December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Jim Bell goes to Jail!
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:28 PM 5/18/97 -0700, Alan Olsen wrote: >(There are also a number >of >psychological studies that show that people will do all sorts of horrific >things to their fellow man when someone in authority tells them to. If they >are led to believe that they are "bad" in some way, many will enjoy it.) Right. I read a book on that. I think it was called "The Millgram Experiment". Normal people would administer (fake, but they didn't know it) electroshocks to a subject even after the subject had stopped moving and could have been assumed to be unconscious or even dead. An excellent demonstration of the power of authority. And the gullibility of the average person. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi

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Re: Just Say "No" to Congress
by Blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Vladimir Z. Nuri, blowing smoke out his ears, wrote: >the question is not "how do we hold the government accountable for >our cash" but, "*when* will we"? [and] >anyone who disbelieves in the authority of the US government >yet sends them their tax money is a hypocrite. .......................................................................... The first sentence implies that Nurilogical proposes that government should be held accountable by its citizens, including himself ("*when* will we"). On the other hand, he obviously believes in the authority of the US government, as he has always supported it in arguments on the list, especially in counter arguments against TCM. So, it appears that VZN is not *ready* to hold the government accountable, preferring not to protest when his own money is withheld for him, but hypocritically wondering when everyone will make this will happen. However, he's correct: similar to the argument I made about there being no difference between those who kill the good along with the bad & the ugly (that's from the title of a Clint Eastwood movie, for those who aren't familiar with that line), all those who argue for morality and libertarian ideals, but still "give in" when it comes to tax time, are all losers. <g> But this shameless capitulation is intellectualized away with the explanation that everyone is outnumbered by the men holding the legalized guns, who are in turn supported by all those true believers in The American Socialist Way of Life; that way being: the reception of benefits without any need to be consciously aware of, to identify, their actual source or the actual method of their obtainment. .. Blanc .. Blanc

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Re: I Treat All My Enemies Equally
by Blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

TruthMonger wrote: > Blanc makes some excellent points about the average citizen being >caught in a ping-pong crossfire in the conflict between government >and anti-government forces. However, as I said, this is in the nature >of conflict and the citizen's best option may be to make a daily >effort to resist the government oppression, no matter how small it >may seem in any instance. ..................................................... Appreciate all the kudos, TruthMongrel. <g> The problem that I was talking about is that of not being able to distinguish one's enemies from one's friends because they all act alike and therefore being in a position of danger from either of them. In that case, it doesn't matter which philosophy (political, economic, etc.) one should support; the immediate fact of the matter is physical - physical safety from all those Cowboys & Indians trying to get rid of each other regardless of the reasons or the purpose. In that case they are not advancing the kind of philosophical cause which supports superior values and which results in better circumstances. They are not "separating the wheat from the shaf", they are not being descriminating about what should live and what should die, they are not allowing innocent bystanders to make a decision about which side they're on or what risks they are willing to take in the "war" which they may not realize is happening. In that case, the real end of a "terrorist" action is personal and has little to do with a preferable way of life for humans, or grievances against an unjust oppressor. When two "opposed" groups are willing to stick it you without concern, there is no difference between them. Because, what difference does it make? .. Blanc .. Blanc

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New rules re money transfers to foreign locations
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The NY Times reports that new rules will be announced Monday which will require non-bank financial institutions (like check-cashing stores, Western Union, etc.) to report transfers of $750 or greater with a foreign destination. (The old reporting threshold was $10K.) According to the article, the new regulation is expected to generate approximately one million additional forms per year for FINCEN/Treasury to process, and require 25,000 such NBFI's to register with Treasury. The regulation will take effect in 90 days after a public comment period. It does not apply to cash, instruments like traveler's checks, or domestic transfers; it also does not apply to banks themselves. (All of those mediums of transport are covered by different rules with other reporting requirements.) See <http://www.nytimes.com/yr/mo/day/news/national/drug-cartels.html>. -- Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: gbroiles(a)netbox.com | http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto.

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Re: CFV: moderate sci.cryonics -- I vote NO
by Igor Chudov ＠ home 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lewis McCarthy (lmccarth(a)cs.umass.edu) wrote in <3377FA31.167E(a)cs.umass.edu>: * Charles Platt writes: * > I feel it's unfortunate that the * > charter was worded to exclude anonymous postings, but clearly this * > news group does need to be moderated, and I believe that Keith will * > do so fairly and openly. * * That's all well and good, but the CFV is a referendum (in part) on the * particular charter that appears in the CFV, not on an alternate policy * that purportedly may be followed by the moderator. Unfairly applied That is correct. The promises by the proposed moderator are even more suspicious given that: This future moderator PROMISES TO VIOLATE HIS OWN CHARTER. The charter is absolutely clear in respect to what is not allowed: Charter> Unacceptable messages include personal attacks, messages Charter> posted without a valid sender address, and any message not Charter> pertaining to the topics above. (see http://xp5.dejanews.com/getdoc.xp?recnum=5944883&server=db97p2x&CONTEXT=864… for the charter and ballot) * written rules have a real chance of being challenged, whereas with * unwritten rules there's much less hope of receiving fair treatment. * Overly broad restrictions, like the one in the CFV regarding messages * from unreplyable senders, are a boon for selective enforcement. I repeat again, in my opinion, there is no valid reason for any moderated discussion newsgroup to ever forbid anonymous and pseudonymous postings. Such restrictions destroy the value that usenet newsgroups have. Correspondently, I will strongly oppose any proposal that restricts posters ability to post anonymously. Presence of such provision in the charter is a strong indication that the proponent is a control freak. * It's been a couple of years since I voted on a newsgroup proposal, but * I'll be voting NO on this sci.cryonics reorganization. Get back to me * if the charter is reworded s.t. the moderator is directed to judge a * message primarily based on its _content_ rather than its _sender_. Could not agree more! * CFV pointer: Message-ID <863077501.7020(a)isc.org>, posted to the usual * places on May 8 by David Bostwick * -- * Lewis http://www.cs.umass.edu/~lmccarth/lmkey.asc "And all the * science, I don't understand; it's just my job, eight days a week..."

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Crypto use to foil law enforcement?
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I ran across this entry in the Congressional Record which discusses several examples where encryption was discovered in the course of a law enforcement investigation. [Congressional Record: September 18, 1996 (Senate)][Page S10882-S10886] [...] Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I'm pleased that the Senate has passed the eonomic espionage bill. This is an important measure that I believe will save American business significant amounts of money. The theft of confidential information from American businesses is a serious problem, and this bill takes important steps in the right direction. I am particularly pleased that the Senate has accepted the amendment I offered with Senator Kyl. This amendment commissions the first-ever study on the criminal misuse of encryption technologies. Under the Grassley-Kyl amendment, court officers who prepare pre-sentencing reports will include information on the use of encryption to conceal criminal conduct, obstruct investigations, and commit crimes. The sentencing commission will then collect and collate this information and include it in its annual report to congress. In this way, I am hopeful that Congress and executive branch will have reliable data on whether the criminal misuse of encryption is actually a problem and, if so, what response to this problem would be appropriate. As chairman of the Oversight Subcommittee on the Judiciary Committee, I did an informal survey of state-level law enforcement concerning the criminal misuse of encryption. This informal survey, while not scientific, provides valuable insights into the actions of the criminal element in our society. Here are just some of the responses my subcommittee received. In one case involving John Lucich of the New Jersey attorney general's office was involved, a computer was seized pursuant to a warrant in a serious assault case. Examination revealed that approximately 20 percent of the hard drive files were encrypted. Investigators sought the assistance of two different Federal agencies. Both of these agencies were unsuccessful in decrypting the files. Finally, a third Federal agency was successful in decrypting the files after expending considerable resources. The Decrypted files did not contain evidence of the assault but rather contained evidence of child pornography. The encryption type likely used was ``DES.'' And Officer Tim O'Neill of the Roseville, California Police Department reported to the subcommittee that he participated in a search involving a complaint against a subject who was on probation for solicitation/annoyance of minors. The subject had a hidden encrypted file on his personal computer. In the ``slack'' area at the end of the file the officer found names, addresses, school, grade, and phone numbers of 4-5 young teen girls. The encryption type used was known as ``pincrypt.'' Officer Mike Menz of the same department advised the subcommittee that he was working on a joint State/Federal major check fraud case where part of the potential evidence was encrypted. Ivan Ortman, a senior prosecutor in Seattle, Washington, encountered some encrypted files and password protection in a cellular phone fraud investigation. For a number of files the popular and inexpensive ``PGP'' type of encryption was used. Orton indicated that no effort was even made to examine the files as the police could not locate any method for ``cracking that encryption.'' In other words, why try since such an effort is certain to be futile. Surely a rational society should look long and hard at this situation. Agent Chuck Davis of the Colorado Bureau of Investigation reported to the subcommittee that he has encountered encryption as well as password protection problems. In one embezzlement case, a computer system has seized. Examination revealed that files on the hard disk were encrypted. The software manufacturers were contacted and the technical personnel who wrote the program advised that, ``they had left no `back door' access to the product as this would adversely impact sales. The hallmark of the program's appeal is that it cannot be broken, even by those who created it.'' Agent Davis advised that his investigation was ``halted'' due to the time and expense of a ``brute force attack''. The encryption program used was entitled ``watchdog.'' Agent Davis also advised the subcommittee that password protection also presents problems for other types of investigators. In cases involving theft of drugs from an emergency room by a doctor, bribery/ extortion by a police officer, and the suicide by an 11 year-old boy after telling friends that he had been molested by a family friend, investigators encountered password protection. The first two cases were successfully resolved through assistance from the manufacturer of the software. The third case, however, especially illustrates the seriousness of decryption problems--determining the unique key or in this case, password from a large number of possibilities. According to Agent Davis, a mere 4 character password has 1.9 million possibilities due to the number of keyboard characters. Can you imagine how difficult it must be to figure a short, 4 character password. What if the password were 10 characters or 20 or more? It's easy to see why criminals are moving toward password protection for their records. -- Greg Broiles gbroiles(a)c2.net 510-986-8779 voice 510-986-8777 fax

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"wazoo"} = "<remailer(a)wazoo.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"shaman"} = "<remailer(a)lycaeum.org> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"hidden"} = "<remailer(a)hidden.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 19 May 97 6:49:06 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- nym config(a)nym.alias.net ******+*++#* 4:09 99.98% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de ++-+++-+--- 2:11:39 99.87% weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de ++-+-+-+--- 2:13:33 99.86% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net ---.-+.---- 5:30:41 99.83% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ******** *+* 13:32 99.63% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com +++.- ++*+++ 1:14:45 99.62% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net * *+**+**** 14:21 99.49% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com #####*## #++ 5:06 99.06% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com __ __ .--*-* 34:59:29 98.54% replay remailer(a)replay.com ** **.-+ 2:26:52 98.42% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net +-.-+-+ -+ 2:17:53 95.56% hidden remailer(a)hidden.net ##..-####* 2:30:26 93.35% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Need some info...
by Wasim Q. Malik 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi. I'm gonna give a talk on the subject of hacking/security soon. Need your help with it. Things that I'm gonna include are: what is hacking, ethics of hacking, psychlogy of hacking, other abstracts. Some technical stuff, such as hacking tools and tactics, including IP spoofing, packet sniffing, cracker programs, keyloggers, progs like satan, etc. Can you suggest some additional stuff to be included, or if you have any resources (URLs, articles, progs, HOW-TOs, graphics, anything!), related to any of the above topics, technical or whatever, please please do send it over. Your suggestions will be a great help, as well as any info. Thanks. Wasim Q. Malik Network Security Expert SDNP Pakistan

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Re: PGP 5.0 beta is out at PGP.com
by geeman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

and if they encrypted or eliminated the feature that logs all my pgp-encrypted traffic. At 11:39 AM 5/17/97 -0700, Alan Olsen wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >The pgp 5.0 beta is out. It is for Win95/NT 4.0 only. PGPKeys.exe pukes its >guts out when run. (At least on my machine.) > >It looks like they have hired a new graphics artist. The splash page looks >interesting. Nice if the rest would run... > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >Version: 5.0 beta >Charset: noconv > >iQEUAwUBM337SeQCP3v30CeZAQHrIwf3bwkNKXwDPb5R2qLMneIIWBTfYvwAGCQ6 >8xqd0BHSsD+7ZzF4u9iVZWV9sHN/62LxAo886FfDP7PtKG+JZrZCa+KOUj2Zw3qk >1wltug8/rylAoLHulXwFVfwWb001jMIsS5RYNqDLqyccVF2TWUbVKQEgH7EI9VJ3 >EU8gZzHF61ok+bqacmV/r7ANoIdfFRvLZHm0iGo6Xm4xHz8lw2JzDWWvnhWnEquD >mf3XUaNRVYnI4/+kgs8fx5golMY3pPQrl6PR0XdvvLJITUhiqM3SVTDs9IL4hWAx >V7WWGPHaJZw6nVAl5LNbLK9puGFw0FMap1a6Ld+HnmRlxlgpr8B/ >=gdHU >-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > >--- >| "Bill Clinton - Bringing back the sixties one Nixon at a time." | >|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | >| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | >|`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| >| http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/ |alan(a)ctrl-alt-del.com| > > >

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Re: Mail bombs from "helpful" Cypherpunks
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:26 pm -0400 on 5/18/97, Tim May wrote: > I have no way of > removing such "mail bombs" with my Eudora/POP system until they have been > downloaded to my machine My version of Eudora, and, I think, the freeware version also, has a little check box in the "Checking Mail" settings dialog which lets you leave messages over a certain size on the server, where you can delete them without having to download them. Since I'm on about 100 mail lists at last count, including, of course, the SET-dev list, where such godawful cluelessness (including, BTW, the use of multimegabyte .pdf, Microsoft Word <including macro viruses, of course>, and ASN1 files :-)) is commonplace, I have found this little checkbox a godsend. I have mine set at 100k. It works for me. Of course, Tim doesn't get to read this message, or any other, for that matter, to do him any good this time around... If we lived here, we'd be home now. Self reference is a dish best tasted cold, I suppose. Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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