December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: A question about the new ISP ruling and email...
by Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: Jim Choate <ravage(a)EINSTEIN.ssz.com> > > Hi, > > I was pondering the draconian implications of the requirement to register > ISP's. Would an email only site be an ISP under these regulations? I dunno. But I've begun netcopping the Ignition-Point list on an ongoing basis (starting Friday), and they'll be an interesting test case of whether what they're doing is "fair use". Pobox.com/listbox.com is reluctantly assigning a person to receive (my) copyright complaints, and will register themselves with the FCO. I like to post whole articles myself. Anyway, for a test case, better them than me. ---guy ;-)

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IP: Head of U.S. Internet Policy Plans to Resign: Magaziner
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: ignition-point(a)majordomo.pobox.com X-Sender: believer(a)telepath.com Date: Sat, 07 Nov 1998 09:05:02 -0600 To: believer(a)telepath.com From: believer(a)telepath.com Subject: IP: Head of U.S. Internet Policy Plans to Resign: Magaziner Mime-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-ignition-point(a)majordomo.pobox.com Precedence: list Reply-To: believer(a)telepath.com Source: New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/yr/mo/cyber/articles/07magaziner.html November 6, 1998 Magaziner, Head of U.S. Internet Policy, Plans to Resign By JERI CLAUSING ASHINGTON -- Ira C. Magaziner, who has led the Clinton Administration's efforts to foster the growth of the Internet and electronic commerce, said today that he plans to leave the White House before the end of the year. Magaziner said he has not set a departure date or made any firm plans for his future, but he hopes to wrap up his duties within the next month and move back to New England. His family moved there a year ago, he said, and he has been commuting since then. "I felt a responsibility to follow through on what we had committed," Magaziner said. "And we have had some good successes." Magaziner joined the Clinton Administration five and a half years ago to draft what turned out to be a doomed effort to restructure the nation's health care system. He then turned to the Internet, where he has been aggressively trying to shape domestic and international policy for electronic commerce and governance of the Internet. "At a time when there was a lot of confusion about where the [Internet] industry was going both domestically and internationally, Ira Magaziner was the guy who rolled up his sleeves and got into the nitty-gritty of how technology works, what the effect would be on our society, and then took those notions and began to be the evangelist for the Internet industry in a global marketplace," said Brian O'Shaughnessy, spokesman for the Internet Alliance, one of the world's largest associations of companies with Internet interests. "He's a cerebral guy who took these intellectual ideas and wrestled a lot of very powerful forces to the table... He's certainly been the champion for [Internet] self-governance." In June 1997, after studying the Internet for 15 months, Magaziner released the Administration's "Framework for Electronic Commerce," which called for a hands-off, market-driven approach to regulation of the global network. Magaziner's philosophy then and now is that while the Internet is growing rapidly, this growth could be stymied by excessive government intervention. "For this potential to be realized fully," he wrote in that report, "governments must adopt a nonregulatory, market-oriented approach to electronic commerce, one that facilitates the emergence of a transparent and predictable legal environment to support global business and commerce. Official decision makers must respect the unique nature of the medium and recognize that widespread competition and increased consumer choice should be the defining features of the new digital marketplace." Since then, he has led efforts to hand administration of the global network over to the private sector, and has traveled the world pushing other countries to endorse his tax-free, unregulated approach to the new medium. Magaziner said he is satisfied that he has put the issue of electronic commerce on the world's agenda. In addition to winning passage of two new laws imposing a moratorium on new Internet taxes in the United States and protecting copyrights in the digital age, he has won international agreements to keep the Internet duty-free and set standards for international payment systems. He is also wrapping up what has been a highly contentious effort to hand the administrative functions of the Internet's name and address system over to a private corporation. But as he announces his departure, Magaziner has left one important issue -- online privacy -- unresolved. Magaziner has been the lead cheerleader for industry self-regulation on how personal data is collected and used in electronic databases, a controversial stance that has put the United States directly at odds with the European Union and one that threatens to disrupt electronic commerce with those countries. Critics say he has ignored consumer interests in favor of business. However, others laud his refusal to back down. "Ira...has been working long and hard on behalf of self-governance and not letting the E.U. data directive simply become the rule of the day," O'Shaughnessy said. The European directive that took effect last month imposes strict privacy policies on companies that do business in Europe. A key provision of that law prohibits any company doing business in the European Union from transmitting personal data to any country that does not guarantee comparable privacy protections. The European Union has said that self-regulatory models adopted by industry groups in the United States do not meet its requirements. It has held off on imposing sanctions against the United States until at least December while the governments involved attempt to negotiate a compromise. The Commerce Department this week laid out its negotiating position, which proposes giving companies a variety of "safe harbors" to satisfy privacy protection. One idea is to create independent organizations that would monitor a company's data practices and give companies that comply with accepted guidelines what amounts to a stamp of approval. The E.U. has so far rejected that plan. But Magaziner said the Administration has scored a victory in getting the E.U. to agree to discuss self-regulation as a remedy. "They agreed to hold back, and we are still discussing it with them," he said. "We got them to recognize in February self-regulation as being legitimate. So under their own direction they are saying self-regulatory approaches can work. Now we have to get them to agree to recognize what we are proposing. That may not be finished by the time I leave, but it will be well along." Magaziner has also been leading the effort to move administration of the Internet to an international, nonprofit corporation. That power had been exercised by the United States government -- at first directly, and in recent years under a government contract granting a monopoly on domain name registrations to Network Solutions, a corporation based in Herndon, Va. A driving force toward creation of the new board was the demand by private companies around the world that they be allowed to compete with Network Solutions in the lucrative business of registering domain names. But finding a solution that balances the interests of more traditional, academic institutions with trademark holders and commercial entities with a huge stake in the future of electronic commerce proved difficult, and much controversy still surrounds the plan that Magaziner hopes to finalize this month. Last month, the Administration tentatively approved handing the reins of the Internet over to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). This new corporation was set up largely under the direction of one of the Internet's founders, the late Jon Postel. Although the ICANN proposal was presented as having "the support of a broad consensus of Internet stakeholders, private and public," several groups have complained that it was hammered out in secret and still lacks proper fiscal controls and appropriate power checks on future board members. The Department of Commerce has asked the nine-member interim board of ICANN to craft new bylaws that address those concerns, a proposal that is expected to be completed within the next week and which will be the topic of a public meeting next week in Cambridge, Mass. Copyright 1998 The New York Times Company ----------------------- NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ----------------------- **************************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address or (un)subscribe ignition-point-digest email@address **************************************************** www.telepath.com/believer **************************************************** --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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RE: Quick, Dear -- Beat Me
by Albert P. Franco, II 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: "Lynne L. Harrison" <lharrison(a)dueprocess.com> >Subject: RE: Quick, Dear -- Beat Me >At 10:47 AM 11/5/98 -0500, Petro wrote: >>At 12:08 AM -0500 11/5/98, Blanc wrote: >>>From Duncan Frissell: >>> >>>I just went to the bank I do business with this week to open a new account. >>>They wanted my social security number, (which they actually already have on >>>record), and during a search on her handy database, the Customer Assistance >>>clerk informed me that there was another person in Florida using the same >>>number. Long list of problems which could result from someone using your SSN snipped... >All in all, you should seriously reconsider your decision of not reporting >the problem. > > So much for the SSN "never" becoming a national ID number! Since your SS account and pension can be negatively impacted, this tends to reinforce the idea that your SSN should be a secret. But how can we keep it a secret if they keep putting it on public documents such as drivers licenses? Seems to me that when they are all done making the SSN the official National ID number they will need to give us a NEW SSN that is secret, kind of like a PIN to unlock and validate our National ID and SS accounts. ...and latter a PIN to protect the PIN... APF

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Re: A question about the new ISP ruling and email...
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Now *this* should be fun. Someone who claims to be a cypherpunk is now going to call the copyright police on a non-profit, volunteer news list. Cryptoanarchy indeed. The ganglia twitch. When the going gets tough, the "tough" rat out the innocent, it appears... Cheers, Bob Hettinga --- begin forwarded text From: Information Security <guy(a)panix.com> Date: Sat, 7 Nov 1998 14:56:55 -0500 (EST) To: cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net Subject: Re: A question about the new ISP ruling and email... Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net Precedence: first-class Reply-To: Information Security <guy(a)panix.com> X-Loop: cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net > From: Jim Choate <ravage(a)EINSTEIN.ssz.com> > > Hi, > > I was pondering the draconian implications of the requirement to register > ISP's. Would an email only site be an ISP under these regulations? I dunno. But I've begun netcopping the Ignition-Point list on an ongoing basis (starting Friday), and they'll be an interesting test case of whether what they're doing is "fair use". Pobox.com/listbox.com is reluctantly assigning a person to receive (my) copyright complaints, and will register themselves with the FCO. I like to post whole articles myself. Anyway, for a test case, better them than me. ---guy ;-) --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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genetic copy protection
by David Honig 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A patent on a means to produce seeds which germinate, but which produce plants whose seeds are sterile, was reviewed in Science, p 850, 30 Oct 98 vol 282. The trick is that the seeds are genetically engineered, and the seeds are 'activated' by an antibiotic (which acts like a signal). The purpose is to copy-protect other engineered genes in the organism. US pat 5,723,765 David Honig "When horsemeat is outlawed, only outlaws will eat horsemeat"

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Re: Blind signal demodulation
by pgut001＠cs.auckland.ac.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Matt Crawford" <crawdad(a)fnal.gov> wrote: >>The October 1993 Proceedings of the IEEE contain a number of rather ... >>... They also comment that blind decoders for typical voiceband >>signals can be implemented on Pentium MMX/UltraSparc-grade hardware. >Did you make specific a more general spec they made, or did you typo the date >of the issue? Oops, that should be October 1998, not 1993 (ie last months issue). Sorry about that. Peter.

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IP: ISPI Clips 6.14: Anonymous eCash Provider-DigiCash-Files Chapter 11
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: "ama-gi ISPI" <offshore(a)email.msn.com> Subject: IP: ISPI Clips 6.14: Anonymous eCash Provider-DigiCash-Files Chapter 11 Date: Fri, 6 Nov 1998 00:19:06 -0800 To: <Undisclosed.Recipients(a)majordomo.pobox.com> ISPI Clips 6.14: Anonymous eCash Provider-DigiCash-Files Chapter 11 News & Info from the Institute for the Study of Privacy Issues (ISPI) Friday November 6, 1998 ISPI4Privacy(a)ama-gi.com ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ This From: CNET News.com, November 4, 1998 http://www.news.com DigiCash Files Chapter 11 http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,28360,00.html?st.ne.4.head By Tim Clark, timc(a)cnet.com Staff Writer, CNET News.com Electronic-cash pioneer DigiCash [ http://www.digicash.com/ ] said today it's filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection after shrinking its payroll to about six people from nearly 50 in February. The company, which has been running off a bridge loan from its venture capital investors since June, is seeking new investors from established financial institutions or a buyer for its software technology. The company's operations in the Netherlands, where it was founded, were liquidated in September. "To really launch and brand something like this in the Internet space is likely to take a fair amount more capital," said Scott Loftesness, DigiCash's interim CEO since August. "It's more appropriate for strategic investors, corporate players or banks themselves as a consortium model." Electronic-cash schemes have found difficult sledding recently. First Virtual Holdings [ http://www.firstvirtual.com/ ], which had a form of e-cash, exited the business in July. CyberCash's [ http://www.cybercash.com/ ] CyberCoin offering hasn't really caught on. Digital Equipment, now part of Compaq Computer [ http://www.compaq.com/ ] is testing its Millicent electronic cash, and IBM [ http://www.ibm.com/ ] is in early trials for a product called Minipay. Under bankruptcy laws, DigiCash's Chapter 11 filing allows the company to continue operations, while keeping its creditors at bay as the company reorganizes. Most of DigiCash's $4 million in debt is owed to its initial venture capital financiers who extended the bridge loan, August Capital http://www.augustcap.com/ ], Applied Technology, and Dutch investment firm Gilde Investment. DigiCash's eCash allows consumers to make anonymous payments of any amount--and anonymity differentiates eCash against other e-cash schemes. DigiCash's intellectual property assets include patents, protocols, and software systems that also could be used for applications, like online electronic voting or private scrip issued by a particular retailer. DigiCash suffered a setback in September when the only U.S. bank offering its scheme, Mark Twain Bank, dropped the offering. But a number of major banks in Europe and Australia offer or are testing DigiCash's electronic cash. Also in September, DigiCash closed its Dutch operations and liquidated its assets there. Loftesness said DigiCash has a list of 35-40 potential partners, and he has been talking to players like IBM for months. He expects to resolve DigiCash's status in the next five months. "Everybody feels anonymous e-cash is inevitable, but the existing situation was not going to get there from here," said Loftesness, who is frustrated by potential partners telling him, "This is absolutely strategic, but unfortunately it's not urgent." The company was founded by David Chaum and was well-known in the Internet's earliest days. MIT Media Labs' Nicholas Negroponte is a director of DigiCash. Copyright © 1995-98 CNET, Inc. --------------------------------NOTICE:------------------------------ ISPI Clips are news & opinion articles on privacy issues from all points of view; they are clipped from local, national and international newspapers, journals and magazines, etc. Inclusion as an ISPI Clip does not necessarily reflect an endorsement of the content or opinion by ISPI. In compliance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed free without profit or payment for non-profit research and educational purposes only. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ISPI Clips is a FREE e-mail service from the "Institute for the Study of Privacy Issues" (ISPI). To receive "ISPI Clips" on a regular bases (up to 3 - 8 clips per day) send the following message "Please enter [Your Name] into the ISPI Clips list: [Your e-mail address]" to: ISPIClips(a)ama-gi.com . The Institute for the Study of Privacy Issues (ISPI) is a small contributor-funded organization based in Victoria, British Columbia (Canada). ISPI operates on a not-for-profit basis, accepts no government funding and takes a global perspective. ISPI's mandate is to conduct & promote interdisciplinary research into electronic, personal and financial privacy with a view toward helping ordinary people understand the degree of privacy they have with respect to government, industry and each other and to likewise inform them about techniques to enhance their privacy. But, none of this can be accomplished without your kind and generous financial support. If you are concerned about the erosion of your privacy in general, won't you please help us continue this important work by becoming an "ISPI Supporter" or by taking out an institute Membership? We gratefully accept all contributions: Less than $60 ISPI Supporter $60 - $99 Primary ISPI Membership (1 year) $100 - $300 Senior ISPI Membership (2 years) More than $300 Executive Council Membership (life) Your ISPI "membership" contribution entitles you to receive "The ISPI Privacy Reporter" (our bi-monthly 12 page hard-copy newsletter in multi-contributor format) for the duration of your membership. For a contribution form with postal instructions please send the following message "ISPI Contribution Form" to ISPI4Privacy(a)ama-gi.com . We maintain a strict privacy policy. Any information you divulge to ISPI is kept in strict confidence. It will not be sold, lent or given away to any third party. **************************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address or (un)subscribe ignition-point-digest email@address **************************************************** www.telepath.com/believer ****************************************************

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re: Response to Anonymous re: Zero-Knowledge Freedom
by Austin Hill 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Attn: Anonymous Thank you for your comments with regards to the Freedom project. I would like to respond to some of the points you have brought up. >-----Original Message----- >From: HyperReal-Anon [mailto:nobody@sind.hyperreal.art.pl] >Sent: Friday, November 06, 1998 7:30 PM >To: austin(a)zks.net >Subject: > > >Attn: Austin Hill >Zero Knowledge Systems, Inc. >3981 St. Laurent Blvd. >Suite 810 >Montr=E9al, Qu=E9bec >H2W 1Y5 >Canada >514.286.2636 phone >514.286.2755 fax > >Mr. Hill: > >Congratulations. I hope your name goes down in history for being >involved in creating and operating FREEDOM.net > >Additional suggestions for the FREEDOM.NET concept: > >1) Undoubtedly, after your client software is developed and deployed >there will be nations run by legislators and politicians with evil >intentions to continue to restrict and sabotage the privacy of >individuals. If your software already has flexible measures coded into >it to counter these evil forces, privacy seeking citizens from >affected nations will prevail. > >For the client side software, it would be extremely useful to have a >feature (or an input field) where users can view their IP hops >(traceroutes), but more important to allow users to BYPASS all local >FREEDOM servers in their home country (example: if terrible laws are >passed like in the Netherlands requiring logging and storage of all >packet info., etc.). In this manner, a local user in a restrictive >nation could set their client to BYPASS all local FREEDOM servers, >accessing only FREEDOM servers in the nearest friendly nation which >protects privacy of users and allows FREEDOM servers to operate AS YOU >DESIGNED THEM. Even the FSU of Russia has already begun to >implement "black box" requirements at every ISP (only Internet by >satellite will bypass this ?) > >Example: > ><Box to check> **Bypass local FREEDOM SERVER** >Enter the IP address of first FREEDOM server to route >through__________________________________ (user fills in this blank) > Route definitions for use of AnonymousIP nodes is COMPLETELY configurable. A user of Freedom can define preferred exit hops (i.e. 'Make all my pseudonyms IP traffic come from country X'); server's to avoid (i.e. 'Never use any Freedom node in country X'); and some rather advanced custom configurations (i.e. 'Always make my exit hop of of the following countries, use the fastest and best routing point for my first hop and make my middle hop one of the following trusted nodes') With regards to countries such as the Netherlands; and Russia these laws will have no effect on Freedom users. Since all IP traffic leaves the local computer anonymized and multiply encrypted with the different keys for different hops a local ISP that is logging all traffic as per government rules will only be able to log encrypted data and be able to reveal that this user is using Freedom. The ability to define the destination or content of that Internet traffic is not possible. As well, due to the features we have included for traffic analysis foiling, both packets and links are padded to avoid traffic correlation's. Even if an all powerful network attacker with the ability to watch all incoming and outgoing connections to all Freedom nodes attempts to correlate traffic patterns, they will not be able to reveal the true identity behind the pseudonym. The user interface for controlling the Freedom node selection and some of these rules is designed to make it COMPLETELY transparent and easy for the average Internet user. There will be an advanced mode that allows more advanced users to built custom routing profiles that they can associate with a particular pseudonym or with particular destination sites. (i.e. Whenever I browse 'www.playboy.com' use pseudonym 'playboyfan' and routing profile 'Fast routing, no rules except exit hop cannot be in the following Muslim countries'). > >2) It is very possible government spy agencies will secretly arrange >for spy friendly ISP's to obtain your software and setup FREEDOM >servers in their nation. Then, they could write or modify code to >intercept and decrypt incoming packets of data BEFORE it hit the >FREEDOM servers. Can you write secret "test" code or test packets >such that you can send out packets from your Canadian headquarters to >test all FREEDOM servers deployed worldwide to detect all forms of >tampering, and if detected, send emergency emails and post on >newgroups the violators ? > This is essentially the hostile root/hostile node attack. Ultimately we have decided that protecting against a hostile root or node is infeasible. (i.e. Whatever attempts we make to make it impossible to have a hostile node, do not justify themselves because they are not completely effective) We do employ some simple protections to try and avoid amateur hostile nodes (Valid binary checking, periodic unannounced audits for nodes) but a sophisticated and well financed attacker could and most likely will operate a number of nodes in the network. To compromise the identity behind a pseudonym, an attacker would have to control or collude with all the nodes you use in a particular AnonymousIP route. Since a user by default uses three hops, and can configure specific nodes that they trust this reduces the possibility of a single node or a groups of nodes being able to work to compromise a pseudonyms privacy. (i.e. If you decide based on reputation to trust Zero-Knowledge, you might enter into your preferences to always use at least one Zero-Knowledge server in your AnonymousIP routers. This means that as long as that Zero-Knowledge server does not have a hostile root or that we have not been subverted that your identity is protected. You may choose to chain trusted servers (i.e. Use Zero-Knowledge, TOAD.COM and EFF.ORG servers (TOAD.COM; EFF.ORG are just examples - They are not to imply that they are currently committed to operate Freedom nodes) for all my anonymous routes.) Also because Freedom node operators are rewarded financially to operate Freedom nodes, we've found incredible interest in the ISP community to operate Freedom nodes. This will help to increase the total number of Freedom nodes in the network, making it that much harder for a hostile attacker to operate a large percentage of nodes in the network. (i.e. 'If there are only 10 nodes in the network, running 40% of them is quite easy. If there are 700 nodes in the network and a user only needs 3 of them, owning enough of those 700 nodes to have a reasonable chance at always being all 3 hops is less likely.) >3) Curiously, what if Canadian legislators / politicians create laws >similar to what the Dutch parliment enacted recently ? Would you move >your entire company to another nation ? Or, would you have to move the >FREEDOM net server headquarters to another nation ? It seems very >important initially to setup FREEDOM servers in as many nations as >possible to counteract such attempts to destroy the right to internet >privacy. Canada has proven quite committed to the privacy of its citizens and has demonstrated its support for Canada's growing cryptography industries. Many leading cryptography companies are now setup in Canada and able to export strong cryptography without restriction. We believe that Canada will remain a friendly country in which to develop our products and distribute them around the world. In the event that the US or another country were able to convince Canada to ban anonymity/pseudonymity online; or make it illegal to provide these services there are plans and provisions we have made to ensure we are able to continue to provide service to our customers. Because of the distributed nature of the system, it would take a global effort among all countries to ban and make Freedom illegal (A nice soundbyte waiting to happen ;) The US would have a difficult time (According to our lawyers) passing a law making anonymity/pseudonymity illegal or banning the domestic use of encryption products like Freedom. Ultimately this will be another example of 'the cats out of the bag'. There will most likely be some fights because this will be the first time that completely pseudonymous digital identities will be accessible to the layman; or average Internet user - and the technical sophistication of AnonymousIP with pseudonymous identities mapped on top will pose a serious challenge for some government initiatives. But we will be attempting to educate law enforcement; government officials that this tool will be the primary and most effective way of protecting children online (From stalkers and aggressive marketing profiles); protecting privacy (Both archived histories that we cannot separate ourselves from; multiple roles we have that are difficult to separate online right now and privacy from aggressive marketing) and protecting free speech and human rights on a global level. For this education process to be effective, we will need to help government understand that there are better ways of using traditional law enforcement techniques to accomplish their goals. This is the same process that many of the cypherpunks; privacy advocacy groups and lobbyists have already been doing and we will work on supporting those efforts. Initially we will have servers deployed in MANY countries and we have an aggressive marketing plan to ensure that we have high penetration of servers very quickly after we release. > >4) I urge you to try and think ahead, designing as many >countermeasures as possible into the first initial version of client >software, making it as easy as possible for users to circumvent any >harmful measures taken by the evil forces of the dark side. We have designed the system to be as versatile as possible and as hard to shut down as possible. We have included provisions (Might not be in version 1, but can be applied very quickly after) to circumvent country level firewalls or proxy servers so that countries that attempt to ban all IP traffic to the Freedom network will encounter many difficulties. While this is not likely in most North American or European countries (Although the US many attempt it when they implement ISP blocking provisions for offshore gambling sites (Online Gambling Act)and realize that Freedom clients can bypass ISP political filtering of sites) in certain other countries around the world, the initial reaction will be to ban Freedom and add it to a list of filtered sites. Since some of these countries are the ones that have citizens who in the most urgent need of unlimited access to Free Speech, total privacy for their browsing and online activities and the ability to communicate secretly - we've made it very difficult for any country to ban our traffic. > >5) A PARADOX awaits - Serious privacy advocates will want to "test" >your system. One such test would be to sign up and operate as as a >spammer, and use your system to pass on SPAM, or what about malicious >hackers ? If that person is identified or revealed by you, then your >system has been revealed as not a true anonymous system, and there >will be a media feeding frenzy exposing it. But if it IS a truely >anonymous system, you will have no way to identify and locate spammers >or malicious hackers. The SPAM dilemma was one of the more difficult ones that we faced in designing the project. We were aware that if we could not manage the abuse (Spam, harassment, Anonymous hack attempts) then we would quickly become 'blackballed' for most services and a few bad apples could affect all of our legitimate users. We could not have the option of knowing who to hold responsible for abuse because that would include our holding some sort of identity escrow which we specifically did not want and designed the system to make impossible. The alternative we decided on was to invest significantly on making abuse easier through other networks than the Freedom network. Some of the ways we've accomplished this; - -Designed the entire system around untraceable pseudonymity as opposed to anonymity. This re-enforces the reputation capital aspect of having a pseudonym. In general we hope this will promote people who have made an investment in a pseudonym (Both in time, and money) to be careful about how badly the affect the online reputation of that pseudonym. - -Associated a direct cost with a pseudonym By having a cost associated with a pseudonym, many people who would normally take liberties in abusing Internet communication will/do hesitate, since there is the potential of losing that financial investment. - -Forcing 'nymserver' like features of having all outgoing e-mail pass through the Freedom server, signed by both the pseudonym and the Freedom network key to avoid forged spam baiting mail. - -Allowing end users to have destination blocking per recipient and making it easy for them to request not to receive e-mail from a particular pseudonym. (In cases of harassment) - -Developing sophisticated SPAM blocking systems to make our network VERY VERY unfriendly to pseudonyms attempting to send SPAM. (i.e. Max per day recipients limits of 500 or so people; with the limit automatically adjusting to deal with averages of all pseudonyms and number of confirmed spam complaints.) Bulk mailers will have the option of purchasing a more expensive pseudonym that removes any daily limits for recipients but has strict cancellation policies for unsolicited spam (This enables an underground Zine that publishes anonymously to sent out an edition every Friday to 15,000 people; but if someone buys one of the bulk mailing pseudonyms (Around $500+/year) and abuses by sending a massive SPAM we will confirm the spam complaints (Based on digital sig on headers and message) and then have the right to cancel the pseudonyms (Resulting in the Spammer paying $500+ to deliver one spam to many people then losing that pseudonym.) This makes it cheaper to SPAM from other free services or open mail relay systems thereby diverting hard core spammers from making the Freedom network their home. - -Anonymous Telnet host blocking (Site administrators can work with us to block anonymous telnet to their sites) allowing certain sites such as MUDs and Telnet BBS's to allow access but corporate/university sites to restrict access for anonymous telnet. We hope with these and other systems we have taken the time to develop it will help mitigate or reduce the potential of a few malicious users to harm the legitimate Freedom users. Ultimately we have only once choice in dealing with abuse, canceling the pseudonym which will cause a financial loss for someone as well as killing that 'nym and any reputation it has gathered. The terms under which we will cancel a pseudonym will be very clearly posted, and the only other time is when a government agency (Canadian) issues us a court order to turn off a pseudonym. There is NO MEANS possible for us to reveal the identity of a user (Thereby avoiding some of the Penet.Fi style attacks). > >6) It seems unfortunate that some of the larger, "holier than thou, >self righteous" worldwide ISP's (like AOL) will be frustrated at >FREEDOM net not being able to identify who the spammers or hackers >are, and then BLOCK FREEDOM net packets from going through their >servers, starting little electronic wars. These "blocking wars" have >already occured from time to time. Hopefully with the abuse management tools we've made available we will cut off any attempts to block or ban our service. If certain domains/admins feel they still wish to ban Freedom traffic we would work with them to address whatever concerns we can to help restore good routing relations, but in the end it will be up to our users to fight for FREEDOM, if anyone attempts to take it away. Strong letter writing campaigns, boycotts and media attention should all help pressure certain organizations to deal with us on any complaints or issues they have and not treat pseudonyms as second class online citizens. Ultimately this service and peoples pseudonymous digital identities will be as valuable as they make them. By using them frequently, lobbying sites to support pseudonymous identities (For instance for one click authentication and login to web sites), and making sure the get ALL their friends to use pseudonyms then it becomes REALLY difficult to shut the service down or silence millions of users. If there is a small uptake and we only have 100,000 pseudonyms it would be possible to shut the service down without a lot of noise (We'll make as much as we can, but ultimately our users have to help). With 12 million pseudonyms registered and all of them making as much noise as possible to fight any attempts to ban Freedom, there will by a lot more chance of making Freedom completely ubiquitous. > >7) It would really be useful for your staff to address questions/ >concerns like these and others by creating pages regarding these >matters on your website. Hopefully, you are on some of the lists that I am responding to your e-mail with. Most of this information will be posted in time to our web site, but the FAQ's and whitepapers describing most of this are not ready for publication on the web yet. > > >Anonymously Yours, > >P.S. I will only feel comfortable revealing my anonymous self to you >by way of my psuedonym, when I sign up with your service, which I hope >to do as soon as FREEDOM net is ready. > > Thanks for the interest and comments. I hope I've been able to answer most of your questions. ________________________________________________________________________ _ Austin Hill Zero-Knowledge Systems Inc. President Montreal, Quebec Phone: 514.286.2636 Ext. 226 Fax: 514.286.2755 E-mail: austin(a)zks.net http://www.zks.net Zero Knowledge Systems Inc. - Nothing Personal Changing the world with Zero Knowledge PGP Fingerprints 2.6.3i = 3F 42 A2 0D AF 78 20 ED A2 BB AD BE 8B 40 5E 64 5.5.3i = 77 1E 62 21 B3 F0 EB C0 AA 6C 65 30 56 CA BA C4 94 26 EC 00 keys available at http://www.nai.com/products/security/public_keys/pub_key_default.asp ________________________________________________________________________ _ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPfreeware 5.5.3i for non-commercial use <http://www.pgpi.com> iQA/AwUBNkS3qlbKusSUJuwAEQJzNACg7TTSDuipjmCrT78WMWKskdOkzgQAnAnq R4ka2Ne+CMK4FmyAt6qfExJu =paSA -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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IP: TOTALITARIAN TECHNOLOGY
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Bill Kingsbury <kingsbry(a)gte.net> Subject: IP: TOTALITARIAN TECHNOLOGY Date: Thu, 05 Nov 1998 14:47:59 -0500 To: ignition-point(a)majordomo.pobox.com from: http://www.newdawnmagazine.com.au/50a.htm=20 TOTALITARIAN TECHNOLOGY -- The Truth is Closer Than Fiction --------------------------------- By SUSAN BRYCE=20 Over the last decade, Hollywood has sensitised us to totalitarian technology. Block buster movies portray our heroes and heroines using the weapons of the new millennium. Militarised police forces keep citizens safe; android warrior personnel, part human, part robot are gainfully employed as global peacekeepers; prisoners are incarcerated in high tech electronic jails, controlled with implanted microchips, while the free population is kept under surveillance through the use of biometric identity systems.=20 Science fiction perhaps? Reality yes! Much of what we see on the big screen is not the latest fantasy of Hollywood script writers, but is based on fact. Any film maker wanting a picture of the future need look no further than existing military technology and research. =20 A recent report published by the European Parliament, "An Appraisal of the Technologies of Political Control", shows just how far these new technologies have come, and how they are being actively employed against citizens in countries across the globe.=20 The report warns of "an overall technological and decision drift towards world wide convergence of nearly all the technologies of political control", including identity recognition; denial; surveillance systems based on neural networks; new arrest and restraint methods and the emergence of so called `less lethal' weapons.=20 Developments in surveillance technology, innovations in crowd control weapons, new prison control systems, the rise of more powerful restraint, torture, killing and execution technologies and the role of privatised enterprises in promoting such technologies pose a grave threat to our immediate and future freedoms.=20 Trade in Technologies of Control=20 Cutting edge developments made by the Western military-industrial complex are providing invaluable support to various governments throughout the world. The report "Big Brother Incorporated", by surveillance watchdog Privacy International, presents a detailed analysis of the international trade in surveillance technology. =20 Privacy International says it is concerned about "the flow of sophisticated computer-based technology from developed countries to developing countries -- and particularly to non-democratic regimes where surveillance technologies become tools of political control." =20 The international trade in surveillance technology (known as the Repression Trade), involves the manufacture and export of technologies of political control. More than seventy per cent of companies manufacturing and exporting surveillance technology also export arms, chemical weapons or military hardware.=20 The justification advanced by the companies involved in this trade is identical to the justification advanced in the arms trade -- i.e.: that the technology is neutral. Privacy International's view is that in the absence of legal protection, the technology can never be neutral. =20 As "Big Brother Incorporated" points out, "even those technologies intended for `benign' uses rapidly develop more sinister purposes. The UK manufactured `Scoot' traffic control cameras in Beijing's Tianamen Square were automatically employed as surveillance cameras during the student demonstrations. Images captured from the cameras were broadcast over Chinese television to ensure that the `offending' students were captured." =20 Privacy International cites numerous cases where this type of technology has been obtained for the express purpose of political and social control...=20 -- ICL (International Computers Limited) provided the technological infrastructure to establish the South African automated Passbook system, upon which much of the function of the apartheid regime depended. =20 -- In the 1980s Israeli company Tadiram developed and exported the technology for the computerised death list used by the Guatemalan police. =20 -- Reported human rights abuses in Indonesia -- particularly those affecting East Timor -- would not be possible without the strategic and technological support of Western companies. Among those companies supplying the Indonesian police and military with surveillance and targeting technology are Morpho Systems (France), De la Ruue Printak (UK), EEV Night Vision (UK), ICL (UK), Marconi Radar and Control Systems (UK), Pyser (UK), Siemens Plessey Defense Systems (UK), Rockwell International Corporation (USA) and SWS Security (USA). =20 Tools of Repression for 'Democratic' States=20 We should not forget that the same companies supplying regimes with repression technology, also supply `democratic' states with their totalitarian tools. =20 Leutcher Associates Inc. of Massachusetts supplies and services American gas chambers, as well as designing, supplying and installing electric chairs, auto-injection systems and gallows. The Leutcher lethal injection system costs approximately $30,000 and is the cheapest system the company sells. Their electrocution systems cost =A335,000 and a gallows would cost approximately $85,000. More and more US states are opting for Leutcher's $100,000 "execution trailer" which comes complete with a lethal injection machine, a steel holding cell for an inmate, and separate areas for witnesses, chaplain, prison workers and medical personnel. Some companies in Europe have even offered to supply gallows.=20 In the 1970's, J.A. Meyer of the US Defense Department suggested a countrywide network of transceivers for monitoring all prisoners on parole, via an irremovable transponder implant. The idea was that parolees movements could be continuously checked and the system would facilitate certain areas or hours to be out of bounds, whilst having the economic advantage of cutting down on the costs of clothing and feeding the prisoner. If prisoners go missing, the police could automatically home in on their last position. =20 Meyer's vision came into operational use in America in the mid 1980's, when some private prisons started to operate a transponder based parole system. The system has now spread into Canada and Europe where it is known as electronic tagging. Whilst the logic of tagging is difficult to resist, critics argue that the recipients of this technology appear not to be offenders who would have been imprisoned, but rather low risk offenders who are most likely to be released into the community anyway. Because of this, the system is not cheaper since the authorities gain the added expense of supplying monitoring devices to offenders who would have been released anyway. Electronic tagging is however beneficial to the companies who sell such systems. Tagging also has a profitable role inside prisons in the US and in some prisons, notably, DeKalb County Jail near Atlanta, where all prisoners are bar coded.=20 'Non-Lethal' Technology of Control=20 The increasing militarisation of police forces throughout the world is reflected in the spread of "less lethal" weapons such as pepper gas. Benignly referred to by the media as "capsicum spray", pepper gas was recently used by Australian police in the state of Victoria to subdue a man. According to media reports, the Victorian police also used "a weapon they don't want to disclose". =20 The effects of pepper gas are far more severe than most people realise. It is known to cause temporary blindness, a burning sensation of the skin which lasts from 45 to 60 minutes, upper body spasms which force a person to bend forward and uncontrollable coughing making it difficult to breathe or speak for between 3 to 15 minutes.=20 For those with asthma or subject to restraining techniques which restrict the breathing passages, there is a risk of death. The Los Angeles Times has reported at least 61 deaths associated with police use of pepper spray since 1990 in the USA, and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has documented 27 deaths in custody of people sprayed with pepper gas in California alone, since 1993.=20 The US Army concluded in a 1993 Aberdeen Proving Ground study that pepper spray could cause "Mutagenic effects, carcinogenic effects, sensitization, cardiovascular and pulmonary toxicity, neuro-toxicity, as well as possible human fatalities." =20 The existing arsenal of weapons designed for public order and control will soon be joined by a second generation of kinetic, chemical, optico-acoustic, and microwave weapons, adding to the disabling and paralysing technologies already available. Much of the initial work on these new technologies has been undertaken in US nuclear laboratories such as Oak Ridge, Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos. The European Parliament Report "An Appraisal of the Technologies of Political Control" lists a Pandora's box of new technologies including:=20 -- Ultra-sound generators, which cause disorientation, vomiting and involuntary defecation, disturbing the ear system which controls balance and inducing nausea. The system which uses two speakers can target individuals in a crowd. =20 -- Visual stimulus and illusion techniques such as high intensity strobes which pulse in the critical epileptic fit-inducing flashing frequency and holograms used to project active camouflage. =20 -- Reduced energy kinetic weapons. Variants on the bean bag philosophy which ostensibly will result in no damage (similar claims were once made about plastic bullets). =20 -- New disabling, calmative, sleep inducing agents mixed with DMSO which enables the agent to quickly cross the skin barrier and an extensive range of pain causing, paralysing and foul-smelling area-denial chemicals. Some of these are chemically engineered variants of the heroin molecule. They work extremely rapidly, one touch and disablement follows. Yet one person's tranquillisation may be another's lethal dose. =20 -- Microwave and acoustic disabling systems. =20 -- Human capture nets which can be laced with chemical irritant or electrified to pack an extra disabling punch. =20 -- Lick `em and stick `em technology such as the Sandia National Laboratory's foam gun which expands to between 35-50 times its original volume. Its extremely sticky, gluing together any target's feet and hands to the pavement. =20 -- Aqueous barrier foam which can be laced with pepper spray. =20 -- Blinding laser weapons and isotrophic radiator shells which use superheated gaseous plasma to produce a dazzling burst of laser like light. =20 -- Thermal guns which incapacitate through a wall by raising body temperature to 107 degrees. =20 -- Magnetosphere gun which delivers what feels like a blow to the head. =20 "An Appraisal of the Technologies of Political Control" says "we are no longer at a theoretical stage with these weapons. US companies are already piloting new systems, lobbying hard and where possible, laying down potentially lucrative patents." For example, last year New Scientist reported that the American Technology Corporation (ATC) of Poway, California has used what it calls acoustical heterodyning technology to target individuals in a crowd with infra-sound to pinpoint an individual 200-300 metres away. The system can also project sonic holograms which can conjure audio messages out of thin air so just one person hears them. Meanwhile, Jane's reported that the US Army Research Laboratory has produced a variable velocity rifle for lethal or non lethal use -- a new twist to flexible response. Other companies are promoting robots for use in riot and prison control.=20 Advances in Biometric Identification=20 Through the inevitability of gradualness, repression technology, in the form of biometric identity systems, is permeating our every day life. Biometry involves using a physical characteristic such as a fingerprint, palm print, iris or retina scan to identify individuals. These unique identity charact-eristics are digitally stored on a computer system for verification. This way, the identity of each person can be compared to the stored original. Christians will be interested to note that with biometric systems, the original print is stored not as a `picture' but as an algorithm. The number of your name will be literally in your hand (thumb print) or in your forehead (eyes).=20 Biometric identification is not something that we just see at the movies. It is here, it is with us now. Governments in Australia, the USA and the UK are planning its widespread introduction by 2005. =20 Both the Dutch and Australian public rejected plans for a national information and identification scheme en masse several years ago, but have reacted more passively to equally intrusive (but less blatant) schemes in the 1990's.=20 Uses of the Social Security Number in the USA, the Social Insurance Number in Canada, the Tax File Number in Australia, the SOFI Number in the Netherlands and the Austrian Social Security Number have been extended progressively to include taxation, unemployment support, pensioner benefits and, in some cases, health and higher education. Functional creep is rampant.=20 Large scale government computer based schemes have been shown in several countries to be much less cost-effective than was originally estimated. Years after the governments of the United States and Australia developed schemes to match public sector data, there is still no clear evidence that the strategy has succeeded in achieving its goals. The audit agencies of both federal governments have cast doubt that computer matching schemes deliver savings. =20 A nationwide survey by Columbia University last year reported that 83% of people approve of the use of finger imaging. Biometrics is being embraced on a global scale. The Australian company, Fingerscan, a subsidiary of Californian based Identix Inc, recently won one of the biggest bank contracts for biometric security in the world. Fingerscan is working with the Bank of Central Asia in Jakarta, Indonesia to replace numeric passwords for employees at 5000 branches with fingerprint based system access.=20 Fingerscan also has the world's largest application of biometrics in the servicing of automated teller machines. In conjunction with contractor Armaguard, which services ATMs for Australian banks, many ATMs are now unlocked by the representative's fingerprint. The representative brings a portable scanning device that plugs into the back of the ATM and connects the bank's server which grants him or her admittance. =20 The US government has a deadline of 1999 to implement electronic benefits processing for welfare recipients, but this may be delayed to accommodate biometrics, which is currently being piloted in five American states. The Australian government will introduce a biometric identity system for welfare recipients by 2005.=20 Blue Cross and Blue Shield in the USA have plans to introduce nationwide fingerprinting for hospital patients. This may be extended into other medical applications. The Jamaican Government is planning to introduce electronic thumb scanning to control elections. Social Security verification using biometrics is used in Spain and South Africa. In 1994, the UK Department of Social Security developed a proposal to introduce a national identification card, which recommended a computerised database of the hand-prints of all 30 million people receiving government income assistance. =20 Big Brother's International Network of Surveillance=20 Biometric identification is the technology of today and the future. It is not a matter of if, but when, a global network of computers will link all stored biometric images in a central location, managed by a collective of international authorities. =20 In 1994, under the leadership of US Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a consortium of the world's leading companies formed the Global Information Infrastructure Commission (GIIC). Headed by the president of Mitsubishi, the chair of EDS, and the vice chair of Siemens Corporation, the GIIC intends to create a conglomerate of interests powerful enough to subsume government interest in the regulation of biometric and other technologies. The effort is being funded to a large extent by the World Bank.=20 Governments in 26 countries are, at this moment, monitoring and cooperating with project FAST (Future Automated Screening for Travelers). FAST was first piloted in 1993 by US immigration authorities when a new lane at New York's John F. Kennedy airport was opened. The technology for the system is known as INPASS (Immigration and Natur-alization Service Passenger Accelerated Service System) which is a biometric identification system used to expedite passengers through customs at international airports in as little as 20 seconds.=20 Applicants for registration with FAST are interviewed, and identity confirmed. Hand prints are taken, converted to a template and stored digitally on a smart card. Once the last of five green lights appear at the tips of the fingers, the glass exit door opens and the passenger continues to the baggage claim and customs zone. The system is currently a voluntary trial for frequent travellers to and from the USA who are US or Canadian nationals. =20 With new technology, travelers can rest assured that their security is always in good hands. The US Militech Corporation has developed a Passive Millimeter Wave Imaging system, which can scan people from up to 12 feet away and see through clothing to detect concealed items such as weapons, packages and other contraband. Variations of this through-clothing human screening are under development by companies such as the US Raytheon Corporation, and will be an irresistible addition to international airports everywhere.=20 Once upon a time, surveillance was targeted at certain groups and individuals. In our time, surveillance occurs en masse. Much of the `harmless' computer based technology necessary for our daily lives could actually be used to keep the entire population under surveillance. =20 Telephone systems lend themselves to a dual role as a national interceptions network, according to "An Appraisal of the Technologies of Political Control". For example, the message switching system used on digital exchanges like System X in the UK, supports an Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) Protocol. This allows digital devices, e.g. faxes, to share the system with existing lines. The ISDN subset is defined in their documents as "Signaling CCITT"-series interface for ISDN access. =20 What is not widely known is that built-in to the international CCITT protocol is the ability to take phones `off hook' and listen into conversations occurring near the phone, without the user being aware that it is happening. This effectively means that a national dial up telephone tapping capacity is built into these systems from the start. Further, the digital technology required to pinpoint mobile phone users for incoming calls means that all mobile phones in a country when activated, are mini-tracking devices.=20 The issues surrounding the uncontrolled and unregulated spread of tyrannical technology are immediate and ongoing. The technologies of repression that are trialed in so-called non-democratic countries are now being aggressively marketed in the West, while Hitler's Germany becomes a vague memory. It is up to us to do what ever we can to stop the insidious spread of this technology, and to demand the right to choose whether we participate in the biometric system or not. We should ask ourselves... who will heed our cry for help once these technologies are fully implemented? =20 REFERENCES=20 Davies, Simon, "Touching Big Brother", Information Technology People, Vol 7, No 4, 1994=20 Elllerman, Sarah, "The Rise of Tempest", Internet Underground Magazine, June 1996.=20 European Parliament, Scientific and Technical Operations Assessment, 1998, "An Appraisal of Technologies of Political Control", available at http://jya.com/stoa-atpc.com=20 Jane's US Military R & D, "Human Computer Interface, Vol 1, Issue 3 1997=20 O'Sullivan, Olara, "Biometrics comes to Life", http://www.banking.com/aba/cover_0197.htm=20 Privacy International, 1995, "Big Brother Incorporated", http://www.privacy.org/pi=20 US Scientific Advisory Board, "New World Vistas", the proceedings of Fiftieth Anniversary Symposium of the USAF SAB, November 10, 1994, (republished by International Committee for the Convention Against Offensive Microwave Weapons).=20 Susan Bryce is an investigative journalist and researcher whose interests include issues which affect individual freedom, environmental health, surveillance technology and global politics. She can be contacted c/- Mapleton Post Office, QLD 4560 **************************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address or (un)subscribe ignition-point-digest email@address **************************************************** www.telepath.com/believer ****************************************************

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IP: ISPI Clips 6.10: Washington to Seek Public's Advice on EU Privacy Laws
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: "ama-gi ISPI" <offshore(a)email.msn.com> Subject: IP: ISPI Clips 6.10: Washington to Seek Public's Advice on EU Privacy Laws Date: Thu, 5 Nov 1998 00:29:18 -0800 To: <Undisclosed.Recipients(a)majordomo.pobox.com> ISPI Clips 6.10: Washington to Seek Public's Advice on EU Privacy Laws News & Info from the Institute for the Study of Privacy Issues (ISPI) Thursday November 5, 1998 ISPI4Privacy(a)ama-gi.com ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ This From: Fox News, November 4, 1998 http://www.foxnews.com U.S. Negotiators Ask For Public Feedback in Talks With Europe Over Privacy Law http://www.foxnews.com/js_index.sml?content=/news/wires2/1104/n_ap_1104_334 .sml NEW YORK Raising the stakes in its talks with Europe over a new privacy law there, the Commerce Department on Wednesday publicly reaffirmed a laissez-faire approach toward protecting personal privacy that remains at odds on key positions taken by European negotiators. The Commerce Department released a statement for public feedback that details its basic position in the talks. The talks attempt to resolve deep differences over a sweeping European privacy measure that has the potential to disrupt some commerce with the United States. The law took effect on Oct. 26, but sanctions were suspended while the talks go on. U.S. firms from global drug makers to direct marketers doing business in Europe fear the new directive could bar them from using customers' confidential information for everything from valuable scientific research to junk mail, stifling business commerce. In its position paper, the U.S. reiterated its view that U.S. companies should not be forced to give people access to personal information about themselves. In addition, companies should have the option to choose an independent industry group to police its privacy policies, instead of a government body, as required by the European law. "For now, we're trying to get (Europe's) reaction to these principles themselves,'' said David Aaron, under secretary of Commerce. Aaron said the United States wants to give companies "safe harbors'' to satisfy privacy protection demands. Some experts said the government's seeking of public comment could suggest that the United States may seek to modify its position if enough people favor the European approach. "This is significant because it is the first time that the Commerce Department has asked for public comment on its negotiating position with the European Union,'' said Joel Reidenberg, a law professor at Fordham University and an expert on U.S.-Europe relations. A Commerce Department spokeswoman said the principles would be posted on its Web site. © 1998, News America Digital Publishing, Inc. d/b/a Fox Market Wire. --------------------------------NOTICE:------------------------------ ISPI Clips are news & opinion articles on privacy issues from all points of view; they are clipped from local, national and international newspapers, journals and magazines, etc. Inclusion as an ISPI Clip does not necessarily reflect an endorsement of the content or opinion by ISPI. In compliance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed free without profit or payment for non-profit research and educational purposes only. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ISPI Clips is a FREE e-mail service from the "Institute for the Study of Privacy Issues" (ISPI). To receive "ISPI Clips" on a regular bases (up to 3 - 8 clips per day) send the following message "Please enter [Your Name] into the ISPI Clips list: [Your e-mail address]" to: ISPIClips(a)ama-gi.com . The Institute for the Study of Privacy Issues (ISPI) is a small contributor-funded organization based in Victoria, British Columbia (Canada). ISPI operates on a not-for-profit basis, accepts no government funding and takes a global perspective. ISPI's mandate is to conduct & promote interdisciplinary research into electronic, personal and financial privacy with a view toward helping ordinary people understand the degree of privacy they have with respect to government, industry and each other and to likewise inform them about techniques to enhance their privacy. But, none of this can be accomplished without your kind and generous financial support. If you are concerned about the erosion of your privacy in general, won't you please help us continue this important work by becoming an "ISPI Supporter" or by taking out an institute Membership? We gratefully accept all contributions: Less than $60 ISPI Supporter $60 - $99 Primary ISPI Membership (1 year) $100 - $300 Senior ISPI Membership (2 years) More than $300 Executive Council Membership (life) Your ISPI "membership" contribution entitles you to receive "The ISPI Privacy Reporter" (our bi-monthly 12 page hard-copy newsletter in multi-contributor format) for the duration of your membership. For a contribution form with postal instructions please send the following message "ISPI Contribution Form" to ISPI4Privacy(a)ama-gi.com . We maintain a strict privacy policy. Any information you divulge to ISPI is kept in strict confidence. It will not be sold, lent or given away to any third party. **************************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address or (un)subscribe ignition-point-digest email@address **************************************************** www.telepath.com/believer ****************************************************

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