December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Comparing Cryptographic Key Sizes
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Peter Trei <trei(a)process.com> writes: > Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk> writes. > > 56 bit DES is probably roughly similar to 512 bit RSA in hardness to > > break. > > This is way off. We used ~457,000 MIPS years to search half of the > DES keyspace. Factoring a 512 bit modulus using the General Number > Field Sieve (GNFS) would take about 28,000 MIPS years (see Schneier > for the exact number - I don't have AC2 at hand) > > Lenstra has estimated that with 500,000 MIPS years, you should be > able to factor a 600 bit modulus using GNFS, if your workstations > had enough memory. Ah yes. Well I did read your post on coderpunks where you described the results of asking Lenstra and looking for ideas for what to break next, how hard 512 bits was etc. So... 28,000 MIPs years you say... but that neglects memory. Lenstra's conclusion was that even 512 bits couldn't be done, from your post. So by that measure it is harder (due to memory overhead) than DES even though theoretically taking less MIPS with 64 mb workstations. Also he was unsure about the availability of a large enough supercomputer to reduce the final matrix. So any suggestetions of how to summarise the "hardness" of a problem when it includes memory and cpu costs in as simple terms as possible. (Bearing in mind the reader in most cases hasn't grasped the difference between public key crypto and symmetric key, and is comparing 1024 bit keys to 56 bit keys and probably thinks that it is 1024/56 times harder.) > > About 10 years ago now Michael Wiener made a design for such a DES > > breaking machine. He estimated it would cost $10,000,000 to build a > > machine which would break a 56 bit DES encrypted message a few hours. > > His machine was scalable, pay more money, break the key faster, pay > > less take longer. The estimate was that could build one with enough > > DES key searching units to break it in a day for $1,000,000. That was > > 10 years ago. 10 years is a long time in the computer industry. > > Nowadays you build the machine more cheaply as chip technology has > > progressed, and computers are much faster per $. Estimates are around > > $100,000 to build the machine (neglecting hardware engineers > > consultancy fees). > > Go back and check the numbers - if you don't the journalists will. > (I don't have this paper to hand either :-( ) The Wiener paper is > much more recent (93?) , and the cost much lower (I think it was > about $1M for HW and $500K for development costs, for a 3.5 hour > machine). I think I have his paper as a postscript file, will look. But what do you think of the extrapolation to todays prices? $100k? (Ignoring consultancy fees). Thanks for the criticisms, more please on readability and understandability to neophytes! Adam -- Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

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by TruthMailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anon-To:

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[ PGP 2.6.3 ]
by bull＠juno.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can someone give me a site where I can get a compiled copy of PGP 2.6.3?

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Re: spook pressure on crypto exports
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ian Grigg <iang(a)systemics.com> writes: > Bill said: > > ... and have been trying to work on the Irish...) > > and Adam said: > > Ireland is new to me. What's their problem? > > Ditto! I'd like to know because ... > > > Who's exporting things to attract spook export attention over there? > > Systemics is an Irish company, and so is Baltimore, and we both > are 'exporters' depending on one's viewpoint. So's SSE (subsidiary of Siemens-Nixdorf). But that's mostly/all defense stuff, so they're presumably in thick with the military intelligence, and export permission would be a snip for them. > I don't know about Baltimore, but there is not a lot of pressure > they can put on Systemics, as the majority of the Cryptix effort is > now handed over to non-Systemics people. That's the beauty of > freeware. Ireland allows intangible export, no permission required, same as UK. They do say they would like a list of customers after the fact, but that's just would like, not you are required to give or else. (Clearly it would be a bit difficult to list the customers off your open access web page). For tangible exports you need permission, much as in the UK. I get the impression that the `open for business' attitude (love that 10% corporate tax break, is systemics getting this?) would mean you'd get an easier time than in the UK. They promise fast efficient turn around on export applications. (Unlike NZ MFAT, reread Peter Gutmann's story of down under intrigue on http://jya.com/nsazeal.htm amazing, nearly bankrupted the company!) > In contrast, I have been told that Ireland represents a prime place > for this sort of stuff, as there are no restrictions whatever. I think it's better than say UK. But clearly not `no restrictions' at least for tangible exports re above comments. I don't know how this works out in practice, what they give tangible export permission to, etc. Adam -- Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

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Netscape, 128-bit export
by Ariel Glenn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

from their web site, at http://www.netscape.com/flash2/newsref/pr/newsrelease428.html --- MOUNTAIN VIEW, Calif. (June 24, 1997) -- Netscape Communications Corporation (NASDAQ: NSCP) today announced the United States Department of Commerce has granted the company permission to export Netscape Communicator client software with 128-bit encryption capabilities. Available for immediate download from the Netscape Internet site, Netscape Communicator with strong encryption would allow users worldwide to enjoy far greater protection for their information when communicating with certified, strong encryption applications on Intranets and the Internet. Netscape also received approval to export Netscape SuiteSpot server software featuring 128-bit encryption capabilities to certified banks worldwide. VeriSign will be providing a special-use digital certificate which enables the encryption. This will allow Netscape Communicator users to access their banking information from almost anywhere in the world and communicate using strong encryption with those banks which have implemented Netscape SuiteSpot servers and completed the certification process. --- some pr crap deleted --- International users who have Netscape Communicator do not need to download a new version of Netscape Communicator to take advantage of the strong encryption capabilities being announced today. Negotiation of the strong encryption between international versions of Netscape Communicator and Netscape SuiteSpot servers approved for export to banks occurs through a unique mechanism based on a special-use digital certificate. etc... ----- So... is this new approval for export of 128-bit encryption only for encryption between the users and these banks, or is it general? If it's general, is GAK built in or not? And if not, how did they get approval? Ariel Glenn / AcIS R&D / Columbia University ariel(a)columbia.edu #include <stddisclaimer.h>

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Political Prisoner of Intel
by Mike Duvos 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.rahul.net/jeffrey/ovs -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ enoch(a)zipcon.com $ via Finger $

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CNN - Encryption bill expected to pass House - June 23, 1997
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.cnn.com/TECH/9706/23/encryption.reut/index.html Encryption bill expected to pass House June 23, 1997 Web posted at: 10:05 p.m. EDT (0205 GMT) WASHINGTON (Reuter) -- Legislation to relax U.S. export limits on computer-encoding technology is likely to move ahead in the House of Representatives this week, despite a severe setback in the Senate last week. The House International Relations' economic policy and trade subcommittee will vote on a bill Tuesday, chairwoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Republican of Florida, said. Current U.S. law strictly limits export of encryption software, which scrambles information and renders it unreadable without a password or software "key." Once the realm of spies and generals, encryption has become a critical technology to safeguard electronic commerce and global communications over the Internet. In the Senate last week, a similar bill to relax encryption-export controls was torpedoed when the Senate Commerce Committee approved a substitute which would only modestly ease export restrictions. It effectively would allow the government to crack encrypted messages in the United States by gaining access to the software keys. The Clinton administration has been a strong proponent of so-called key-recovery mechanisms, arguing that the proliferation of strong encryption without key recovery would hamper law-enforcement and national security agencies' ability to keep tabs on criminals and terrorists. The House bill under consideration relaxes export rules without requiring key recovery. With 125 co-sponsors in the House, and "enthusiastic support" from industry and civil liberties and privacy advocates, the bill "is expected to be passed with limited changes," Ros-Lehtinen added. The bill could face a tougher challenge when considered by the full International Relations Committee. Chairman Benjamin Gilman, Republican of New York, is not a strong supporter of export liberalization, congressional staffers said. U.S. software companies such as Netscape Communications, and Microsoft Corp. have been clamoring for relief from encryption export controls. Copyright 1997 Reuters Limited. All rights reserved.

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Re: Comparing Cryptographic Key Sizes
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks, Adam, for sending this along. As it turns out, I'm working on an article about encryption and privacy that will appear in Time Magazine next month. Yesterday I photocopied a few pages of Applied Crypto and printed out the (I believe) February 1996 paper on recommended key lengths and passed them around the office. Your summary is even more handy. -Declan ------------------------- Declan McCullagh Time Inc. The Netly News Network Washington Correspondent http://netlynews.com/

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Re: Hettinga's e$yllogism
by Secret Squirrel 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>1. Government has copy of keys >2. Government misuses keys. > >Simple enough for you? Too simple. Escrow for ecash isn't to allow forging cash, or stealing it. It allows tracing it. If you tell financial experts that making ecash traceable under court order is goint to make electronic commerce impossible, they'll laugh. They already use systems which are even less private than that. Anon

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by TruthMailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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