December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

FW: Information about Algorithmic hash
by Shrinidhi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all, Can any one tell where can I find info about Algorithmic hash

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Re: I must admit. . .
by Joel O'Connor 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cypherpunks write code? Make people use it. . . ---mib <mib(a)io.com> wrote: > > On Mon, Dec 14, 1998 at 12:25:50PM -0800, you wrote: > > I wonder sometimes whether or not there is hope for us to ever stop > > this tyrrany. I've seen a bunch of us diss the strike saying it was > > an outlandish and foolish idea, but I hadn't seen anyone of you come > > up with something better. > > Cypherpunks write code? > > - d. > == "Be sand in the gears of the machine." Henry David Thoreau _________________________________________________________ DO YOU YAHOO!? Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com

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Norstar Question
by Leif Ericksen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This may be slightly off the topic here sorry... :( Ok for those of you that are actually reading this message I have a question about a Small Office Norstart Switch/voice mail system. I have recently taken the task of doing phone admin wehre I work and we use a Norstar system. I am waiting on tech support/help folk to get back to me and wanted to see if I can get the system working before they call. Here is the problem. I do Feature 983 to get to the admin section and I type in the password for some reason the password is not working. I tried a fewother combinations to see if it was given some other password, as well I checked the defaults and I have had NO luck getting into the admin section. Thus my question.... Is there a back door way ito the system that anybody on the net knows of? If so plese send it to me. If it means actually having access to the device I belive it is in a closet that I can get to with the aid of some other folk here that have the key. Thank you, Leif Ericksen.

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Re: I must admit. . .
by Joel O'Connor 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 hahahaha. . .now that was good. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 6.0.2 iQA/AwUBNnfhbVMQ9C083U98EQL7/ACaAlm+meYQpigAcpd2b60nTM48nT4AnjV+ bcnaWyFIx+QMFOvAEvoSi6B7 =LMpF -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ---mib <mib(a)io.com> wrote: > > On Wed, Dec 16, 1998 at 02:42:44PM +0000, Joel O'Connor wrote: > > Cypherpunks write code? Make people use it. . . > > Vee have vays... > > - d. > == "Be sand in the gears of the machine." Henry David Thoreau _________________________________________________________ DO YOU YAHOO!? Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com

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Re: I must admit. . .
by Joel O'Connor 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 It only took one to turn India around. Ghandi nearly starved to death, used nothing but passifism and won the race man. You can't discredit the labors of a few, wonderous things can happen when 3 people bond together for a common cause. To much negativity in this world already, I don't wish to add to it. We've got nothing left but hope and what a large flame a small spark can ignite. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 6.0.2 iQA/AwUBNnfiP1MQ9C083U98EQJ8tACg7OHwYApyS5ZV910pjal4l10a66cAoLT3 0MMHXv2SVi4gvLgd/VhGSVV8 =cZCk -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ---Rabid Wombat <wombat(a)mcfeely.bsfs.org> wrote: > > > > On Mon, 14 Dec 1998, Joel O'Connor wrote: > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > Hash: SHA1 > > > > I wonder sometimes whether or not there is hope for us to ever stop > > this tyrrany. I've seen a bunch of us diss the strike saying it was > > an outlandish and foolish idea, but I hadn't seen anyone of you come > > up with something better. That act of protest, no matter how small, > > serves to raise awareness. > > Nothing like an extremely weak protest effort to hurt the cause ... > > Having three geeks unplug their computers for a day sends the message > that "nobody cares." > > > == "Be sand in the gears of the machine." Henry David Thoreau _________________________________________________________ DO YOU YAHOO!? Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com

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Re: CRYPTO-GRAM, December 15, 1998
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Okay, I finally got the story right about Network Associates Inc. and the > Key Recovery Alliance. (Last month I pointed to a Wired News story that > they quietly rejoined.) The story is wrong. They never left the KRA. > Since its inception, Trusted Information Systems was a big mover and shaker > in the KRA. When NAI bought TIS in May 1998, TIS's membership transferred > to NAI. NAI resigned the leadership posts that TIS had held in the > Alliance and stopped attending its meetings, but never left the KRA. So, > NAI is a member of the KRA, and has been since it bought TIS. > http://www.wired.com/news/print_version/technology/story/16219.html As a further clarification, it is incorrect to say that NAI "never left the KRA." Network Associates Inc. (NAI) was formed out of McAfee and Network General. McAfee was a member of the KRA, so at the time NAI was formed, it was a member of the KRA. When NAI bought PGP, in late 1997, Phil Zimmermann found out about NAI's membership, and he was able to persuade management to withdraw from the KRA. This is why it is wrong to say that NAI never left the KRA. See http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,17112,00.html. NAI bought TIS a few months later. TIS was a member and in fact a leading member of the KRA. By purchasing TIS, NAI inherited its membership in the KRA, and so NAI was once again a member. It's not clear whether Phil Zimmermann or anyone else tried to get NAI to again withdraw from the KRA, but if they did, they were not successful. NAI renewed its membership later in 1998 and is still a member of the KRA, although it has reduced its level of participation.

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Network Associates' KRA Partner status
by Jim Gillogly 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bruce Schneier said in the "News" section of Crypto-Gram: >> Okay, I finally got the story right about Network Associates Inc. and the >> Key Recovery Alliance. (Last month I pointed to a Wired News story that >> they quietly rejoined.) The story is wrong. They never left the KRA. >> Since its inception, Trusted Information Systems was a big mover and shaker >> in the KRA. When NAI bought TIS in May 1998, TIS's membership transferred >> to NAI. NAI resigned the leadership posts that TIS had held in the >> Alliance and stopped attending its meetings, but never left the KRA. So, >> NAI is a member of the KRA, and has been since it bought TIS. >> http://www.wired.com/news/print_version/technology/story/16219.html Someone responded: > When NAI bought PGP, in late 1997, Phil Zimmermann found out about NAI's > membership, and he was able to persuade management to withdraw from > the KRA. This is why it is wrong to say that NAI never left the KRA. > See http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,17112,00.html. I remember hearing this at the time. The cited article (8 Dec 1997) has supporting quotes from NAI's Gene Hodges. In addition, Dave Del Torto wrote to the secretary of KRA last month and got a response from secretariat staffer Michael LoBue on 20 Nov 1998 that addresses this point in passing: Indeed, some of this current 'public debate' about NAI's relationship with the KRA goes back to their public statement that they 'withdrew' from the organization. The fact of the matter is that they simply did not choose to become an actual member at the time the organization was formally constituted. When it was reported that they withdrew, there was in fact no entity from which to withdraw. While the actual status of KRA is interesting, the relevant point is that NAI did indeed say they were withdrawing, and they did withdraw from participation in the nascent organization. > NAI bought TIS a few months later. TIS was a member and in fact a leading > member of the KRA. By purchasing TIS, NAI inherited its membership in > the KRA, and so NAI was once again a member. It was more explicit than this. Michael LoBue said further: Concerning Network Associates membership in the KRA, in response to your question I have verified that our files contain an executed Membership Agreement for Network Associates (dated July 2, 1998), as well as a properly completed Application for Membership of that same date. This is not just accepting the existing membership status of TIS. It's reversing NAI's non-membership status and explicitly joining. DDT's message and KRA's response were posted to several lists on 22 Nov 1998. Somebody'd better write this all in a physical book before the wrong version gets scribbled into history. Webbage is nice, but is regrettably transient. -- Jim Gillogly 26 Foreyule S.R. 1998, 18:06 12.19.5.13.19, 5 Cauac 12 Mac, Ninth Lord of Night

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[e-money] Press Review IV: E-mail trail
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Wed, 16 Dec 1998 14:37:56 +0100 To: e-money(a)moving-art-studio.com From: jens-ingo <jens.ingo.brodesser(a)euronet.be> Subject: [e-money] Press Review IV: E-mail trail Sender: owner-e-money(a)mail.serve.com Reply-To: owner-e-money(a)moving-art-studio.com MOVING ART STUDIO LIST: E-MONEY http://www.moving-art-studio.com/ ================================= found in wired news on 16 dec 1998 pst http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/16485.html ==================== start quoted text ==================== China Delays Net Trial Reuters 7:35 a.m. 25.Nov.98.PST SHANGHAI -- China has delayed the closed-door trial of a man accused of using the Internet to undermine the state, and on Wednesday his wife called for an open court hearing. Lin Hai, a 30-year-old computer engineer, had been scheduled to go on trial on Thursday. He is accused of inciting subversion of state power, but a Shanghai court has postponed the case indefinitely, said Lin's wife, Xu Hong. "They did not say when it might get underway," Xu told Reuters. "When it starts, I would want it to be in open court so there would be public scrutiny." Lin, who was arrested in March, has been accused of using the Internet to send tens of thousands of email addresses to VIP Reference, a dissident publication based in the United States. If convicted, he could face up to life in prison. The case was to be heard in a closed-door session at the Shanghai Number One Intermediate Court. Even the defendant's wife was to be barred from court. "Of course I believe I should be at the trial," Xu said. "But the hearing should be open to the public as well." The court offered no explanation for its sudden decision to postpone the hearing, but Xu said it could be a result of international interest in the case. The case has been ignored by the official Chinese media but has attracted widespread attention abroad. Some 1.2 million Chinese are on the Internet, and the total is expected to reach 5 million by 2000. The government has embraced the Internet, but so have a number of dissident groups. VIP Reference, one of many dissident publications that have sprung up online, says it sends information to 250,000 email accounts in China from various email addresses in the United States. Court documents called VIP Reference a hostile foreign organization, and claimed it used data provided by Lin "to disseminate large numbers of articles aimed at inciting subversion of state power and the socialist system." Lin ran a now-defunct software company that set up Web sites and provided job searches for multinational companies. His supporters say he frequently exchanged or purchased email addresses to build up a database for his online job search business. Copyright© 1998 Reuters Limited. ==================== end quoted text ==================== ================================== You are subscribed to the list e-money. To *un*subscribe simply send mail to e-money(a)moving-art-studio.com *message text: subscribe or unsubscribe* --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Strike may have had small impact...
by Kevlar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think the impact of the strike on December 14 against the Wassenaar Arrangement has been greatly under-estimated. Even though I can only comfirm a handfull of brave souls may have supported the cause, the discussion about it was enough to raise awareness. And wasn't that the point? I submit this as proof for your aproval: (Orinigal story quoted directly from: http://www.zdnet.com/icom/e-business/1998/12/wassenaar/index.html ) December 14, 1998 Wassenaar Pact May Threaten Global E-com By Jim Kerstetter - PC Week Could a treaty banning the use of strong encryption put the screws, once again, to the U.S. encryption industry? Cryptographers and others in the security industry worry that that could be exactly what is happening. The Clinton administration this month, in an about-face to indications that it was loosening its grip on encryption, announced the signing of a treaty with 32 countries called the Wassenaar Arrangement. The treaty would limit key lengths to 64 bits or less. Clinton administration officials said the treaty will, for the first time, level the playing field for U.S. companies trying to sell abroad. That's true, to a point. U.S. companies have long complained that they were unfairly hampered by the lack of restrictions in other countries. What they had hoped would happen--and what the administration seemed to be edging toward--was an easing of U.S. export laws. They never asked for stronger controls in other countries. The Wassenaar Agreement broadsided many who had watched the Clinton administration over recent years grant export licenses for strong encryption products to companies such as Hewlett-Packard Co. and Netscape Communications Corp. Jeff Smith, general counsel of the Washington industry group Americans for Computer Privacy, said in a statement the treaty is a welcome attempt to level the playing field, but "it also demonstrates flaws in our government's encryption export policies." Security status quo So what does it mean if the agreement does become law? For starters, it would not cut the use of unbreakable encryption. The Data Encryption Standard, the U.S. standard for symmetric, or private-key, encryption, has been broken at 56 bits. No one has publicly acknowledged breaking a DES key longer than that. The Triple DES key, commonly used in the United States, would continue to be illegal for export. Ironically, the government's own proposed Advanced Encryption Standard, which is expected to replace DES in about two years, would not be allowed for export. It's not clear what the treaty will mean to companies that have already been granted export licenses either for strong encryption--the financial-transaction encryption that has been exempt in the past--or for authentication mechanisms that usually take 1,024 bits. In other words, the treaty would reinforce the status quo in the United States. Elsewhere around the world, it could be a different story. Of the 32 other nations, several, such as the United Kingdom and Japan, already have strong encryption controls. But others, such as Germany, have virtually no export controls, and companies there could be seriously impacted. About 18 months ago, the control of encryption products was taken out of the hands of the U.S. Department of Defense, which had long considered encryption a munition, and handed to the Commerce Department. Although the result was often the same--the DOD, the National Security Agency, the CIA and the FBI still had a say in what could and could not be exported--the shift of control was considered by many to be a sign that the administration was growing more friendly to industry concerns. Those hopes were further bolstered when export limits were raised from 40 bits to 56 bits, when financial institutions where allowed to use whatever they wanted to protect transactions and when a long list of companies gained export approval. But the Wassenaar Agreement, which must still be approved by Congress and legislative bodies in most of the participating countries, would put the brakes on that road to government deregulation. Jim Kerstetter is a staff writer at PC Week. Send e-mail to jim_kerstetter(a)zd.com. -Kevlar <Webmaster(a)max-web.com> Does God know Peano Algebra? Or does she not care if strong atheists couldnt reason their way out of a trap made of Boolean presumptions? A little bit of knowledge is a dangerous thing, but zero knowlege is absolutely subversive. Overspecialization breeds in weakness. It's a slow death. Beat your algorithms into swords, your dumb terminals into shields, and turn virtual machines into battlefields... Let the weak say, "I am strong" and question authority.

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y2k+weapons
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

finally a good analysis of the weaponry situation.. surprised it has taken this long for anyone to write something like this. hopefully most weaponry systems will have failsafe mechanisms that prevent them from being shot off. in other words, they will malfunction, they will not work or be launchable.. worst case scenario of course is that they launch..!! the analogy is sort of like with stop lights. how horribly will they fail? for example stop lights could fail and just blink in all 4 directions, or they could be green in all 4 directions.. both are a failure, but the latter is more like a "catastrophic" failure.. with weapons, inoperability is a failure, launching is a catastrophic failure. ------- Forwarded Message Delivered-To: pswann(a)easynet.co.uk From: Carolyn Langdon <forumpub(a)stlc.com> Subject: Y2K and Nuclear Weapons Command Date: Wed, 9 Dec 1998 16:25:51 -0500 Organization: St Lawrence Centre for the Arts Encoding: 119 TEXT Science for Peace Media Release For immediate release - December 1998 Y2K and Nuclear Weapons Command and Control Systems Toronto - There are over 35,000 nuclear weapons remaining in the world today. These arsenals contain the destructive power of 650,000 Hiroshima bombs. Thousands of these weapons, mostly land-based ballistic missiles and submarine launched missiles are in a state of ready deployment. That is their warheads, which contain the nuclear fissile material, are attached to their delivery systems. Computers have become increasingly central to nuclear operations but they have not been without their glitches and serious flaws. During the Cold War computer malfunctions produced several serious false alarms of missile attacks, and during the Gulf War computer malfunctions contributed to the failings of the Patriot anti-missile system. "Both Russia and the U.S. are believed to have a "launch on warning" policy, so that a retaliatory launch is made after an adversary's missile is detected, and before the warhead impacts. Thus a single accidental or unauthorized launch could result in wholesale nuclear war." says Dr. Alan Phillips of Science for Peace. "When you factor in the Y2K computer problem an already dangerous situation becomes untenable", says Calvin Gotlieb from Science for Peace. "A Y2K meltdown in the nuclear systems of any one of the nuclear countries - the U.S., Russia, China, France, Britain, India, Pakistan and Israel (an undeclared nuclear state) would spell disaster." Dr. Barbara Simons, President of the Association for Computing Machinery states, "I am not going to worry about whether or not my VCR might become confused on 1/1/00. The worst case scenario is not especially bad. I am, however, going to worry about whether or not a computer that controls a major weapons system becomes confused on 1/1/00." Research findings by a number of different agencies and experts, both inside and outside the U.S. Dept. of Defense (DOD), show "no confidence" in the Pentagon's present program to meet the Year 2000 challenge. The DOD weapons systems utilize millions of 'embedded systems' in the form of microchips and microprocessors. U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre has admitted that, "everything is so interconnected, it's very hard to know with any precision that we've got it fixed." This was the U.S. state of affairs after 2 billion dollars had been spent trying to fix it. There is little information coming out of Russia about their progress with Y2K problems, but we can safely surmise that all can't be well given their diminished resources. David Parnas, the NSERC/Bell Industrial Research Chair in Software Engineering at McMaster University is concerned about the risks posed by the Y2K computer problem and nuclear systems. He says that, "The US military establishment is heavily dependent on computers for communication, intelligence and for control of weapons. Computer programs are very complex constructions. When a problem is discovered it often takes weeks to fix. Often the "fixed" program is still not right and requires further repair after the revised program is put into service. Sometimes, programs that are not date sensitive exchange dates with programs that are and will fail when those 'partner' programs fail." The Fail Safe Solution: All nuclear weapons states need to disconnect their nuclear warheads from their delivery systems to eliminate the risk of nuclear war by miscalculation, accident, or the Y2K problem. With proper planning and sufficient lead-time, it is technically feasible. In 1991, in the wake of the coup attempt in the Soviet Union, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev took thousands of nuclear weapons off deployment in a short period of time. The most difficult problem will be providing safe storage for the thousands of warheads from land-based missiles. In view of the risks involved in leaving weapons on ready alert, this difficulty can be easily overcome if governments start planning now. We need to hear from NATO, the U.N. and Congress that a multilateral approach to the Y2K problem is being coordinated. To date there has been near silence. Time is running out for a coordinated approach. Similar views to those of Science for Peace are held by individual computer scientists and nuclear physicists, organizations like the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research and the British American Security Information Council, both based in the U.S., and Physicians for Global Responsibility among others. - - - 30 - For more information please contact: Science for Peace Board members: Dr. Alan Phillips, Science for Peace & Physicians for Global Survival, 905-385-0353 Calvin Gotlieb, Professor Emeritus, Dept of Computer Science, U of T T. 416-978-2986 or 416-482-4509 David Parnas, P.Eng., NSERC/Bell Industrial Research Chair in Software Engineering, Dept. of Computing and Software, Faculty of Engineering at McMaster University 905-525-9140x27353 or 905-648-5772 Other: Barbara Simons, President of the Association for Computing Machinery (simons(a)acm.org) Arjun Makhijani, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research (U.S.) 301-270-5500 For further information on the Y2K issue and other related nuclear issues see the Science for Peace website at: www.math.yorku.ca/sfp/ Science for Peace is located at University College, 15 King's College Circle, University of Toronto M5S 3H7 Canada. Tel. 416-978-3606.

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