December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Spelling error...
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, It's clathrate, not calthrate... Sorry. ____________________________________________________________________ The seeker is a finder. Ancient Persian Proverb The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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usa-v-cej-wc.htm (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Notice: mucho text deleted. Forwarded message: > X-within-URL: http://jya.com/usa-v-cej-wc.htm > criminal threats to kill, injure, obstruct, impede, threaten and > intimidate IRS > and other Government employees. I have also conducted numerous > investigations involving the use of computers and the Internet. Since > Western District of Washington. In the investigation of Mr. Bell, it > was discovered that he had posted a plan (titled "Assassination > Politics") on the Internet, offering users of the Internet a method > for anonymously funding the assassinations of IRS and other Government > Internet group known as the "Cypherpunks." During the investigation of This guy has experience with the Internet and doesn't know the difference between a group and a mailing list, what a maroon. > Bell I noted that Bell exchanged both private and public e-mail > messages with an unidentified person using the name "Toto." Implying Bell was under surveillance. > residence. Shortly thereafter, a member of the Cypherpunks group > stated via the Internet that he had obtained a copy of the warrant and > return, and publicly posted them on the Internet. And the point is? > Bell was arrested and charged with Corruptly Obstructing and Impeding So I can non-corruptly obstruct and impede? > 4. On June 23, 1997, an anonymous message was posted to the > Cypherpunks Internet mailing list. [A "mailing list" consists of the Well, finaly got the terms right. > 5. Based on my training and experience, I know that "Bot" is a slang > term for an automated computer program. I also know that "e$" and > "eCa$h" are slang terms for electronic or digital cash, which was a ... > maker or indorser [as written]. [By analogy, digital cash is like a > digital "poker chip" issued by a particular casino.] Oh well, I knew he couldn't keep it straight. > 6. On September 4, 1997, a second message involving "Dead Lucky" was > anonymously posted to the Cypherpunks group. This message stated in This guy keeps using 'group' instead of 'mailing list', there is the potential implication of conspiracy here...I wouldn't be surprised if just about all of us weren't under surveillance at this point. > 8. On December 9, 1997, an anonymous message was posted to the > Cypherpunks Internet mail group with the subject listed as "Encrypted > InterNet DEATH THREAT!!! / ATTN: Ninth District Judges / PASSWORD: > sog"[.] The body of the message was encrypted with the publicly > available encryption software PGP, and was initially unreadable. Using > PGP software and the password shown in the subject line of the > message, I was able to decrypt the message, which contained a > rambling, five-page statement, including the following: > I can also be tied into Jim Bell's Worldwide Conspiracy to > assassinate government authorities, through my implementation of an > Assassination Bot ..." See I told you there was a conspiracy buried in there somewhere! > 9. I noted that this message contained a PGP digital signature. From > my training and experience, I am aware that this digital signature is > used as a way to authenticate digital documents to make sure that they > are authored by the purported author and that no one has tampered with > them. When I checked the signature using only PGP software, the PGP > program was unable to identify it. > Only July 1, 1998, Royal Canadian > Mounted Police (RCMP) Investigator Steve Foster provided me with a PGP > "Secret Key Ring" which he stated he had obtained from a computer > which Canadian Customs authorities had seized from an individual by > the name of CARL EDWARD JOHNSON. [A "secret key ring" is a > user-generated code which allows for the encryption (and later > authentication) of computer-generated documents.] When I checked the > digital signature on the Internet death threat using the PGP software > and JOHNSON'S secret key ring, the computer identified the signature > as one of the signature keys stored in JOHNSON'S computer. Because > both the "private" and "public" portions of the "key" were stored on > JOHNSON'S computer, the message can be authenticated as having been > generated by the person who possessed this "secret key" and knew the > correct password. In other words, only the person possessing the > secret key found on JOHNSON'S computer could have generated the "death > threat" message. > 10. I have also spoken by phone with Special Agent Jeremy Sheridan of > the United States Secret Service. Sheridan told me that on July 31, > 1998, he located and interviewed Carl JOHNSON at 1800 West Magee, in > Tucson, Arizona. The address belongs to a Linda Reed, who, according > to Canadian police authorities, is a friend of JOHNSON'S. During this > interview JOHNSON admitted that he often wrote on the Internet and > among the names he used were Toto, C.J. Parker, and TruthMonger. > Johnson also stated that he had been using the Internet account of > Linda Reed. Sheridan showed JOHNSON a decrypted copy of the December > 9, 1997 Internet message entitled "Encrypted InterNet DEATH THREAT!!! > / ATTN: Ninth district Court Judges / PASSWORD: sog." JOHNSON > acknowledge that he wrote it. JOHNSON also stated that he had > significant psychological problems. Probably not a wise move, don't know about psychological problems but it certainly demonstrates a lack of intelligence. > bomb that was discovered in the basement of the Estevan courthouse on > June 3, 1998. Block advised me that Carl JOHNSON has been formally > charged with placing the bomb and that a warrant for his arrest has > been issued in Canada. Block advised me that he believes that JOHNSON > fled to the United States after placing the bomb in the Estevan > courthouse. That's impressive if true. > 15. On June 10, 1998, an anonymous message was posted to the > Cypherpunks Internet group. In the message, it is stated that the > bomber "placed the bomb before embarking on a middle-leg of the So that's why he came to Austin? ____________________________________________________________________ The seeker is a finder. Ancient Persian Proverb The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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Movie/Research Research
by WGKOPP＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, I'm a screenwriter in Los Angeles and I'm currently working on a psychological thriller. I'm trying to research how a particular thing could be done, and I cannot seem to find precisely what I'm looking for. You are surely highly learned individual, and I wonder if I could pick your brains for a moment. Here is the situation I need help with:- The "villians" are charging people $15 (from their credit card - or another source) to download or "watch" a video clip of highly illicit material, from a specific website. Our "protagonist" has to stop these "video's" and the people behind them, but, they cannot seem to trace them, or where the funds are going. How can this be done? How can we realistically make it so that origins and/or location & authors of the website are untraceable. Also, that the funds are untraceable. The only way our protagonist can find the villains, is by revealing a terrible secret from his past, something he's tried desperately to forget and put behind him. He eventually does catch the villains, but not electronically. He catches them, by reliving his painful past. Do you have any idea's? If so, I'd be most grateful if you could share them with me. Once the screenplay is completed and hopefully sold, I'm sure the very least I could offer is a film credit. Yours, Wayne Kopping

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internet monitoring, UK
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------- Forwarded Message From: "ama-gi ISPI" <offshore(a)email.msn.com> To: <Undisclosed.Recipients(a)majordomo.pobox.com> Subject: IP: ISPI Clips 4.25:UK Police May Soon Tap Your Email & Internet Use At Will Date: Tue, 8 Sep 1998 01:16:50 -0700 ISPI Clips 4.25:UK Police May Soon Tap Your Email & Internet Use At Will News & Info from the Institute for the Study of Privacy Issues (ISPI) Tuesday September 8, 1998 ISPI4Privacy(a)ama-gi.com ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ This From: The Independent Network, Monday September 7, 1998 http://www.independent.co.uk The PC in your mailbox: The police may soon be allowed to read your email and check your Internet use at will. http://www.independent.co.uk/net/980907ne/index.html By Paul Lavin When you drop an envelope in a red pillar-box, you walk away confident that your mail will not be read by anyone except the addressee. However, when you send an email, it might be wise to reflect on the differences. According to the organisation Internet Freedom, an agreement being negotiated between the UK's internet service providers (ISPs) and the police will open the email of the UK's eight million Internet users to scrutiny without debate in Parliament or oversight by the courts or the Home Secretary. British police are said to be close to reaching an agreement with ISPs that will enable them to monitor customers' emails and web usage logs. Chris Ellison of Internet Freedom, says: "Following a series of meetings between the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and Internet industry representatives, we understand that both groups have stated a willingness to reach a 'memorandum of understanding' about implementing police access to private data held by ISPs." According to David Kennedy, chairman of the Internet Service Providers Association, that is a serious overstatement of the discussions. However, he admits that the UK's ISPs are trying to avoid being flooded by court orders or having the police cart off critical servers for evidence. He says: "We are talking to law enforcement representatives to find a way to work with them within the legal framework that exists. All members of our association take the view that emails are private." As with the understanding between the Metropolitan Police and the ISPs over "banned" Usenet newsgroups and the closing down of web sites that may breach the law, the significance of such an agreement is that any such police activity may not be subjected to judicial review or legal constraint. Detective Chief Superintendent Keith Ackerman, chairman of the ACPO's computing crimes sub-committee, says: "We want to ensure the criminal doesn't take best advantage of the Internet, without requiring the Government to use the sledgehammer of regulation. However, we are not looking for the ability to go on fishing expeditions." The ISPs know that they are stuck in the middle, according to Keith Mitchell, chairman of Linx, a partnership of large ISPs. He says: "To divulge private email even under duress would be commercial suicide for an ISP. In some circumstances it would constitute a crime." Nonetheless, mistakes happen and there are well-known cases where the police have been persuasive. Mitchell says: "The current laws do not adequately protect ISPs or private individuals. We will be active in seeking responsive changes from Parliament." While there are undoubtedly individuals who use the Internet's email and worldwide web for nefarious purposes, the vast majority of people who use email and the web for personal and business communications have an expectation of privacy. And law-abiding citizens who wholeheartedly support the goals of law enforcement agencies may nevertheless feel uneasy about giving them carte blanche over email. America Online has been quite vocal in its opposition to opening the doors to the police short of a court order. Many ISPs agree. Julie Hatch, marketing communications director of Easynet, says:"We do not allow anyone to access our customers' email without a court order. "It makes no difference if it is an estranged wife or a suspicious business partner or anyone else, we would not divulge a subscriber's private email unless we were presented with a court order. This is in accordance with our terms and conditions. "Our business is also subject to restrictions imposed by the Data Protection Act (DPA), and in any situation we would certainly abide by those rules. So unless a subscriber's actions are illegal, you can say that email is confidential." The DPA provides scanty protection to email users, however. While the Act has aspects that protect the quality and use of information held in computer systems, disclosure can be afforded by a compliant ISP by simply including appropriate language in the small print of their terms and conditions. Data may be revealed to law enforcement officials as long as the subscriber is notified. Easynet's assurances highlight the differences between ISPs that are classified as telecoms providers, protected from feeling the long arm of the law by a regulatory framework, and those that are merely private businesses unaccountable to anyone but their owners and governed solely by their contracts with subscribers. As well as Easynet, UK ISPs that are regulated as telecoms providers include BT Internet and Demon, which is now part of Scottish Telecom. Smaller ISPs are more vulnerable to the persuasive demands of the police.They have no legally protected right of privacy and any redress for email disclosure would only be for breach of contract. Furthermore, most ISPs now include in their terms and conditions a requirement that the subscriber bear the expense of any legal costs resulting from their use of the service. This could lead to a complaining subscriber having to bear the costs of both sides of a lawsuit against an ISP even if they won. The most serious aspect of this potential agreement between the police and ISPS is, according to critics, the absence of legal safeguards. In order to tap telephones, the police need the permission of the Home Secretary and must justify violating the privacy of a suspect. It is not clear from the law whether tapping a telephone and tapping into an email exchange are the same thing. Chris Ellison says: "This is what is so dangerous about the new culture of private regulation and moral responsibility. ISPs now operate in a moral climate which insists on limitations for freedom of speech. Any material that causes offence - especially to children and ethnic minorities - is regularly removed. ISPs have now embraced this self-censorship credo and are willing to set themselves up as moral arbiters of internet content, filtering out anything that they feel may be illegal." Without public debate or scrutiny by Parliament, the police are likely to gain, as Liz Parratt from the organisation Liberty puts it, "a snoopers' charter for the Internet". Ordinary users will have little legal protection or redress against police monitoring of their communications. This trend could render the Internet less private and more regulated than any other communications medium. "If nothing else, these discussions have demonstrated what self-regulation really means: ISPs undertaking the role of publicly unaccountable instruments of law enforcement." Email is not like a letter in an envelope; it is more like a postcard. Just as you would not put some messages on a postcard, you should think before you use email for your most private communications. While the legality and desirability of the any agreement between ACPO and the ISPs is highly debatable, anyone interested in maintaining their privacy on the Internet must take responsibility for their own actions. The agreement between ACPO and ISPs will be the subject of three seminars: 22 September in Edinburgh, 8 October in London and 27 October in Manchester. Additional details can be found at http://www.linx.net/misc/acposeminar.html . - --------------------------------NOTICE:------------------------------ ISPI Clips are news & opinion articles on privacy issues from all points of view; they are clipped from local, national and international newspapers, journals and magazines, etc. Inclusion as an ISPI Clip does not necessarily reflect an endorsement of the content or opinion by ISPI. In compliance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed free without profit or payment for non-profit research and educational purposes only. - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ISPI Clips is a FREE e-mail service from the "Institute for the Study of Privacy Issues" (ISPI). To receive "ISPI Clips" on a daily bases (approx. 4 - 8 clips per day) send the following message "Please enter [Your Name] into the ISPI Clips list: [Your e-mail address]" to: ISPIClips(a)ama-gi.com . The Institute for the Study of Privacy Issues (ISPI) is a small contributor-funded organization based in Victoria, British Columbia (Canada). ISPI operates on a not-for-profit basis, accepts no government funding and takes a global perspective. ISPI's mandate is to conduct & promote interdisciplinary research into electronic, personal and financial privacy with a view toward helping ordinary people understand the degree of privacy they have with respect to government, industry and each other and to likewise inform them about techniques to enhance their privacy. But, none of this can be accomplished without your kind and generous financial support. If you value in the ISPI Clips service or if you are concerned about the erosion of your privacy in general, won't you please help us continue this important work by becoming an "ISPI Clips Supporter" or by taking out an institute Membership? We gratefully accept all contributions: Less than $60 ISPI Clips Supporter $60 - $99 Primary ISPI Membership (1 year) $100 - $300 Senior ISPI Membership (2 years) More than $300 Executive Council Membership (life) Your ISPI "membership" contribution entitles you to receive "The ISPI Privacy Reporter" (our bi-monthly 12 page hard-copy newsletter in multi-contributor format) for the duration of your membership. For a contribution form with postal instructions please send the following message "ISPI Contribution Form" to ISPI4Privacy(a)ama-gi.com . We maintain a strict privacy policy. Any information you divulge to ISPI is kept in strict confidence. It will not be sold, lent or given away to any third party. ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer ********************************************** ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Movie/Research Research (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From: WGKOPP(a)aol.com > Date: Tue, 8 Sep 1998 21:33:54 EDT > Subject: Movie/Research Research > The "villians" are charging people $15 (from their credit card - or another > source) to download or "watch" a video clip of highly illicit material, from > a specific website. > Our "protagonist" has to stop these "video's" and the people behind them, but, > they cannot seem to trace them, or where the funds are going. > > How can this be done? How can we realistically make it so that origins and/or > location & authors of the website are untraceable. Also, that the funds are > untraceable. You'd need to use something like an eternity server or a data haven. These allow one to obtain information from an unknown 3rd party based on a distributed network of servers and search engines. All transactions of e$ would need to go through an anonymous remailer of some sort that interfaced to a suitable bank handlding EFT's via the Internet. The web surfing could be implimented via a CROWDS style mechanism. ____________________________________________________________________ The seeker is a finder. Ancient Persian Proverb The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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(fwd) ppdd - encrypted filesystem - kernel patch and support progs.
by demona＠demona.doldrums.dyn.ml.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- forwarded message -- Path: nntp.net-link.net!ptdnetP!newsgate.ptd.net!newsfeed.fast.net!howland.erols.net!newsfeed1.telenordia.se!newsfeed1.funet.fi!news.helsinki.fi!not-for-mail From: Allan Latham <alatham(a)ibm.net> Newsgroups: comp.os.linux.announce Subject: ppdd - encrypted filesystem - kernel patch and support progs. Followup-To: comp.os.linux.misc Date: Tue, 8 Sep 1998 08:38:12 GMT Organization: Flexsys Lines: 48 Approved: linux-announce(a)news.ornl.gov (Mikko Rauhala) Message-ID: <pycola.905243893.18924(a)laulujoutsen.pc.helsinki.fi> Reply-To: alatham(a)flexsys-group.com NNTP-Posting-Host: laulujoutsen.pc.helsinki.fi Old-Date: Sat, 05 Sep 1998 14:43:19 +0200 X-No-Archive: yes X-Auth: PGPMoose V1.1 PGP comp.os.linux.announce iQCVAgUBNfTs+lrUI/eHXJZ5AQEL7QQAm4TJb/hig4GSK4jpwd2PhuA8IKynybEF L+5ki9aYooX3Je/LdyvHVeg9kFL0IM8qdYNK01W6jJDqscoM4Hlp8KstxmpIDn1v OTBF9AbX4HQKUKO3J1UcNn+J89WZN/lmSB9lcgnJ6YAaKWpAYPVUFaoOoTPgHTg4 ITpeWxe/v9s= =w014 Xref: nntp.net-link.net comp.os.linux.announce:1426 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ppdd is an advanced encrypted file system for i386 Linux only. It is used in a similar way to the loop device and offers simplicity and speed plus full strength encryption (128 bit). The design takes into consideration the fact that data on disc has a long lifetime and that an attacker may have the matching plaintext to much of the cyphertext. A combination of master/working pass phrases offers enhanced security for backup copies. Current status is BETA and comments on the implemenation and underlying crypography are most welcome. It consists of a kernel patch plus support programs and is intended for users with enough knowledge to compile the kernel, setup lilo, partition disks etc. It is not for absolute beginners or "non technical" users just yet. Available from: http://pweb.de.uu.net/flexsys.mtk Package is ppdd-0.4.tgz, pgp signature is also available from same url. Allan Latham <alatham(a)flexsys-group.com> - -- This article has been digitally signed by the moderator, using PGP. http://www.iki.fi/mjr/cola-public-key.asc has PGP key for validating signature. Send submissions for comp.os.linux.announce to: linux-announce(a)news.ornl.gov PLEASE remember a short description of the software and the LOCATION. This group is archived at http://www.iki.fi/mjr/linux/cola.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 iQCVAgUBNfTs+lrUI/eHXJZ5AQEWhQP9Fd7tlWEZs/jG5Kcq/foSJBW6Me/WXS1W wRgKukImIl/DstOW9Ni1ZhfEoT4xwp0fpnVPdl+5aPG76thLv/T4iVRwVwh47hem y34x3IbvKnX6jvOqONEvrYbGL3CreMd1QWq3YuXUTZUVJVZVb6nSL4Wh5vKt/0na ijokp4QDMDk= =K4sO -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- end of forwarded message --

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Re: Tax silliness (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Tue, 8 Sep 1998 19:04:02 -0700 > From: Tim May <tcmay(a)got.net> > Subject: Re: Tax silliness > not issued a royal decree absolving the perpetrator of taxes, they could > have collected taxes on the guy who got the ball and then taxes on the guy > who had the ball given to him. Through the miracle of multiple taxation, > the IRS gets it all....) That isn't accurate. The tax was a 'gift tax' and the ONLY person required to pay tax on it is the person GIVING the gift. Had you actualy read the announcement by the IRS it states very clearly that the reciever is NOT responsible for any taxes. ____________________________________________________________________ The seeker is a finder. Ancient Persian Proverb The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

2 1

IP: ISPI Clips 4.25:UK Police May Soon Tap Your Email & Internet Use At Will
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: "ama-gi ISPI" <offshore(a)email.msn.com> Subject: IP: ISPI Clips 4.25:UK Police May Soon Tap Your Email & Internet Use At Will Date: Tue, 8 Sep 1998 01:16:50 -0700 To: <Undisclosed.Recipients(a)majordomo.pobox.com> ISPI Clips 4.25:UK Police May Soon Tap Your Email & Internet Use At Will News & Info from the Institute for the Study of Privacy Issues (ISPI) Tuesday September 8, 1998 ISPI4Privacy(a)ama-gi.com ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ This From: The Independent Network, Monday September 7, 1998 http://www.independent.co.uk The PC in your mailbox: The police may soon be allowed to read your email and check your Internet use at will. http://www.independent.co.uk/net/980907ne/index.html By Paul Lavin When you drop an envelope in a red pillar-box, you walk away confident that your mail will not be read by anyone except the addressee. However, when you send an email, it might be wise to reflect on the differences. According to the organisation Internet Freedom, an agreement being negotiated between the UK's internet service providers (ISPs) and the police will open the email of the UK's eight million Internet users to scrutiny without debate in Parliament or oversight by the courts or the Home Secretary. British police are said to be close to reaching an agreement with ISPs that will enable them to monitor customers' emails and web usage logs. Chris Ellison of Internet Freedom, says: "Following a series of meetings between the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and Internet industry representatives, we understand that both groups have stated a willingness to reach a 'memorandum of understanding' about implementing police access to private data held by ISPs." According to David Kennedy, chairman of the Internet Service Providers Association, that is a serious overstatement of the discussions. However, he admits that the UK's ISPs are trying to avoid being flooded by court orders or having the police cart off critical servers for evidence. He says: "We are talking to law enforcement representatives to find a way to work with them within the legal framework that exists. All members of our association take the view that emails are private." As with the understanding between the Metropolitan Police and the ISPs over "banned" Usenet newsgroups and the closing down of web sites that may breach the law, the significance of such an agreement is that any such police activity may not be subjected to judicial review or legal constraint. Detective Chief Superintendent Keith Ackerman, chairman of the ACPO's computing crimes sub-committee, says: "We want to ensure the criminal doesn't take best advantage of the Internet, without requiring the Government to use the sledgehammer of regulation. However, we are not looking for the ability to go on fishing expeditions." The ISPs know that they are stuck in the middle, according to Keith Mitchell, chairman of Linx, a partnership of large ISPs. He says: "To divulge private email even under duress would be commercial suicide for an ISP. In some circumstances it would constitute a crime." Nonetheless, mistakes happen and there are well-known cases where the police have been persuasive. Mitchell says: "The current laws do not adequately protect ISPs or private individuals. We will be active in seeking responsive changes from Parliament." While there are undoubtedly individuals who use the Internet's email and worldwide web for nefarious purposes, the vast majority of people who use email and the web for personal and business communications have an expectation of privacy. And law-abiding citizens who wholeheartedly support the goals of law enforcement agencies may nevertheless feel uneasy about giving them carte blanche over email. America Online has been quite vocal in its opposition to opening the doors to the police short of a court order. Many ISPs agree. Julie Hatch, marketing communications director of Easynet, says:"We do not allow anyone to access our customers' email without a court order. "It makes no difference if it is an estranged wife or a suspicious business partner or anyone else, we would not divulge a subscriber's private email unless we were presented with a court order. This is in accordance with our terms and conditions. "Our business is also subject to restrictions imposed by the Data Protection Act (DPA), and in any situation we would certainly abide by those rules. So unless a subscriber's actions are illegal, you can say that email is confidential." The DPA provides scanty protection to email users, however. While the Act has aspects that protect the quality and use of information held in computer systems, disclosure can be afforded by a compliant ISP by simply including appropriate language in the small print of their terms and conditions. Data may be revealed to law enforcement officials as long as the subscriber is notified. Easynet's assurances highlight the differences between ISPs that are classified as telecoms providers, protected from feeling the long arm of the law by a regulatory framework, and those that are merely private businesses unaccountable to anyone but their owners and governed solely by their contracts with subscribers. As well as Easynet, UK ISPs that are regulated as telecoms providers include BT Internet and Demon, which is now part of Scottish Telecom. Smaller ISPs are more vulnerable to the persuasive demands of the police.They have no legally protected right of privacy and any redress for email disclosure would only be for breach of contract. Furthermore, most ISPs now include in their terms and conditions a requirement that the subscriber bear the expense of any legal costs resulting from their use of the service. This could lead to a complaining subscriber having to bear the costs of both sides of a lawsuit against an ISP even if they won. The most serious aspect of this potential agreement between the police and ISPS is, according to critics, the absence of legal safeguards. In order to tap telephones, the police need the permission of the Home Secretary and must justify violating the privacy of a suspect. It is not clear from the law whether tapping a telephone and tapping into an email exchange are the same thing. Chris Ellison says: "This is what is so dangerous about the new culture of private regulation and moral responsibility. ISPs now operate in a moral climate which insists on limitations for freedom of speech. Any material that causes offence - especially to children and ethnic minorities - is regularly removed. ISPs have now embraced this self-censorship credo and are willing to set themselves up as moral arbiters of internet content, filtering out anything that they feel may be illegal." Without public debate or scrutiny by Parliament, the police are likely to gain, as Liz Parratt from the organisation Liberty puts it, "a snoopers' charter for the Internet". Ordinary users will have little legal protection or redress against police monitoring of their communications. This trend could render the Internet less private and more regulated than any other communications medium. "If nothing else, these discussions have demonstrated what self-regulation really means: ISPs undertaking the role of publicly unaccountable instruments of law enforcement." Email is not like a letter in an envelope; it is more like a postcard. Just as you would not put some messages on a postcard, you should think before you use email for your most private communications. While the legality and desirability of the any agreement between ACPO and the ISPs is highly debatable, anyone interested in maintaining their privacy on the Internet must take responsibility for their own actions. The agreement between ACPO and ISPs will be the subject of three seminars: 22 September in Edinburgh, 8 October in London and 27 October in Manchester. Additional details can be found at http://www.linx.net/misc/acposeminar.html . --------------------------------NOTICE:------------------------------ ISPI Clips are news & opinion articles on privacy issues from all points of view; they are clipped from local, national and international newspapers, journals and magazines, etc. Inclusion as an ISPI Clip does not necessarily reflect an endorsement of the content or opinion by ISPI. In compliance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed free without profit or payment for non-profit research and educational purposes only. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ISPI Clips is a FREE e-mail service from the "Institute for the Study of Privacy Issues" (ISPI). To receive "ISPI Clips" on a daily bases (approx. 4 - 8 clips per day) send the following message "Please enter [Your Name] into the ISPI Clips list: [Your e-mail address]" to: ISPIClips(a)ama-gi.com . The Institute for the Study of Privacy Issues (ISPI) is a small contributor-funded organization based in Victoria, British Columbia (Canada). ISPI operates on a not-for-profit basis, accepts no government funding and takes a global perspective. ISPI's mandate is to conduct & promote interdisciplinary research into electronic, personal and financial privacy with a view toward helping ordinary people understand the degree of privacy they have with respect to government, industry and each other and to likewise inform them about techniques to enhance their privacy. But, none of this can be accomplished without your kind and generous financial support. If you value in the ISPI Clips service or if you are concerned about the erosion of your privacy in general, won't you please help us continue this important work by becoming an "ISPI Clips Supporter" or by taking out an institute Membership? We gratefully accept all contributions: Less than $60 ISPI Clips Supporter $60 - $99 Primary ISPI Membership (1 year) $100 - $300 Senior ISPI Membership (2 years) More than $300 Executive Council Membership (life) Your ISPI "membership" contribution entitles you to receive "The ISPI Privacy Reporter" (our bi-monthly 12 page hard-copy newsletter in multi-contributor format) for the duration of your membership. For a contribution form with postal instructions please send the following message "ISPI Contribution Form" to ISPI4Privacy(a)ama-gi.com . We maintain a strict privacy policy. Any information you divulge to ISPI is kept in strict confidence. It will not be sold, lent or given away to any third party. ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer **********************************************

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IP: Machine Vision For Biometric Applications
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: believer(a)telepath.com Subject: IP: Machine Vision For Biometric Applications Date: Wed, 09 Sep 1998 09:07:57 -0500 To: believer(a)telepath.com ---------------------- NOTE: Document contains instructive images. You should go to the website and open the images. ---------------------- Source: Applied Optics Group at the University of Kent at Canterbury (U.K.) http://speke.ukc.ac.uk/physical-sciences/aog/facereco/ Machine Vision For Biometric Applications We are currently conducting research in the areas of automated facial recognition and data compression of digitised images of the human face. This work began by performing an eigenfactor analysis on a data set comprising 290 faces drawn largely from the student population at the University of Kent, Canterbury. The image below shows the first three components (eigenfaces) resulting from this analysis. It is interesting to note that eigenfaces 2 and 3 have a clear relationship to gender. Thus the addition of eigenface 2 to the average eigenface (1) results in a feminine face whereas the subtraction of face 2 produces a face having masculine characteristics. In a similar way, addition of face 3 to the average produces a masculine face and subtraction of face 3 from the average results in a face having feminine features. This approach, variously known as the Karhunen-Loeve expansion, eigenfactor analysis, principal components or the Hotelling transform has exceptional data compression properties when applied to this particular pattern class (2-D images of human faces). Below, we show the image reconstruction quality that is achievable using codes of varying lengths which describe how to reconstitute the image using the component eigenfaces as a basis. Note that the subject shown here was not included in the original data set used to generate the eigenface basis. Despite this, recognition is achieved using a very short code. This method works particularly well when conditions such as head-camera orientation and subject illumination are controlled.We are now investigating other methods (some related to the Karhunen-Loeve expansion, some not) which may be suitable for automated facial recognition under less benign conditions. In particular, we are beginning to investigate the use of illumination compensation techniques and 3-D imaging techniques which are independent of illumination conditions. The group working on facial recognition here at UKC collaborates with a number of commercial/industrial organisations in the U.K. and Europe. We currently await the outcome of a cooperative research bid (CRAFT) to the European Commission which will involve the development of facial biometrics for smart cards and other access control applications. The industrial partners are Neural Computer Sciences (U.K.), Datastripe Ltd (U.K.), Inside Technologies (France), Smartkort (Iceland) and A la Carte (Belgium). More links on Facial Recognition Staff Involved Dr. C.J. Solomon - E-mail: C.J.Solomon(a)ukc.ac.uk Jamie P. Brooker - E-mail: jpb3(a)ukc.ac.uk ----------------------- NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ----------------------- ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer **********************************************

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[FP] FW: Bill to Limit Nat'l ID Plan
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: "ScanThisNews" <mcdonalds(a)airnet.net> Subject: [FP] FW: Bill to Limit Nat'l ID Plan Date: Fri, 4 Sep 1998 22:09:53 -0500 To: "Scan This News Recipients List" <scan(a)efga.org> [Forwarded message from:] believer(a)telepath.com [mailto:believer@telepath.com] Sent: Monday, May 05, 1997 3:12 PM To: believer(a)telepath.com Subject: Bill to Limit Nat'l ID Plan --------------------------- NOTE TO LISTEES: Remember: LIMITING is NOT what we want. Limiting will only detail the terms and conditions under which a National ID *W*I*L*L* be required. We want no ID at all. Let's make this clear to legislators. They still don't get it. --------------------------- Source: Washington Post http://search.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WAPO/19980904/V000365-090498-idx.htm l Senate Mulls Healthcare ID Proposal By Cassandra Burrell Associated Press Writer Friday, September 4, 1998; 1:39 a.m. EDT WASHINGTON (AP) -- A plan to assign every American a lifetime health-care ID number, similar to a Social Security number, could face new limits under a measure headed for Senate debate. A provision introduced Thursday by Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison, R-Texas, would prohibit the Health and Human Services Department from going forward with the plan until Congress approves its specifics. Critics say the system, being developed as part of the 1996 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, could invade privacy by opening medical histories to insurers, employers and others. The law guarantees that anyone changing or losing a job would be able to get health insurance, even with a pre-existing medical condition. ``The plan, as HHS intended to carry it forward, raises questions of excessive government involvement and control -- not to mention privacy,'' Hutchison said. The Senate Appropriations Committee added Hutchison's amendment to an $82 billion spending bill funding the Labor, Education and Health and Human Services departments as well as several related agencies for the fiscal year that begins Oct. 1. The committee approved the overall bill with little debate and sent it to the Senate. But some members said they planned to introduce more controversial issues into the bill during floor debate, including provisions dealing with federal funding of single-sex classrooms and allowing Medicare recipients to go outside the program for care not covered by the plan. President Clinton has threatened to veto a matching bill in the House because it lacks money for some of his favorite programs, such as summer jobs for poor youth and low-income heating assistance. Also Thursday, the Senate resolved a dispute over staffing at the Federal Election Commission, clearing the way for passage of a $29.9 billion spending bill funding the Treasury Department and related agencies. The Treasury bill was pulled from the Senate floor in late July because of Democratic objections to a Republican amendment that would have made it easier to remove the FEC's staff director and general counsel. With resolution of the issue, the bill passed 91-5 Thursday without further debate. Introduced by Sen. Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., the disputed amendment sought to limit to four years the currently open-ended terms of the two officials and to require approval of four of the FEC's six commissioners before the terms could be extended. Each party selects three commissioners. Democrats, led by Sen. Carl Levin of Michigan, contended the amendment would let one party remove an official for no reason and undermine the agency's independence. Under a compromise worked out with Levin, the current general counsel and staff director would not have term limits, future service would be set at six years with votes of only three commissioners required to approve an extension. The $27 billion House bill, which passed in July, does not include language on the FEC staffers. Differences will have to be worked out in a House-Senate conference. The Senate bill, which would increase money for drug enforcement, gang resistance and customer service by the Internal Revenue Service, establishes spending at $7.85 billion for the IRS, $1.7 billion for the U.S. Customs Service and $593 million for the Secret Service. Like the House bill, it would freeze salaries for members of Congress but would allow 3.6 percent cost-of-living raises for other federal workers. It also was amended to require federal employee health plans that cover prescription drugs to provide coverage for contraceptives. © Copyright 1998 The Associated Press ----------------------- NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml -----------------------

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