December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Shakespeare
by John Clark 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Tim May tcmay(a)got.net Wrote: >I read part of a book about some pretty convincing evidence that the >works of "Shakespeare" were probably written by a member of Queen >Elizabeth's royal court. I think that's unlikely, the myth probably started because some people can't imagine a person without royal blood being a genius. >This guy had the time, had the education, knew the workings of >royalty, and was an accomplished writer...all things the nearly-illiterate >(evidence shows) Wm. Shakespeare, a merchant, did not have. There is little evidence that Shakespeare was a merchant, although his father was, he was a glover and a very successful one, at least until Shakespeare was a teenager when his Father lost most of his money. Although he doesn't seem to have gone to collage, as the son of a rich man he did go to the equivalent of very good grade and high schools where he certainly learned Latin and Greek and History. In addition there Is a 10 year gap between the time he finished "high school" and he when he wrote his first play. Some think he traveled, some think he was in the military, whatever he did he must have learned about the world. Also, I don't see how an actor could be illiterate, true he did spell his name differently on occasion but that wasn't unusual at a time before spelling was standardized. There was certainly an actor named William Shakespeare who got rich off the royalties from plays he claimed to have written over a period of 20 years, he made enough money to buy the second largest house in his hometown. If Shakespeare didn't write them it's hard to understand why the real author never objected but instead kept writing new plays to make another man even more money. >one of the biggest problems with applying computerized analysis >to these works is the paucity of material known to be written by the >"real" Wm. Shakespeare, the historical person. If you look at all the words in Shakespeare's plays and poems you will find that about 30% of the words he uses one time and never again in anything he wrote. This percentage is vastly greater than any other writer of his day or our own. I think this statistic is amazing and probably important, but I confess I'm not quite sure what to make of it. Does it prove it was written by a committee or by a genius who could always find exactly the right word? I lean toward the genius theory. PS; Tim this is the first time I've had the pleasure of responding to one of your posts since you were on the Extropian List, I'm still on that list because it has a much higher signal to noise ratio than most, feel free to drop by for a visit, you would be welcome. John K Clark jonkc(a)att.net -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.5.5 iQA/AwUBNfN1JN+WG5eri0QzEQIVTACfbLmnspemT7gid05/JlPBDtuMUfUAoP+E S8k9L8yiMJmJzN+chRDY7tjV =vAg0 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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[Fwd: ISAKMP Key Recovery Extensions]
by Frank O'Dwyer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, the attached draft is not designed for corporate recovery of encrypted email, that's for sure. Cheers, Frank O'Dwyer. To: cryptography(a)c2.net, cypherpunks(a)algebra.com Subject: Re: ISAKMP Key Recovery Extensions From: ulf(a)fitug.de (Ulf Möller) Date: Mon, 7 Sep 98 01:47 +0200 In-Reply-To: <199809011443.KAA23307(a)ietf.org> Organization: HR13 Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)algebra.com >From the IETF's IPSEC Working Group: Title : ISAKMP Key Recovery Extensions Author(s) : T. Markham Filename : draft-rfced-exp-markham-00.txt Pages : 13 Date : 31-Aug-98 This document describes the proposed approach for negotiating and exchanging key recovery information within the Internet Security Association Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP). ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-rfced-exp-markham-00.txt

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Re: Snakes of Medusa torment Larry Detweiler
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

hi timmy. we have reached a breakthrough in your psychotherapy in which you actually address me directly <g> you completely gloss over my point about Linux, because it demonstrates my arguments very well. those who work on Linux are very similar to cpunks. distributed all over the world, and they are united by a common desire/vision and mailing lists. you have an unexpressed hatred of some aspects of hacking, of course, so you find linux repulsive and incomprehensible. this list has always lacked vision, by *anyone*. a group is united by a vision. if you have no vision, you have nothing but a bunch of anarchists who cannot accomplish anything substantial together. want proof? how about the history of the last few years of mounting irrelevance of this list? what you get is miniature projects that may succeed or fail, and if they succeed, an implication is carried that they are "cpunk" projects. there are obviously no cpunk projects. and that's the weakness of this so-called "group". any time such a project is proposed by anyone, self-righteous anarchists such as yourself shoot it down. ok, mount one of your lame arguments that "this is only a mailing list. there are no projects". again, precisely. you want more out of this list, or less? every time I tell you how to get more, you say you want less. every time you complain you get less, I tell you how to get more. sure, let's have an immature debate society. we've had that for what, ~6 years or so? the time flies when you're having fun <g> aren't you somewhat ashamed that the recent EFF crack had *nothing* to do with anyone on this list? frankly, I think it's pretty lame. imagine the way a mailing list can help mobilize support and resources. we've seen glimpes in the past of this. instead Gilmore did it entirely behind the scenes, never announcing it to this list, because clearly no one here has the maturity to cooperate to complete a meaningful project. there are only complaints, as lead by the Lead Sniper. (wow, that's a funny term, with lots of implications, I think I might start using it more often!!!) btw, killed any cats lately?? a huge waste of talent, if you ask me, and the main reason that you have such a high turnover/attrition on this list. ever asked yourself why there is so much turnover/attrition here? but we're not going to get very far, with you conveniently deleting my key points as usual. stick your head in the digital /dev/null some more. see no VZN, hear no VZN, speak no VZN. truly your philosophy...!!! "eletrocracy"? I have no idea what you're talking about. whatever it is, it does sound pretty infantile!!! a useful straw man, I suppose. maybe if you elaborated it might refresh my memory <g>

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KRAP is at it in the IETF
by William H. Geiger III 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hello, It has come to my attention that the KRAP (key recovery alliance program) has submitted an I-D (internet draft) to the IETF for adding GAK (government access to keys) to the IPSEC protocols: ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-rfced-exp-markham-00.txt ISAKMP Key Recovery Extensions <draft-rfced-exp-markham-00.txt> 7. AUTHOR INFORMATION Tom Markham Secure Computing Corp 2675 Long Lake Road Roseville, MN 55113 USA Phone: 651.628.2754, Fax: 651.628.2701 EMail: tom_markham(a)securecomputing.com I consider this a perversion of the standards process of the IETF to advance a political agenda which must be stopped at all cost. Below are the e-mail addresses of some people that you should write (politely) expressing your objections to any such additions to the protocols: IPSEC Chairs: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> Robert Moskowitz <rgm(a)icsa.net> Security Area Directors: Jeffrey Schiller <jis(a)mit.edu> Marcus Leech <mlecch(a)nortel.ca> As I mentioned before, be polite. These people are not the ones proposing GAK be added to the IPSEC protocols. They have put a lot of time and effort in forwarding the cause for strong encryption. They should be made aware of the communities objections to these attempts by KRAP. Thanks, - -- - --------------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.openpgp.net Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. OS/2 PGP 5.0 at: http://www.openpgp.net/pgp.html - --------------------------------------------------------------- Tag-O-Matic: It's OS/2, Jim, but not OS/2 as we know it. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3a-sha1 Charset: cp850 Comment: Registered_User_E-Secure_v1.1b1_ES000000 iQCVAwUBNfOVk49Co1n+aLhhAQFJwwP+O4vrZVKFpOG8vCHFwbDuPIv/99AhBnKF RK/Ikc5y2gGKq9hfxkTb4o77YUrDaEGkYUPHk+ZC57Oag0Lu1v6W1EAbQ5T4RpzH JWYXOonQmbqw5rH0h6brzqrH3ep9Ej9DR0gv4mGgIfSNlJSUu6TWO5ZHXKWiE4yy 5flH0Ngg/TI= =EzNL -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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digital sig bill
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------- Forwarded Message To: believer(a)telepath.com From: believer(a)telepath.com Subject: IP: About Digital Signature Bill 09/05/98 0752 Source: US Newswire http://www.usnewswire.com/topnews/Current_Releases/0904-138.txt Abraham Urges Senate to Pass Digital Signature Bill U.S. Newswire 4 Sep 17:30 Abraham Urges Senate to Pass Digital Signature Bill Next Week To: National Desk Contact: Joe McMonigle of the Office of U.S. Sen. Spencer Abraham, 202-224-8833 WASHINGTON, Sept. 4 /U.S. Newswire/ -- While President Clinton used a visit in Ireland today to digitally sign an electronic commerce agreement with Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern on a laptop computer, U.S. Sen. Spencer Abraham (R-Mich.) urged his colleagues in the Senate to pass his legislation requiring federal agencies to start allowing the public to do the same. S.2107, the Government Paperwork Elimination Act, would require federal agencies to make versions of their forms available online and allow people to submit these forms with digital signatures instead of handwritten ones. It also sets up a process by which commercially developed digital signatures can be used in submitting forms to the government and permits the digital storage of federal documents. "If it's okay for President Clinton and Prime Minister Ahern, it should also be okay for the federal government to recognize the digital signature of ordinary Americans," Abraham said. "This legislation will bring the federal government into the electronic age, in the process saving American individuals and companies millions of dollars and hundreds of hours currently wasted on government paperwork," Abraham said. "Each and every year, Americans spend in excess of $600 billion simply filing out, documenting and handling government paperwork. This huge loss of time and money constitutes a significant drain on our economy and we must bring it under control." "By providing individuals and companies with the option of electronic filing and storage, this bill will reduce the paperwork burden imposed by government on the American people and the American economy. It will allow people to move from printed forms they must fill out using typewriters or handwriting to digitally-based forms that can be filled out using a word processor. This savings in time, storage and postage will be enormous," said Abraham. The Government Paperwork Elimination Act would: -- Require the federal government make available its forms online and allow citizens to sign forms by the use of digital signatures. -- Direct the Commerce Department to conduct a study of the impact of this Act on the use of digital signatures for electronic commerce and on individual privacy. -- Allow Executive Agencies 18 months to establish a method for agencies to put forms online. The forms must be able to be filled out, signed and filed with the agency electronically. -- Work to develop a system whereby fees and payments associated with the forms can also be submitted at the same time. For example, a citizen could use their tax software to create all the information necessary for filling out their tax forms, fill in the IRS online form, submit it and any indicated payments, and immediately receive a tax receipt. -- Enable the federal government to allow its employees to have digital signatures for use with citizens and allow agencies to use electronic notice where written notice had been required, if the citizen prefers electronic notice. -- Establish that a digital signature will have legal standing. -- Provide that Administration guidelines and procedures for electronic signatures that are used for the government forms that are compatible with those the private sector will be using for commerce, and specifies that any system used by the government must be industry and technology neutral. -- State that if an employer is required to collect, file and store paper forms that are completed by employees, that electronic storage will likely be accepted. -- Allow the government five years to implement these provisions. "The information age is no longer new. We are in the midst of a revolution in the way people do business and maintain records. The Government Paperwork Elimination Act will force Washington to catch up with these developments, and release our businesses from the drag of an obsolete bureaucracy as they pursue further innovations," said Abraham. Co-sponsors of the Paperwork Elimination Act include Sens. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), Jack Reed (D-R.I.), John McCain (R-Ariz.), Trent Lott (R-Miss.), Thad Cochran (R-Miss.), and Conrad Burns (R-Mont.) -0- /U.S. Newswire 202-347-2770/ 09/04 17:30 Copyright 1998, U.S. Newswire - ----------------------- NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml - ----------------------- ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer ********************************************** ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Re: What we are Fighting
by Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: Tim May <tcmay(a)got.net> > >Information "I am not a klook" Security wrote: > > >> Subject: Terrorist FBI, on Terrorism > >> Date: Fri, 4 Sep 1998 09:58:23 EDT > >> > >> Statement for the Record > >> FBI Director Louis J. Freeh before the Senate Judiciary Committee, > >> September 3, 1998 > > >> The FBI supports a balanced encryption policy that satisfies fourth > >> amendment concerns for privacy, the commercial needs of industry for > >> robust encryption, and the government's public safety and national > >> security needs. > > But it bears constant repeating, especially to the skeptical, that there > are NO DOMESTIC CRYPTO LAWS. > > We all know this, but Freeh and Company continue to mumble about "meeting > the legitmate needs of law enforcement." What can they be speaking of? > > Obviously his side is contemplating domestic crypto restrictions. > > They are planning domestic crypto restrictions, GAK, and all the rest of > what we have long expected. They have stated so openly; ~"if we hear a lot of encrypted hiss from [CALEA] intercepts, we'll need GAK to be the law of the land". (a tilde before the quote means I am paraphrasing). In fact, at the same time the FBI used to say they weren't calling for such a law, they were pushing behind the scenes for it. * http://epic.org/crypto/ban/fbi_dox/impact_text.gif * * SECRET FBI report * * NEED FOR A NATIONAL POLICY * * A national policy embodied in legislation is needed which insures * that cryptography use in the United States should be forced to be * crackable by law enforcement, so such communications can be monitored * with real-time decryption. * * All cryptography that cannot meet this standard should be prohibited. And here's the ECHELON/UKUSA slant: * What Is The OECD * * The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, based in * Paris, France, is a unique forum permitting governments of the * industrialized democracies to study and formulate the best policies * possible in all economic and social spheres. : From owner-firewalls-outgoing(a)GreatCircle.COM Wed May 14 18:54:15 1997 : Received: from osiris (osiris.nso.org [207.30.58.40]) by ra.nso.org : (post.office MTA v1.9.3 ID# 0-13592) with SMTP id AAA322 : for <firewalls(a)GreatCircle.COM>; Wed, 14 May 1997 12:56:13 -0400 : Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 12:58:46 -0400 : To: firewalls(a)GreatCircle.COM : From: research(a)isr.net (Research Unit I) : Subject: Re: Encryption Outside US : : : I was part of that OECD Expert Group, and believe I may shine at least : some light on what exactly was said and happened at the meetings. : : The main conflict during all sessions was the demand of the US to be : able to decrypt anything, anywhere at any time versus the European : focus: we want to have the choice - with an open end - to maintain : own surveillance. The US demand would have caused an immediate : ability to tap into what the European intelligence community believes to : be its sole and exclusive territory. In fact the Europeans were not at all : pleased with the US view points of controlling ALL crypto. Germany and : France vigorously refused to work with the US on this issue. : : The Clipper initiative (at the time not readily developed) was completely : banned, except for the Australian and UK views that felt some obligation : from the 1947 UKUSA treaty (dealing with interchange of intelligence). : : With a vast majority the US was cornered completely, and had to accept : the international views. And actually adopted those as well. EFF, EPIC and : other US organizations were delighted to see the formal US views barred, : but expressed their concern on the development of alternate political : pressure that would cause the same effects. : : As time went by that was indeed what the US did, and up to now with minor : success. : : Bertil Fortrie : Internet Security Review Declan, wanna track down this person and find out the names of those who spoke of the ultra-secret UKUSA treaty that's never been seen, and interview them? ---- When Sonny Bono hit a tree, yet another Senator convinced by the FBI/NSA's little presentation of horrors (which is preceded by a visible sweep for electronic bugs) was lost. Only an Executive Order seems like it will get domestic crypto "outlawed". One continued worrisome slant to the FBI/NSAs pushing for domestic GAK is that they use the same arguments for retaining export controls (which Clinton did by Executive Order, or they would have expired) as they give for wanting to extend these controls domestically. LART me if I'm wrong, but that makes the issue different from most other export-controlled non-secret technology/products. ---- I still think someone (without a job ;-) should test the export law by pulling in PGP from outside the US and then immediately putting it back at the same site. If could find someone on the lower East Side willing to do it for $5000. Gilmore, care to make another investment in making the government's position look silly? ;-) ---guy

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Re: Child-Molesting Forger's Chilling Confession!!!1!
by your name 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

application/www-form-urlencoded

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Re: [Fwd: ISAKMP Key Recovery Extensions]
by Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: "William H. Geiger III" <whgiii(a)invweb.net> > > In <35F37E90.76109489(a)brd.ie>, on 09/07/98 > at 07:34 AM, "Frank O'Dwyer" <fod(a)brd.ie> said: > > >Well, the attached draft is not designed for corporate recovery of > >encrypted email, that's for sure. > > 4. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS > > This document was produced based on the combined efforts of the protocol > subcommittee of the Key Recovery Alliance. > > Why am I not surprised? > > I hope the IETF will not accept the implementation of *any* GAK proposals > into the RFC's. If these people want to force Big Brother on us they > should not have the benefit of the IETF to do so. ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-rfced-exp-markham-00.txt o Government Requirements: Governments must be able to intercept the CKRB at the time of key establishment or periodically while the security association remains active. This requires that the key recovery enabled entity transmit the CKRB during the key establishment protocol and every N hours during the security association. Whooey! They've been infiltrated by idjits. ---guy

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Re: IP: Encryption Expert Says U.S. Laws Led to Renouncing of Citizenship
by jimg＠mentat.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

M-K Shen wrote: > > Robert Hettinga wrote: > > > > Sameer Parekh, the president of the Web server company C2 Net, said: > > "I think it's essential if you want business that you're doing your > > development overseas. It's pretty clear to anyone internationally that > > anything exportable [from the United States] is a joke." > > Let's wait and see whether AES will be genuinely exportable. Why wait? None of the AES candidates is currently exportable without a license, and the much weaker DES algorithm that one of them will replace is not exportable without a license. In fact, according to the instructions posted at NIST the algorithm designers from outside the US and Canada were required to fill out export license applications in order to get a copy of their own algorithms back from NIST. Without a change in the regulations AES will be no more exportable than DES is now. Jim Gillogly

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KRAP is at it in the IETF
by Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: "William H. Geiger III" <whgiii(a)invweb.net> > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > Hello, > > It has come to my attention that the KRAP (key recovery alliance program) > has submitted an I-D (internet draft) to the IETF for adding GAK > (government access to keys) to the IPSEC protocols: > > ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-rfced-exp-markham-00.txt > > I consider this a perversion of the standards process of the IETF to > advance a political agenda which must be stopped at all cost. > > Below are the e-mail addresses of some people that you should write > (politely) expressing your objections to any such additions to the > protocols: Dear Sirs, # o Government Requirements: Governments must be able to intercept the # CKRB at the time of key establishment or periodically while the # security association remains active. This requires that the key # recovery enabled entity transmit the CKRB during the key establishment # protocol and every N hours during the security association. Speaking as someone who monitors company Internet traffic (email) for compliance and security purposes, I would like to ask why the IETF is working on a key recovery standard. If a company chooses to deploy, say, PGP with key recovery internally, then any messages sent with it encrypted in the receiving party's public key are available to the sending company's Information Security personnel. If a company wishes to make the key recovery information available to the government, they can individually choose to do that. The IETF should not be helping to put such an infrastructure in place. Governments are our adversaries with respect to encryption and privacy. The US government, represented by the FBI/NSA, used to state that they weren't pushing for mandatory domestic encryption. (requiring people use curtains on their homes that the government can see through) Eventually we found out they lied, and were pushing for exactly that behind the scenes: * http://epic.org/crypto/ban/fbi_dox/impact_text.gif * * SECRET FBI report * * NEED FOR A NATIONAL POLICY * * A national policy embodied in legislation is needed which insures * that cryptography use in the United States should be forced to be * crackable by law enforcement, so such communications can be monitored * with real-time decryption. * * All cryptography that cannot meet this standard should be prohibited. Feel free to cite this manipulation when discarding key recovery proposals. If you put a key recovery proposal in place, it makes it that much easier for them to require its use. Plus my basic complaint: this proposal is of no use to business or Internet users. None. Its only purpose is to allow interception and decoding over the Internet. And if you think this would happen only with a court order, check out this "anytime, anywhere" wording by the US government... ---guy Don't be another cog in the ECHELON monitoring machine. The U.S. asked the OECD to agree to internationally required Key Recovery. * What Is The OECD * * The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, based in * Paris, France, is a unique forum permitting governments of the * industrialized democracies to study and formulate the best policies * possible in all economic and social spheres. : From owner-firewalls-outgoing(a)GreatCircle.COM Wed May 14 18:54:15 1997 : Received: from osiris (osiris.nso.org [207.30.58.40]) by ra.nso.org : (post.office MTA v1.9.3 ID# 0-13592) with SMTP id AAA322 : for <firewalls(a)GreatCircle.COM>; Wed, 14 May 1997 12:56:13 -0400 : Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 12:58:46 -0400 : To: firewalls(a)GreatCircle.COM : From: research(a)isr.net (Research Unit I) : Subject: Re: Encryption Outside US : : : I was part of that OECD Expert Group, and believe I may shine at least : some light on what exactly was said and happened at the meetings. : : The main conflict during all sessions was the demand of the US to be : able to decrypt anything, anywhere at any time versus the European : focus: we want to have the choice - with an open end - to maintain : own surveillance. The US demand would have caused an immediate : ability to tap into what the European intelligence community believes to : be its sole and exclusive territory. In fact the Europeans were not at all : pleased with the US view points of controlling ALL crypto. Germany and : France vigorously refused to work with the US on this issue. : : The Clipper initiative (at the time not readily developed) was completely : banned, except for the Australian and UK views that felt some obligation : from the 1947 UKUSA treaty (dealing with interchange of intelligence). : : With a vast majority the US was cornered completely, and had to accept : the international views. And actually adopted those as well. EFF, EPIC and : other US organizations were delighted to see the formal US views barred, : but expressed their concern on the development of alternate political : pressure that would cause the same effects. : : As time went by that was indeed what the US did, and up to now with minor : success. : : Bertil Fortrie : Internet Security Review : ==

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