- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

RE: My Departure, Moderation, and "Ownership of the List"
by Jason Vagner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>(And if Sandy wants comity and good cheer, let him either form >his own list or establish a filtered list just the way Blossom >and Arachelian did. Hijacking the list to reform it in his own >image is dirty pool.) Just something from another perspective: I've been on the list for quite a long time, though I've never posted. I've been online for over ten years, ran my share of mailing lists, and understand majordomo quite well. As far as I can tell, nobody has ever advertised or posted instructions for joining Blossom's or Arachelian's lists. At one time I gave a little bit of an effort to find them, to no avail. They don't seem readily available on the search engines (again, as of about 6 months ago). I never did flat out post a request for the information, as it was not that important for *me* to find it. I imagine that these individuals might have limited resources for a list-too-large, but is there really a reason this is request-only info? --- Jason Vagner <jlv(a)sig.bsh.com> Resist KRAP and GAK. Police States Are Bad. "All that one can give is what is going to happen, which may have little to do with a present that you can grasp." - Avital Ronell.

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Re: New X-Ray Imager
by Adam Shostack 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

| A poll last week by the Los Angeles Times found that a majority of people -- | 58 percent -- said they would curtail some civil liberties if it would help | thwart terrorism. Thirteen percent said it would depend on what rights were | at stake. The poll didn't ask people to single out any rights. Its worth noting the 'if it would help thwart terrorism.' The 'best,' most expensive anti-terrorism measures ever used in the US were at the Summer Olympics. The White House point man on encryption admitted at last years CFP that Clipper and its derivatives would not have prevented the Oklahoma city bombing. A question worth asking is do we want to apply evolutionary pressure to terrorists? I prefer hijacking to bombings wrt aircraft, but the FAA disagrees. I prefer having my car stolen without me in it as well. (I think John Gilmore asked that question, but I could be wrong.) Adam -- Pet peeve of the day: Security companies whose protocols dare not speak their name, because they don't have one. Guilty company of the day is now V-One.

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Re: Dissolving Choke Points
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:36 PM 2/3/97 -0800, Peter Hendrickson wrote: >What I have seen is a pretty complete elimination of the signal that >was there. Some might argue that this is "just" because Tim stopped >posting. But so what? The result of moderation was the elimination >of signal. Nonsense. The signal had left long before the moderation began. The steepest drop in signal (not S/N ratio) was between shortly before Perry left and Vulis had completed his takeover. Signal is cause by signal generators. Most top signal generators, other than Tim, had left because of pollution caused by the likes of Vulis, aga, and his homophonic boyfriends. Moderation has nothing to do with the loss of signal other than that signal from Tim was lost. And while I appreciated Tim's essays, they were never the sole source of signal on the list. Tim did not even provide the majority of signal. "Best individual contributor", sure. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi

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Re: More on digital postage
by Kent Crispin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

jim bell allegedly said: > > > No, you're taking the issue to ridiculous extremes. That's why we have > doors, and locks, etc. And, for that matter, "No trespassing" signs. > > But having an address, and a walkway, and a doorbell is generally considered > if not explicit permission, but at least toleration of the idea that > somebody can walk up and knock on the door, etc. But if someone leans on my doorbell for 4 hours solid, I can call the police and have them carted away. Carried to extremes, it's criminal trespass. > Having a telephone with a > number that anyone can dial is going to result in some level of intrusion. > Having a fax machine is a similar issue, unless technology provides a way to > block unwanted faxes. > > I certainly don't claim that we shouldn't try to do anything about these > limitations! Quite the opposite, technology should be employed to protect > privacy. But faxes are not fundamentally different than telephones, > doorbells, and walkways: They facilitate interaction, even potentially > undesirable interaction. And, just as in the case with my doorbell, when the undesirable interaction gets past some reasonable limit, legal action can be taken. > > Nope. Sure I realize that they _can_, but that doesn't make it right, > >and it doesn't make it legal. > > "Legal" is an arbirary concept; the opposite, "illegal," is merely what some > bunch of brainless legislators get together and disapprove. Arbitrary or not, it has real world consequences. But then most things with real world consequences are arbitrary, unlike libertarian fantasies, which enjoy the luxury of unreality. -- Kent Crispin "No reason to get excited", kent@songbird.com,kc@llnl.gov the thief he kindly spoke... PGP fingerprint: 5A 16 DA 04 31 33 40 1E 87 DA 29 02 97 A3 46 2F

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(fwd) DES challenge organisation
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An announcement forwarded to me (due to being on des-challenge mailing list I think) of proposed organisation for breaking RSADSI's DES challenge. Those interested in participating might wish to join the lists mentioned. In addition the list: des-challenge(a)muffin.org is for discussion of the DES challenge, and can be subscribed to by sending email to majordomo(a)muffin.org. -Adam ====================================================================== Subject: Announcement: Organisation Committee From: ths(a)rz.tu-ilmenau.de (Thomas S.) Date: 15 Feb 1997 18:27:40 +0000 Hi! The six volunteers who answered the call for a committee of management have got together to try to help 'steer' the DES challenge. We have considered the available options of proceeding, and we kindly ask everyone interested in this project to follow our proposals, to avoid waste of efforts. 1. The attempt to break the key will be coordinated. We chose this mainly because we can make a political statement. We don't want it to be a race for money. Each task will be handled by logically separate servers, some of which with be replicated and run as a hierachy. The protocol will use UDP, although there will be gateway servers for other protocols (such as HTTP, SMTP, FAX, etc). We hope that one of the first requests for a key range will be from parties interested in using a "random" approach -- we would appreciate some discussion on how large their ranges should be. 2. There will be one consistent WWW structure for the project. It does not have to managed by a single person. This structure should provide statistics, information for developers, interested users and perhaps even for the press. Several mirrors and translations will be started soon. The starting point is: http://www.des.crypto.org/ [fh28.fa.umist.ac.uk/des/] The url in brackets has to be used till we get the final subdomain. Likewise for the rest of this document. 3. The work of the different groups should be stated and coordinated on the page http://www.des.crypto.org/people.html. [fh28.fa.umist.ac.uk/des/people.html] This is to avoid uncoordinated parallel developmemt. Please write to Thomas S. <webmaster(a)mail.des.crypto.org> [webmaster(a)fh28.fa.umist.ac.uk] if you what want to be mentioned on this page. 3a. Several mailing lists have been set up for the different groups: des-coding for the actual DES routine and optimisation des-networking for the network code and protocol des-www for www contributions and mirrors des-pr for press contact, translations etc (like challenge-pr) des-misc :-) des-announce moderated, important information for users of the client List address: <list>@lists.des.crypto.org [@xtn.net] To subscribe, send mail to majordomo(a)lists.des.crypto.org [@xtn.net] with in the body of the message (several actions allowed): subscribe <list> Achives available (see homepage). 4. The actual DES routine has to be written and optimised. We ask developers to participate and coordinate their efforts using the mailing list des-coding. For obvious reasons, developers outside the USA are prefered, but "publication" of algorithms seems to be a legal way go get around. Please do not use this list to distribute crypto code. 5. The prize money will be split equally between Gutenberg and EFF. There is a possibility of using part of it for stickers or something similar, but don't count on it. We hope to get a working system up and running ASAP. The fact alone that DES is seriously challenged (with a reasonable time frame) should give us quite some publicity (by the time the system is ready). If we can make use of that, we will have significantly more client than for the 48 bit key. The organisation committee: Piete Brooks <Piete.Brooks(a)cl.cam.ac.uk> Jered Floyd <jered(a)mit.edu> Tim Newsome <drz(a)froody.bloke.com> Germano Caronni <caronni(a)tik.ee.ethz.ch> Thomas Roessler <Thomas.Roessler(a)sobolev.rhein.de> Thomas S. <ths(a)fh28.fa.umist.ac.uk>

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Re: Fuck UseNet (fwd)
by Kent Crispin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

E. Allen Smith allegedly said: > > From: IN%"ravage(a)EINSTEIN.ssz.com" "Jim Choate" 15-FEB-1997 07:11:54.43 > > >Perhaps in addition to the X-foo structures we have discussed already we > >might consider adding, > > >X-distrib-policy: foo > > >Where foo might be, > > > Public Domain > > All rights reserved, contact author for redistribution > > Distribution for non-commercial uses permitted > > Refer to authors header > > Copyleft > > etc. > > >or whatever the policy might be for a given remailer. This would > >significantly aid folks in their shopping around. > > The basic difficulty with this idea is that _senders_ generally > don't have much of a choice where the messages go, once you've decided > to accept them. In other words, just because you've decided to accept > a message doesn't mean it suddenly becomes > copyleft/public domain/whatever. Now, if you, say, announced that only > subscribers to your particular list, subscribers to any other lists > adopting the same idea, and those who'd sign a consent agreement could > post through your list, that wouldn't be a problem... although I > suspect you wouldn't get many subscribers. > -Allen That wouldn't be the way it work -- Jim operates one of the cp remailers; I operate another. Jim has a standard policy concerning public domain/copyright that is different than mine. So *I* put an X-distrib-policy header in all the cp mail I forward to him. More precisely, all of my incoming mail for "cypherpunks(a)songbird.com" gets the header. This protocol needs a bit of refinement, and perhaps some hacking at majordomo, but seems fairly straightforward. Jim's policy is actually very reasonable. It has a rational basis, though one might disagree with it, and it is easy to deal with it this way. A more extreme policy -- "The operator of this mailing list claims an exclusive copyright on every piece of mail sent to it; by sending to it you agree to this policy", for example -- would be harder to deal with. -- Kent Crispin "No reason to get excited", kent@songbird.com,kc@llnl.gov the thief he kindly spoke... PGP fingerprint: 5A 16 DA 04 31 33 40 1E 87 DA 29 02 97 A3 46 2F

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Re: (fwd) DES challenge organisation
by Timothy C. May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:02 PM +0000 2/15/97, Adam Back wrote: >Thomas S <ths(a)fh28.fa.umist.ac.uk> writes: >> [...] >> >> 5. The prize money will be split equally between Gutenberg and EFF. >> There is a possibility of using part of it for stickers or >> something similar, but don't count on it. > >Not a good idea. > >How can this be enforced? The RSADSI DES challenge is open to all >comers, and how do you prove that someone who finds the key found it >through this group effort? > >I have a suspicion many people would be tempted to fill in the RSA >challenge form and email it in themselves. $10,000 is a fair amount >of money. Once again, the advantages of an "uncoordinated search" should be mentioned. An uncoordinated search, in which people randomly search chunks of keyspace is obviously less efficient than a coordinated search where no part of the space is searched two or more times. However, an uncoordinated search is only less efficient by a small factor of two or three, with a 95% probability that the key will be found with an effort "only" 3 times greater than with a coordinated search. (The Poisson probability distribution is what's involved here, and the math is fairly easy to work out.) A 2-4x factor is significant, and may warrant a coordinated search. However, the various problems implicit in coordinated searches are factors, too. Also, an uncoordinated search solves the "prize" problem, as whomever finds the key makes the contact with RSADSI. One of the problems with a coordinated search, if the remaining keyspace to be doled out is publically announced, is that as the keyspace is searched and a key _not_ found, the remaining keyspace is increasingly more tempting for "independent searchers" to search. Sort of the way the odds on some lotteries actually become "acceptable" as the lottery pot grows. The organizer of the coordinated search must then, I surmise, keep the assignments secret and dole out keyspace securely. Having the prize money go to the finder of the key, as opposed to some artificial division between EFF, Gutenberg, etc., is also an incentive for people to contribute more CPU time. --Tim May >I know I would be tempted. I have been running Svend Olaf's DES code, >and my intention in the unlikely event that I hit the key had been to >claim the money. > >How does it hurt the publicity if the actual individual who finds the >key takes the money? Surely it adds excitement to the story? > >In fact it would provide people with a possibly more powerful >incentive to try to break the key in the first place -- in the hopes >of winning the prize! $10,000 means more to a lot of people than >opposing ITAR/EAR, and participating in a technical challenge. To >start with a lot of people who's CPUs we could be using don't even >know what ITAR/EAR are! > >> We hope to get a working system up and running ASAP. The fact alone >> that DES is seriously challenged (with a reasonable time frame) >> should give us quite some publicity (by the time the system is >> ready). If we can make use of that, we will have significantly more >> client than for the 48 bit key. > >I would have thought announcing that $10,000 can be won by running >easy to use windows software on a wide selection of newsgroups would >get you lots of CPUs! > >Adam >-- >print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> >)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc` Just say "No" to "Big Brother Inside" We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: (fwd) DES challenge organisation
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thomas S <ths(a)fh28.fa.umist.ac.uk> writes: > [...] > > 5. The prize money will be split equally between Gutenberg and EFF. > There is a possibility of using part of it for stickers or > something similar, but don't count on it. Not a good idea. How can this be enforced? The RSADSI DES challenge is open to all comers, and how do you prove that someone who finds the key found it through this group effort? I have a suspicion many people would be tempted to fill in the RSA challenge form and email it in themselves. $10,000 is a fair amount of money. I know I would be tempted. I have been running Svend Olaf's DES code, and my intention in the unlikely event that I hit the key had been to claim the money. How does it hurt the publicity if the actual individual who finds the key takes the money? Surely it adds excitement to the story? In fact it would provide people with a possibly more powerful incentive to try to break the key in the first place -- in the hopes of winning the prize! $10,000 means more to a lot of people than opposing ITAR/EAR, and participating in a technical challenge. To start with a lot of people who's CPUs we could be using don't even know what ITAR/EAR are! > We hope to get a working system up and running ASAP. The fact alone > that DES is seriously challenged (with a reasonable time frame) > should give us quite some publicity (by the time the system is > ready). If we can make use of that, we will have significantly more > client than for the 48 bit key. I would have thought announcing that $10,000 can be won by running easy to use windows software on a wide selection of newsgroups would get you lots of CPUs! Adam -- print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle ?"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"death"} = "<x(a)deathsdoor.com> cpunk pgp hash latent post"; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"wazoo"} = "<remailer(a)wazoo.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"shaman"} = "<mix(a)mix.nymserver.com> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 17 Feb 97 6:46:40 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- wazoo remailer(a)wazoo.com ++++++++*+++ 37:37 100.00% nym config(a)nym.alias.net *#*##**++#*+ 4:23 99.99% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net -__.+-..---+ 7:52:03 99.93% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net ** *++++++*+ 35:11 99.89% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com .++--.+--- 2:08:12 99.85% weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de +++++++++++ 1:06:36 99.77% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com ***-* *#+# 4:10 99.62% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de + ++++++ + 1:04:02 99.05% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net #*##*+* **+ 20:23 98.49% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net .++ -- +++ 1:16:02 98.36% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com +++++++ +++ 42:18 98.28% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com -------- -- 5:19:42 98.21% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com ++++ + -- 2:16:10 97.36% replay remailer(a)replay.com ---+** ---* 1:27:53 88.59% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com ## *### *# 1:38 84.09% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ******* ** 8:25 82.44% shaman mix(a)mix.nymserver.com 11:03 22.27% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com *+ 22:42:38 21.62% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: The Offending Stronghold posts...
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here're wee additions to your archive: I subbed to cp-unedited from the first, so could compare the unedited messages with the edited. Some of mine(*) were edited, including a few on the Stronghold topic. But to me that's not as big a deal as some want to make of it. For example, in response to Tim's request to repost DV's Stronghold ploy, I did so, and it was edited. Sandy sent me a courteous email stating that he was not forwarding the message. I answered that that was okay with me because I thought that DV was using the issue as a ploy to undermine Sandy. Hey, there were no legal or other threats made to me, darn it! Another of my edited messages stated that there had been good discussion on the unedited list about DV's Denial of Service attack on Cypherpunks. Another noted that DV had been admirably successful in drawing others into his fight -- in support and in opposition -- as part of his DoS. Another questioned "Who's Censoring Who?" and offered the opinion that "censorship" rhetorically exaggerated Sandy's moderation. (I still believe that's the case.) For what it's worth, I oppose moderation, but favor experimentation, in the recognition that humans are near-endlessly adaptable and near- uncontrollable no matter what control mechanisms are employed -- anarchy is the norm whether advocated or not. So, I think the moderation experiment was a success, in that it has led to an unexpectedly constructive reconfiguration of Cypherpunks -- and not the last, that's for sure -- and showed that any archy is wishful dreaming of tortured hearts and minds and loins. A one hand applause to Dr. V and archy-demolishers for vibrating the c'punks house the way SATAN did bigger shoddy piles. Two hands to TCM for more memorable quaking of structure-bunkered c'punks and others. ----- * I'll supply copies of messages cited if you like.

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