December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: CyberScam
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:03 PM 10/22/98 -0700, Kevlar wrote: >And you were just kidding..... I wasn't kidding. I was absolutely sincere when I told him to shove a bowling ball up his ass. >http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/zdnn_smgraph_display/0,4436,2151220,00.ht… >Or search zdnet's site for "scam" and choose "A Bull In Bull Market". I read the article, and if that level of cluelessness is indicative of the mentality of your typical online trader, then they deserve what they get. I found a couple of quotes especially amusing. These are both from John Reed Stark, another official-type thrown into the internet without a fucking life preserver, it would seem. This lack of information gives rise to a situation "that ends up with victims not investing but gambling," Oh yeah, aside from these scammers, the stock market is otherwise a really solid, robust investment scheme. Playing the stock market is a gamble, pure and simple, and anyone dumb enough to listen to the likes of some random asshole touting his crappy stock deserves what they get. Darwinism as applied to capitalism. "Combine the Web's culture of trust, stir in the greatest bull market in history, add stocks that genuinely have had phenomenal growth, and you have victims who don't have any reason to disbelieve promises of guaranteed 20 percent returns." The Web's culture of trust? Oh good, another clueless idiot in charge of managing internet services. What culture of trust is it that I've missed in my internet travels? Is there some online place chock full of trusted souls, some Cyber-commune, that I missed? Oh well, like I said, any idiot that would buy into such an obviously fraudulent solicitation deserves what they get. Is it just working in a new medium that makes people such blatant morons, or is it simply indicative of the intelligence of your average American? I'd have to say that I'm inclined to believe the latter.

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Re: Women cannot commit rape? (fwd)
by lcs Mixmaster Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Choate wrote: > > Forwarded message: > > > Date: Wed, 21 Oct 1998 22:50:50 -0500 > > From: Kevin Elliott <k-elliott(a)wiu.edu> > > Subject: Re: Women cannot commit rape? > > > This is true in the United States as well. That's why in every state, > > I don't believe that is accurate. Just about 2 years ago two women were > sentenced to prison because they kidnapped and raped a man. > > Perhaps one of the more versed in case law members might remember it. > Could it have involved penetration with a blunt object? That would be more forceful than the "rape" in the French case that started the thread.

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Re: bank cosortium to form CA
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Fri, 23 Oct 1998 00:38:10 -0400 (EDT) From: Rich Salz <salzr(a)certco.com> To: cryptography(a)c2.net Subject: Re: bank cosortium to form CA Sender: owner-cryptography(a)c2.net I seem to have gotten myself dropped from the list, but luckily a friend forwarded (part of?) Steve's posting and Ben's (snarky :) followup. Let me try to give some details. The WSJ had a one-day exclusive, and their coverage was (from our perspective ;) not the best. You can find some other (free) coverage at www.wired.com, http://www.americanbanker.com/cgi-bin/read_intrastory?981021TECH999, and www.businesswire.com (sorry I don't have all the URL's convenient). Here's some details. I am not an official CertCo spokesman. Official press contacts can get contact info and collatoral from www.certco.com. The following comes from our press release, supporting Q&A, etc. We're creating a new company (name being chosen; I'll call it GTO for global trust organization -- the PR says enterprise, but GTE is already in use :). The GTO is aiming for online *business-to-business* commerce. The B2B point is key: we're in the high-value commercial transaction area. Don't think buying some books from amazon.com, think of Texas buying all their textbooks. The GTO will be running a root CA and a "repository" where the CA will publish its certs and CRL's. The root will use CertCo's RootAuthority. Our Multi-Step signing can take a private key and split it into a set of keyps called fragments. We then destroy the original key. When enough fragments sign something (quorum determined at the time the fragments are generated, and are usually like "5 of 7"), those signatures can be combined (mathematically) and the result looks like it was signed by the initial key. So we can take a key, spread its fragments around the world, and have a very secure root. That's step one. Step two is the root CA will certify CA's for member banks. These are big global banks each having billions in assets. (The initial eight banks are ABN Amro, Bank of America, Bankers Trust, Barclays Bank, Chase Manhattan, Citibank, Deutsche Bank, and Hypo Vereinsbank. Others have expressed interest in joining.) These banks will issue certs -- 1K keys initially, on smartcards -- to personnel at their corporate customers. The rules by which these banks issue these cards, how the companies and employees treat the cards, notify banks in case of turnover or compromise, etc., are all part of joining. We call these the "system rules." It's way more than a CPS (certification practice statement); it is a common contractual arrangement that the banks and their customers will all be issuing and handling and processing certs/cards in the same way. That's step two. This step is perhaps the most important. If someone at Tire Supplier receives a signed email message from someone at Car Maker, and they can see that CM's cert is within the GTO PKI, then they can trust it as much as they trust their own certs. Step three is online verification. TS can present the CM's cert to their bank and get verification that the cert is valid. TS's bank can trust CM's bank because of the common adherance to the rules. One of the rules for joining is that you treat peer banks with as much trust as you trust yourself, provided they can be shown to be following the rules. Or perhaps shown to not be breaking the rules. :) The GTO believes businesses will trust these decisions to their banks; that they'll pay the banks to manage the risk of trusting the identities to which the certs attest. (Hence, the for-profit intent :) Step four. Now, suppose CarMaker sends a "request to buy US$1M worth of tires" to TireSupplier. TS can send CM's cert, a hash of the message, and a request for "assurance" to his (TS's) bank. TS can decide that their exposure, should CM prove to not be who the certificate claim, is US$100K. So TS asks his bank for $100K assurance, for a period of 30 days. If it turns out that, say someone stole CM's cert, or CM left the company and is now working somewhere else buy using old credentials, or CM's bank didn't issue the CRL in a timely manner, etc., TS's bank will pay TS the US$100K. The system rules include procedures for due diligence, arbitration, and (last resort) legal recourse should TS need to "file a claim" on their assurance. Or, to put it in terms of the PR materials, business partners can get warranties on the identity of their trading partners online, over the Internet, as a new service from their bank. Step five is to extend the hierarchy down so that the big banks can "charter" or "sponsor" smaller banks. The L1 might be a service bureau for the L2's, an L2 might have its own CA, etc... It is the GTO's plan to publish our certificate profiles (derived from PKIX), directory schemas, system rules, network protocols, smartcard requirements, etc. It will be an open system I can't talk about schedules, other than to say it's very aggressive. :) If you're in the Boston area, Dan Geer will be giving a talk on this at the November meeting of the Digital Commerce Society of Boston, For more info, send "info dcsb" in the body of a message to <mailto:majordomo@ai.mit.edu> . If you want to subscribe to the DCSB e-mail list, send "subscribe dcsb" in the body of a message to <mailto:majordomo@ai.mit.edu> . Hope this helps. I'll be out of the office Friday, but will try to answer any questions I can next week. /r$ --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Practical Free-Space Quantum Key Distribution over 1 km
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text To: cryptography(a)c2.net Cc: gs.satellite(a)Qualcomm.com, gs.security(a)Qualcomm.com Subject: Practical Free-Space Quantum Key Distribution over 1 km From: Paul Pomes <ppomes(a)Qualcomm.com> Organization: Qualcomm, Inc. X-url: <http://people.qualcomm.com/ppomes/> X-PGP-Key: <http://pgp5.ai.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x9EF97D4D> MIME-Version: 1.0 Date: Fri, 23 Oct 1998 08:04:51 -0700 Sender: owner-cryptography(a)c2.net W.T. BUTTLER et al: Practical Free-Space Quantum Key Distribution over 1 km Physical Review Letters, vol 81, no 15, pp 3051-3301 (1998). <http://ojps.aip.org/journal_cgi/getpdf?KEY=PRLTAO&cvips=PRLTAO0000810000150… 3000001> Abstract: A working free-space quantum key distribution system has been developed and tested over an outdoor optical path of ~ 1 km at Los Alamos National Laboratory under nighttime conditions. Results show that free-space quantum key distribution can provide secure real-time key distribution between parties who have a need to communicate secretly. Finally, we examine the feasibility of surface to satellite quantum key distribution. /pbp --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Forwarded mail...
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: 23 Oct 1998 16:40:03 -0000 > From: lcs Mixmaster Remailer <mix(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu> > Subject: Re: Women cannot commit rape? (fwd) > > > This is true in the United States as well. That's why in every state, > > > > I don't believe that is accurate. Just about 2 years ago two women were > > sentenced to prison because they kidnapped and raped a man. > > > > Perhaps one of the more versed in case law members might remember it. > > > > Could it have involved penetration with a blunt object? That would be > more forceful than the "rape" in the French case that started the thread. As I remember the case two women kidnapped and sexualy assaulted a hitchhiker. Their defence was that it wasn't possible to rape man against his will. The jury found them guilty of the charge. I don't have a lot of spare time right now (I've had 3 full days off in the last 6 weeks and have to work Sunday) so I am unable to follow up and find the specifics. If nobody happens to remember it we might table it until I can get the time to find the specifics. ____________________________________________________________________ To know what is right and not to do it is the worst cowardice. Confucius The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: your note
by Ernest Hua 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Why the tone, Ernest? > > Because, in case you haven't been aware of it, accusing a journalist of > censorship is a very serious thing. > > Ray Suarez Mr. Suarez, Well, in that case, I owe you an apology for the poor choice of the word "censor", and I suspected it as much after thinking about your replies. I am more accustom to the use of "censor" not so much in the deliberate and conspiratorial sense as you might be taking it. Allow me to point to the books by Project Censored, which, I believe, never directly accuse any news organizations of deliberately censoring for the purpose of covering up anything. Their prime accusation is that the news mechanism as a component of a democratic society have filters whose optimizations have been taken advantage of by organizations actually desiring the cover up. I think the intelligence agencies are probably good at this (if not, they are not doing their job), and I am sure the FBI is a quick study on this topic of just how fast news spreads through the media, and how certain news do or do not make it through the media channels. The FBI and the NSA have often been targets of lawsuits and Congressional scrutiny in the past, so they probably have organizational structures to help defend against such scrutiny. This does not automagically imply some sort of big brother conspiracy, but if the resources are there to spin their agenda, I doubt they will say, "well this is not ethical to use for our own purposes ...". Unlike many right wing extremists, I'm not even trying to accuse the FBI or the NSA of deliberately trying to fool the American public for some evil purposes. My belief is that larger and larger secret bureaucracies have a certain behavior which could have the net result of undermining democratic principles, so while it is not the news organizations fault that they may have been taken advantage of, we often have to depend on the news organizations themselves dig themselves out and to counter act this effect. Daniel Patrick Moynihan recently released a book on the topic of secrecy and the effect on bureaucracy, and I was quite impressed by the N Y Times excerpt. By the way, I don't know if you understand why I'm so concerned about this topic, but I do want to clear the basic problems: 1. I am NOT accusing you or TOTN of censoring the wiretap topic. a. All connotations of "censor". 2. I am accusing you and TOTN of censorin the topic of the lack of reporting by main stream media on that specific hour. a. Only the specific mechanical connotation of "censor" which means not putting the topic on the air. b. I am questioning the relevance of some of the calls relative to mine. 1) I will grant that due to the mechanism of pre-screens, that you might not have understood the specific nature of my topic, and might have thought I just wanted to talk about wire taps. c. I will grant that that there are many reasons why stories/items get dropped on the floor, mostly not the evil conspiratorial reasons. I can even imagine a few of these reasons myself. However, a discussion of news organizations and how they decide why one story is dropped and another is put on is worth knowing (that was what I wanted to ask you on the air). On this particular exchange, you might also want to explain how you pick and choose callers on the air. Of course, you cannot put every caller on the air. So how do you choose? Is there a control of flow factor? Doubtful in that particular hour. I am sure there is some attempt to limit the digression of the topics. Is there some intangible mood factor analogous to a club DJ's emotional sync with the dance crowd? Ern

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Men can be raped
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Of course it's possible to rape a man. Just because he becomes erect doesn't mean he desires sexual intercourse. People are more than the instictive reactions their body produces. Someone who chooses not to engage in sex, but is coerced into doing so, is raped, regardless of his body's physical reactions. The key element is coercion. Erections or other bodily responses have nothing to do with it. Consider a murderer who ties his victim to a chair and rigs a diabolical device. A hammer strikes the victim's tendon below his knee, causing his leg to reflexively kick and set off a bomb. The murdere is caught but argues that the person committed suicide, since he kicked the bomb switch himself.

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Human Action Gone
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text From: "Mises Institute News" <news(a)mises.org> To: <miseslist(a)mises.org> Subject: Human Action Gone Date: Fri, 23 Oct 1998 13:53:07 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V4.72.3110.3 Precedence: bulk Sender: miseslist-owner(a)mail.mises.org Status: U Thanks to an overwhelming response, our stock of other Human Action editions is now gone. The Scholar's Edition will be available November 23, 1998. This is a re-release of the original, unaltered 1949 treatise that shaped a generation of Austrians and made possible the intellectual movement that is leading the global charge for free markets. Made available for the first time in decades, exclusively through the Ludwig von Mises Institute, this edition uses extraordinary materials and the best of modern technology, combined with ancient standards of craftsmanship in the tradition of Oxford University's Clarendon Press. This magnificent work is produced for the ages. Carefully set in the classic, readable, and beautiful Jansen typeface, including the 1954, 30-page index prepared under Mises's supervision, the most extensive ever compiled; Printed on stunning pure white, acid-free Finch Fine 50 lb. paper; Covered in spectacular dark azure Odyssey cloth from the Netherlands, the finest natural-finish, moisture-resistant book fabric in the world; Protected by a strong slipcase from the famous Old Dominion company, covered in matching Odyssey cloth and featuring old-fashioned thumb-cuts for easy handling; Secured by the finest caliper Binders Board; Graced with antique-stone endpapers from Ecologic Fibers; Casebound with the strongest Smyth-sewn signatures; Fitted at head and foot with silken endbands, thick wrapped for durability; Complimented with a double-faced satin ribbon place marker, and portrait of Mises; Stamped with brilliant, real non-tarnishing gold foil from Japan's Nakai International; Produced at R.R. Donnelly's famed Crawfordsville Bindery, where America's finest books are assembled. All told, The Scholar's Edition looks exactly like the classic work it is, ready for a lifetime (or two) of use. The introduction, by Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Jeffrey Herbener, and Joseph Salernobased on newly discovered archivestells of the tragic and glorious history of this seminal work, and of its bright future as the manifesto of liberty. Human Action: The Scholar's Edition is the foundation of every library of freedom. You will want a treasured copy in your collection. And if you want to send a copy as a gift to a friend or family member, we'll wrap it appropriately at no charge, and enclose a card in your name. The price for this nine-hundred-page masterpiece is $65. Your credit card will not be charge until the order is shipped. Call 800-636-4737, or order securely through our on-line catalog at www.mises.org --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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IP: Data Encryption and the First Amendment: Pete duPont
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hey *I* want some of the 4096 bit encryption! :-). Cheers, Bob Hettinga "My coun-try 'tis of thee, land of plu-to-cracy..." Forbes/duPont 2000 ;-). --- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: ignition-point(a)majordomo.pobox.com X-Sender: believer(a)telepath.com Date: Fri, 23 Oct 1998 15:06:12 -0500 To: believer(a)telepath.com From: believer(a)telepath.com Subject: IP: Data Encryption and the First Amendment: Pete duPont Mime-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-ignition-point(a)majordomo.pobox.com Precedence: list Reply-To: believer(a)telepath.com Source: Intellectual Capital http://www.IntellectualCapital.com/issues/98/1022/iced.asp Data Encryption and the First Amendment by Pete du Pont October 22, 1998 The microprocessor and the Internet have created an information revolution that is sweeping the globe. This revolution is putting information once available only to the media, political and intellectual elite into the kitchens of ordinary people all across America and opening previously locked cabinets in government, industry and academe. In short, the information revolution is empowering people; it is giving them the tools and the information to make informed choices for themselves. People can more easily exchange information with one another -- buy, sell, discuss and decide among different options. Already, e-mail exceeds regular mail usage by 10-to-1. Forrester Research reports that $8 billion in goods and services were traded over the Internet in 1997; by 2002, 21 million homes will be doing online financial transactions worth $327 billion. Essential to this commercial and personal communication is security. We want to know that our information travels safely, without alteration or eavesdropping, and that there is neither information theft nor identity fraud. Which means that we must encrypt our data, so that only intended parties can access it. A glimpse into the future In the U.S. banking system, for example, just two of the largest fund-transfer systems transmit more than 300,000 electronic fund-transfer messages worth $2 trillion every day. For obvious security reasons, the Treasury Department already requires that all electronic fund transfers be encrypted. For those of us doing commerce at a somewhat smaller order, or simply e-mail or information transfers, security is equally compelling. One of the primary tasks of government is to protect the interests and property of citizens, and in the information and e-commerce age, enhancing the encryption of data to ensure its integrity should be one of our government's priorities. The good news is that encryption technology is galloping forward. What was state of the art a few years ago is now rearview-mirror encryption. Today, 56-bit encryption, with its 72 trillion combinations, is giving way to 128-bit encryption. A Canadian company called Jaws Technology has a new technology with 4,096-bit encryption. Cracking it, its creators say, would require the equivalent of hitting 1,000 consecutive holes in one on the golf course from a 150-yard tee. The bad news is that our government is demanding limits on encryption technology and demanding access to all our encrypted messages -- financial, commercial and ordinary e-mail. The government's efforts began with the Clipper chip in 1993. The Clipper chip would have required encryption users to submit their encryption keys to a government database. It met with such a hail of objections from technical and civil liberties groups that it never came to pass, but the idea lives. The government currently is seeking both the funding of a huge new encryption technology center and the means to access any computer communication individuals might generate. The case against limits on encryption It seems to me that all of this is wrongheaded, that these demands for government access to our computer transmissions are based on three false assumptions. The first is that government can legislate encryption standards. The truth is that encryption technology is moving too rapidly for statutory law to keep up. For example, the National Bureau of Standards at one point decided that the nation should have a single 56-bit key encryption algorithm, an idea almost immediately obsolete as technology went to 128-bit algorithms and higher. Second is the idea that regulation can prevent criminals from acquiring unbreakable encryption. The analogy here is a familiar one: Does anyone believe that gun-control laws -- gun registration or prohibition of ownership, for example -- will keep guns out of the hands of criminals? Similarly, encryption-strength ceilings, key escrow or "trapdoors" in computer programs to allow government access will limit personal and business usage by citizens and slow criminals not at all. The international market is too accessible and its encryption offerings equally or more sophisticated than U.S. technology. Third is the idea that such regulations are cost-free to people using computer technology. Key escrow and trapdoor systems would make encryption for U.S. businesses and individuals less secure, more vulnerable and more easily broken. Weakening the encryption security of American users is a not a policy in the national interest. Forcing information vulnerabilities upon individuals and businesses is weakening national security, not strengthening it. Most egregious in such encryption regulation is the massive invasion of civil liberties it represents. The idea that various government agencies, from the FBI to health-care agencies, the IRS and the Justice Department, will have instant access to our Quicken programs, e-mail and data transmissions is both dangerous and unsettling. Liberty in the 21st century It is not as if the government has a good record regarding individual privacy. President Nixon's FBI tracked its enemies; the Clinton IRS seems to be auditing unfriendly 501(c)(3)s; and some 800 FBI files mysteriously found their way to Craig Livingstone's pizza-and-beer sessions. No doubt there is a unique, it-will-never-happen-again exculpatory reason for these violations of civil liberties. But if the government has the power to intercept and use your data for its purposes, it will do so sooner or later. That is a truth, and no amount of reassurance should lead us to believe otherwise. From Edmund Burke ("people never give up their liberties but under some delusion") to Woodrow Wilson ("the history of liberty is a history of limitations of governmental power, not the increase of it"), Americans have jealously guarded their freedom. The next frontier of free speech will be the technology of encryption. In the 18th century, the First Amendment was essential to guarding free speech. Protecting the empowering technology of data transmission will be just as essential to maintaining liberty in the 21st century. --- Pete du Pont is the editor of IntellectualCapital.com. He is a former Republican governor and congressman from Delaware. His e-mail address is petedupont(a)intellectualcapital.com. ----------------------- NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ----------------------- **************************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address or (un)subscribe ignition-point-digest email@address **************************************************** www.telepath.com/believer **************************************************** --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Irony
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:19 PM 10/23/98 +0200, Mok-Kong Shen wrote: >> Dear Friend, > >I don't know the English term but in my native language what is >described is call 'chaining letters', supposed to be a method to >become rich very rapidly. That was illegal, though. In my language we have something called humor, which some taxonomize with terms like irony, sarcasm, wit, etc.

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