July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

[liberationtech] iPhones/iPads secretly track 'scary amount' of your movements
by Frank Corrigan 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

More reasons for activists/protesters in hostile (ordinary) environments not to bring along their mobile phone, latest cell connected gizmo. "The most immediate problem is that this data is stored in an easily-readable form on your machine" http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/04/20/secret_iphone_location_tracking/ _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [p2p-hackers] Distributed identity, chat, publishing, and sharing
by Sean Lynch 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 01/10/2013 07:14 PM, Tony Arcieri wrote: > For what it's worth, this sounds an awfully lot like what I have > envisioned for the Cryptosphere: > > https://github.com/tarcieri/cryptosphere Very interesting. "Cryptosphere" is a good name for such a system, though from what you describe there the project seems more concerned about identifying content than people, whereas my idea centers around identifying people, with content being secondary. > > Contacts would be identified by their (Ed25519) public key. When you add > someone, you just paste their public key and type a "pet name" for them, > which is what would be shown in your contact list. > > > Really close to what I had in mind, and I plan on using Ed25519. This is > actually an approach that forces you to do more than take a fleeing > glance at a given user's public key thumbprint/ID and I feel that's > missing from many similar systems (e.g. OTR) Yeah, to me verifying key fingerprints is a lost cause - people will never do it. Instead we need the socialist millionaire protocol for bootstrapping, and a web of trust. Or the very simple fact that you got someone's public key via a MITM-proof channel in the first place, like a QR code on a business card, NFC, etc. > > > People could also associate various metadata with their public key > in a very similar way > to how they do with PGP keys: with metadata packets signed by themselves > and other people, thus establishing a web of trust that would enable > search, the same way we can reliably search for PGP keys but with an > easier-to-use interface that will always show someone's relationship to > your current trusted contacts. > > > My goal was to collect metadata about content transfers in the system by > having all participants in file transfers sign a client-specific long > chain which serves as a record of who has transferred what. > > Through the course of normal system operation any given peer will > collect a number of these long chains, which can be run through a > collaborative filtering algorithm (e.g. singular value decomposition) in > order to make an educated guess about the properties of peers you've > never interacted with based on their collective similarity to peers you > have interacted with directly. Can you elaborate on this? By metadata I was thinking of things like filename, content description, ratings, etc. > > Here are some possible implementation strategies. The only one I've made > any progress on so far is uTP: > > 1. uTP with our own DHT implementation for bootstrapping, lookup, and > storage of published stuff > > > My plan was to use CurveCP with the Ed25519 private scalar as the > CurveCP private key. This allows you to set up secure channels which are > based on the same identities as the other signatures in the system. Given that the part that needs to be small is the public key, what's the benefit of using the same private key? Once you have an Ed25519 public key, you can always do an authenticated Diffie-Hellman exchange with an ephemeral session key, which gives you perfect forward security if any individual session private key is compromised. > > CurveCP presently has some issues with embedding and congestion control > but I hope if people actually start using it these problems will get > resolved. I ran across CurveCP before and had forgotten about it. Embedding and congestion control are primary requirements for me, and libutp fits the bill, even allowing the user to provide a callback for sending and receiving data, which is where I'd apply the encryption. > > I guess you could call this a p2p, pseudonymous version of Facebook, > with all the same functionality and none of the privacy problems because > privacy would always be defined by encryption. If you want something > public, you post it in the clear. If you want something seen by only > your friends, you encrypt the encryption key with each of their > curve25519 keys. > > > A crypto capability-based access control scheme comes to mind here. The system you describe could certainly make a good platform for what I describe, though I'm far more interested in the "applications" themselves, i.e. chat, publishing, sharing, etc., than in the underlying infrastructure. My primary concern about the underlying infrastructure is that it be secure, easy to install/use, doesn't use a tremendous amount of CPU or bandwidth (this should ideally run on mobile phones), and connects reasonably quickly. All of the applications could even be written in Javascript and distributed through the network itself, signed by their authors. They could run as web workers using a particular protocol to talk to the main app if the network runs in a browser, or in QtScript if it's a native Qt app. I have no idea how to securely run untrusted JS in Java, though. I'd like to implement as little of this as possible, since it's a pretty big undertaking and will require a number of iterations to get something usable. That's why I am thinking of things like embedding I2P and Freenet or Tor and Gnunet. I'd prefer C++ and Qt over Java, though building for Windows will be a bit of a challenge, especially for Gnunet with its huge number of not-very-crossplatform dependencies like libgcrypt, among others. I'd love to have it able to build in VS, but Tor won't either IIRC. _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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FC: Ex-GOP senator's wife pleads to email attack campaign
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

http://www.cluebot.com/article.pl?sid=01/06/15/0135212 Ex-GOP Senator's Wife Pleads to Email Attack Campaign posted by Declan (declan(a)well.com) on Thursday June 14, @08:32PM The wife of a U.S. senator who unsuccessfully ran for re-election in 2000 plead "no contest" on Thursday to charges of using a pseudonym to send email messages that disparaged her husband's Democratic rival. Minnesota prosecutors charged Christine Gunhus, who married former Republican senator Rod Grams after working on his campaign, with violating state criminal laws. Grams' rival, Democratic-Farmer-Labor candidate Mike Ciresi, had filed a complaint under the Minnesota Fair Campaign Practices Act. The risks of using technology you don't completely understand and that could leak your identity are worth noting: * Gunhus is accused of using a Hotmail account (Katie Stevens -- kylomb(a)hotmail.com) to send the disparaging email messages, which talked about how Ciresi had represented corporate polluters and anti-union companies. But Hotmail includes an X-Originating-IP: header that shows the IP address of the sender -- a problem if you're typing it from the opposing campaign's computer! * Prosecutors say they traced the IP address back to an AT&T WorldNet user who repeatedly used the "Katie Stevens" Hotmail account by connecting from Gunhus' home number. (Guess they keep Caller ID logs.) Apparently the person using the "Katie Stevens" pseudonym was smart at first, sending the mail from a Kinko's store, but then got sloppy. * The email attacks included Microsoft Word attachments, which a Ciresi aide investigated. The aide found that Word listed the document authors as Grams staffers including -- you guessed it -- Christine Gunhus. * Democratic researchers reported that they found Globally Unique Identifiers (GUIDs) in the Word documents. The GUID includes the Ethernet MAC address. Prosecutors last August obtained a search warrant to seize Gunhus' computer, from which they could extract the MAC address if the Ethernet card was still the same. * Let's not forget the political risk. In an article in the Minneapolis Star-Tribune on the pseudonymous mail campaign last year, the Grams campaign offered a remarkably narrow denial. A spokesman hedged: "We didn't put this together and send it out of the Grams campaign office," leaving open the question of whether it was sent by a campaign worker from another location. * And what about the legal risk to free speech? The Minnesota Civil Liberties Union reasonably argues that a criminal law that bans sending pseudonymous messages is unconstitutional. A Supreme Court decision, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission (http://www.epic.org/free_speech/mcintyre.html) says that a prohibition on the distribution of anonymous campaign literature violates the First Amendment. The state law seems to be ecumenical in its application: A Republican has used it to attack the Sierra Club (http://www.fcregister.com/ziegler11_6_00.htm) Epilogue: Grams managed to derail his Democratic rival's primary bid, and Ciresi did not win his party's nomination. Even though Grams lost the general election in the fall, that hasn't halted his political ambitions. The Washington Times reported on April 13 that Grams is reportedly considering a challenge in 2002 to U.S. Senator Paul Wellstone, a liberal Democrat. _________________________________________________________________ Slate articles from last year on the pseudonymous attacks: http://slate.msn.com/netelection/entries/00-07-21_86798.asp http://slate.msn.com/netelection/entries/00-09-13_89569.asp City Pages article from last year: http://www.citypages.com/databank/21/1032/article8969.asp AP article on the "no contest" plea this week: http://www.infobeat.com/cgi-bin/WebObjects/IBFrontEnd.woa/wa/fullStory?arti… ------------------------------------------------------------------------- POLITECH -- Declan McCullagh's politics and technology mailing list You may redistribute this message freely if you include this notice. To subscribe, visit http://www.politechbot.com/info/subscribe.html This message is archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----- End forwarded message -----

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Re: [gsc] US too delusional to fix
by info 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> is shedding some cars and banks really the decline? These are symptoms. They are symptoms of the grab for power by vested economic and political interests, and to hell with everyone else. > Was it ever a incline to begin with? Yes, very clearly. You are perhaps a little young to remember a time when every year, planes went higher and faster, more things were available to more people, the per capita income kept rising, new records were set in nearly every area of human activity, all the time. If you didn't live before 1969, you missed the peak. In Western Civilisation, people used to travel faster than the speed of sound. They don't any longer. People used to visit the Moon. They don't any longer. Private passenger rail service used to be available. It is not any longer. People used to have a reasonable expectation of a future with more inventions, brighter, faster, niftier vehicles. But, of course, the intention of the socialists has always been to prevent that future, to license all activities, to regulate all conduct, to prevent innovation, to destroy entrepreneurship, to have boots smashing human faces, forever. So, naturally, we don't have those things to anticipate. The inventors have invented, but they cannot make any money because they aren't allowed to sell their products. The Moller air car cannot be flown except as an experimental aircraft. The ducted fan personal aircraft can't be flown except as an experimental aircraft. Richard Branson couldn't enter the USA to look at the designs for his new spaceship because he's a foreign national. The civilisation that Raven refers to has peaked. It peaked about 40 years go. It cannot advance because too many people are trying to live with other people's money. The burden of government is too great. The idiocy of self-important central planners is in the way of any and every accomplishment. The way to solve this problem has traditionally been for the thin veneer of civil behavior to wear off, and people go out and slaughter the scum who have been causing them grief and aggravation. When every city has every lamp post and city building decorated with the eviscerated bodies of the filth who think they govern us without our consent, then a new culture can arise to replace the old. In some ways, the alternatives already exist. The old culture developed a robust inter-connected network or reticulum of networked computer systems. About the same time that the peak accomplishments of the old culture were impressing the masses, people began to develop open source cryptography. The old system almost certainly cannot last indefinitely. The problem with solving problems with other people's money is, as Maggie Thatcher noted, eventually you run out. At a guess, that was Maggie quoting Hayek. Sensible fuck. About 1969, DARPA funded the first mil-net which was adapted to commercial use in 1973 as Compuserve. In 1976, Hayek conceived of free market money, denationalisation of currency. About that time, open source crypto became the standard approach, and within a few years we had RSA and other standards. I suspect that the arrival of technologies like encryption and bitTorrent and peer to peer networks and digital bearer instruments and Loom are the harbingers of doom to the old civilisation. A new culture based on open source and consent is replacing the old culture of compulsion and limited competition. These transitions can be tricky. And, in general, those who have made their lives out of forcing other people to pay taxes and serve in the military against their will and obey endless mindless regulations don't deserve any respect, not even for their worthless lives. Isaac Asimov wrote about that same time that an empire which is allowed to last too many generations brings on a worse dark age when it collapses. Its collapse is inevitable. The only question is how long the authoritarian regime will survive before it collapses. And the consequence of that question is that the longer it lasts, the slower will be the recovery. The more knowledge will be lost in the transition. And the more despair people will have before they get on with setting up a new way of doing things. Regards, Jim http://bostontea.us/

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Re: [gsc] US too delusional to fix
by info 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> is shedding some cars and banks really the decline? These are symptoms. They are symptoms of the grab for power by vested economic and political interests, and to hell with everyone else. > Was it ever a incline to begin with? Yes, very clearly. You are perhaps a little young to remember a time when every year, planes went higher and faster, more things were available to more people, the per capita income kept rising, new records were set in nearly every area of human activity, all the time. If you didn't live before 1969, you missed the peak. In Western Civilisation, people used to travel faster than the speed of sound. They don't any longer. People used to visit the Moon. They don't any longer. Private passenger rail service used to be available. It is not any longer. People used to have a reasonable expectation of a future with more inventions, brighter, faster, niftier vehicles. But, of course, the intention of the socialists has always been to prevent that future, to license all activities, to regulate all conduct, to prevent innovation, to destroy entrepreneurship, to have boots smashing human faces, forever. So, naturally, we don't have those things to anticipate. The inventors have invented, but they cannot make any money because they aren't allowed to sell their products. The Moller air car cannot be flown except as an experimental aircraft. The ducted fan personal aircraft can't be flown except as an experimental aircraft. Richard Branson couldn't enter the USA to look at the designs for his new spaceship because he's a foreign national. The civilisation that Raven refers to has peaked. It peaked about 40 years go. It cannot advance because too many people are trying to live with other people's money. The burden of government is too great. The idiocy of self-important central planners is in the way of any and every accomplishment. The way to solve this problem has traditionally been for the thin veneer of civil behavior to wear off, and people go out and slaughter the scum who have been causing them grief and aggravation. When every city has every lamp post and city building decorated with the eviscerated bodies of the filth who think they govern us without our consent, then a new culture can arise to replace the old. In some ways, the alternatives already exist. The old culture developed a robust inter-connected network or reticulum of networked computer systems. About the same time that the peak accomplishments of the old culture were impressing the masses, people began to develop open source cryptography. The old system almost certainly cannot last indefinitely. The problem with solving problems with other people's money is, as Maggie Thatcher noted, eventually you run out. At a guess, that was Maggie quoting Hayek. Sensible fuck. About 1969, DARPA funded the first mil-net which was adapted to commercial use in 1973 as Compuserve. In 1976, Hayek conceived of free market money, denationalisation of currency. About that time, open source crypto became the standard approach, and within a few years we had RSA and other standards. I suspect that the arrival of technologies like encryption and bitTorrent and peer to peer networks and digital bearer instruments and Loom are the harbingers of doom to the old civilisation. A new culture based on open source and consent is replacing the old culture of compulsion and limited competition. These transitions can be tricky. And, in general, those who have made their lives out of forcing other people to pay taxes and serve in the military against their will and obey endless mindless regulations don't deserve any respect, not even for their worthless lives. Isaac Asimov wrote about that same time that an empire which is allowed to last too many generations brings on a worse dark age when it collapses. Its collapse is inevitable. The only question is how long the authoritarian regime will survive before it collapses. And the consequence of that question is that the longer it lasts, the slower will be the recovery. The more knowledge will be lost in the transition. And the more despair people will have before they get on with setting up a new way of doing things. Regards, Jim http://bostontea.us/

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Re: [tahoe-dev] Resurrecting Mojo Nation
by James A. Donald 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 2012-06-10 2:07 PM, Jack Byer wrote: > This isn't the first time a combination of Bitcoin and tahoe-lafs has > been suggested but I'd like to ask a different question than just > whether or not is makes sense to use bitcoins to pay people for > storage. Is it practical to go back to the original goal of MN instead > of a limited subset if the reasons for the project's failure are > addressed? From what I can tell the pricing mechanism of MN was broken > because it didn't really have a market. A market needs independent > decision-making agents bidding against each other to resolve > conflicting goals and MN didn't have that. It's not realistic to > expect users to sit in front of a screen all day and daytrade Mojo in > order to achieve price discovery. Mojo nation had an automatic auction scheme: When acting as a server your computer serviced requests starting with those offering the best price, down to the worst, thus when operating as a server, automatic price discovery. When acting as a client the client should have automatically adjusted its offers in accordance with its user's performance goals and price limits, trying automatically to pay the lowest price consistent with adequate service, trying to discover market clearing prices with minimal human intervention and make that information available to the user. I don't think it did. So as a server, there was automatic price discovery, as a client, there was, to the best of my knowledge, no useful automatic price discovery. For micropayments, where your computer performs lots of transactions on your behalf without consulting you, this was an unacceptable flaw. I have never seen a post mortem from the Mojo Nation developers. Would like to see one. Perhaps one exists, and I just missed it. Seems to me that Tahoe fails because it retreated from the goals of Mojo Nation - as Mojo Nation itself did. To achieve reliability, you really want a large number of servers, for a large number of servers you need a large community, preferably the entire world as one community, but if you have large community, tahoe gives you the tragedy of the commons. Tahoe relies on social enforcement of good behavior. A community large enough to produce benefits from shared and distributed storage is large enough that the cost of informal social enforcement of good behavior is excessive - and bad social behavior results in unreliable storage. Also, tahoe abandons EGTP. We need a replacement for TCP that provides end to end encryption, protocol negotiation, and NAT tunneling. TCP is an unworkable protocol in a large, untrusting, and untrustworthy society. EGTP was such a replacement, or was intended to be such a replacement. I would say that the main result of the Tahoe experiment is that you really have to do what Mojo Nation attempted to do, and that the subset has problems. Bittorrent was a successful descendent of Mojo Nation, but because storage is not rewarded, torrents go unseeded. Need to reward both storage and bandwidth. Mojo Nation done right would be bittorrent with the capability to support both mutable and immutable files (a torrent is an immutable file), with an incentive to seed, and with the capability to support an enormous number of inactive seeds without overhead costs. We would like the capability to support mutable files, as tahoe does, so that we can have lists of immutable files, as tahoe does. Such a mutable list would be the equivalent of the pirate bay. _______________________________________________ tahoe-dev mailing list tahoe-dev(a)tahoe-lafs.org https://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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FC: Ex-GOP senator's wife pleads to email attack campaign
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

http://www.cluebot.com/article.pl?sid=01/06/15/0135212 Ex-GOP Senator's Wife Pleads to Email Attack Campaign posted by Declan (declan(a)well.com) on Thursday June 14, @08:32PM The wife of a U.S. senator who unsuccessfully ran for re-election in 2000 plead "no contest" on Thursday to charges of using a pseudonym to send email messages that disparaged her husband's Democratic rival. Minnesota prosecutors charged Christine Gunhus, who married former Republican senator Rod Grams after working on his campaign, with violating state criminal laws. Grams' rival, Democratic-Farmer-Labor candidate Mike Ciresi, had filed a complaint under the Minnesota Fair Campaign Practices Act. The risks of using technology you don't completely understand and that could leak your identity are worth noting: * Gunhus is accused of using a Hotmail account (Katie Stevens -- kylomb(a)hotmail.com) to send the disparaging email messages, which talked about how Ciresi had represented corporate polluters and anti-union companies. But Hotmail includes an X-Originating-IP: header that shows the IP address of the sender -- a problem if you're typing it from the opposing campaign's computer! * Prosecutors say they traced the IP address back to an AT&T WorldNet user who repeatedly used the "Katie Stevens" Hotmail account by connecting from Gunhus' home number. (Guess they keep Caller ID logs.) Apparently the person using the "Katie Stevens" pseudonym was smart at first, sending the mail from a Kinko's store, but then got sloppy. * The email attacks included Microsoft Word attachments, which a Ciresi aide investigated. The aide found that Word listed the document authors as Grams staffers including -- you guessed it -- Christine Gunhus. * Democratic researchers reported that they found Globally Unique Identifiers (GUIDs) in the Word documents. The GUID includes the Ethernet MAC address. Prosecutors last August obtained a search warrant to seize Gunhus' computer, from which they could extract the MAC address if the Ethernet card was still the same. * Let's not forget the political risk. In an article in the Minneapolis Star-Tribune on the pseudonymous mail campaign last year, the Grams campaign offered a remarkably narrow denial. A spokesman hedged: "We didn't put this together and send it out of the Grams campaign office," leaving open the question of whether it was sent by a campaign worker from another location. * And what about the legal risk to free speech? The Minnesota Civil Liberties Union reasonably argues that a criminal law that bans sending pseudonymous messages is unconstitutional. A Supreme Court decision, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission (http://www.epic.org/free_speech/mcintyre.html) says that a prohibition on the distribution of anonymous campaign literature violates the First Amendment. The state law seems to be ecumenical in its application: A Republican has used it to attack the Sierra Club (http://www.fcregister.com/ziegler11_6_00.htm) Epilogue: Grams managed to derail his Democratic rival's primary bid, and Ciresi did not win his party's nomination. Even though Grams lost the general election in the fall, that hasn't halted his political ambitions. The Washington Times reported on April 13 that Grams is reportedly considering a challenge in 2002 to U.S. Senator Paul Wellstone, a liberal Democrat. _________________________________________________________________ Slate articles from last year on the pseudonymous attacks: http://slate.msn.com/netelection/entries/00-07-21_86798.asp http://slate.msn.com/netelection/entries/00-09-13_89569.asp City Pages article from last year: http://www.citypages.com/databank/21/1032/article8969.asp AP article on the "no contest" plea this week: http://www.infobeat.com/cgi-bin/WebObjects/IBFrontEnd.woa/wa/fullStory?arti… ------------------------------------------------------------------------- POLITECH -- Declan McCullagh's politics and technology mailing list You may redistribute this message freely if you include this notice. To subscribe, visit http://www.politechbot.com/info/subscribe.html This message is archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----- End forwarded message -----

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Re: [tahoe-dev] Resurrecting Mojo Nation
by James A. Donald 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 2012-06-10 2:07 PM, Jack Byer wrote: > This isn't the first time a combination of Bitcoin and tahoe-lafs has > been suggested but I'd like to ask a different question than just > whether or not is makes sense to use bitcoins to pay people for > storage. Is it practical to go back to the original goal of MN instead > of a limited subset if the reasons for the project's failure are > addressed? From what I can tell the pricing mechanism of MN was broken > because it didn't really have a market. A market needs independent > decision-making agents bidding against each other to resolve > conflicting goals and MN didn't have that. It's not realistic to > expect users to sit in front of a screen all day and daytrade Mojo in > order to achieve price discovery. Mojo nation had an automatic auction scheme: When acting as a server your computer serviced requests starting with those offering the best price, down to the worst, thus when operating as a server, automatic price discovery. When acting as a client the client should have automatically adjusted its offers in accordance with its user's performance goals and price limits, trying automatically to pay the lowest price consistent with adequate service, trying to discover market clearing prices with minimal human intervention and make that information available to the user. I don't think it did. So as a server, there was automatic price discovery, as a client, there was, to the best of my knowledge, no useful automatic price discovery. For micropayments, where your computer performs lots of transactions on your behalf without consulting you, this was an unacceptable flaw. I have never seen a post mortem from the Mojo Nation developers. Would like to see one. Perhaps one exists, and I just missed it. Seems to me that Tahoe fails because it retreated from the goals of Mojo Nation - as Mojo Nation itself did. To achieve reliability, you really want a large number of servers, for a large number of servers you need a large community, preferably the entire world as one community, but if you have large community, tahoe gives you the tragedy of the commons. Tahoe relies on social enforcement of good behavior. A community large enough to produce benefits from shared and distributed storage is large enough that the cost of informal social enforcement of good behavior is excessive - and bad social behavior results in unreliable storage. Also, tahoe abandons EGTP. We need a replacement for TCP that provides end to end encryption, protocol negotiation, and NAT tunneling. TCP is an unworkable protocol in a large, untrusting, and untrustworthy society. EGTP was such a replacement, or was intended to be such a replacement. I would say that the main result of the Tahoe experiment is that you really have to do what Mojo Nation attempted to do, and that the subset has problems. Bittorrent was a successful descendent of Mojo Nation, but because storage is not rewarded, torrents go unseeded. Need to reward both storage and bandwidth. Mojo Nation done right would be bittorrent with the capability to support both mutable and immutable files (a torrent is an immutable file), with an incentive to seed, and with the capability to support an enormous number of inactive seeds without overhead costs. We would like the capability to support mutable files, as tahoe does, so that we can have lists of immutable files, as tahoe does. Such a mutable list would be the equivalent of the pirate bay. _______________________________________________ tahoe-dev mailing list tahoe-dev(a)tahoe-lafs.org https://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS Weekly Call report 2012-08-29
by Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Folks: Here is your traditional, once-a-week, cryptic, and potentially inaccurate summary of the developer conference call. In what follows I make no attempt to explain the context. Sorry -- don't have time right now! However, we do try to explain contexts on tickets, so if this sounds interesting to you, you can probably figure out what we're talking about by reading #127, #615, #821, #827, #1455, #1797, and/or #1798. The ultimate goal is to allow you to view arbitrary content when loaded from your Tahoe-LAFS gateway without allowing it to spy on or interfere with other content also loaded from your Tahoe-LAFS gateway. (And by "view" content I mean execute that content as a program.) This is good to prevent exploits of "decentralized web apps" (such as my blog: B9). Note that decentralized web apps hosted on Tahoe-LAFS are _already_ pretty well-defended from one another. The unguessable URIs go a long way to preventing a lot of attacks. This work is just about closing off that one weird attack (which requires the user to navigate *from* the prize content *to* the malicious content for it to work) and also about providing Defense In Depth so that other unforeseen attacks will be defeated before we even imagine them. B9 https://lafsgateway.zooko.com/uri/URI:DIR2-RO:d73ap7mtjvv7y6qsmmwqwai4ii:tq… https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/127# Cap URLs leaked via HTTP Referer header https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/615# Can JavaScript loaded from Tahoe access all your content which is loaded from Tahoe? https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/821# A script in a file viewed through the WUI can obtain the file's read cap https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/827# Put file download links ('?save=true') in WUI directory listings https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/1455# WUI: ambiently accessible pages should framebust in order to prevent UI redressing attacks https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/1797# WUI: view content in an HTML5 sandboxed iframe https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/1798# Segregate gateway HTTP ports: one for raw bytes and one for generated WUI pages Tahoe-LAFS Developer Conference Call 2012-08-28 In attendance: Zooko, David-Sarah, Brian scribe: Zooko defense against malicious javascript Using html5 iframe sandboxing, each request to the gateway to load the content of a cap "$CAP" actually returns a generated HTML page containing a sandboxed iframe tag with src=SERVER:BYTESPORT/cap/$CAP. b" Kaminsky back-jacking b" an additional authority when the attacker knows the readcap, but we want to prevent him from causing your browser to execute the contents in certain context? / David-Sarah's weird idea of an extra key per gateway b" backward compatibility with scripts/apps that use the WAPI to load raw bytes of caps? What authority to I intend to extend to target content when I click on its link in source content? proposal: I intend for the target content to receive *no more authority* when I click on its link than if I had typed in its URL. Ways that this is not what the web currently does: b" Click on a little question mark next to a field, it pops open a very small explanation. If you go back to the original window and click the question mark again, it will pop open the same explanation window instead of a new one. b" Generate a virtual history when everything is really /app#pageid possible threat models: Game 1: There is a secret prize cap, and you -- the attacker -- win if any code of yours learns the secret cap. I will run your code, and navigate around however you like, as a user. (The Kaminsky back-jacking attack is a successful attack in this sort of game. It requires that the user will navigate *from* the secret prize document *to* attacker-controlled content.) Game 2: There is a secret prize cap, and the user has it loaded *from the barenakedcap port* in a window. Then the user navigates from that content to an attacker-provided link. The link can, at the attacker's discretion, point to attacker-controlled content stored in LAFS. So, if the link goes to a barenakedcap containing attacker-controlled content, then the Kaminsky back-jacking attack will work, letting that attacker-controlled content gain access to the prize cap. But if the link goes to an HTML5 sandbox wrappedcap, our use of HTML5 sandboxing will prevent the resulting attacker-controlled content from gaining the prize cap. David-Sarah had an idea for a defense that might help in this Game 2 or in a related game, involving another encryption key which is known to this gateway and unknown to the attacker. Brian argued that the attacker-controlled content, that gets loaded in this gateway and given access to that content, will eventually learn any such key or any such transformation of the URL. Zooko proposed one-time barenaked URLs -- when the gateway receives a request to load a wrappedcap, then it generates an unguessable nonce, serves up the HTML5 sandbox wrapper which includes <iframe src="$SERVER:$BARENAKEDDATAPORT/$NONCE">, and over on the barenakeddata port, it will answer *only* the first request for $NONCE by serving up the content. (Any subsequent requests will get some kind of error.) After the call was over, I, Zooko, began to wonder what's the point of the barenakeddata port at all, and if the sandbox port could, instead of including a src= link pointing to the one-time-URL on the barenakeddata port, instead include the actual content in the script tag. I think Brian mentioned something like that on the call, about having the gateway put all of the content into a data URL to put into the script tag, or something. One possible motivation to have the barenakeddata port at all is to support applications that need access to the pristine, bitwise exact data, such as in order to download it to disk. It is kind of funny that we want to have an HTTP server to serve up pure data, but we never, never want a full-fledged HTTP client (which interprets Javascript and HTML and all that) to look at it! Full-fledged HTTP clients should only look at the other HTTP server -- the one that serves up sandboxed content. Only custom scripts should look at the one that serves up pure bytes. _______________________________________________ tahoe-dev mailing list tahoe-dev(a)tahoe-lafs.org https://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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by 3diaz23＠msn.com 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

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