December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Hettinga's e$yllogism
by winsock＠rigel.cyberpass.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>1. Government has copy of keys >2. Government misuses keys. > >Simple enough for you? Too simple. Escrow for ecash isn't to allow forging cash, or stealing it. It allows tracing it. If you tell financial experts that making ecash traceable under court order is goint to make electronic commerce impossible, they'll laugh. They already use systems which are even less private than that. Anon

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Comparing Cryptographic Key Sizes II
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I got quite a few useful comments on the key comparison summary I posted earlier. Even some people said they found it useful. Mark Grant improved the readability, plus other suggestions. Peter Trei urged me to actually re-read the Wiener paper to quote the figures correctly rather than from memory. Also Peter raised issues to do with how to compare hardness to break DES against 512 bit RSA. There is now an aside more technical note explaining the issues. I think I stand by my original comparison of "roughly equal", because depending on how you view it, it'll come out 10x cheaper, or 10x harder. (Memory being one hurdle each participating workstation needing of the order of 128 Mb; the other hurdle being the existance of a machine large enough to reduce the matrix which results from all the relations). I don't think we can explain it any more technically and expect it to be useful to a journalist. We need a gross generalisation: is it approx as hard, is it 100x harder. They don't want to hear about space complexity, the matrix reduction phase (RSA) nor known plaintext memory trade offs (DES). If we don't supply the gross generalisation, they will do it themselves to make it palatable for their readers. With less understanding of the subject, their generalisation is likely to be even wildly inaccurate than the generous error bars on ours. This is not an insult to journalists. Crypto is a technical, complicated field. I wouldn't contemplate making estimates in other peoples fields. Further discussion of course still sought (rip it apart pessimists on crypto estimates). Here's the new improved version. Adam -- Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc` ====================================================================== Comparing Cryptographic Key Sizes There are two types of cryptographic keys; public keys -- sometimes called asymmetric key -- and symmetric keys. RSA and Diffie-Hellman are common public key algorithms and RC4, DES and IDEA common symmetric key algorithms. You cannot directly compare public key lengths (for example RSA keys) with symmetric key lengths (DES, RC4); this is an important point which confuses many people. For example, 40 bit RC4 (a symmetric key cipher) can be broken in a few hours with a few hundred workstations but 40 bit RSA (a public key cipher) can be broken in a fraction of a second on one PC. A 350 bit RSA key is roughly equivalent in strength to 40 bit RC4, and 512 bit RSA key is thought to cost roughly the same to break as a 56 bit DES key. (That last comparison (DES vs 512 bit RSA) glosses over many issues. Here's a summary if you're interested: no one's broken a 512 RSA bit key yet, and you need lots of memory to break RSA at that key size, a PC with 128 Mb would be required to participate. In contrast, you need hardly any memory to break DES, any PC will do. The internet based breaking of a DES key in answer to RSA DSI's challenge involved many participants, and included some participants with low end 486 PCs with 1Mb of memory. Theoretically 512 bit RSA could be broken more quickly than DES, but, as you need more memory than typical workstations have, a distributed internet attack with the same group of participants as for the DES break would clearly take longer. There are a number of other factors also.) Symmetric keys sizes are easy to understand; for any particular algorithm, adding one bit to the key length doubles the difficulty. Estimating the difficulty of breaking a public key (say RSA) is harder because the increase in strength is not straightforward, but typically adding ten bits to the size of an RSA key doubles the strength. This is why public key systems require longer keys to provide the same security. Most systems use a mixture of public and symmetric key ciphers, because public key ciphers are _slow_ but dramatically simplify key management. Symmetric key ciphers are fast, so they are used in conjunction with public key systems to speed up the combined system. Such a system using two ciphers -- one public key and one symmetric key -- is only as strong as the weakest link. For example, consider the export version of SSL, as shipped in the export version of Netscape browsers and servers; it uses 512 bit RSA, and 40 bit RC4. Cracking 40 bit RC4 is easier than cracking 512 bit RSA, so export SSL can be broken by breaking the 40 bit RC4 component. Ian Goldberg recently broke a 40 bit RC5 key himself with Berkeley univ machines in 3.5 hours. 40 bit RC4 could be broken in a similar time. 512 bits RSA is not enough either, and you can rest assured that the NSA, other governments' secret services, and any corporation or organised crime group with sufficient funds can break it. 512 bits is likely within reach of a distributed internet effort, or soon will be. There is a further problem. Each session uses a different, randomly chosen, RC4 key, so breaking one RC4 key only allows you to read a single message. However, every message is encrypted with the _same_ 512 bit RSA key, so if you can break that key you can immediately read any message sent to or from the server. As a consequence, the public key size should be chosen to be much harder to break than the symmetric key. In this case although the key is thousands of times harder to break it would be worth attacking if the server is processing thousands or millions of transactions. 56 bit DES is harder to break than 40 bit RC4 (SSL); you would expect that the extra sixteen bits would increase the difficulty 65536 times, but DES is faster than RC4. In software it's about 5 times faster, so breaking DES in software is about 10000 times harder than breaking 40 bit RC4 (as used in export SSL). But if the Russian Mafia or a corporation involved in industrial espionage wanted to break 56 bit DES they would not use software but would build a special purpose piece of hardware which was designed only to break DES. DES was designed to be fast in hardware, and is a relatively slow cipher in software. In 1993 Michael Wiener designed such a DES breaking machine. His estimated cost for a machine capable of breaking 56 bit DES in a 3.5 hours hours was $1,000,000. The machine was scalable, so that by spending more or less money you could reduce or increase the time taken to break the key. He estimated that building a machine to break DES in 21 minutes would cost $10,000,000. That was 10 years ago; 10 years is a long time in the computer industry. Today the machine would be much cheaper because chip technology has progressed and computers are much faster per $. Estimates are around $20,000 to build a machine to break a DES key within a day (neglecting hardware engineers consultancy fees). When you consider the sorts of uses DES is being used for by banks, ATM card PINs, wire transfers, interbank exchanges, DES is clearly out-of-date. Everyone expects that NSA, GCHQ, SCSSI have built one or more machines for $20,000+; this is considered obvious because the NSA and SCSSI allow export of 56 bit DES. $20,000 is not much money for a secret service, or for many less scrupulous individuals. Algorithms using 40 bit keys are insecure against all but trivial cracking attempts. Systems using DES (such as SET) are only secure against organisations who can't raise $20,000 and can't find people who know lots about crypto and hardware design; $20,000 is not much money for the Rusian Mafia either. Even worse, once you have built such a machine the cost of cracking each key is only a few hundreds or thousands of dollars, so any DES key protecting information of greater value is a tempting target. US export controls used to restrict exports to 40 bit RC4. When the cypherpunks broke several 40 bit RC4 systems the rules were relaxed to 56 bits. Now that a distributed internet group has broken 56 bit DES, the US government's claim that 56 bit is "good enough" is being demonstrated to be patently false. The US government's other ploy has been to allow larger key lengths, but to keep a master key to all communications for themselves. When full strength encryption systems with 128 bit symmetric keys are widely available from foreign competitors, this firstly makes no sense: why can't the US software industry export when every one has strong crypto anway. And secondly the US software industry is losing billions each year in lost sales to their european competitors. 128 bit encryption is unbreakable for all practical purposes. You will recall in the discussion above that each bit of key size doubles the work required to break a symmetric cipher. A 128 bit cipher is 4,722,366,482,869,645,213,696 times harder to break than DES. That is a very large number. Messages encrypted with such keys aren't likely to be breakable for 30-100 years from now. Similarly 1024, to 4096 bit public key systems are in use, and available outside the US. These systems are of roughly comparable hardness to break to 128 bit symmetric keys, the larger the key, the more secure. One final point: things are getting better for cryptography. The attackers job is getting harder. With each doubling of machine speed it is possible to use larger keys, and still encrypt and decrypt instantly when you have the key. When PGP was first released back in 1991, 1024 bit RSA keys were slow to use on the state of the art PC then, a lowly '286. Nowadays an entry level PC, a Pentium 133 whistles through 4096 bit keys. If we say that a P133 is 50x faster than a 20Mhz '286 you can see that the same person using encryption now can use key sizes which before were too slow. I can assure you that in moving from a 1024 bit key to a 4096 bit key, the attackers job is well in excess of 50x harder. Greatly in excess of a trillion trillion times harder.

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Re: spook pressure on crypto exports (was Re: cypherpunks coding challenge)
by pgut001＠cs.auckland.ac.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Death rays from Mars made Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk> write: >Bill Stewart <stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com> writes: >>(Though actually SSLeay has been very useful to a lot of the >>world's free cryptography, and has prompted the US spooks >>to pressure the Australian spooks into restricting crypto exports, >>just as they've pressured the NZs into restricting them for >>Peter Gutman, and have been trying to work on the Irish...) >Could you elaborate on these. I caught Peter Gutmann's comments on the >hassles a company he did some work for were having with the NZ spooks. (The >spooks intercepted their mailed disk, plus some other cloak and dagger >spookish stuff). Nothing was intercepted. They (the GCSB, NZ subsidiary of the NSA) came up with some phony story about NZ customs intercepting a shipment of military-grade encryption (or something similar) which they fed to the Australian spooks (DSD). NZ Customs knew nothing of this, and the DSD were apparently also considerably surprised by it. As far as I can tell it was a very amateurish attempt to intimidate one of the companies involved (frighteningly amateurish in fact - a single phonecall was enough to confirm that they'd invented the whole incident themselves, the only real effect it had was to get them a front-page story in the National Business Review and (presumably) piss off the DSD for sending them on a wild goose chase and risking media exposure). >Is this still going on, was it ever resolved? Can the next version of >cryptlib be exported legally? Or are we relying on Peters bravery? It can be legally exported. Although the people pulling the strings are the GCSB, the group enforcing it is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT)'s export control group, who are idiots (I can elaborate on this in great detail at some point, preferably over a beer). I have several written statements from them that I can freely export it electronically (along with all sorts of bogosities such as a letter signed by the minister in which the first sentence of the second paragraph says exactly the opposite of the last sentence in the paragraph, and other, similar gems). At one point I was firing off one letter after another to them just to see how silly they would get, but it got boring after awhile. I'll put these letters online at some point for people to have a laugh at. I should also clarify a point about the online writeup of my experiences, which imply that the NSA was active in directing the GCSB over export controls. I'd had some feedback from a high-level US spook source that this wasn't quite the case, but the source has some rather unusual opinions on spooks and their activities (something along the lines of "Civilization would collapse tomorrow if it wasn't for the fine efforts of the CIA and NSA") which made me somewhat suspicious about the accuracy of the information. Anyway, what this source said (and this bit I can believe) was that NZ was completely out of its depth with this (which was obvious from the way it was handled) and was terrified of offending the US. According to the source, the NSA was exerting a *moderating* influence on the whole thing, and that any progress made was because the NSA told the GCSB to back off. This would indicate an interesting case of the NSA exerting very strong indirect influence on determining crypto policy. The GCSB knew the NSA didn't want crypto being distributed, and when they heard of the export they went into overdrive to show the NSA what good boys they could be and how keen they were to help the US by enforcing US policy for NZ crypto. This interpretation is believable, NZ is very much a junior member of the UKUSA alliance and really doesn't want to do anything which might offend the other partners. They knew the US didn't want crypto being made available, so they went out of their way to try to show the NSA that they could be trusted to do their bit in restricting crypto (I'm certain that something as amateurish as the NZ Customs story didn't come from the NSA, even the DSD seemed unaware of it). This means that it doesn't actually require any direct intervention from the USG to control crypto policy, the mere knowledge that the NSA doesn't like something is enough to make the local spooks (who, in NZ's case, rely on the NSA for much of their hardware and training) do whatever they think will keep the NSA happy. It's perfect for the NSA I guess, because they get complete deniability (Just yell "Will noone rid me of this troublesome crypto" and sit back and wait). Peter. BTW, what's happened to taz.nceye.net? The cypherpunks mail->news doesn't seem to have been updated for more than a week.

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Child Pornography [JPEG]
by TruthMailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This email contains child pornography encrypted with strong cryptography using the public key of a federal prisoner. It is being sent via a chain of anonymous remailers using strong cryptography to Senators, Congressmen, and Media. It is originating from a hacked account which was protected by weak encryption. What can you do about it? Nothing! You can pass legislation violating the constitutional rights of millions of citizens to safeguard their privacy and freedom of speech--laws against strong encryption--laws against using anonymity in communications--laws against citizens putting an anti-government cork in their butt-hole (Government Access to Korks--GAK) but you can't stop myself and others from routing around the damage you do to freedom and liberty. Perhaps you can use the seized computer of the federal prisoner to decrypt the enclosed child pornography but you will not be able to decrypt the stego hidden inside this message which reveals my identity. The reason for this is simple--the stego technology I am using leaves the original graphics file unchanged. It is a technology that law enforcement does not have access to. There is an inner circle within society and the government that does have access to the technology, however, and they are using it to fight government and corporate fascism. What can you do? Pass another law--pass a law which imprisons anyone who has a thought or technology which is inaccessible to the scrutiny of government agencies. "Everything not permitted is forbidden." What can you do? Take away all rights and freedoms--imprison everyone. The constitutional rights and freedoms of the citizens have been trashed under the pretext of protecting society from drugs and pornography and numerous other horsemen of the apocalypse, yet I can drive ten minutes in any direction and find drugs to purchase and I can find and send pornography freely over a variety of medium. For the record, I acquired the software used to encrypt the enclosed child pornography from a foreign source while the U.S. government is ineffectually stifling American business in order to prevent tools of freedom and privacy from being universally available. -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 MessageID: gygqk6Zjhr8ssJKvMxDdwQkYiBMJaW22 hQCMA/qHVDBboB2dAQQAlcc0zGN2wXUG4twV4M1TXkrMmob/fYP4k4tpIv7KEJQ8 2vA/iBXDPxcfURdKp750bnNVFN0yUUUoYk7o6vnrwDFYWbe3zWE7sePbaY+L4f/A E4yCXGXwal9GN61ayH2mfQds8Jv328u7zLX8Dxeu5vs8ALtjw3GOnewwuHPr/Pul Pa0Y0I5Di3SGQGmvBo27nJZV2ev/ctRg+Kr6kfPIp+/c3TyEpbOY/4R6r4hi8lZS ahKfdWWnJh4aMfIiljLO6RyRIVwzRf4PLkyl+xuPMy7EbtzC16kmI5syjur0XOv5 scF4eO+WHSnKcDDA8bC1B+/qVdHJrtu9gJc+4ZlUEnLDGPGq3s09LPIDhYgLlb3j Dw3bOdqYzCmf6WEaFC6OT0R4nPWPifosBCYONr94pyJ+npLLUe1dyR1U/sPxQwxL CcT0VAt8FQH1qlPER+6DvEoV3XLVtmx05nB7iKkSY2nBS5ZifvP+2Wid7wEE8XH+ EKLqxDB85PtXKifhlMpgUpEa/sf1u8ZotsQEmubMJCYi1WrKsij1vIYTsKqjb9gK 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1 0

Child Pornography [JPEG]
by TruthMailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This email contains child pornography encrypted with strong cryptography using the public key of a federal prisoner. It is being sent via a chain of anonymous remailers using strong cryptography to Senators, Congressmen, and Media. It is originating from a hacked account which was protected by weak encryption. What can you do about it? Nothing! You can pass legislation violating the constitutional rights of millions of citizens to safeguard their privacy and freedom of speech--laws against strong encryption--laws against using anonymity in communications--laws against citizens putting an anti-government cork in their butt-hole (Government Access to Korks--GAK) but you can't stop myself and others from routing around the damage you do to freedom and liberty. Perhaps you can use the seized computer of the federal prisoner to decrypt the enclosed child pornography but you will not be able to decrypt the stego hidden inside this message which reveals my identity. The reason for this is simple--the stego technology I am using leaves the original graphics file unchanged. It is a technology that law enforcement does not have access to. There is an inner circle within society and the government that does have access to the technology, however, and they are using it to fight government and corporate fascism. What can you do? Pass another law--pass a law which imprisons anyone who has a thought or technology which is inaccessible to the scrutiny of government agencies. "Everything not permitted is forbidden." What can you do? Take away all rights and freedoms--imprison everyone. The constitutional rights and freedoms of the citizens have been trashed under the pretext of protecting society from drugs and pornography and numerous other horsemen of the apocalypse, yet I can drive ten minutes in any direction and find drugs to purchase and I can find and send pornography freely over a variety of medium. For the record, I acquired the software used to encrypt the enclosed child pornography from a foreign source while the U.S. government is ineffectually stifling American business in order to prevent tools of freedom and privacy from being universally available. -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 MessageID: gygqk6Zjhr8ssJKvMxDdwQkYiBMJaW22 hQCMA/qHVDBboB2dAQQAlcc0zGN2wXUG4twV4M1TXkrMmob/fYP4k4tpIv7KEJQ8 2vA/iBXDPxcfURdKp750bnNVFN0yUUUoYk7o6vnrwDFYWbe3zWE7sePbaY+L4f/A E4yCXGXwal9GN61ayH2mfQds8Jv328u7zLX8Dxeu5vs8ALtjw3GOnewwuHPr/Pul Pa0Y0I5Di3SGQGmvBo27nJZV2ev/ctRg+Kr6kfPIp+/c3TyEpbOY/4R6r4hi8lZS ahKfdWWnJh4aMfIiljLO6RyRIVwzRf4PLkyl+xuPMy7EbtzC16kmI5syjur0XOv5 scF4eO+WHSnKcDDA8bC1B+/qVdHJrtu9gJc+4ZlUEnLDGPGq3s09LPIDhYgLlb3j Dw3bOdqYzCmf6WEaFC6OT0R4nPWPifosBCYONr94pyJ+npLLUe1dyR1U/sPxQwxL CcT0VAt8FQH1qlPER+6DvEoV3XLVtmx05nB7iKkSY2nBS5ZifvP+2Wid7wEE8XH+ EKLqxDB85PtXKifhlMpgUpEa/sf1u8ZotsQEmubMJCYi1WrKsij1vIYTsKqjb9gK 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1 0

"writing code"
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think that "cypherpunks write code" is best understood with an added layer of abstraction, e.g., "cypherpunks change the things that bother them." So I think that "cypherpunks write memes" can be a useful strategy. But I think it's important to pay attention to which memes are written - do you mean "Write your Congressperson about this horrible problem!" or "Fuck the government, fix your own problem(s)!"? Many of the exhortations to the public consist mostly of "Hey! Get involved! Vote!", even where this passive "voting" stuff created the very problems which led to the exhortations. Sure, let's write memes. But let's write memes that encourage people to solve their own problems and avoid the use of unnecessary force. The mess that Congress is making out of crypto policy and export control should provide a crystal-clear example of what we're likely to get if we expect Washington - or local legislatures - to fix our problems. Next year Congress will probably fuck with E-mail and spam legislation the way it's screwing up crypto this year. In 1999, they'll have found something else. (Also, FYI, there was an implied :) smiley at the end of my message about three-strikes term limits. It's a cute idea, but I bring it up mostly to illustrate how pathetic and weak contemporary political thought is - we're ending up with a legal system which consists of crap like that, announced at press conferences full of various sympathetic "victims", hosted & funded by lobbyists paid for by prison-guard unions.) -- Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: gbroiles(a)netbox.com | http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto.

1 0

Japan & bombing the US
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, Several people have made comment on the difference between states and protectorates of one sort or another in reference to the comment I made about Oregon being the only US state to be bombed in WWII. While this is technicaly true if you go back and look at the original posting I replied too was made in the context of US involvment in the war and how isolated we were, so isolated, the claim went, that the Japanese were unable to invade or otherwise attack the US. While it is true that Oregon was the only area attacked which was a state under the context of US possessions being attacked it is false. The main point here is that the original proposal was incorrect due to more than a semantic technicality. This brings the whole issue of the US sitting out the war into question. A question I answer strongly in the negative. It is not possible that the US could have sat out the war as a neutral. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

2 1

Re: How did these people find our list? (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Tue, 24 Jun 1997 10:30:11 -0400 > From: Duncan Frissell <frissell(a)panix.com> > Subject: Re: How did these people find our list? (fwd) > June 21, 1942, Fort Stevens at the mouth of the Columbia in Oregon is fired > upon by the deck gun of a Japanese submarine. The first continental costal > battery to be attacked by a foreign enemy (not counting those Southerners) > since the War of 1812. The Japs fire 17 shells. No apparent damage. Fort > Stevens is unable to depress its guns sufficiently to hit the submarine. A > draw. Two Jap subs were sunk in San Francisco harbor. Unfortunately I can't find the dates, will keep looking. > Oregon also suffered the U.S. Mainland's only domestic casualties due to > enemy action when a teacher and members of her family on a hike in southern > Oregon were killed by a Japanese balloon bomb. (These bombs were attached to Actualy it was a man, his wife, and two children. The two kids were playing with it when it went off. My memory tells me that the women and two kids were killed. Don't remember if she was a teacher or not. There was an interesting video recreation on TDC last month on this incident on a special on the Japanese balloon bombs. > balloons released from Japanese submarines off the coast.) Actualy most of them were released from the Japanese mainland at specific points. If you do further research on this you will learn how they used the ballast sand in the balloons (mechanicly complicated) to track their source. All the sites were bombed and the baloons ceased. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

1 0

SAFE clears House subcommittee, with amendments
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

*************** Date: Tue, 24 Jun 1997 21:09:41 -0400 To: fight-censorship-announce(a)vorlon.mit.edu From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> Subject: FC: SAFE clears House subcommittee, from LEGI-SLATE [Since I showed up late today and missed some of the early discussion, I asked my friend Amy for permission to pass along her report. She graciously agreed. --Declan] ***************** SAFE Act Nears Home in House After Subcommittee Tosses It Out Favorably By Amy Branson LEGI-SLATE News Service WASHINGTON (June 24) -- Casting the only opposing vote to H.R. 695 -- the "Security and Freedom Through Encryption Act" -- Rep. Doug Bereuter, R-Neb., knew his position was the lonely one at a subcommittee markup Tuesday. "The goal must be to balance between the competitiveness of U.S. companies and U.S. national security goals," Bereuter began. "However, this bill fails that balance because it significantly relaxes U.S. export control of encryption without requiring a key recovery policy ... to those exports." Despite Bereuter's problems with the bill, the House International Relations Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade passed H.R. 695 by a recorded vote of 14 yeas and 1 nay [Vote 1]. H.R. 695 lifts export restrictions on many kinds of strong encryption products, prohibits federal or state governments from requiring anyone to give up the key to their encrypted communications, and establishes criminal penalties for using encryption to further a criminal offense. "This is a vitally important piece of legislation if we're going to continue to promote the United States dominance of the software industry worldwide," the bill's sponsor, Rep. Bob Goodlatte, R-Va., said Tuesday afternoon. Goodlatte, who does not sit on the International Relations Committee, spoke on behalf of his bill at the markup session. "This legislation is also very important from the standpoint of promoting the safety and security of American citizens and others in the use of the Internet," he added. Subcommittee members also adopted by voice vote an "en bloc amendment" that made what they described as mostly "technical" changes to the bill. Subcommittee aides emphasized that the purpose of the amendment language was to close loopholes and fix unintended omissions contained in the underlying legislation. For example, the amendment expands the kinds of products that do not have to have a validated license for export or re-export to include "any consumer product commercially available in the U.S. or abroad using encryption capabilities which are inaccessible to the end user and is not designed for military or intelligence end use." The amendment also expands the term "generally available" as it is used in the bill to include hardware with encryption capabilities. As the bill now is written, only software with encryption capabilities is covered. Also, the en bloc amendment added a "Sense of Congress" section to the end of the bill. In addition to "finding" that the president "has not been able to come to agreement with other encryption producing countries on export controls on encryption," the amendment suggests the president immediately should call an international conference to reach a policy agreement with other encryption exporting countries. Administration officials disapprove of this language because they say they are "close" to reaching an encryption export policy agreement with these countries, one House aide said. But the administration has been making this claim for several years, the aide said. This legislation already has been reported favorably by the House Judiciary Committee, which did not have jurisdiction over the export language. The International Relations subcommittee, however, had jurisdiction over the most controversial parts of the bill: the export provisions. The bill still faces a markup in the full International Relations Committee where there likely will be another technical amendment, the aide said. Meanwhile, the Senate Commerce Committee recently adopted a so-called "compromise" encryption bill that satisfies Clinton administration concerns about the availability of strong encryption technology overseas. But industry officials decry the legislation, sponsored by Senate Commerce Committee Chairman John McCain, R-Ariz., and Sen. Robert Kerrey, D-Neb. Senate legislation [S. 377] that more closely resembles Goodlatte's SAFE Act has been put on the back burner because of Clinton administration objections. Sen. Conrad Burns, R-Mont., is sponsoring that bill, which also is known as Pro-CODE, or Promotion of Commerce Online in the Digital Era Act of 1997. -30- TYPE*MARKUP BILL*HR695 DATE*6/24/97 ------------------------- Declan McCullagh Time Inc. The Netly News Network Washington Correspondent http://netlynews.com/ -------------------------------------------------------------------------- This list is public. To join fight-censorship-announce, send "subscribe fight-censorship-announce" to majordomo(a)vorlon.mit.edu. More information is at http://www.eff.org/~declan/fc/

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Underground extract: System X
by proff＠iq.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anyone read this book? Apparently the first in-depth investigation into the international computer underground to come out of the Southern-Hemisphere - or so I'm told ;) - J.A Extracts from Underground - The true nature of System X Extracted from Chapter 10 - "Anthrax - The Outsider" Note: System X's name has been changed for legal reasons. Sometimes the time just slipped away, hacking all night. When the first hint of dawn snuck up on him, he was invariably in the middle of some exciting journey. But duty was duty, and it had to be done. So Anthrax pressed control S to freeze his screen, unfurled the prayer mat with its built-in compass, faced Mecca, knelt down and did two sets of prayers before sunrise. Ten minutes later he rolled the prayer mat up, slid back into his chair, typed control Q to release the pause on his computer and picked up where he left off. This company's computer system seemed to confirm what he had begun to suspect. System X was the first stage of a project, the rest of which was under development. He found a number of tables and reports in System X's files. The reports carried headers like 'Traffic Analysis', 'calls in' and 'calls out', 'failure rate'. It all began to make sense to Anthrax. System X called up each of the military telephone exchanges in that list. It logged in using the computer-generated name and password. Once inside, a program in System X polled the exchange for important statistics, such as the number of calls coming in and out of the base. This information was then stored on System X. Whenever someone wanted a report on something, for example, the military sites with the most incoming calls over the past 24 hours, he or she would simply ask System X to compile the information. All of this was done automatically. Anthrax had read some email suggesting that changes to an exchange, such as adding new telephone lines on the base, had been handled manually, but this job was soon to be done automatically by System X. It made sense. The maintenance time spent by humans would be cut dramatically. A machine which gathers statistics and services phone exchanges remotely doesn't sound very sexy on the face of it, until you begin to consider what you could do with something like that. You could sell it to a foreign power interested in the level of activity at a certain base at a particular time. And that is just the beginning. You could tap any unencrypted line going in or out of any of the 100 or so exchanges and listen in to sensitive military discussions. Just a few commands makes you a fly on the wall of a general's conversation to the head of a base in the Philippines. Anti-government rebels in that country might pay a pretty penny for getting intelligence on the US forces. All of those options paled next to the most striking power wielded by a hacker who had unlimited access to System X and the 100 or so telephone exchanges. He could take down that US military voice communications system almost overnight, and he could do it automatically. The potential for havoc creation was breathtaking. It would be a small matter for a skilled programmer to alter the automated program used by System X. Instead of using its dozen or more modems to dial all the exchanges overnight and poll them for statistics, System X could be instructed to call them overnight and reprogram the exchanges. --- No-one would be able to reach one another. An important part of the US military machine would be in utter disarray. Now, what if all this happened in the first few days of a war? People trying to contact each other with vital information wouldn't be able to use the telephone exchanges reprogrammed by System X. THAT was power. It wasn't like Anthrax screaming at his father until his voice turned to a whisper, all for nothing. He could make people sit up and take notice with this sort of power. Hacking a system gave him a sense of control. Getting root on a system always gave him an adrenalin rush for just that reason. It meant the system was his, he could do whatever he wanted, he could run whatever processes or programs he desired, he could remove other users he didn't want using his system. He thought, I own the system. The word 'own' anchored the phrase which circled through his thoughts again and again when he successfully hacked a system. The sense of ownership was almost passionate, rippled with streaks of obsession and jealousy. At any given moment, Anthrax had a list of systems he owned and that had captured his interest for that moment. Anthrax hated seeing a system administrator logging onto one of those systems. It was an invasion. It was as though Anthrax had just got this woman he had been after for some time alone in a room with the door closed. Then, just as he was getting to know her, this other guy had barged in, sat down on the couch and started talking to her. It was never enough to look at a system from a distance and know he could hack it if he wanted to. Anthrax had to actually hack the system. He had to own it. He needed to see what was inside the system, to know exactly what it was he owned. The worst thing admins could do was to fiddle with system security. That made Anthrax burn with anger. If Anthrax was on-line, silently observing the adminsÕ activities, he would feel a sudden urge to log them off. He wanted to punish them. Wanted them to know he was into their system. And yet, at the same time, he didnÕt want them to know. Logging them off would draw attention to himself, but the two desires pulled at him from opposite directions. What Anthrax really wanted was for the admins to know he controlled their system, but for them not to be able to do anything about it. He wanted them to be helpless. Anthrax decided to keep undercover. But he contemplated the power of having System X's list of telephone exchange dial-ups and their username - password combinations. Normally, it would take days for a single hacker with his lone modem to have much impact on the US military's communications network. Sure, he could take down a few exchanges before the military wised up and started protecting themselves. It was like hacking a military computer. You could take out a machine here, a system there. But the essence of the power of System X was being able to use its own resources to orchestrate widespread pandemonium quickly and quietly. Anthrax defines power as the potential for real world impact. At that moment of discovery and realisation, the real world impact of hacking System X looked good. The telecommunications company computer seemed like a good place to hang up a sniffer, so he plugged one into the machine and decided to return in a little while. Then he logged out and went to bed. When he revisited the sniffer a day or so later, Anthrax received a rude shock. Scrolling through the sniffer file, he did a double take on one of the entries. Someone had logged into the company's system using his special login patch password. He tried to stay calm. He thought hard. When was the last time he had logged into the system using that special password? Could his sniffer have logged himself on an earlier hacking session? It did happen occasionally. Hackers sometimes gave themselves quite a fright. In the seamless days and nights of hacking dozens of systems, it was easy to forget the last time you logged into a particular system using the special password. The more he thought, the more he was absolutely sure. He hadn't logged into the system again. Which left the obvious question. Who had? ________________________________________________________________________ [This extract may be reposted non-commercially and without charge only] Underground; Tales of Hacking, Madness and Obsession on the Electronic Frontier, by Suelette Dreyfus; published by Mandarin (Random House Australia); (P) 475 pages with bib. http://www.underground-book.com/ or http://underground.org/book

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