July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

[fc] Financial Cryptography 2003 CFP
by Rebecca Wright 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Call for Papers Financial Cryptography '03 January 27-30, 2003 La Creole Beach Hotel, Gosier, Guadeloupe Sponsored by the International Financial Cryptography Association Original papers are solicited on all aspects of financial data security and digital commerce for submission to the Seventh Annual Conference on Financial Cryptography (FC '03). FC '03 brings together researchers in the financial, legal, cryptologic, and data security fields to foster cooperation and exchange of ideas. Relevant topics include: Anonymity Infrastructure Design Auctions Legal and Regulatory Issues Audit and Auditability Payments and Micropayments Authentication and Identification Peer-to-Peer Systems Certification and Authorization Privacy Commercial Transactions and Contracts Reputation Systems Digital Incentive Systems Risks Management Digital Rights Management Secure Banking Identity Management Smart Cards Implementation Issues Trust Management Information Economics Watermarking We are particularly interested in novel approaches, such as game-theoretic or economic approaches, to these topics. Instructions for Authors: Complete papers (or complete extended abstracts) must be at most fifteen (15) single-spaced standard pages in length and must be received by 23h59 EST on September 13, 2002. All papers must be submitted electronically. (In exceptional circumstances, paper submissions can be accepted, but special arrangements must be made with the program chairs prior to September 1, 2002.) Papers must be in either standard PostScript or PDF format, and should be submitted electronically according to the instructions at http://ifca.ai/fc03/ prior to the deadline. Submissions in formats other than PostScript or PDF, including word processor source formats such as MS Word or LaTeX, will be rejected. Submitted papers should include on the first page the title, all authors and their affiliations, a brief abstract, and a list of topical keywords. Papers must describe original work. Submission of previously published material and simultaneous submission of papers to other conferences or workshops with proceedings is not permitted. Authors of papers found to be double submissions risk having all their submissions withdrawn from consideration, as well as any other appropriate sanctions. Proposals for panels are also solicited, and should include a brief description of the panel as well as prospective participants. Panel proposals should also be submitted electronically, in plain ASCII format. The conference proceedings containing all accepted papers will be published in the Springer-Verlag Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS) series after the conference. A pre-proceedings containing preliminary versions of the papers will be distributed at the conference. Important Dates: Conference January 27 - 30, 2003 Submission deadline September 13, 2002, 23h59 EST Author notification November 11, 2002 Pre-proceedings version due December 16, 2002 Proceedings version due March 31, 2003 General Chair: David Pointcheval (Ecole Normale Superieure) Program Chairs: Jean Camp (Harvard University) and Rebecca Wright (Stevens Institute of Technology) Program Committee: Chris Avery (Harvard Universiy) Helger Lipmaa (Helsinki University of Technology) Dan Burk (University of Minnesota) Dahlia Malkhi (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Lorrie Cranor (AT&T Labs) Satoshi Obana (NEC) Carl Ellison (Intel Labs) Andrew Odlyzko (University of Minnesota) Ian Goldberg (Zero Knowledge) Benny Pinkas (DIMACS) John Ioannides (AT&T Labs) Jacques Stern (Ecole Normale Superieure) Markus Jakobsson (RSA Laboratories) Gene Tsudik (U. C. Irvine) Ari Juels (RSA Laboratories) _______________________________________________ fc mailing list fc(a)ifca.ai http://mail.ifca.ai/mailman/listinfo/fc --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)wasabisystems.com

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Re: [liberationtech] New Satphone Safety Guide
by Jacob Appelbaum 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 03/13/2012 03:43 PM, Brian Conley wrote: > Hi all, > > I'm pleased to announce that we have released our newest guide, focusing on > increasing satphone safety through best practices. > > You can find the guide here: > > http://smallworldnews.tv/Guide/Guide_SatPhone_English.pdf > > comments, questions, and critiques much appreciated! > > I will be writing a longer blog about the motivations and timeliness later > this week. Also you can see Frank Smyth's comments here at CPJ.org: > > http://cpj.org/blog/2012/03/from-small-world-timely-advice-on-safe-satphone… > > > Hi Brian, Some thoughts in response to specific chunks of text from your pdf follow... "If you communicate with someone outside the satphonebs service provider network your communications are subject to any observation happening on the other user. Communicating with other satphones from the same service provider is much safer. Even this method is not entirely secure, but following these basic steps will limit your risks." This is a really weird statement. The first sentence is true. The second is pretty subjective, I'd even say incorrect but there is some wiggle room. The third is also a bit weird to the point of being incorrect. Limit what risk? Risk in relation to whom? If someone is sniffing the uplink for either phone, it's irrelevant to take such a step - it's probably even irrelevant if your threat model includes the sat phone provider as part of the adversary model. "The time needed to connect with the network is the first major security risk." Sure - why is that though? Isn't it because 0) the beam pattern for uplink 1) gps location being sent by the phone 2) the phone provider knowing 0 & 1 and 3) the downlink? So really is it the time that is the issue? Or what is done during that time? "2.3 USING A SATPHONE, A WALKTHROUGH" This walk through seems not entirely correct. For example 07 is not really the full picture, is it it? Isn't that when the phone sends the GPS data and not in step 10 as indicated? "3.1 PHONE CONFISCATION" I rather like this part of the guide. "In some cases the authorities may have the proper equipment to b listen inb on your transmissions, however this requires highly advanced and sophisticated technology" I think this is misleading. What country doesn't have the ability to do this? It requires a fun cube dongle pro or a GNU Radio, a commercial device or something else home brew - if a hacker at the CCC can do it, it's not "highly advanced and sophisticated technology" in my opinion. That isn't to say that it was easy, it's just that now that the work is done - the code, the hardware and the rest of the information is available for anyone who cares to try. That is not a high bar and it would be misleading to suggest it. "Your location may be logged at the service providerbs Ground Earth Station (GES)" Or anyone watching... "Thurayabs encryption has been broken, and more advanced governments may be able to break the encryption of other satphones. To learn more see Section 6.2.2" Which sat phone protocol isn't broken? I don't see a table for which protocols or devices you mean to support with this guide - so it's not clear why Thuraya is the security exception, rather than an example of the insecurity rule. "Voice calls are a very risky method for communicating via satellite." All times when a user is associated with the network the user is at risk. "It is best to keep your call under three minutes" Why three? "Email sent from your satphone does not provide the same protection as Email sent via computer or mobile data plans." While true, this implies that email is somehow secure, ever - which we all know to be totally bogus, right? "On some mobile phones and all computers Tor can be used to anonymize your computers traffic and hide your identity and location. If at all possible use a secure internet connection to communicate, not a satphone." Tor can't protect you from hardware that spies on you - if your sat phone sends your GPS location, an attacker will know the exact location of the user, even if they do not know what they are doing or saying. This seems obvious but it is important to note - the GPS location is at a different layer. "Inmarsatbs iSatphonePro" Why? Rheinmetall, trltech, and others intercept that by brand name. How is that better than Thuraya? They're all doomed in terms of content security and location privacy - why suggest those in that case? For example, it seems odd to me that you did not mention the Cryptophone[0] as an example of how to secure the content of the communications - that is probably the only tool on the market right now that has any such claim. Combined with a Motorola 9501 Iridium satellite pager[1], I think you could do something interesting that actually improved the security of communications or at least assist in solving the rendezvous problem. The Motorola 9501 is entirely passive and so it can receive with a very minimal view of the sky, it does not transmit your location from the device, etc. All the best, Jacob [0] http://www.cryptophone.de/en/products/satellite/ [1] http://www.outfittersatellite.com/iridium_9501.htm _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. You may ask for a reminder here: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Call for input to President's Commission on Enhancing Cybersecurity - bridging the trust gap between the IT community and the US government
by Herb Lin 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Dear IPers - You may know that President Obama has established a commission to consider how to strengthen cybersecurity in both the public and private sectors while protecting privacy, ensuring public safety and economic and national security, fostering discovery and development of new technical solutions, and bolstering partnerships between Federal, State, and local government and the private sector in the development, promotion, and use of cybersecurity technologies, policies, and best practices. (See https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/09/executive-order-comm….) I am one of the 12 designated commissioners. Recognizing that trust is hard to build and easy to destroy (and a variety of things have happened over the last 20 years have occurred to do the latter), one issue that has come up is the enormous gap of trust between the U.S. government and the information technology (IT) community, from which many IPers are drawn. This rift is not helpful to either side, and I'd like to solicit input from the IP community about what you think the government can do or refrain from doing to help bridge that gap. It would be most helpful if you could three things in your response: 1 - Your best examples of things the government (and what part of the US government) has done to alienate the IT community specifically. (Or, at the very least, show how the examples you provide connect to the interests of the IT community.) 2 - Things that the U.S. government could realistically do in the short and medium term (i.e., 0-10 year time frame) that would help bridge the trust gap. If your answer is "Don't do dumb things!", it would be better and more useful to provide *examples* of what not to do. 3 - Things that the U.S. government could realistically do in the longer term to do the same. Please send your responses to CENCinput1(a)gmail.com. (I set up this email address, but I'd like to keep the traffic separate from my non-Commission work email.) I promise to read as many as I can individually and share what I learn with the commission membership. Also, feel free to circulate this call for input to anyone else you feel would want to comment. Thanks much Herb ======================================================================= Herb Lin Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security and Cooperation Research Fellow, Hoover Institution Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 USA herblin(a)stanford.edu 650-497-8600 office || 202-841-0525 cell || 202-540-9878 fax AIM herblin (any time you see me) Skype herbert_lin (usually by appointment) Twitter @HerbLinCyber This message was sent to the list address and trashed, but can be found online. - - - End forwarded message - - -

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Call for input to President's Commission on Enhancing Cybersecurity - bridging the trust gap between the IT community and the US government
by Herb Lin 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Dear IPers - You may know that President Obama has established a commission to consider how to strengthen cybersecurity in both the public and private sectors while protecting privacy, ensuring public safety and economic and national security, fostering discovery and development of new technical solutions, and bolstering partnerships between Federal, State, and local government and the private sector in the development, promotion, and use of cybersecurity technologies, policies, and best practices. (See https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/09/executive-order-comm….) I am one of the 12 designated commissioners. Recognizing that trust is hard to build and easy to destroy (and a variety of things have happened over the last 20 years have occurred to do the latter), one issue that has come up is the enormous gap of trust between the U.S. government and the information technology (IT) community, from which many IPers are drawn. This rift is not helpful to either side, and I'd like to solicit input from the IP community about what you think the government can do or refrain from doing to help bridge that gap. It would be most helpful if you could three things in your response: 1 - Your best examples of things the government (and what part of the US government) has done to alienate the IT community specifically. (Or, at the very least, show how the examples you provide connect to the interests of the IT community.) 2 - Things that the U.S. government could realistically do in the short and medium term (i.e., 0-10 year time frame) that would help bridge the trust gap. If your answer is "Don't do dumb things!", it would be better and more useful to provide *examples* of what not to do. 3 - Things that the U.S. government could realistically do in the longer term to do the same. Please send your responses to CENCinput1(a)gmail.com. (I set up this email address, but I'd like to keep the traffic separate from my non-Commission work email.) I promise to read as many as I can individually and share what I learn with the commission membership. Also, feel free to circulate this call for input to anyone else you feel would want to comment. Thanks much Herb ======================================================================= Herb Lin Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security and Cooperation Research Fellow, Hoover Institution Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 USA herblin(a)stanford.edu 650-497-8600 office || 202-841-0525 cell || 202-540-9878 fax AIM herblin (any time you see me) Skype herbert_lin (usually by appointment) Twitter @HerbLinCyber This message was sent to the list address and trashed, but can be found online. - - - End forwarded message - - -

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Call for input to President's Commission on Enhancing Cybersecurity - bridging the trust gap between the IT community and the US government
by Herb Lin 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Dear IPers - You may know that President Obama has established a commission to consider how to strengthen cybersecurity in both the public and private sectors while protecting privacy, ensuring public safety and economic and national security, fostering discovery and development of new technical solutions, and bolstering partnerships between Federal, State, and local government and the private sector in the development, promotion, and use of cybersecurity technologies, policies, and best practices. (See https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/09/executive-order-comm….) I am one of the 12 designated commissioners. Recognizing that trust is hard to build and easy to destroy (and a variety of things have happened over the last 20 years have occurred to do the latter), one issue that has come up is the enormous gap of trust between the U.S. government and the information technology (IT) community, from which many IPers are drawn. This rift is not helpful to either side, and I'd like to solicit input from the IP community about what you think the government can do or refrain from doing to help bridge that gap. It would be most helpful if you could three things in your response: 1 - Your best examples of things the government (and what part of the US government) has done to alienate the IT community specifically. (Or, at the very least, show how the examples you provide connect to the interests of the IT community.) 2 - Things that the U.S. government could realistically do in the short and medium term (i.e., 0-10 year time frame) that would help bridge the trust gap. If your answer is "Don't do dumb things!", it would be better and more useful to provide *examples* of what not to do. 3 - Things that the U.S. government could realistically do in the longer term to do the same. Please send your responses to CENCinput1(a)gmail.com. (I set up this email address, but I'd like to keep the traffic separate from my non-Commission work email.) I promise to read as many as I can individually and share what I learn with the commission membership. Also, feel free to circulate this call for input to anyone else you feel would want to comment. Thanks much Herb ======================================================================= Herb Lin Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security and Cooperation Research Fellow, Hoover Institution Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 USA herblin(a)stanford.edu 650-497-8600 office || 202-841-0525 cell || 202-540-9878 fax AIM herblin (any time you see me) Skype herbert_lin (usually by appointment) Twitter @HerbLinCyber This message was sent to the list address and trashed, but can be found online. - - - End forwarded message - - -

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Call for input to President's Commission on Enhancing Cybersecurity - bridging the trust gap between the IT community and the US government
by Herb Lin 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Dear IPers - You may know that President Obama has established a commission to consider how to strengthen cybersecurity in both the public and private sectors while protecting privacy, ensuring public safety and economic and national security, fostering discovery and development of new technical solutions, and bolstering partnerships between Federal, State, and local government and the private sector in the development, promotion, and use of cybersecurity technologies, policies, and best practices. (See https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/09/executive-order-comm….) I am one of the 12 designated commissioners. Recognizing that trust is hard to build and easy to destroy (and a variety of things have happened over the last 20 years have occurred to do the latter), one issue that has come up is the enormous gap of trust between the U.S. government and the information technology (IT) community, from which many IPers are drawn. This rift is not helpful to either side, and I'd like to solicit input from the IP community about what you think the government can do or refrain from doing to help bridge that gap. It would be most helpful if you could three things in your response: 1 - Your best examples of things the government (and what part of the US government) has done to alienate the IT community specifically. (Or, at the very least, show how the examples you provide connect to the interests of the IT community.) 2 - Things that the U.S. government could realistically do in the short and medium term (i.e., 0-10 year time frame) that would help bridge the trust gap. If your answer is "Don't do dumb things!", it would be better and more useful to provide *examples* of what not to do. 3 - Things that the U.S. government could realistically do in the longer term to do the same. Please send your responses to CENCinput1(a)gmail.com. (I set up this email address, but I'd like to keep the traffic separate from my non-Commission work email.) I promise to read as many as I can individually and share what I learn with the commission membership. Also, feel free to circulate this call for input to anyone else you feel would want to comment. Thanks much Herb ======================================================================= Herb Lin Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security and Cooperation Research Fellow, Hoover Institution Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 USA herblin(a)stanford.edu 650-497-8600 office || 202-841-0525 cell || 202-540-9878 fax AIM herblin (any time you see me) Skype herbert_lin (usually by appointment) Twitter @HerbLinCyber This message was sent to the list address and trashed, but can be found online. - - - End forwarded message - - -

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Call for input to President's Commission on Enhancing Cybersecurity - bridging the trust gap between the IT community and the US government
by Herb Lin 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Dear IPers - You may know that President Obama has established a commission to consider how to strengthen cybersecurity in both the public and private sectors while protecting privacy, ensuring public safety and economic and national security, fostering discovery and development of new technical solutions, and bolstering partnerships between Federal, State, and local government and the private sector in the development, promotion, and use of cybersecurity technologies, policies, and best practices. (See https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/09/executive-order-comm….) I am one of the 12 designated commissioners. Recognizing that trust is hard to build and easy to destroy (and a variety of things have happened over the last 20 years have occurred to do the latter), one issue that has come up is the enormous gap of trust between the U.S. government and the information technology (IT) community, from which many IPers are drawn. This rift is not helpful to either side, and I'd like to solicit input from the IP community about what you think the government can do or refrain from doing to help bridge that gap. It would be most helpful if you could three things in your response: 1 - Your best examples of things the government (and what part of the US government) has done to alienate the IT community specifically. (Or, at the very least, show how the examples you provide connect to the interests of the IT community.) 2 - Things that the U.S. government could realistically do in the short and medium term (i.e., 0-10 year time frame) that would help bridge the trust gap. If your answer is "Don't do dumb things!", it would be better and more useful to provide *examples* of what not to do. 3 - Things that the U.S. government could realistically do in the longer term to do the same. Please send your responses to CENCinput1(a)gmail.com. (I set up this email address, but I'd like to keep the traffic separate from my non-Commission work email.) I promise to read as many as I can individually and share what I learn with the commission membership. Also, feel free to circulate this call for input to anyone else you feel would want to comment. Thanks much Herb ======================================================================= Herb Lin Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security and Cooperation Research Fellow, Hoover Institution Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 USA herblin(a)stanford.edu 650-497-8600 office || 202-841-0525 cell || 202-540-9878 fax AIM herblin (any time you see me) Skype herbert_lin (usually by appointment) Twitter @HerbLinCyber This message was sent to the list address and trashed, but can be found online. - - - End forwarded message - - -

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Call for input to President's Commission on Enhancing Cybersecurity - bridging the trust gap between the IT community and the US government
by Herb Lin 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Dear IPers - You may know that President Obama has established a commission to consider how to strengthen cybersecurity in both the public and private sectors while protecting privacy, ensuring public safety and economic and national security, fostering discovery and development of new technical solutions, and bolstering partnerships between Federal, State, and local government and the private sector in the development, promotion, and use of cybersecurity technologies, policies, and best practices. (See https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/09/executive-order-comm….) I am one of the 12 designated commissioners. Recognizing that trust is hard to build and easy to destroy (and a variety of things have happened over the last 20 years have occurred to do the latter), one issue that has come up is the enormous gap of trust between the U.S. government and the information technology (IT) community, from which many IPers are drawn. This rift is not helpful to either side, and I'd like to solicit input from the IP community about what you think the government can do or refrain from doing to help bridge that gap. It would be most helpful if you could three things in your response: 1 - Your best examples of things the government (and what part of the US government) has done to alienate the IT community specifically. (Or, at the very least, show how the examples you provide connect to the interests of the IT community.) 2 - Things that the U.S. government could realistically do in the short and medium term (i.e., 0-10 year time frame) that would help bridge the trust gap. If your answer is "Don't do dumb things!", it would be better and more useful to provide *examples* of what not to do. 3 - Things that the U.S. government could realistically do in the longer term to do the same. Please send your responses to CENCinput1(a)gmail.com. (I set up this email address, but I'd like to keep the traffic separate from my non-Commission work email.) I promise to read as many as I can individually and share what I learn with the commission membership. Also, feel free to circulate this call for input to anyone else you feel would want to comment. Thanks much Herb ======================================================================= Herb Lin Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security and Cooperation Research Fellow, Hoover Institution Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 USA herblin(a)stanford.edu 650-497-8600 office || 202-841-0525 cell || 202-540-9878 fax AIM herblin (any time you see me) Skype herbert_lin (usually by appointment) Twitter @HerbLinCyber This message was sent to the list address and trashed, but can be found online. - - - End forwarded message - - -

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Call for input to President's Commission on Enhancing Cybersecurity - bridging the trust gap between the IT community and the US government
by Herb Lin 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Dear IPers - You may know that President Obama has established a commission to consider how to strengthen cybersecurity in both the public and private sectors while protecting privacy, ensuring public safety and economic and national security, fostering discovery and development of new technical solutions, and bolstering partnerships between Federal, State, and local government and the private sector in the development, promotion, and use of cybersecurity technologies, policies, and best practices. (See https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/09/executive-order-comm….) I am one of the 12 designated commissioners. Recognizing that trust is hard to build and easy to destroy (and a variety of things have happened over the last 20 years have occurred to do the latter), one issue that has come up is the enormous gap of trust between the U.S. government and the information technology (IT) community, from which many IPers are drawn. This rift is not helpful to either side, and I'd like to solicit input from the IP community about what you think the government can do or refrain from doing to help bridge that gap. It would be most helpful if you could three things in your response: 1 - Your best examples of things the government (and what part of the US government) has done to alienate the IT community specifically. (Or, at the very least, show how the examples you provide connect to the interests of the IT community.) 2 - Things that the U.S. government could realistically do in the short and medium term (i.e., 0-10 year time frame) that would help bridge the trust gap. If your answer is "Don't do dumb things!", it would be better and more useful to provide *examples* of what not to do. 3 - Things that the U.S. government could realistically do in the longer term to do the same. Please send your responses to CENCinput1(a)gmail.com. (I set up this email address, but I'd like to keep the traffic separate from my non-Commission work email.) I promise to read as many as I can individually and share what I learn with the commission membership. Also, feel free to circulate this call for input to anyone else you feel would want to comment. Thanks much Herb ======================================================================= Herb Lin Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security and Cooperation Research Fellow, Hoover Institution Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 USA herblin(a)stanford.edu 650-497-8600 office || 202-841-0525 cell || 202-540-9878 fax AIM herblin (any time you see me) Skype herbert_lin (usually by appointment) Twitter @HerbLinCyber This message was sent to the list address and trashed, but can be found online. - - - End forwarded message - - -

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Call for input to President's Commission on Enhancing Cybersecurity - bridging the trust gap between the IT community and the US government
by Herb Lin 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Dear IPers - You may know that President Obama has established a commission to consider how to strengthen cybersecurity in both the public and private sectors while protecting privacy, ensuring public safety and economic and national security, fostering discovery and development of new technical solutions, and bolstering partnerships between Federal, State, and local government and the private sector in the development, promotion, and use of cybersecurity technologies, policies, and best practices. (See https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/09/executive-order-comm….) I am one of the 12 designated commissioners. Recognizing that trust is hard to build and easy to destroy (and a variety of things have happened over the last 20 years have occurred to do the latter), one issue that has come up is the enormous gap of trust between the U.S. government and the information technology (IT) community, from which many IPers are drawn. This rift is not helpful to either side, and I'd like to solicit input from the IP community about what you think the government can do or refrain from doing to help bridge that gap. It would be most helpful if you could three things in your response: 1 - Your best examples of things the government (and what part of the US government) has done to alienate the IT community specifically. (Or, at the very least, show how the examples you provide connect to the interests of the IT community.) 2 - Things that the U.S. government could realistically do in the short and medium term (i.e., 0-10 year time frame) that would help bridge the trust gap. If your answer is "Don't do dumb things!", it would be better and more useful to provide *examples* of what not to do. 3 - Things that the U.S. government could realistically do in the longer term to do the same. Please send your responses to CENCinput1(a)gmail.com. (I set up this email address, but I'd like to keep the traffic separate from my non-Commission work email.) I promise to read as many as I can individually and share what I learn with the commission membership. Also, feel free to circulate this call for input to anyone else you feel would want to comment. Thanks much Herb ======================================================================= Herb Lin Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security and Cooperation Research Fellow, Hoover Institution Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 USA herblin(a)stanford.edu 650-497-8600 office || 202-841-0525 cell || 202-540-9878 fax AIM herblin (any time you see me) Skype herbert_lin (usually by appointment) Twitter @HerbLinCyber This message was sent to the list address and trashed, but can be found online. - - - End forwarded message - - -

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