July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

Bear Advisory
by None 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

The California State Department of Fish and Game is advising hikers, hunters, fishermen and golfers to take extra precautions and keep alert for bears while in the Yosemite and Mammoth areas. They advise people to wear noise-producing devices such as little bells on their clothing to alert but not startle the bear unexpectedly. They also advise carrying pepper spray in case of an encounter with a bear. It is also a good idea to watch for fresh signs of bear activity and know the difference between black bear and grizzly bear droppings. Black bear droppings are smaller and contain berries and possibly squirrel fur. Grizzly bear droppings have little bells in them and smell like pepper spray.

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Re: <nettime> FW: [IP] WikiLeaks sold classified intel, claims website's co-founder
by t byfield 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

almost(a)riseup.net (Mon 12/06/10 at 10:13 AM +0100): > Also I didn't realize Cryptome was ever the first to leak anything. They > typically just linked to stuff that was already out there - and I thought > that was the point. Show how damaging publicly available information can > be. The 'first' to leak anything is a needlessly huge claim, but Cryptome was very early and very focused. It began in the context of the Cypherpunks list, which served that time as a kind of coordination point for, amidst lots of ravings, efforts to make cryptography more 'open' (I'm ever-more reluctant to use that word, and in the context of 'opening' techniques that primarily serve to *close* things the irony becomes very poignant). This mainly consisted of challenging its militarization (and consequent criminalization by anyone not sanctioned by the ~military), but it led to some other astounding projects -- for example distributed-computing projects like SETI@home[1] can all trace their origins to Lucky Green's wish that he could exploit all the CPU cycles wasted worldwide running Windows screensavers. [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_distributed_computing_projects ...though Vernor Vinge's name was regularly invoked on the list (esp _True Names_), so even then the issue wasn't 'F1RST!!!'. Rather, the ethic of the list was something more like the IETF's 'rough consensus and running code,' just without the consensus bit. Let's just say it wouldn't take long to come up with a "How many cypherpunks does it take to screw in a lightbulb?" joke. Your assumption that Cryptome typically linked to stuff is completely off, but in a useful way, one that says a lot about where the net has drifted over all these years: from a society of 'maintainer'-driven sites, to a delusional 'ecology' of eden where things magically just seem to 'be' there (until they're not!), to lately this mystified 'cloud' stuff (I'll merely gesture in the direction the analogy points, toward an 'environment'). Actually storing the documents, rather than merely linking to them, has been central to Cryptome's logic from day one. Any fool can link to any fool document, a truth that goes a long way toward unravel the mass of 'clicktivist' rubbish; but physically possessing documents -- whatever that means -- involves much more serious risks. I should probably add that I'm not privy to Cryptome's inner workings in any way. Cheers, T # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mail.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime(a)kein.org ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: <nettime> FW: [IP] WikiLeaks sold classified intel, claims website's co-founder
by t byfield 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

almost(a)riseup.net (Mon 12/06/10 at 10:13 AM +0100): > Also I didn't realize Cryptome was ever the first to leak anything. They > typically just linked to stuff that was already out there - and I thought > that was the point. Show how damaging publicly available information can > be. The 'first' to leak anything is a needlessly huge claim, but Cryptome was very early and very focused. It began in the context of the Cypherpunks list, which served that time as a kind of coordination point for, amidst lots of ravings, efforts to make cryptography more 'open' (I'm ever-more reluctant to use that word, and in the context of 'opening' techniques that primarily serve to *close* things the irony becomes very poignant). This mainly consisted of challenging its militarization (and consequent criminalization by anyone not sanctioned by the ~military), but it led to some other astounding projects -- for example distributed-computing projects like SETI@home[1] can all trace their origins to Lucky Green's wish that he could exploit all the CPU cycles wasted worldwide running Windows screensavers. [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_distributed_computing_projects ...though Vernor Vinge's name was regularly invoked on the list (esp _True Names_), so even then the issue wasn't 'F1RST!!!'. Rather, the ethic of the list was something more like the IETF's 'rough consensus and running code,' just without the consensus bit. Let's just say it wouldn't take long to come up with a "How many cypherpunks does it take to screw in a lightbulb?" joke. Your assumption that Cryptome typically linked to stuff is completely off, but in a useful way, one that says a lot about where the net has drifted over all these years: from a society of 'maintainer'-driven sites, to a delusional 'ecology' of eden where things magically just seem to 'be' there (until they're not!), to lately this mystified 'cloud' stuff (I'll merely gesture in the direction the analogy points, toward an 'environment'). Actually storing the documents, rather than merely linking to them, has been central to Cryptome's logic from day one. Any fool can link to any fool document, a truth that goes a long way toward unravel the mass of 'clicktivist' rubbish; but physically possessing documents -- whatever that means -- involves much more serious risks. I should probably add that I'm not privy to Cryptome's inner workings in any way. Cheers, T # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mail.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime(a)kein.org ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[p2p-hackers] Privacy issues with P2P protocols
by Arnaud Legout 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hi, I would like to point you to a recent work we made that we believe might be of interest to the BitTorrent/P2P community. In this work that will be presented at IMC'11, we show what we believe to be a significant privacy issue for most P2P protocols. -We show that leveraging on Skype, we can map a social identity (name, age, location, email address, etc.) to an IP address fully inconspicuously. This attack works for all (500M) Skype users. This is severe as an attacker does not need the ISP support (that an individual cannot usually get) to retrieve the social identity linked to an IP address. -We show that we can then follow the mobility of a Skype user, and we found that we can indeed observe real mobility patterns for a large fraction of Skype users. -Finally, we were able to link a Skype identity to a list of BitTorrent downloads even if the user is behind a NAT or a proxy (we use the predictability of the IP-ID in IP headers to make sure that two different applications are running on the same host). That attack described uses Skype, but would also work with several other popular VoIP systems. All details are available here: http://hal.inria.fr/inria-00632780/en/ Regards, Arnaud. _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Bear Advisory
by None 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

The California State Department of Fish and Game is advising hikers, hunters, fishermen and golfers to take extra precautions and keep alert for bears while in the Yosemite and Mammoth areas. They advise people to wear noise-producing devices such as little bells on their clothing to alert but not startle the bear unexpectedly. They also advise carrying pepper spray in case of an encounter with a bear. It is also a good idea to watch for fresh signs of bear activity and know the difference between black bear and grizzly bear droppings. Black bear droppings are smaller and contain berries and possibly squirrel fur. Grizzly bear droppings have little bells in them and smell like pepper spray.

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[p2p-hackers] Privacy issues with P2P protocols
by Arnaud Legout 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hi, I would like to point you to a recent work we made that we believe might be of interest to the BitTorrent/P2P community. In this work that will be presented at IMC'11, we show what we believe to be a significant privacy issue for most P2P protocols. -We show that leveraging on Skype, we can map a social identity (name, age, location, email address, etc.) to an IP address fully inconspicuously. This attack works for all (500M) Skype users. This is severe as an attacker does not need the ISP support (that an individual cannot usually get) to retrieve the social identity linked to an IP address. -We show that we can then follow the mobility of a Skype user, and we found that we can indeed observe real mobility patterns for a large fraction of Skype users. -Finally, we were able to link a Skype identity to a list of BitTorrent downloads even if the user is behind a NAT or a proxy (we use the predictability of the IP-ID in IP headers to make sure that two different applications are running on the same host). That attack described uses Skype, but would also work with several other popular VoIP systems. All details are available here: http://hal.inria.fr/inria-00632780/en/ Regards, Arnaud. _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [liberationtech] Why Bluecoat?
by Collin Anderson 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

As someone that would probably be within that subset of people singling out Blue Coat, I would perhaps go as far as saying that the company is targeted because it is relatively easy. Citizen Lab, Telecomix and others were able to locate the devices because they had the sorts of signatures, tagging and predictable configuration ports that clearly malicious devices would not have. However, despite that they are not single-use surreptitious listening devices, the company had so clearly failed in any due diligence in manner that creates a broader debate that also applies to the Ciscos, Fortinets, et al of the world. If one were to tell me how to detect ZTE or Huawei kit on a network, you would essentially be dictating my time and attention for the next month. By all means, please. Until then, at least Blue Coat provides the opportunity to educate policy-makers on what should be done, case in point the civil society comment to State asking this very question: http://newamerica.net/publications/resources/2013/comments_regarding_sensit… Comments to the comment are very welcome, had I realized it was publicly posted, I would have shared it with Libtech earlier. On Sat, Apr 6, 2013 at 2:03 PM, Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb <ei8fdb(a)ei8fdb.org>wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > > I left the other wonderful people out: ZTE and their monitoring centre > (shown in pictures from Libya), and of course Huawei. > > Just to give a good global representation. > > > On 6 Apr 2013, at 15:41, Jillian C. York wrote: > > > Honestly? Because there is ample evidence to support it at the moment. > I would also suggest that it's only "singled out" in the US - in Europe, > the focus right now is on Gamma (FinFisher) and Amesys, largely. > > > > Activists have been accused in the past of "singling out" Cisco as well. > Attention has now turned to Bluecoat. When there is evidence of another > company's misdeeds, attention will surely turn there. > > > > Is that sufficient logic for you? > > > > On Sat, Apr 6, 2013 at 11:50 AM, Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb < > ei8fdb(a)ei8fdb.org> wrote: > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > Hash: SHA1 > > > > > > Hi, > > > > I've been thinking about this for a while, and can't find a logical > reason. Possibly I'm not thinking about it hard enough. > > > > I'm curious as to why Bluecoat seem to be singled out for all this > attention regarding use in countries where the governments are "not nice"? > Is it because they are a public, well known company? A lot the same stories > repeat the same stories of Bluecoat equipment being used in the same > oppressive regimes. > > > > As someone who worked in ISP level infrastructure for a while > (thankfully no longer), I've seen the equipment used "for neutral uses" - > network management, etc. > > > > However, there are a lot more sinister and disgusting companies who's > products *sole-purpose* is surveillance and censorship, and sole market is > those oppressive countries we talk about on this list. > > > > My point of view is not to defend Bluecoat, quite the opposite, but > there are nastier and uglier fish out there. > > > > Can anyone set me right, or give an opinion? On or off list is fine. > > > > thanks, > > Bernard > > > > - -------------------------------------- > > Bernard / bluboxthief / ei8fdb > > > > IO91XM / www.ei8fdb.org > > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > > Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.17 (Darwin) > > Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org > > > > iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJRX+/0AAoJENsz1IO7MIrrMQcH/1vOMQvty80EZkCGcqbXiT9t > > SI0o9OOU+wn3Am5ERwDfXlcXy+V/28vbXxPvbhRtjIukF1X94fgJ95+ODn2dOY6g > > B4wnOmLzvDT8HovPhf1zH4Dkot3N50Rkt4V4k29163EYVPgLkkuRrPgU6HGwB9IH > > dVW54KNXnZX3sXFsYle0j8rayI1tgPWpesPpWCe/J5pI+ljLTFbLEJ+Ytz6rPbqu > > y4c/Irjknh8NCVr1LLaGnTkeZQstv5oWZErRrv0bl9Qkm737PAkUCmhTjvBoJw7+ > > kJ9b7lFjJ2h9TRdw54RwTomRrhe4yYmPYlWnSyy4k6d6PK1B7bjKdUT89xjn4jY= > > =PYRZ > > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > -- > > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by > emailing moderator at companys(a)stanford.edu or changing your settings at > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech > > > > > > > > -- > > US: +1-857-891-4244 | NL: +31-657086088 > > site: jilliancyork.com | twitter: @jilliancyork > > > > "We must not be afraid of dreaming the seemingly impossible if we want > the seemingly impossible to become a reality" - Vaclav Havel > > -- > > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by > emailing moderator at companys(a)stanford.edu or changing your settings at > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech > > - -------------------------------------- > Bernard / bluboxthief / ei8fdb > > IO91XM / www.ei8fdb.org > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.17 (Darwin) > Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org > > iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJRYGNVAAoJENsz1IO7MIrrsT8H/2ZcRr+vWXVYpbFjGVBxiGh1 > Ywpmpd9h0Fnhp0lXqIRav8Op3EGFNkz8iT6Iaf0R/gjIYZnw+SWfw2E9BMbljyN3 > 1At+X6PllrUkbkomwJvJnaIri+xC3F7C2IZfeQlbefAm3h5LUwClpCzI6UFuJkLV > wZKPvb74VOkrddhxsUsPkqFq7B1J0x43FYpPlF3OaRJ6beWHlDuBrc+350zFMw28 > EajxjtTE1GApETOkzsQePT1R9nsAlpeM/4MEjErcQcct289U7owdf+WDHKO0koj0 > 1wqtq6M64jX8k1aw1Buw1i4ukhz9DrTtc9IK44xdcLsrkPFSym7H3CCjrmiIwng= > =jhqN > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > -- > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by > emailing moderator at companys(a)stanford.edu or changing your settings at > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech > -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at companys(a)stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[liberationtech] Chromebooks for Risky Situations?
by Nadim Kobeissi 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Dear LibTech, I'm frankly not sure about this idea, it may certainly be a bad one, but I've been using a Chromebook for almost a week now, and I've had some observations regarding this device. I'd like to discuss whether it's a good idea to hypothetically have Chromebooks used by activists, journalists, human rights workers and so on, as opposed to laptops with either Windows or Mac OS X running on top. First, the security and operational models are very interesting. In fact, I think this is probably the most secure end-user laptop OS currently on the mainstream market. Namely, Chromebooks use verified boot, disk encryption (with hardware-level tamper-resistance,) and sandboxing. This compounds with a transparent automatic update schedule from Google's Chrome team, which already has (from my experience) a truly superb reputation for security management. I'm looking at you, Adam Langley! The operating system itself is minimal. There is *much* less room for malware to be executed or for spyware to embed itself on the OS level. The difference in attack vector size between Chromebooks and Mac OS/Windows appears phenomenal to me. Of course, Chromebooks still have a filesystem and users are allowed to plug in USB drives, but due to the minimal nature of the operating system, its highly unusual strength of focus on security, and its relatively new nature, even malware delivered from these mediums may end up being much less common than in other platforms (Windows/Mac). I also feel that the minimal nature of Chromebooks leaves security considerations out of the way while offering an interface that is accessible to activists and journalists around the world. This accessibility is also a security feature! (I've long argued that accessibility should be considered a security feature.) Now, for the obvious (and unfortunate!) downsides: Chromebooks natively encourage users to store all of their data on Google, leaving the company with an unbalanced amount of control over these machines, and attracting itself as a compromise target relevant to Chromebook users. Another downside: No Tor. No PGP. No encryption software. Cryptocat is available for Chrome OS, but I can hardly say that's enough at all! The restricted, minimal nature of the operating system and the security-focused design of both the hardware and boot process are really appealing to me, and are the brunt of what makes me write this email. Should Chromebooks be recommended for activists and journalists in dangerous situations? As I've disclaimed above, this is only a theoretical discussion, please feel free to disagree and don't take me seriously just yet. :-) NK -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Wikipedia & Tor
by Arrakis Tor 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

This is a conversation with Jimmy Wales regarding how we can get Wikipedia to let Tor get through. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Anyone with a port 80 can vandalize your website. Yes, but we notice that we can control a significant amount of vandalism by blocking ip numbers which have proven to be particularly problematic. TOR servers are among the absolute worst. And TOR operators don't seem to care. We go to the trouble > to block all the file sharing clients, and often abused ports and > protocols like IRC. Many of us typically block ports which do not have > any legitimate reason for being used. If all it take is a port 80 to > vandalize the wikipedia, of which port 80 is a public service, then > there is no point in discriminating against Tor users since every IP > is an equal opportunity offender. Equal *opportunity*, but we have very strong empirical evidence here. TOR ip numbers are the worst offenders that we have seen. People use TOR specifically to hide their identity, specifically to vandalize wikipedia. > You say that tor is quite irresponsibly managed. How would you propose > we manage tor servers differently? Ban users who vandalize wikipedia. That'd be a start. Rate limit edits at Wikipedia, that'd be good. Write an extension to your software which would help us to distinguish between "trusted" and "newbie" Tor clients. I completely fail to comprehend why Tor server operators consistently refuse to take responsibility for their crazed users. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] Summarized -- Warrantless NSA program involved massive data
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

collection (NYT) X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.746.2) Reply-To: dave(a)farber.net http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/24/politics/24spy.html WASHINGTON, Dec. 23 - The National Security Agency has traced and analyzed large volumes of telephone and Internet communications flowing into and out of the United States as part of the eavesdropping program that President Bush approved after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks to hunt for evidence of terrorist activity, according to current and former government officials. The volume of information harvested from telecommunication data and voice networks, without court-approved warrants, is much larger than the White House has acknowledged, the officials said. ...One issue of concern to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which has reviewed some separate warrant applications growing out of the N.S.A.'s surveillance program, is whether the court has legal authority over calls outside the United States that happen to pass through American-based telephonic "switches," according to officials familiar with the matter. ...Since the disclosure last week of the N.S.A.'s domestic surveillance program, President Bush and his senior aides have stressed that his executive order allowing eavesdropping without warrants was limited to the monitoring of international phone and e- mail communications involving people with known links to Al Qaeda. ...The use of similar data-mining operations by the Bush administration in other contexts has raised strong objections, most notably in connection with the Total Information Awareness system, developed by the Pentagon for tracking terror suspects, and the Department of Homeland Security's Capps program for screening airline passengers. ...But the Bush administration regards the N.S.A.'s ability to trace and analyze large volumes of data as critical to its expanded mission to detect terrorist plots before they can be carried out, officials familiar with the program say. ...A former technology manager at a major telecommunications company said that since the Sept. 11 attacks, the leading companies in the industry have been storing information on calling patterns and giving it to the federal government to aid in tracking possible terrorists. "All that data is mined with the cooperation of the government and shared with them, and since 9/11, there's been much more active involvement in that area," said the former manager, a telecommunications expert who did not want his name or that of his former company used because of concern about revealing trade secrets. ...The switches are some of the main arteries for moving voice and some Internet traffic into and out of the United States, and, with the globalization of the telecommunications industry in recent years, many international-to-international calls are also routed through such American switches. ...Now that foreign calls were being routed through switches on American soil, some judges and law enforcement officials regarded eavesdropping on those calls as a possible violation of those decades- old restrictions, including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which requires court-approved warrants for domestic surveillance. ...But the N.S.A.'s backdoor access to major telecommunications switches on American soil with the cooperation of major corporations represents a significant expansion of the agency's operational capability, according to current and former government officials. ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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