Administration at this point to withdraw the Clipper Chip proposal and to begin an open and public review of encryption policy. The escrowed encryption initiative raises vital issues of privacy, law enforcement, competitiveness and scientific innovation that must be openly discussed. 5. The USACM reaffirms its support for privacy protection and urges the administration to encourage the development of technologies and institutional practices that will provide real privacy for future users of the National Information Infrastructure.

1 0

ACM Releases Crypto Study (fwd)
by NetSurfer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 30 Jun 1994 16:34:47 +0000 From: "US ACM, DC Office" <usacm_dc(a)acm.org> To: "usacm_dc(a)acm.org" <distribution.list(a)acm.org> Subject: ACM Releases Crypto Study Association for Computing Machinery PRESS RELEASE __________________________________________________ Thursday, June 30, 1994 Contact: Joseph DeBlasi, ACM Executive Director (212) 869-7440 Dr. Stephen Kent, Panel Chair (617) 873-3988 Dr. Susan Landau, Panel Staff (413) 545-0263 COMPUTING SOCIETY RELEASES REPORT ON ENCRYPTION POLICY "CLIPPER CHIP" CONTROVERSY EXPLORED BY EXPERT PANEL WASHINGTON, DC A panel of experts convened by the nation's foremost computing society today released a comprehensive report on U.S. cryptography policy. The report, "Codes, Keys and Conflicts: Issues in U.S Crypto Policy," is the culmination of a ten-month review conducted by the panel of representatives of the computer industry and academia, government officials, and attorneys. The 50-page document explores the complex technical and social issues underlying the current debate over the Clipper Chip and the export control of information security technology. "With the development of the information superhighway, cryptography has become a hotly debated policy issue," according to Joseph DeBlasi, Executive Director of the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), which convened the expert panel. "The ACM believes that this report is a significant contribution to the ongoing debate on the Clipper Chip and encryption policy. It cuts through the rhetoric and lays out the facts." Dr. Stephen Kent, Chief Scientist for Security Technology with the firm of Bolt Beranek and Newman, said that he was pleased with the final report. "It provides a very balanced discussion of many of the issues that surround the debate on crypto policy, and we hope that it will serve as a foundation for further public debate on this topic." The ACM report addresses the competing interests of the various stakeholders in the encryption debate -- law enforcement agencies, the intelligence community, industry and users of communications services. It reviews the recent history of U.S. cryptography policy and identifies key questions that policymakers must resolve as they grapple with this controversial issue. The ACM cryptography panel was chaired by Dr. Stephen Kent. Dr. Susan Landau, Research Associate Professor in Computer Science at the University of Massachusetts, co-ordinated the work of the panel and did most of the writing. Other panel members were Dr. Clinton Brooks, Advisor to the Director, National Security Agency; Scott Charney, Chief of the Computer Crime Unit, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice; Dr. Dorothy Denning, Computer Science Chair, Georgetown University; Dr. Whitfield Diffie, Distinguished Engineer, Sun Microsystems; Dr. Anthony Lauck, Corporate Consulting Engineer, Digital Equipment Corporation; Douglas Miller, Government Affairs Manager, Software Publishers Association; Dr. Peter Neumann, Principal Scientist, SRI International; and David Sobel, Legal Counsel, Electronic Privacy Information Center. Funding for the cryptography study was provided in part by the National Science Foundation. The ACM, founded in 1947, is a 85,000 member non-profit educational and scientific society dedicated to the development and use of information technology, and to addressing the impact of that technology on the world's major social challenges. For general information, contact ACM, 1515 Broadway, New York, NY 10036. (212) 869-7440 (tel), (212) 869-0481 (fax). Information on accessing the report electronically will be posted soon in this newsgroup.

1 0

Clipper "voluntary" like taxes are?
by Vincent.Cate＠FURMINT.NECTAR.CS.CMU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On the front page of the 6/29/94 WSJ there is mention of the fact that the IRS chief refers to the US tax system as "voluntary". I had heard this "voluntary" before. So at about 3:20 today I called the IRS at 1-800-tax-1040 to ask if this was correct. After about 40 minutes on hold (fortunately I have a computer to keep me busy) I got someone. They said that, yes, the US does have a "voluntary compliance" tax system. They said that I could find the tax codes saying this in the local library. I tried to pin down why they used the word "voluntary". After asking a couple questions I said, "but if we don't comply there are penalties, right?", they said yes, then I said, "so why is it voluntary?" and they hung up on me. Since this same government says that Clipper is "voluntary" I am worried that they mean some new Orwellian definition of "voluntary" and not the old fashioned "voluntary" many of us might have assumed. Voluntary used to mean things like "without legal obligation" and such (see below). Get a copy of PGP while you can, -- Vince Word voluntary (VAHL'uhn-ter'ee) adj. Definition --adj. 1. a. Arising from one's own free will. b. Acting on one's own initiative. 2. Acting or serving in a specified capacity willingly and without constraint or guarantee of reward. 3. Normally controlled by or subject to individual volition. 4. Capable of exercising will; volitional. 5. Proceeding from impulse; spontaneous. 6. Law. a. Acting or performed without external persuasion or compulsion. b. Without legal obligation, payment, or valuable consideration: a voluntary conveyance. c. Not accidental; intentional: voluntary manslaughter. --n., pl. - ies. 1. Mus. Solo organ music, occasionally improvised, that is played usually before and sometimes during or after a church service. 2. A volunteer. voluntarily (-taruh-lee) --adv. voluntariness --n. Etymology ME < Lat. voluntarius < voluntas, choice < velle, to wish. Domain Literature, Rhetoric, Philosophy, Law, Music Synonyms voluntary, intentional, deliberate, willful, willing, spontaneous. These adjectives mean unforced. Voluntary is applied in several related senses to what is done by choice, to physical movement subject to regulation by the will, and less often to action that is not only of one's choice but premeditated. The last-named sense is more basic to intentional and deliberate; in addition, deliberate stresses the idea of action taken with full awareness of the consequences. Willful can mean merely in accordance with one's will but often implies headstrong persistence in a self- determined course of action. Willing suggests acceding to a course proposed by another, without reluctance or even eagerly. Spontaneous refers to behavior that seems wholly unpremeditated, a natural response and a true reflection of one's feelings.

1 0

Reply to Tim May's comments
by Michael Wilson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May wrote (reply comments offset by leading '***'): Subject: Re: 'Black' budget purchases Michael Wilson writes: > The data from the Maryland Procurement Office that is stored in certain > databases (and removed from others, as I have just discovered when I checked) > provides the complete 'black' budget purchases of the intelligence community, > not just their purchases of supercomputers. Such raw data goes a long way > towards confirming other bits of intelligence, such as the establishment by NSA > of its own chip manufacturing facility owing to a lack of trust in undocumented > sections of commercial silicon. This data is useful beyond knowing the numbers That the NSA contracted National Semiconductor to build a facility on-site has been common knowledge since 1989-90. The fab is not state of the art (i.e., is not 1.8 micron or better) and is believed to be used for the very reasonable purpose of producing keying material in a secure environment (ROMs, PROMs, fuse-linked micros, PLAs, etc.). It is unlikely--but possible--that high-performance micros are being manufactured there. *** We were tracking NSA purchases of material over a decade ago; as for their usage of the technology, my statement was simply that they felt, after serious analysis, that they couldn't trust commercial silicon. The issue was trust, not computation power. > of supercomputers available (although it does help provide an upper boundary on > raw processing power, useful for quantifying tolerances). > > What we find interesting regarding the number of supercomputers at NSA is what > they do to the keyspace; a supposition of ours from the early period of > commercial public key was an attack on the domain of potential keys. Given a > known keylength, a powerful systematic search for primes that fit that range > can, over time, begin to damage the strength of the system. Careful analysis of This is nonsense. A typical 1024-bit RSA system uses p and q close to 512 bits each, e.g., 511 and 513. Whatever. Now a 512-bit number is a 150-plus decimal digit number. About .5-1% of all of these numbers are prime (by the Prime Number Theorem, or somesuch...about 1/N of all N-digit numbers are prime, as I recall). How big a keyspace is this to start searching "systematically"? Considering that there are "only" about 10^73 particles of all kinds in the entire universe (based on our best estimate of the size of the universe, the density of galaxies, gas clouds, etc.), this means that if every particle in the universe were searching for and recording the primes they discovered, each particle would have to store 10^77 primes! So much for "a powerful systematic search for primes that fit that range." *** You assume that your selection of primes is random; it is the case, particularly in the initial usages of public-key systems, that attacks could be made on keyspaces based on the prime generation method. A point that number-crunch jockeys tend to forget is that psychology and systems analysis provide greater in-roads against secure systems than brute force. > technical resource also allows one to speculate--are CM platforms (pardon the > pun) used for exhaustive systematic search for keys, while Cray systems are used > for attacks on the keyspace? Differentiation of parallel versus scalar > processing towards attack domains is interesting. "Parallel versus scalar processing"? Parallelism means nothing at these scales...see the above point. *** Your point is orthogonal to our point. The two systems are used for different attacks--parallelism can be used for exhaustive search, such as for DES keys, while scalar processing can be used for testing primality. > Michael Wilson > Managing Director, The Nemesis Group > The Adversary --Tim May *** TNG

2 1