- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Free calls to Govt (fwd)
by Robert A. Hayden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This is being forwarded from the ALA Intellectual Freedom mailing list. Thought it might be important here :-) - ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sun, 10 Dec 1995 09:59:48 -0500 From: Charles Willett <willett(a)AFN.ORG> To: Multiple recipients of list ALAOIF <ALAOIF(a)UICVM.CC.UIC.EDU> Subject: Free calls to Govt (fwd) - ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sat, 9 Dec 1995 14:31:58 -0700 From: El Tiburon <proteios(a)indirect.com> To: internet_censorship(a)monad.net Subject: Free calls to Govt 1) Dail 1-800-444-1555 2) They will give you a short recorded message. 3) Follow instructions if you have a touch tone phone, public ones work best and they have other advantages. :> 4) Enter a zip code...they ask for yours but it doesn't have to be...it can be any in the US. 5) Make a choice of the elected politician's office you want to be connected to. 6) When the staff person answers you are set to discuss the proposed environmental reform regulations, OR ANY OTHER ISSUE YOU WANT! Couple of tricks...we found they limit the number of calls to 3 from each number. Solution: public phones are everywhere...enjoy Exxon's corporate attempt to influence "grassroots democracy". M ______________________________________________________ Activism - Isnt it just participation? Internet Users Consortium 7031 E. Camelback Ste 102-515 Scottsdale, AZ 85251 IUC URL: http://www.indirect.com/www/molsen/ Proteios URL: http://www.indirect.com/www/proteios/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: PGP Signed with PineSign 2.2 iQCVAwUBMMsZczokqlyVGmCFAQE+8AP7BkUKpHH06aC79T8P/J+YRF1AeMC/MB0W 2mEqED/zNhNF7pp2v0mUlRLpG6jrY0NRGip3JWZhRcdTwiMaVEWYNNHE6dUeklzO zm27/NxqKpi/e5ie+CsNwXKeket87+af8OZ8bzvIYg28pNcHAjnq5PLG62Oqsrxz 8E3QAHjAwc4= =l1BI -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu \ /__ Finger for Geek Code Info <=> Finger for PGP Public Key \/ / -=-=-=-=-=- -=-=-=-=-=- \/ http://krypton.mankato.msus.edu/~hayden/Welcome.html -----BEGIN GEEK CODE BLOCK----- Version: 3.1 GED/J d-- s:++>: a-- C++(++++)$ ULUO++ P+>+++ L++ !E---- W+(---) N+++ o+ K+++ w+(---) O- M+$>++ V-- PS++(+++)>$ PE++(+)>$ Y++ PGP++ t- 5+++ X++ R+++>$ tv+ b+ DI+++ D+++ G+++++>$ e++$>++++ h r-- y+** ------END GEEK CODE BLOCK------

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Re: Warning about Pegasus Mail and PGP (fwd)
by Adam Hupp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Where can you get the Open Encryptor PGP interface? -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQBtAzCNppQAAAEDALhWZl7IuGZ9zZT5bACo0b/1L0Nv0C72vKHIO3IHh+cwpHHa 2Ozb9aeO0UvXGwkkZIYgUm0EvmzKh7yb1GTLvBp5kXpR3I9w+Yj4LGlBDERpUWw6 x4ED49pwDnz1Hl5FBQAFEbQYYXNoIDxhaHVwcEBwcmltZW5ldC5jb20+ =PtJK -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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What is AOL
by HyperReal-Anon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Twenty1CC(a)aol.com had these pearls of wisdom: >Found in rec.homor.funny.reruns Yes, you are quite a rerun, but you aren't funny. To answer your question, AOL is a haven for crackers, lamers, losers, fakers, and posers like yourself. You owe the Cypherpunks a video of your very violent and graphic death.

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Re: GAK and self-incrimination?
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ed Carp writes: > Greg Broiles writes: >> Tim May writes: >> >> >Consider this hypo: I send an encrypted message to a partner in crime >> >containing plans for future crimes and descriptions of past crimes. I >> >don't GAK the message. The government prosecutes me under the >> >Anti-Terrorism and Child Protection Act of 1997. >> > >> >My defense? That GAKKing the message would be tantamount to incriminating >> >myself, which the Fifth Amendment protects me against. > >> The Fifth protects you against *compelled* self-incrimination . . . In >> particular, you're free to simply not send the message at all. > >I don't believe that that would be a consideration. Wasn't there a >court case a few years ago, in which a convicted criminal sued the >government, charging that filling out one of those forms that you >have to fill out when you buy a gun was a violation of his 5th >amendment rights? What ever happened to that case? This sounds like _Haynes v. United States_ 390 US 85 (1968); the Supreme Court ruled that requiring registration of particular weapons (possession of which was illegal) violated the Fifth Amendment. The difference between _Haynes_ (and _Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board_ 382 US 70 (1965)) and Tim's hypo is that Tim's hypo doesn't force only guilty people to provide information, it requires all people using crypto to do so - so it's not targeted at "persons inherently suspect of criminal activities" (see _Haynes_ at 96, _Anderson at 79), and it doesn't necessarily give rise to "real and appreciable hazards of incrimination" (_Haynes_ at 97). But it seems to me that the real bottom line is that the information which is compelled is not incriminating, and the information which is incriminating is not compelled. The keys to my crypto might lead to incriminating evidence, or they might prove to be useful in a prosecution, but they're not in themselves any sort of a signal that a crime has been or will be committed. I think it's a different argument - and probably even comes out the other way - if the command to reveal a key is made to a particular individual in circumstances where possession/knowledge of the key is likely to implicate the holder in criminal activity. If the police find an encrypted disk which is labelled "The Story of How I Killed Jimmy Hoffa and Where I Put His Body and the Murder Weapon", compelling someone to reveal the key which decrypts the file(s) on that disk seems incriminating, even if the information produced (the string of binary digits which is the key) isn't by itself incriminating. Is it "self-incrimination" to require people to provide the government with an address when they register a car, even though the police may use that address to look for evidence if you're suspected of a crime? Is it "self-incrimination" to require drivers involved in an auto accident to remain at the scene and provide a name and address to cops or other drivers? (Supreme Court says no self-incrim re hit & run statute, _California v. Byers_, 402 US 424 (1971).) (Now, if the government required people who weren't using GAK to provide a "Statement of Refusal to Comply with GAK", I think it'd be a different kettle of fish entirely.) I'm not trying to say that I think GAK is good - I think it's awful. But I don't think it's incompatible with the way that the Fifth amendment has been interpreted over the past 200 years. I think it's possible to ignore those interpretations and make up your own, but I don't think that's of much practical utility where the dominant local gang doesn't find your theory plausible or expedient. So much for the rule of law. >I also think that, besides the obvious 5th amendment problems, there >would be a 1st amendment problem - if you "*had* to use GAK to >communicate, that would be an impermissible restriction on your 1st >amendment rights. I agree with you re the First amendment. -- "The anchored mind screwed into me by the psycho- Greg Broiles lubricious thrust of heaven is the one that thinks every temptation, every desire, every inhibition." greg(a)goldenbear.com -- Antonin Artaud gbroiles(a)darkwing.uoregon.edu

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mailing List
by John H. Wynne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Please put me on your mailing list

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Welcome to cypherpunks
by Majordomo＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- Welcome to the cypherpunks mailing list! If you ever want to remove yourself from this mailing list, you can send mail to "Majordomo(a)toad.com" with the following command in the body of your email message: unsubscribe cypherpunks Cypherpunks Mailing List <cypher(a)infinity.nus.sg> Here's the general information for the list you've subscribed to, in case you don't already have it: About cypherpunks ----------------- I. Administrivia (please read, boring though it may be) The cypherpunks list is a forum for discussing personal defenses for privacy in the digital domain. It is a high volume mailing list. If you don't know how to do something, like unsubscribe, send mail to majordomo(a)toad.com and the software robot which answers that address will send you back instructions on how to do what you want. If you don't know the majordomo syntax, an empty message to this address will get you a help file, as will a command 'help' in the body. Even with all this automated help, you may still encounter problems. If you get really stuck, please feel free to contact me directly at the address I use for mailing list management: cypherpunks-owner(a)toad.com Please use this address for all mailing list management issues. Hint: if you try to unsubscribe yourself from a different account than you signed up for, it likely won't work. Log back into your old account and try again. If you no longer have access to that account, mail me at the list management address above. Also, please realize that there will be some cypherpunks messages "in transit" to you at the time you unsubscribe. If you get a response that says you are unsubscribed, but the messages keep coming, wait a day and they should stop. For other questions, my list management address is not the best place, since I don't read it every day. To reach me otherwise, send mail to eric(a)remailer.net This address is appropriate for emergencies (and wanting to get off the list is never an emergency), such as the list continuously spewing articles. Please don't send me mail to my regular mailbox asking to be removed; I'll just send you back a form letter. Do not mail to the whole list asking to be removed. It's rude. The -request address is made exactly for this purpose. To post to the whole list, send mail to cypherpunks(a)toad.com If your mail bounces repeatedly, you will be removed from the list. Nothing personal, but I have to look at all the bounce messages. There is no digest version available. There is an announcements list which is moderated and has low volume. Announcements for physical cypherpunks meetings, new software and important developments will be posted there. Mail to cypherpunks-announce-request(a)toad.com if you want to be added or removed to the announce list. All announcements also go out to the full cypherpunks list, so there is no need to subscribe to both. II. About cypherpunks The cypherpunks list is not designed for beginners, although they are welcome. If you are totally new to crypto, please get and read the crypto FAQ referenced below. This document is a good introduction, although not short. Crypto is a subtle field and a good understanding will not come without some study. Please, as a courtesy to all, do some reading to make sure that your question is not already frequently asked. There are other forums to use on the subject of cryptography. The Usenet group sci.crypt deals with technical cryptography; cypherpunks deals with technical details but slants the discussion toward their social implications. The Usenet group talk.politics.crypto, as is says, is for political theorizing, and cypherpunks gets its share of that, but cypherpunks is all pro-crypto; the debates on this list are about how to best get crypto out there. The Usenet group alt.security.pgp is a pgp-specific group, and questions about pgp as such are likely better asked there than here. Ditto for alt.security.ripem. The cypherpunks list has its very own net.loon, a fellow named L. Detweiler. The history is too long for here, but he thinks that cypherpunks are evil incarnate. If you see a densely worded rant featuring characteristic words such as "medusa", "pseudospoofing", "treachery", "poison", or "black lies", it's probably him, no matter what the From: line says. The policy is to ignore these postings. Replies have never, ever, not even once resulted in anything constructive and usually create huge flamewars on the list. Please, please, don't feed the animals. III. Resources. A. The sci.crypt FAQ anonymous ftp to rtfm.mit.edu:pub/usenet-by-group/sci.crypt The cryptography FAQ is good online intro to crypto. Very much worth reading. Last I looked, it was in ten parts. B. cypherpunks ftp site anonymous ftp to ftp.csua.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks This site contains code, information, rants, and other miscellany. There is a glossary there that all new members should download and read. Also recommended for all users are Hal Finney's instructions on how to use the anonymous remailer system; the remailer sources are there for the perl-literate. C. Bruce Schneier's _Applied Cryptography_, published by Wiley This is required reading for any serious technical cypherpunk. An excellent overview of the field, it describes many of the basic algorithms and protocols with their mathematical descriptions. Some of the stuff at the edges of the scope of the book is a little incomplete, so short descriptions in here should lead to library research for the latest papers, or to the list for the current thinking. All in all, a solid and valuable book. It's even got the cypherpunks-request address. IV. Famous last words My preferred email address for list maintenance topics only is hughes(a)toad.com. All other mail, including emergency mail, should go to hughes(a)ah.com, where I read mail much more regularly. Enjoy and deploy. Eric ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Cypherpunks assume privacy is a good thing and wish there were more of it. Cypherpunks acknowledge that those who want privacy must create it for themselves and not expect governments, corporations, or other large, faceless organizations to grant them privacy out of beneficence. Cypherpunks know that people have been creating their own privacy for centuries with whispers, envelopes, closed doors, and couriers. Cypherpunks do not seek to prevent other people from speaking about their experiences or their opinions. The most important means to the defense of privacy is encryption. To encrypt is to indicate the desire for privacy. But to encrypt with weak cryptography is to indicate not too much desire for privacy. Cypherpunks hope that all people desiring privacy will learn how best to defend it. Cypherpunks are therefore devoted to cryptography. Cypherpunks wish to learn about it, to teach it, to implement it, and to make more of it. Cypherpunks know that cryptographic protocols make social structures. Cypherpunks know how to attack a system and how to defend it. Cypherpunks know just how hard it is to make good cryptosystems. Cypherpunks love to practice. They love to play with public key cryptography. They love to play with anonymous and pseudonymous mail forwarding and delivery. They love to play with DC-nets. They love to play with secure communications of all kinds. Cypherpunks write code. They know that someone has to write code to defend privacy, and since it's their privacy, they're going to write it. Cypherpunks publish their code so that their fellow cypherpunks may practice and play with it. Cypherpunks realize that security is not built in a day and are patient with incremental progress. Cypherpunks don't care if you don't like the software they write. Cypherpunks know that software can't be destroyed. Cypherpunks know that a widely dispersed system can't be shut down. Cypherpunks will make the networks safe for privacy. [Last updated Mon Feb 21 13:18:25 1994]

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Your Majordomo request results
by Majordomo＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- Your request of Majordomo was: >>>> subscribe cypherpunks Succeeded. Your request of Majordomo was: >>>> end END OF COMMANDS

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next article?
by bill payne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

False Security William H. Payne Abstract Why 130 million Wiegand cards are in use throughout the world . The most secure of all access card technologies. HID Wiegand cards are virtually impossible to counterfeit... any attempt to alter them destroys them! ... Since no direct contact with the card is required, they are totally enclosed, making them absolutely immune to the elements and a frustration of vandals. ... The secrets to the security of an HID Wiegand card are those little enclosed wire strips. Once corrupted, they won't work. Access Control & SECURITY SYSTEMS INTEGRATION, September 1998 www.prox.com http/www.securitysolutions.com http://www.securitysolutions.com/ Bullshit. Fumble, Bumble and Inept Funds Electronic Lock Breaking at Sandia National Laboratories. Zola http://zolatimes.com/ Would this be worth some bucks? Want another FUN article? http://www.zolatimes.com/v2.29/bw1.html http://www.aci.net/kalliste/bw1 I would need a BRILLIANT EDITOR to help polish the ms. http://www.aci.net/kalliste/ On the other hand, we POSSSIBLY could get this UNFORTUNATE MATTER SETTLED before it gets WORSE. biru copyright bill payne 9/30/98 7:27 PM Counterfeiting Wiegand Wire Access Credentials Bill Payne October 16,1996 Abstract Wiegand wire access credentials are easy and inexpensive to counterfeit. Access Control & Security Systems Integration magazine, October 1996 [http://www/securitysolutions.com] published the article, Wiegand technology stands the test of time by PAUL J. BODELL, page 12 Many card and reader manufacturers offer Wiegand (pronounced wee-gand) output. However, only three companies in the world make Wiegand readers. Sensor Engineering of Hamden Conn., holds the patent for Wiegand, and Sensor has licensed Cardkey of Simi Valley, Calif., and Doduco of Pforzheim, Germany, to manufacture Wiegand cards and readers. ... A Wiegand output reader is not the same thing as a Wiegand reader, and it is important to understand the differences. In brief, Wiegand reader use the Wiegand effect to translate card information around the patented Wiegand effect in which a segment of a specially treated wire generates an electronic pulse when subjected to a specific magnetic field. If the pulse is generated when the wire is near a pick-up coil, the pulse can be detected by a circuit. Lining up several rows of wires and passing them by a cold would generate a series of pulses. Lining up two rows of wires - calling on row "zero bits" and the other "one bits" - and passing them by two different coils would generate two series of pulses, or data bits. These data bits can then be interpreted as binary data and used to control other devices. If you seal the coils in a rugged housing with properly placed magnets, and LED and some simple circuitry, you have a Wiegand reader. Carefully laminate the special wires in vinyl, and artwork, and hot-stamp a number on the vinyl, and you have a Wiegand card. IN THE BEGINNING Wiegand was first to introduce to the access control market in the late 1970s. It was immediately successful because it filled the need for durable, secure card and reader technology. Embedded in the cards, Wiegand wires cannot be altered or duplicated. ... Bodell's Last statement is incorrect. Tasks for EASILY counterfeiting Wiegand wire cards are 1 Locate the wires inside the card to read the 0s and 1s. 2 Build an ACCEPTABLE copy of the card. Bodell's clear explanation of the working of a Wiegand card can be visualized zero row | | | one row | | binary 0 1 0 0 1 representation Solutions to Task 1 A X-ray the card B MAGNI VIEW FILM, Mylar film reads magnetic fields ... Edmunds Scientific Company, catalog 16N1, page 205, C33,447 $11.75 is placed over the top of the Wiegand card. COW MAGNET, Cow magnetics allow farmers to trap metal in the stomachs of their cows. Edmunds, page 204, C31,101 $10.75 is placed under the card. Location of the wires is easily seen on the green film. Mark the position of the wires with a pen. Next chop the card vertically using a shear into about 80/1000s paper-match-sized strips. Don't worry about cutting a wire or two. Note that a 0 has the pen mark to the top. A 1 has the pen mark at the bottom. Take a business card and layout the "paper match"-like strips to counterfeit the card number desired. Don't worry about spacing. Wiegand output is self-clocking! Tape the "paper-match - like" strips to the business card. Only the FUNCTION of the card needs to be reproduced! History Breaking electronic locks was done as "work for others" at Sandia National Laboratories beginning in 1992 funded by the Federal Bureau of Investigation/Engineering Research Facility, Quantico, VA. The FBI opined that this work was SECRET/NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION. Details of the consequences of this work are covered in Fired Worker File Lawsuit Against Sandia Specialist Says He Balked When Lab Sought Electronic Picklock Software, Albuquer Journal, Sunday April 25, 1993 State-sanctioned paranoia, EE Times, January 22, 1996 One man's battle, EE Times, March 22, 1994 Damn the torpedoes, EE Times, June 6, 1994 Protecting properly classified info, EE Times, April 11, 1994 DOE to scrutinize fairness in old whistle-blower cases, Albuquerque Tribune, Nov 7 1995 DOE boss accelerates whistle-blower protection, Albuquerque Tribune, March 27, 1996 DOE doesn't plan to compensate 'old' whistle-blowers with money, Albuquerque Tribune September 27, 199

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Re: NSA rigs Crypto machines according to Balto Sun
by Ulf_Moeller＠public.uni-hamburg.de 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

pcw(a)access.digex.net (Peter Wayner) writes: >So, is this what happened at Crypto AG? Is this what happened at Netscape? What happened to Crypto AG is that they are -- at least partly -- *owned* by the German secret service BND. I'll try to give a rough translation of a section from a book by Erich Schmidt-Eenboom: "The BND would like to put a Clipper chip of their own, an exclusive federal German back-door, into the encryption devices delivered abroad. Rumors are persistent that this already happens -- illegally, of course. For that purpuse, camouflage companies such as the Crypto AG in the Swiss Steinhausen am Zuger are preferredly used. A former Crypto financial manager confirmed to FOCUS magazine: The company's owner is the Federal Republic of Germany. Crypto AG has been delivering crypto devices to armies, polices and secret services in about 120 countries for over 40 years. The enterprise got into the headlines when Crypto employee Hans Buehler was arrested in March 1992 in Iran for threadbare espionage accusations and was released only 9 1/2 months later on bail of one million dollars. The true reasons for the arrest can only be guessed. According to the records of the Bern police, Buehler was classified as a security risk after his release by the west German ministry of defense and then was fired by Crypto AG. The Zuerich lawyer office assigned with indemnification claims, Gloor & Sieger, draws the conclusion that "Iran has been suspecting for some longer time that the crypto deviced delivered by Crypto AG had never or no more conformed with Iranian security needs". Further they state: "It is a fact (...) that for several years, articles kept appearing in the international press reporting decryption of classified messages encrypted with Crypto devices". Some signs indicate that the suspection that Crypto devices have been manipulated on purpuse is not at all out of place. During his arrest in Iran, Buehler has been interrogated about reports in news articles of the above kind for months. Crypto devices have been tested and certified by the BND central office for encryption affairs and later by the BSI. In addition to that: After the murder of exile politician Bachtiar by an Iranian death commando in Paris, the BND decrypted an encrypted radio message by the Iranian secret service VEVAK at no effort." German original: From: frank(a)artcom.de (Frank Rieger) Newsgroups: de.org.ccc Subject: Crypto AG (Behördenverschlüsselung) Date: Wed, 28 Jun 1995 15:13:31 +0200 Organization: ART + COM Lines: 26 Distribution: world Message-ID: <frank-2806951513310001(a)penny.artcom.de> In der Liste der Firmen die Verschlüsselungsgeräte für Behörden anbieten war auch die Crypto AG in der Schweiz. Zu dieser Firma fand ich gerade eine interessante Textstelle in (1): "Den eigenen Clipper-Chip, das exklusive bundesdeutsche Hintertuerchen, wuerde der BND gerne in Verschluesselungsgeraete einbauen die ins Ausland geliefert werden. Hartnaekig haelt sich das Geruecht, dass dies manchmall bereits geschieht - illegalerweise, versteht sich. Dabei bedient man sieh hevorzugt Tarnfirmen wie etwa der Crypto AG im schweizerischen Steinhausen am Zuger . Eine Firma, von der ein Ex-Crypto-Finanzmanager gegenueber der Zeitschrift FOCUS bestaetigte: Besitzer der Firma ist die Bundesrepu blik. Die Crypto AG ruestet seit Ueber 40 Jahren Armeen, Polizei und Geheimdienste in rund 120 Laendern mit Verschluesselungsgeraeten aus. In die Schlagzeilen geriet das Unternehmen, als der Crypto-Mitarbeiter Hans Buehler unter fadenscheinigem Spionagevorwurf im Maerz 1992 im lran verhaftet wurde und erst neuneinhalb Monate spaeter gegen Zahlung einer Kaution von einer Million Dollar freikam. Ueber den wahren Grund der Verhaftung lassen sich nur Vermutungen anstellen. Laut Akten der Berner Polizei wurde Buehler nach seiner Haftentlassung vom westdeutschen Verteidigungsministerium als Sicherheitsrisiko eingestuft und daraufhin von der Crypto AG entlassen. Das mit Schadenersatzfarderungen betraute Zuericher Anwaltsbuero Gloor & Sieger kommt in einem Schriftsatz zu dem Schluss, "dass der Iran schon seit laengerer Zeit den Verdacht hegte, dass die von der Crypto AG gelieferten Chiffriergeraete den iranischen Sieherheitsbeduerfnissen nicht oder nicht mehr entspraechen". Weiter heisst es :"Tatsache ist (. . .), dass ueber mehrere Jahre hinweg immer wieder Artikel in der internationalen Presse erschienen sind, welche von der angehliehen Dekryptierung von klassitizierten Meldungen, welche mit Crypto-Geraeten chiffriert worden sind, berichten." Einige Indizien deuten darauf hin dass der Verdacht, Crypto-Geraete seien mit Absicht manipuliert worden, keineswegs abwegig ist. Ueber Berichte in Zeitungsartikeln der erwaehnten Art wurde Buehler waehrend seiner Haft im Iran ueber Monate weg verhoert. Crypto-Geraete sind von der BND-Zentralstelle fuer Chiffrierwesen und spaeter vom BSl geprueft und abgenommen worden. Hinzu kommt noch folgendes: Nach der Ermordung des Exilpolitikers Bachtiar durch ein iranisches Todeskommando in Paris war es dem BND ein l eichtes, einen verschluesselten Funkspruch des iranischen Geheimdienstes VEVAK zu dechiffrieren." (1): Schmidt-Eenboom, Erich: Die schmutzigen Geschäfte der Wirtschaftsspione; ECON Verlag 1994, S. 230f. (OCR-&Konvertierungsfehler vorbehalten)

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Re: Warning about Pegasus Mail and PGP (fwd)
by Siberia 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ftp://ftp.aimnet.com/users/jnavas/winpmail/ On 10 Dec 95 at 4:07, Adam Hupp wrote: > Where can you get the Open Encryptor PGP interface? Namaste' Kimberly Long klong(a)phoenix.net What is life? It is the flash of a firefly in the night. It is the breath of a buffalo in the wintertime. It is the little shadow which runs across the grass and loses itself in the sunset. ~Crowfoot 1821-1890 )O(

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