July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

How to wiretap or identify a GSM phone - and enable the masses
by John Gilmore 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

David Burgess, a software/radio engineer formerly employed in building GSM-tapping equipment, has turned his efforts to publicly implementing the GSM standards in free software under GPLv3. He hopes to provide low-cost GSM communication service to billions in underserved regions of the world. He also hopes to demystify the cellular networks for a generation of hackers. His OpenBTS software builds on the GNU Radio framework and the USRP computer/radio interfaces to implement a fully functional GSM network base station, making voice and SMS calls with ordinary GSM handsets, and back-hauling via VoIP networks. Early code was tested at Burning Man last year, and he hopes to provide free communcation service to BM participants this year (as well as doing some testing in field conditions under serious load). His understanding of the GSM protocols comes from reading the published standards documents, which are written in bureaucratese but can be decrypted without a secret key. However, a former customer of his has been suing him for alleged disclosure of trade secrets, claiming that either the GSM protocol or perhaps the way to wiretap a GSM phone is secret (the published court documents make vague allegations, as usual). David's blog, "The OpenBTS Chronicles" has a variety of interesting posts, one of which links to a German patent on an IMSI-catcher which lets wiretappers force a phone to identify itself, and to a UK High Court decision that upholds it (and also reveals a Nokia patent on how to do a man-in-the-middle attack on a GSM phone). Clearly the things revealed in these documents are not trade secrets. But they may be of interest to this list. I also found that David's posting on "The Value of Knowing How Stuff Works" struck a chord with me. http://openbts.blogspot.com/ http://openbts.blogspot.com/2009/04/some-comments-on-imsi- catchers.html http://openbts.blogspot.com/2009/05/value-of-knowing-how-stuff-works.html http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OpenBTS http://www.gnuradio.org/trac/wiki/OpenBTS http://openbts.sourceforge.net/ John --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com

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[tor-talk] Roger's status report, August 2012
by Roger Dingledine 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Here's what I said at the beginning of August that I hoped to do: > - Chair the FOCI workshop at Usenix Security, and also attend the rest > of Usenix Security. > https://www.usenix.org/conference/foci12/tech-schedule/workshop-program > https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity12/tech-schedule/technical-… Done. FOCI went really well -- we had 30-40 people there, and I think most of the talks were interesting. I've attempted to pass the torch to Jed Crandall and Joss Wright for next year's FOCI. But it looks like there will be some early stumbling blocks around whether Usenix wants to keep FOCI attached to Usenix Security. We'll see how that plays out. I spent much of my Usenix Security talking to research groups about setting up fast exit relays. See more about that below. I also talked to George Kadianakis about Tor network diversity metrics, and got him talking to a wide variety of other researchers for further suggestions. > - Talk to Ralf-Philipp Weinmann about his TorScan paper (upcoming at > Esorics) and what we can do to address his attacks. I talked to him, but we didn't come to any conclusions. Most of the fixes are delicate and have poorly understood tradeoffs. I left him with the plan that he would write a Tor design proposal or two, so we can think through the implications. > - Look at Rob Jansen's performance graphs from his new Shadow simulations. > Try to move the performance tickets forward. Done. We did a bunch of huge simulations using Amazon EC2, and ended up finding that mysterious bugs were ruining our results. We decided to focus on the simplest simulation question, and try to sort out the bugs. You can read our saga here: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6341 and as of early September, we've found and/or solved some good ones. Hard to say how many more remain before Shadow can solve all our problems, but I think we're getting closer. > - Expand on the set of metrics by which the SponsorF Red Team will judge > the project's success. Specifically, I should list the anonymity attacks > that they shouldn't evaluate since the PETS community is already doing > a good job at evaluating anonymity attacks. Continued. You can read some of my discussions at https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2012-September/003992.html George suggested that we try to turn them into a survey list of Tor attacks. Feel free to get that started if you like the idea. > - Launch the "run fast bridges for BBG" campaign, ideally by gathering > volunteers on tor-relays. Started: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2012-August/001545.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2012-August/001549.html We have a few fast bridges running. The real challenge here will be the traditional bridge distribution strategy question: we need to give them out to people who need them without letting the bad guy find them. We're trying out some not-so-automated strategies first. I think the handful of fast stable bridges we have should be enough for now, on the principle that for any strategy that doesn't tell so many people that the bad guy learns too, a stable 100mbit bridge can handle all the good users who learn about it. In parallel we should continue exploring tricks like Philipp Winter's brdgrd tool: https://gitweb.torproject.org/brdgrd.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/README.md and maybe later on we'll move on to alternate transports like Obfsproxy. > - Launch the "exit relays at universities" push, and send BBG a timetable > for how our exit relay rollout is looking. We've got immediate plans from CMU and Penn that I know of, and promises from Georgia Tech and Michigan: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2012-August/001543.html Moritz and I wrote up https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorExitGuidelines which has so far been useful. Steve Bellovin at Columbia suggested that we get EFF to write a letter that university professors can hand to their general counsel, explaining what Tor is. I'm still talking to EFF people about what exactly they could write. There's also now a tor-relays-universities list as a support group for people trying to run exit relays at universities: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays-universiti… > - Get some money to some exit relay operators, since it turns out (ha) > that it's harder than I expected on our side to do it in a way we'll > pass our audits. Not done. I believe Andrew met with Tor's lawyers to discuss how to position it so that we continue to pass our audits, etc. (Making new organizational and bureaucratic ways to attack Tor doesn't sound great, at least not until we understand them better.) I'm hoping to team up with a couple of other organizations so that we can give them large bulk grants, and they can divide the money up further. If that should be you, please let us know! I'm hoping Moritz can take charge of this topic and make it happen. > - Get 0.2.3.20-alpha and 0.2.3.21-alpha out. I got 0.2.3.20-rc out: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-August/025093.html Turns out 0.2.3.21-rc waited until September. > - Consider an 0.2.2.38 stable update. Done: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-announce/2012-August/000086.html > - Consider an 0.2.4.1-alpha release. Not done, but done in September. > - Sort out my September travel to Germany Done. I'm going to Berlin next week: http://internethumanrights.org/ihrberlin2012/ Dagstuhl after that: http://www.dagstuhl.de/no_cache/en/program/calendar/semhp/?semnr=12381 and ETH Zurich after that to do a talk at Srdjan Capkun's group on Sept 25. > and my November travel to > Netherlands et al. Still unsorted. > - Schedule our NSF "censorship measurement" kickoff meeting, perhaps > the last week of September or first of October. Not yet scheduled. The other PIs are overloaded with other things, so I guess there's no rush, so long as we're doing useful research things. > - Encourage Andrew to put our "project coordinator" job description up > and announce it. He's written the web page, but hasn't announced it or linked it yet. I guess I'll leave that timing up to him > - Try to take a vacation Aug 11-19. Done. I even managed to be on vacation for some of it. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Here are some other things I did in August: - Continued a mass of personal mail threads with exit relay operators. Reaching out to them and talking about how to help them makes them like us more: https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html?graph=bandwidth-flags&start=201… Exit relay capacity moved from 10Gbps to just over 12Gbps in August (growth of 20%), and actual reported load moved from around 6.4Gbps to 8Gbps (growth of 25%). I don't think it's wise to aim to get to BBG's "125 100mbit+ exit relays" goal anytime soon (that would involve something like doubling or more the exit capacity), but we're seeing great effects so far from ramping up the campaign. And if George and Sathya's preliminary graphs are accurate, we have maintained or improved our network diversity during this time. - Tariq's paper on guard rotation got into WPES! I helped them revise it. http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#wpes12-cogs - Turned down a pair of journal review invites because the journals are harming my field (aka not open-access). - Agreed to be on the program committee for PETS 2013: http://petsymposium.org/2013/ Though PETS is technically not open-access either (due to its publisher), I maintain the website so I can make sure that it is open-access in fact. I think that's good enough for now, but I'm pushing for more. - Jumped into the latest "omg Tor isn't perfect" thread: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-August/025278.html - Lost a weekend to what was supposed to be a routine drive replacement and turned into an almost complete hardware replacement for moria1, one of the directory authorities. Thanks again to Andrew Lewman for spending his weekend messing with it. - Helped suggest useful historical documents to seed Karsten's Tech Reports page: http://research.torproject.org/techreports.html --Roger _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[tor-talk] Got a torrent/link for the leaked Bluecoat ProxySG Virtual Appliance?
by suchfun＠vmail.me 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hi, some time ago the Bluecoat ProxySG Virtual Appliance was leaked and you could get it through most popular torrent trackers. Unfortunately, nowadays I can't find a single torrent with peers that serve the whole download. The best I could find will give me the thing till 50%. Does anyone have a torrent that works? Or can someone that has downloaded the whole thing start seeding again? Thanks. _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [tor] Softlayer finally kicks us from their data center
by Zaphod Beeblebrox 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On that note, I'm an ISP. I'm not in the US. I buy my network from tier 1/2. So... my comments? On the cost side, Cogent and Hurricane Electric both sell 100 meg in the $400 to $500 range in top tier data centers. You can easily get Gigabit for $1500 from them (unmetered). So add $500/month for half a rack and another $200 for power, and you've got your own (tiny) colo company. Add a few l2tp connections to carriers and you have your own internet service company. But the DMCA notices go to the ARIN contact for the block. If you just get service, you may not be set as the "owner" (according to ARIN) of the block. I've been ignoring DMCA notices for 10 years (again, I'm not in the US) for both my subscribers, and (for the last year) TOR. The "new" thing has been RCMP calls about child porn (nice users TOR has :). I also get a DDOS every couple of months. Luckily, I can absorb most of them. Really, though, there's only 86 days of IPv4 allocation left (see HE's status page or gadget). The time for you to set up a company, get raw bandwidth and speak BGP with your peers is likely come and gone. TOR needs to think about IPv6. On Mon, Dec 6, 2010 at 1:07 AM, grarpamp <grarpamp(a)gmail.com> wrote: >> Bad news: We have received another DMCA complaint yesterday, and today >> Softlayer told our ISP Midphase that they want our server removed from > > Another note for long term planning... > It may be worthwhile to shop for a circuit from a Tier-1/2 > network entity. Such circuits are provisioned from NAP's > where they have presence. You then need to rent only a > rack. > Benefit: No longer have colo/server companies as > middlemen. The pipe is entirely yours, you're renting > strictly real estate as real estate in a neutral facility. > Drawback: The Tier-1/2's still have AUP's to research. > Cost, mostly because there's nobody but you paying > the missing oversubscription. > Bonus: By then you pretty much need to be, and should be, > your own colo/server compan[y/ies] as well, partly to get > back some oversubscription. Also, in the corporate > "structuring" to skin the cat :) > Hello, yes, I'd like to report copyr... ticket, unable to process. Next hop... > Hello, yes, I'd like to report copyr... ticket, unable to process. Next hop... > Hello, yes, I'd like to report copyr... ticket, unable to process. Next hop... > Hello, yes, I'm giving up. > > Example: Cogent used to sell 100Mb dedicated for $1000/mo. I've seen > them at $7-$6/Mb recently for 100Mb-1Gb, full term. One could find any > list of Tier-1's and check them. > > Also you should look at where the PirateBays, WikiLeaks, > Torrent/Warez, free/hate speech, drug, RapidShare's, etc > sites are hosted and the pipes behind them. > > Unfortunately, short of laying fiber and becoming a Tier-1, > life may wind up being a series of hops. Even if you were > a Tier-1, the others could just gang up and de-peer you. > I'm still hoping for a worldwide net of conjoined community > nets that are simply too big a profit userbase to de-peer > from the commercial net. > ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [tor] Softlayer finally kicks us from their data center
by Zaphod Beeblebrox 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On that note, I'm an ISP. I'm not in the US. I buy my network from tier 1/2. So... my comments? On the cost side, Cogent and Hurricane Electric both sell 100 meg in the $400 to $500 range in top tier data centers. You can easily get Gigabit for $1500 from them (unmetered). So add $500/month for half a rack and another $200 for power, and you've got your own (tiny) colo company. Add a few l2tp connections to carriers and you have your own internet service company. But the DMCA notices go to the ARIN contact for the block. If you just get service, you may not be set as the "owner" (according to ARIN) of the block. I've been ignoring DMCA notices for 10 years (again, I'm not in the US) for both my subscribers, and (for the last year) TOR. The "new" thing has been RCMP calls about child porn (nice users TOR has :). I also get a DDOS every couple of months. Luckily, I can absorb most of them. Really, though, there's only 86 days of IPv4 allocation left (see HE's status page or gadget). The time for you to set up a company, get raw bandwidth and speak BGP with your peers is likely come and gone. TOR needs to think about IPv6. On Mon, Dec 6, 2010 at 1:07 AM, grarpamp <grarpamp(a)gmail.com> wrote: >> Bad news: We have received another DMCA complaint yesterday, and today >> Softlayer told our ISP Midphase that they want our server removed from > > Another note for long term planning... > It may be worthwhile to shop for a circuit from a Tier-1/2 > network entity. Such circuits are provisioned from NAP's > where they have presence. You then need to rent only a > rack. > Benefit: No longer have colo/server companies as > middlemen. The pipe is entirely yours, you're renting > strictly real estate as real estate in a neutral facility. > Drawback: The Tier-1/2's still have AUP's to research. > Cost, mostly because there's nobody but you paying > the missing oversubscription. > Bonus: By then you pretty much need to be, and should be, > your own colo/server compan[y/ies] as well, partly to get > back some oversubscription. Also, in the corporate > "structuring" to skin the cat :) > Hello, yes, I'd like to report copyr... ticket, unable to process. Next hop... > Hello, yes, I'd like to report copyr... ticket, unable to process. Next hop... > Hello, yes, I'd like to report copyr... ticket, unable to process. Next hop... > Hello, yes, I'm giving up. > > Example: Cogent used to sell 100Mb dedicated for $1000/mo. I've seen > them at $7-$6/Mb recently for 100Mb-1Gb, full term. One could find any > list of Tier-1's and check them. > > Also you should look at where the PirateBays, WikiLeaks, > Torrent/Warez, free/hate speech, drug, RapidShare's, etc > sites are hosted and the pipes behind them. > > Unfortunately, short of laying fiber and becoming a Tier-1, > life may wind up being a series of hops. Even if you were > a Tier-1, the others could just gang up and de-peer you. > I'm still hoping for a worldwide net of conjoined community > nets that are simply too big a profit userbase to de-peer > from the commercial net. > ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[Freedombox-discuss] Diaspora
by Weaver 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> That was an interesting article on Diaspora - but I didn't see any mention > of security. No, it wasn't intended as a recommendation of a model to copy, but just as an example of a distributed communication model that may have some ideas that we could employ. Encryption is another aspect again. I'm a fan of microwave radio, myself, with a communication split into different layers of the bandwidth, sent at different times, fully encoded. That's how the South American drug cartels get away with it. But I don't think that's an option in this scenario. Carrying the masts around present a problem and make the action somewhat obvious. http://kitup.military.com/2011/09/sigint-drug-cartels-using-encrypted-commo… Regards, Weaver. -- Religion is regarded by the common people as true, by the wise as false, and by the rulers as useful. b Lucius AnnC&us Seneca. Terrorism, the new religion. -- Religion is regarded by the common people as true, by the wise as false, and by the rulers as useful. b Lucius AnnC&us Seneca. Terrorism, the new religion. _______________________________________________ Freedombox-discuss mailing list Freedombox-discuss(a)lists.alioth.debian.org http://lists.alioth.debian.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/freedombox-discuss ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[Freedombox-discuss] Diaspora
by Weaver 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> That was an interesting article on Diaspora - but I didn't see any mention > of security. No, it wasn't intended as a recommendation of a model to copy, but just as an example of a distributed communication model that may have some ideas that we could employ. Encryption is another aspect again. I'm a fan of microwave radio, myself, with a communication split into different layers of the bandwidth, sent at different times, fully encoded. That's how the South American drug cartels get away with it. But I don't think that's an option in this scenario. Carrying the masts around present a problem and make the action somewhat obvious. http://kitup.military.com/2011/09/sigint-drug-cartels-using-encrypted-commo… Regards, Weaver. -- Religion is regarded by the common people as true, by the wise as false, and by the rulers as useful. b Lucius AnnC&us Seneca. Terrorism, the new religion. -- Religion is regarded by the common people as true, by the wise as false, and by the rulers as useful. b Lucius AnnC&us Seneca. Terrorism, the new religion. _______________________________________________ Freedombox-discuss mailing list Freedombox-discuss(a)lists.alioth.debian.org http://lists.alioth.debian.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/freedombox-discuss ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Secrecy News -- 11/26/12
by Steven Aftergood 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Format Note: If you cannot easily read the text below, or you prefer to receive Secrecy News in another format, please reply to this email to let us know. SECRECY NEWS from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy Volume 2012, Issue No. 117 November 26, 2012 Secrecy News Blog: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/ ** WHITE HOUSE ADVANCES INSIDER THREAT POLICY ** IG REVIEW OF FISA COMPLIANCE COMPLETED BUT NOT RELEASED ** AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS ** INDIA-US SECURITY RELATIONS, AND MORE FROM CRS WHITE HOUSE ADVANCES INSIDER THREAT POLICY In a memorandum to agency heads last week, President Obama transmitted formal requirements that agencies must meet in order "to deter, detect, and mitigate actions by employees who may represent a threat to national security." Along with espionage and acts of violence, the National Insider Threat Policy notably extends to the "unauthorized disclosure of classified information, including the vast amounts of classified data available on interconnected United States Government computer networks." To combat such unauthorized disclosures, agencies are required to "monitor employee use of classified networks." http://www.fas.org/sgp/obama/nitp.pdf The new standards, which have not been made publicly available, were developed by an interagency Insider Threat Task Force that was established by President Obama in the October 2011 executive order 13587, and they reflect the ongoing tightening of safeguards on classified information in response to the voluminous leaks of the last few years. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13587.htm But the latest issuance also illustrates the superfluousness (or worse) of current congressional action concerning leaks. Executive branch agencies do not need Congress to tell them to develop "a comprehensive insider threat program management plan," as would be required by the Senate version of the pending FY2013 Intelligence Authorization Act (section 509). Such plans will go forward in any case. http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_cr/ssci-leaks.pdf Sen. Ron Wyden has placed a hold on the pending intelligence bill, citing objections to several of the proposed anti-leak provisions contained in Title V of the bill. He said the proposed steps were misguided or counterproductive. "I am concerned that they will lead to less-informed public debate about national security issues, and also undermine the due process rights of intelligence agency employees, without actually enhancing national security," he said on November 14. http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_cr/wyden-hold.html The most problematic measures in the Senate bill are those intended to restrict contacts between reporters and government officials. Senator Wyden said that legislative actions to limit the ability of the press to report on classified matters could undermine or cripple the intelligence oversight process. "I have been on the Senate Intelligence Committee for 12 years now, and I can recall numerous specific instances where I found out about serious government wrongdoing--such as the NSA's warrantless wiretapping program, or the CIA's coercive interrogation program--only as a result of disclosures by the press," he said. * * * The record of a July 2012 House Judiciary Committee hearing on National Security Leaks and the Law has recently been published. http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_hr/leaks-hjc.pdf IG REVIEW OF FISA COMPLIANCE COMPLETED BUT NOT RELEASED The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Justice said it had recently completed a review of the Department's use of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act (FAA), but the report is classified and its findings have not been released. "The OIG examined the number of disseminated FBI intelligence reports containing a reference to a U.S. person identity, the number of U.S. person identities subsequently disseminated in response to requests for identities not referred to by name or title in the original reporting, the number of targets later determined to be located in the United States, and whether communications of such targets were reviewed. The OIG also reviewed the FBI's compliance with the required targeting and minimization procedures," according to a November 7 OIG memorandum on Top Management and Performance Challenges in the Department of Justice. http://www.justice.gov/oig/challenges/2012.htm A copy of the classified report has been requested under the Freedom of Information Act. Earlier this year, Sen. Ron Wyden placed a hold on reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act "because I believe that Congress does not have enough information about this law's impact on the privacy of law-abiding American citizens, and because I am concerned about a loophole in the law that could allow the government to effectively conduct warrantless searches for Americans' communications." http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_cr/wyden-fisa.html AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS The Department of Defense issued a new Directive last week establishing DoD policy for the development and use of autonomous weapons systems. http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3000_09.pdf An autonomous weapon system is defined as "a weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator." The new DoD Directive Number 3000.09, dated November 21, establishes guidelines that are intended "to minimize the probability and consequences of failures in autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems that could lead to unintended engagements." "Failures can result from a number of causes, including, but not limited to, human error, human-machine interaction failures, malfunctions, communications degradation, software coding errors, enemy cyber attacks or infiltration into the industrial supply chain, jamming, spoofing, decoys, other enemy countermeasures or actions, or unanticipated situations on the battlefield," the Directive explains. An "unintended engagement" resulting from such a failure means "the use of force resulting in damage to persons or objects that human operators did not intend to be the targets of U.S. military operations, including unacceptable levels of collateral damage beyond those consistent with the law of war, ROE [rules of engagement], and commander's intent." The Department of Defense should "more aggressively use autonomy in military missions," urged the Defense Science Board last summer in a report on "The Role of Autonomy in DoD Systems." http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2012/09/dsb_autonomy.html The U.S. Army issued an updated Army Field Manual 3-36 on Electronic Warfare earlier this month. http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-36.pdf INDIA-US SECURITY RELATIONS, AND MORE FROM CRS New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that have not been made readily available to the public include the following. India-U.S. Security Relations: Current Engagement, November 13, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42823.pdf A Guide to China's Upcoming Leadership Transitions, October 16, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42786.pdf U.S. Trade and Investment Relations with sub-Saharan Africa and the African Growth and Opportunity Act, November 14, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31772.pdf Roles and Duties of a Member of Congress, November 9, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33686.pdf The Congressional Research Service made a humorous appearance in the Doonesbury comic strip on November 24, in connection with the report on tax cuts that was withdrawn in response to criticism from some Republican Senators. http://doonesbury.slate.com/strip/archive/2012/11/24 In fact, as often noted, members of Congress of both parties consistently withhold public access to most CRS reports. http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2012/11/crs_withdrawal.html _______________________________________________ Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the Federation of American Scientists. The Secrecy News Blog is at: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/ To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html OR email your request to saftergood(a)fas.org Secrecy News is archived at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation: http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html _______________________ Steven Aftergood Project on Government Secrecy Federation of American Scientists web: www.fas.org/sgp/index.html email: saftergood(a)fas.org voice: (202) 454-4691 twitter: @saftergood ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Bell trial schedule
by Gordon Jeff TIGTA 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

: : John You will need to be present at the Tacoma Courthouse at 9:00am on Tuesday, 4/3/01. We anticipate you will testify on Tuesday, but it may extend to Wednesday 4/4/01, depending on the pace of the trial, so the return flight should not be scheduled prior to 5pm on 4/4/01. In order to be reimbursed for travel, all travel arrangements need to be made through the Dru Mercer at the US Attorney's office, (206) 553-7970. Let me know if you have any questions. Jeff -----

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Bell trial schedule
by John Young 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

: : Jeff, Thanks for the information. Could you find out if I can buy a transcript of my grand jury testimony before the trial? Robb London has not answered my three inquiries. The court reporters office told me it can be released only with Robb's approval. John

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