July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

[IP] New research on foreign intelligence surveillance/wiretapping
by Dave Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

...... Forwarded Message ....... From: Peter Swire <peter(a)peterswire.net> To: dave(a)farber.net Date: Wed, 08 Sep 2004 11:50:34 -0400 Subj: New research on foreign intelligence surveillance/wiretapping Dave: Earlier today you posted one of my current research papers on secrecy/openness that a reader sent you. Here is a link to the other new paper, "The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law." http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=586616 Last year, for the first time, more wiretap orders were issued in the United States under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act than for all law enforcement actions. This paper gives the most thorough discussion to date of the history and theory of the special laws and institutions used for foreign intelligence surveillance. It analyzes the major changes in the USA-PATRIOT Act, most of which sunset at the end of 2005. It then provides a number of proposals for reform. As part of the overhaul of the U.S. intelligence system, there should be more discussion of the legal rules that govern intelligence activities conducted within the United States. There are compelling reasons to keep much of this surveillance activity secret. There are also compelling reasons to create effective checks and balances in the system, so that secret surveillance powers do not slide into abuses of those powers. As key FISA provisions sunset in 2005, this paper seeks to provide a basis for a more informed public debate. Best, Peter Prof. Peter P. Swire Moritz College of Law of the Ohio State University John Glenn Scholar in Public Policy Research (240) 994-4142; www.peterswire.net ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

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[tor-talk] With a Massive Hardware Hack, Libyan Rebels Hijack Disabled Cell Phone Network
by Christopher A. Lindsey 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Apologies in advance. This is not directly related to Tor. However, it's inspiring and is related to the circumvention of bad actors attempting to restrict people's communication. And, maybe they did use Tor, too! ;-) Excerpt: The Wall Street Journal today brings us an amazing story of a few smart engineers, a couple of big-money backers, and one enormous hardware hack. But todays tale of Libyan rebels and a few international telecom experts hijacking the Libyana cellphone service from strongman Col. Moammar Gadhafis government isnt just another chapter in an ongoing story. Its poignant--perhaps even prescient--reminder of the way 21st century technology is reshaping the geopolitical landscape. Since Irans Twitter Revolution and Egypts successful ouster of former president Hosni Mubarak (largely organized via social networking tools), plenty has been written about the role of social media in political revolution and freedom on the whole. But social media relies on the Web, and in cases of revolution dictatorial regimes often do what they do best: they pull the levers of power, in this case the lever that shuts down the Web. Full article: http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2011-04/massive-hardware-hack-liby… Referenced Wall Street Journal article: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703841904576256512991215284.h… Take care, Chris _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[tor-talk] With a Massive Hardware Hack, Libyan Rebels Hijack Disabled Cell Phone Network
by Christopher A. Lindsey 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Apologies in advance. This is not directly related to Tor. However, it's inspiring and is related to the circumvention of bad actors attempting to restrict people's communication. And, maybe they did use Tor, too! ;-) Excerpt: The Wall Street Journal today brings us an amazing story of a few smart engineers, a couple of big-money backers, and one enormous hardware hack. But todays tale of Libyan rebels and a few international telecom experts hijacking the Libyana cellphone service from strongman Col. Moammar Gadhafis government isnt just another chapter in an ongoing story. Its poignant--perhaps even prescient--reminder of the way 21st century technology is reshaping the geopolitical landscape. Since Irans Twitter Revolution and Egypts successful ouster of former president Hosni Mubarak (largely organized via social networking tools), plenty has been written about the role of social media in political revolution and freedom on the whole. But social media relies on the Web, and in cases of revolution dictatorial regimes often do what they do best: they pull the levers of power, in this case the lever that shuts down the Web. Full article: http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2011-04/massive-hardware-hack-liby… Referenced Wall Street Journal article: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703841904576256512991215284.h… Take care, Chris _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[IP] New research on foreign intelligence surveillance/wiretapping
by Dave Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

...... Forwarded Message ....... From: Peter Swire <peter(a)peterswire.net> To: dave(a)farber.net Date: Wed, 08 Sep 2004 11:50:34 -0400 Subj: New research on foreign intelligence surveillance/wiretapping Dave: Earlier today you posted one of my current research papers on secrecy/openness that a reader sent you. Here is a link to the other new paper, "The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law." http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=586616 Last year, for the first time, more wiretap orders were issued in the United States under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act than for all law enforcement actions. This paper gives the most thorough discussion to date of the history and theory of the special laws and institutions used for foreign intelligence surveillance. It analyzes the major changes in the USA-PATRIOT Act, most of which sunset at the end of 2005. It then provides a number of proposals for reform. As part of the overhaul of the U.S. intelligence system, there should be more discussion of the legal rules that govern intelligence activities conducted within the United States. There are compelling reasons to keep much of this surveillance activity secret. There are also compelling reasons to create effective checks and balances in the system, so that secret surveillance powers do not slide into abuses of those powers. As key FISA provisions sunset in 2005, this paper seeks to provide a basis for a more informed public debate. Best, Peter Prof. Peter P. Swire Moritz College of Law of the Ohio State University John Glenn Scholar in Public Policy Research (240) 994-4142; www.peterswire.net ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

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[tor-dev] Proposal: Tuning the Parameters for the Path Bias Defense
by Mike Perry 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Also exists at https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/mikeperry/torspec.git/blob/path-bias-tun… -------------------------------------------------------------------- Title: Tuning the Parameters for the Path Bias Defense Author: Mike Perry Created: 01-10-2012 Status: Open Target: 0.2.4.x+ Overview This proposal describes how we can use the results of simulations in combination with network scans to set reasonable limits for the Path Bias defense, which causes clients to be informed about and ideally rotate away from Guards that provide extremely low circuit success rates. Motivation The Path Bias defense is designed to defend against a type of route capture where malicious Guard nodes deliberately fail circuits that extend to non-colluding Exit nodes to maximize their network utilization in favor of carrying only compromised traffic. This attack was explored in the academic literature in [1], and a variant involving cryptographic tagging was posted to tor-dev[2] in March. In the extreme, the attack allows an adversary that carries c/n of the network capacity to deanonymize c/n of the network connections, breaking the O((c/n)^2) property of Tor's original threat model. Design Description The Path Bias defense is a client-side accounting mechanism in Tor that tracks the circuit failure rate for each of the client's guards. Clients maintain two integers for each of their guards: a count of the number of times a circuit was extended at least one hop through that guard, and a count of the number of circuits that successfully complete through that guard. The ratio of these two numbers is used to determine a circuit success rate for that Guard. The system should issue a notice log message when Guard success rate falls below 70%, a warn when Guard success rate falls below 50%, and should drop the Guard when the success rate falls below 30%. To ensure correctness, checks are performed to ensure that we do not count successes without also counting the first hop. Similarly, to provide a moving average of recent Guard activity while still preserving the ability to ensure correctness, we "scale" the success counts by an integer divisor (currently 2) when the counts exceed the moving average window (300) and when the division does not produce integer truncation. No log messages should be displayed, nor should any Guard be dropped until it has completed at least 150 first hops (inclusive). Analysis: Simulation To test the defense in the face of various types of malicious and non-malicious Guard behavior, I wrote a simulation program in Python[3]. The simulation confirmed that without any defense, an adversary that provides c/n of the network capacity is able to observe c/n of the network flows using circuit failure attacks. It also showed that with the defense, an adversary that wishes to evade detection has compromise rates bounded by: P(compromise) <= (c/n)^2 * (100/CUTOFF_PERCENT) circs_per_client <= circuit_attempts*(c/n) In this way, the defense restores the O((c/n)^2) compromise property, but unfortunately only over long periods of time (see Security Considerations below). The spread between the cutoff values and the normal rate of circuit success has a substantial effect on false positives. From the simulation's results, the sweet spot for the size of this spread appears to be 10%. In other words, we want to set the cutoffs such that they are 10% below the success rate we expect to see in normal usage. The simulation also demonstrates that larger "scaling window" sizes reduce false positives for instances where non-malicious guards experience some ambient rate of circuit failure. Analysis: Live Scan Preliminary Guard node scanning using the txtorcon circuit scanner[4] shows normal circuit completion rates between 80-90% for most Guard nodes. However, it also showed that CPU overload conditions can easily push success rates as low as 45%. Even more concerning is that for a brief period during the live scan, success rates dropped to 50-60% network-wide (regardless of Guard node choice). Based on these results, the notice condition should be 70%, the warn condition should be 50%, and the drop condition should be 30%. Future Analysis: Deployed Clients It's my belief that further analysis should be done by deploying loglines for all three thresholds in clients in the live network to utilize user reports on how often high rates of circuit failure are seen before we deploy changes to rotate away from failing Guards. I believe these log lines should be deployed in 0.2.3.x clients, to maximize the exposure of the code to varying network conditions, so that we have enough data to consider deploying the Guard-dropping cutoff in 0.2.4.x. Security Considerations While the scaling window does provide freshness and can help mitigate "bait-and-switch" attacks, it also creates the possibility of conditions where clients can be forced off their Guards due to temporary network-wide CPU DoS. This provides another reason beyond false positive concerns to set the scaling window as large as is reasonable. A DoS directed at specific Guard nodes is unlikely to allow an adversary to cause clients to rotate away from that Guard, because it is unlikely that the DoS can be precise enough to allow first hops to that Guard to succeed, but also cause extends to fail. This leaves network-wide DoS as the primary vector for influencing clients. Simulation results show that in order to cause clients to rotate away from a Guard node that previously succeeded 80% of its circuits, an adversary would need to induce a 25% success rate for around 350 circuit attempts before the client would reject it, or a 5% success rate for around 215 attempts, both using a scaling window of 300 circuits. Assuming one circuit per Guard per 10 minutes of active client activity, this is a sustained network-wide DoS attack of 60 hours for the 25% case, or 38 hours for the 5% case. Presumably this is enough time for the directory authorities to respond by altering the pb_disablepct consensus parameter before clients rotate, especially given that most clients are not active for even 38 hours on end, and will tend to stop building circuits while idle. If we raised the scaling window to 500 circuits, it would require 1050 circuits if the DoS brought circuit success down to 25% (175 hours), and 415 circuits if the DoS brought the circuit success down to 5% (69 hours). The tradeoff, though, is that larger scaling window values allow Guard nodes to compromise clients for duty cycles of around the size of this window (up to the (c/n)^2 * 100/CUTOFF_PERCENT limit in aggregate), so we do have to find balance between these concerns. Implementation Notes: Log Messages Log messages need to be chosen with care to avoid alarming users. I suggest: Notice: "Your Guard %s is failing more circuits than usual. Most likely this means the Tor network is overloaded. Success counts are %d/%d." Warn: "Your Guard %s is failing a very large amount of circuits. Most likely this means the Tor network is overloaded, but it could also mean an attack against you or potentially the Guard itself. Success counts are %d/%d." Drop: "Your Guard %s is failing an extremely large amount of circuits. [Tor has disabled use of this Guard.] Success counts are %d/%d." The second piece of the Drop message would not be present in 0.2.3.x, since the Guard won't actually be dropped. Implementation Notes: Consensus Parameters The following consensus parameters reflect the constants listed in the proposal. These parameters should also be available for override in torrc. pb_mincircs=150 The minimum number of first hops before we log or drop Guards. pb_noticepct=70 The threshold of circuit success below which we display a notice. pb_warnpct=50 The threshold of circuit success below which we display a warn. pb_disablepct=30 The threshold of circuit success below which we disable the guard. pb_scalecircs=300 The number of first hops at which we scale the counts down. pb_scalefactor=2 The integer divisor by which we scale. 1. http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/ccs07-doa.pdf 2. https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2012-March/003347.html 3. https://gitweb.torproject.org/torflow.git/tree/HEAD:/CircuitAnalysis/PathBi… 4. https://github.com/meejah/txtorcon/blob/exit_scanner/apps/exit_scanner/fail… -- Mike Perry _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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FC: U.N. security investigating irate email from U.S. gun owners
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Summary: Fewer than 100 angry email messages from American gun owners led U.N. conference organizers to turn over the correspondence to U.N. internal security forces. The U.N. gun-summit began today, and -- see below -- includes proposals for a global gun database, tracking of firearms, complaints about encryption and so on. What's interesting is that even this limited outcry was enough to prompt U.N. officials to make the appropriate "we're not trying to limit private ownership of guns," apparently backtracking from previous positions. Statement on U.N. meeting from Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms: http://www.usnewswire.com/topnews/Current_Releases/0601-139.html To see what kind of reaction the U.N. conference has provoked: http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a3ae8ec916ace.htm http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2001/SmallArmsConfBrf.doc.htm >He said he had seen some of the nearly 100 letters and e-mails that had >been sent by gun-ownership advocates. They were mainly irate and "strongly >worded" protests, and allegations that the United Nations wanted to take >guns away from civilians in conflict with the constitutional rights of >United States citizens. While he would not characterize any of the letters >as explicitly threatening, they had been turned over to United Nations >security authorities. Mr. Honwana added that it was not for his Department >to determine whether the correspondence was threatening. It was up to the >Organization's security staff to make that determination. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/dc2782.doc.htm >A small arms and light weapons register could be established, adds the >report, at the national level to assist information-gathering and >information-sharing. One option could be to extend this register to the >regional level. While the option of a United Nations register was >discussed, significant opposition continues to exist to a global register >on the basis that it is premature and the provision of such sensitive >information could undermine, not enhance, national security. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/dc2746.doc.htm >On specific points to be included in the recommendations to the >Conference, the representative of Pakistan promoted a proper marking >system for numbering weapons... Some tracking system was in the interest >of both producers and governments, which should keep the information under >their authority at all times. http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/CAB/smallarms/files/2001conf2e.pdf >Furthermore, some of these activities are already >conducted by the brokers or other participants in the >chain of the illicit trade, by using e-commerce channels >and networks. This e-commerce is frequently encoded >or encrypted, thus placing an extra burden on the law >enforcement institutions to detect it. -Declan ******** United Nations opens gun conference The United Nations opens a special session in New York focusing on the international market for small arms. The UN has already angered proponents of freedom with proposals to limit or prohibit private ownership of small arms. (07/09/01) http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,29062,00.html UN investigating email from gun owners as 'threat' The United Nations is investigating whether irate letters and email from American gun enthusiasts protesting an upcoming conference on illicit trade in small arms constitute a security threat. The body has received about 100 complaints from Americans "who erroneously believe the conference seeks to infringe on their right to bear arms," said a U.N. spokesman. (07/05/01) http://ap.tbo.com/ap/breaking/MGAFR56XSOC.html ------------------------------------------------------------------------- POLITECH -- Declan McCullagh's politics and technology mailing list You may redistribute this message freely if you include this notice. To subscribe, visit http://www.politechbot.com/info/subscribe.html This message is archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----- End forwarded message -----

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Re: [tahoe-dev] Announcing RentaNode.nl: Tahoe-LAFS storage nodes for rent
by Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Welcome to the world, rentanode.nl! I'm delighted to hear that there is another company focused on helping customers use Tahoe-LAFS. I've already had two potential customers ask (on twitter) if it would be possible for someone to lease service from both rentanode.nl *and* leastauthority.com and spread the ciphertext across both services. Because of the architecture of Tahoe-LAFS, it would be easy for us to make that possible. Let's talk about making sure it can work. With our current setup, leastauthority.com always provides the introducer, and since you said the customer can provide their own introducer for rentanode.nl, then the easiest way to do it would be to use LAE's introducer. Note: decentralized introduction, either by running multiple redundant introducers per #68, or by some more advanced gossip protocol, will probably be coming out in a future version of Tahoe-LAFS. Presumably that would make it even easier for customers to combine our services. Regards, Zooko P.S. I think the announcement of rentanode.nl should be a headline in the next edition of the Tahoe-LAFS Weekly News! https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/68# implement distributed introduction, remove Introducer as a single point of failure _______________________________________________ tahoe-dev mailing list tahoe-dev(a)tahoe-lafs.org https://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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FC: U.N. security investigating irate email from U.S. gun owners
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Summary: Fewer than 100 angry email messages from American gun owners led U.N. conference organizers to turn over the correspondence to U.N. internal security forces. The U.N. gun-summit began today, and -- see below -- includes proposals for a global gun database, tracking of firearms, complaints about encryption and so on. What's interesting is that even this limited outcry was enough to prompt U.N. officials to make the appropriate "we're not trying to limit private ownership of guns," apparently backtracking from previous positions. Statement on U.N. meeting from Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms: http://www.usnewswire.com/topnews/Current_Releases/0601-139.html To see what kind of reaction the U.N. conference has provoked: http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a3ae8ec916ace.htm http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2001/SmallArmsConfBrf.doc.htm >He said he had seen some of the nearly 100 letters and e-mails that had >been sent by gun-ownership advocates. They were mainly irate and "strongly >worded" protests, and allegations that the United Nations wanted to take >guns away from civilians in conflict with the constitutional rights of >United States citizens. While he would not characterize any of the letters >as explicitly threatening, they had been turned over to United Nations >security authorities. Mr. Honwana added that it was not for his Department >to determine whether the correspondence was threatening. It was up to the >Organization's security staff to make that determination. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/dc2782.doc.htm >A small arms and light weapons register could be established, adds the >report, at the national level to assist information-gathering and >information-sharing. One option could be to extend this register to the >regional level. While the option of a United Nations register was >discussed, significant opposition continues to exist to a global register >on the basis that it is premature and the provision of such sensitive >information could undermine, not enhance, national security. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/dc2746.doc.htm >On specific points to be included in the recommendations to the >Conference, the representative of Pakistan promoted a proper marking >system for numbering weapons... Some tracking system was in the interest >of both producers and governments, which should keep the information under >their authority at all times. http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/CAB/smallarms/files/2001conf2e.pdf >Furthermore, some of these activities are already >conducted by the brokers or other participants in the >chain of the illicit trade, by using e-commerce channels >and networks. This e-commerce is frequently encoded >or encrypted, thus placing an extra burden on the law >enforcement institutions to detect it. -Declan ******** United Nations opens gun conference The United Nations opens a special session in New York focusing on the international market for small arms. The UN has already angered proponents of freedom with proposals to limit or prohibit private ownership of small arms. (07/09/01) http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,29062,00.html UN investigating email from gun owners as 'threat' The United Nations is investigating whether irate letters and email from American gun enthusiasts protesting an upcoming conference on illicit trade in small arms constitute a security threat. The body has received about 100 complaints from Americans "who erroneously believe the conference seeks to infringe on their right to bear arms," said a U.N. spokesman. (07/05/01) http://ap.tbo.com/ap/breaking/MGAFR56XSOC.html ------------------------------------------------------------------------- POLITECH -- Declan McCullagh's politics and technology mailing list You may redistribute this message freely if you include this notice. To subscribe, visit http://www.politechbot.com/info/subscribe.html This message is archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----- End forwarded message -----

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Re: [tahoe-dev] Announcing RentaNode.nl: Tahoe-LAFS storage nodes for rent
by Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Welcome to the world, rentanode.nl! I'm delighted to hear that there is another company focused on helping customers use Tahoe-LAFS. I've already had two potential customers ask (on twitter) if it would be possible for someone to lease service from both rentanode.nl *and* leastauthority.com and spread the ciphertext across both services. Because of the architecture of Tahoe-LAFS, it would be easy for us to make that possible. Let's talk about making sure it can work. With our current setup, leastauthority.com always provides the introducer, and since you said the customer can provide their own introducer for rentanode.nl, then the easiest way to do it would be to use LAE's introducer. Note: decentralized introduction, either by running multiple redundant introducers per #68, or by some more advanced gossip protocol, will probably be coming out in a future version of Tahoe-LAFS. Presumably that would make it even easier for customers to combine our services. Regards, Zooko P.S. I think the announcement of rentanode.nl should be a headline in the next edition of the Tahoe-LAFS Weekly News! https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/68# implement distributed introduction, remove Introducer as a single point of failure _______________________________________________ tahoe-dev mailing list tahoe-dev(a)tahoe-lafs.org https://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[liberationtech] iPhones/iPads secretly track 'scary amount' of your movements
by Frank Corrigan 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

More reasons for activists/protesters in hostile (ordinary) environments not to bring along their mobile phone, latest cell connected gizmo. "The most immediate problem is that this data is stored in an easily-readable form on your machine" http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/04/20/secret_iphone_location_tracking/ _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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