December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Depends / Re: Senate spams
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dale Thorn wrote: [snip--left nut] > it would be nice > to try to draw more of a connection between the ideas and ideals and > the reality of the list, otherwise, we'll all wind up looking like > hypocrites. If I post missives misinterpreting your own words and intentions, then you may no doubt be seen as a hypocrite to the gullible, or to those who choose to limit their world view by reading my posts and killfiling yours. In either case, I don't think this is a reason for you to lose a lot of sleep. > I personally don't see anything wrong with limiting > postings to subscribers, as long as subscriptions are open to all. > I also don't see anything wrong with warning a poster about commercial > messages, or other technical problems such as attaching really huge > files to go to the list, since all uncensored forums do this and > everyone I know of agrees with it. To have this option seemed to me to be an area of common agreement among CypherPunks list subscribers at the time of the 'Laker's fans named Bubba' mailboming of the list via forged subscriptions to a sports forum. The attempts to label, as hypocrites, those who thereafter complained about the fascist measures taken by self-appointed list saviors, are nothing more than anal-retentive smoke blowing. I have an efficient ISP provider and can, for a reasonable price, not worry about excessive download time, etc. The real-world reality is that there are those for whom paying to download the results of mailbomb attacks constitutes a denial of service to them. There are undoubtedly also others whose financial and personal time constraints may make a filtered version of the list attractive to them, and thus lead to them retaining their interest in crypto issues, instead of losing interest. I have not seen any of the anti-censorship elements in the CypherPunks suggest that there should not be alternatives available for those whose personal needs and/or interests are better served by various methods of filtering. To attempt to force UCE/Spam on those ill-equipped to deal with it serves no purpose other than to lessen the number of people who will have information in regard to the issues surrounding strong crypto. > The "problem" here (if there is one) is determining SPAM and the like > on a case-by-case basis. Suggestions have been floated here, but as > far as I know, none have been implemented. Igor has implemented spam-attack measures, and has been straightforward in both revealing these measures and asking for opinions in regard to his actions and proposals. I do not anticipate Igor resorting to furtive methodologies in self- servingly manipulating posts but, at the same time, I monitor what is going on in the background of the various lists. I regard 'trust' as something that should be undertaken with one's eyes open, just the same. > The real test, of course, > is when deletions do occur, whether there are any complaints, and > how those complaints are handled. Thankfully, the CypherPunks list will likely never lack for paranoid subscribers to raise warning flags whenever nefarious activities take place in regard to the list (or when the computer 'burps', either). It is up to the individual subscriber to separate the realities from the delusions. (I myself count on the space aliens to provide me with advice and support from the messages I receive from them when the Scotch I drink shorts out the spaces between the mercury fillings in my teeth. You may have a different method.) -- Toto ----------------------------- "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

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Re: Pro-CODE Crypto Bill
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Alan Olsen wrote: > At 12:47 PM 3/2/97 -0500, John Young wrote: > >We've put the new Senate Pro-CODE encryption bill at: > > http://jya.com/s377.htm (23K) > There is an interesting addition to the bill that I have not seen discussed > here yet. The pro-code bill has added an "Information Security Board". This > provision worries me. It sound like a nice little rubber hose committee. > ("The House Committee on Unamerican Encryption"?) > Any opinions on this new development? As long as Senator Charlie McCarthy is heading the committee, then I can't foresee any problems. (But, for the record, I do not know Alan Olsen, and have never been associated with him personally, or member of any group with which he is associated.) Excuse me, I hear a pounding on the door... -- Toto ----------------------------- "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

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Re: Pro-CODE Bill
by E. Allen Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Upon looking over the bill in question (helpfully provided in a more accessible location by jya), I do have some concerns over whether it allows for anonymous remailer export - it has a provision stating Nothing in this Act may be construed to affect any law intended to prevent the- (2) illegal or unauthorized distribution or release of classified, confidential, or proprietary information; or (3) enforcement of Federal or State criminal law. Which causes some question in my mind whether it would cover laws against or discouraging anonymous remailers. (While the Supreme Court would probably find outlawing anonymous remailers to be unconstitutional, laws discouraging their export or other lesser forms of harrassment might still pass muster, unfortunately.) -Allen

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DES Challenge / Who'da Thunk It?
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It seems that all of the efforts to meet the DES Challenge are being sabotaged on one level or another. The des-challenge(a)muffin.org group have never been able to fly on more than one wing. The New Media Laboratories effort has been plagued by rogue clients and its participants being subjected to varieties of interference/trojan-horses. Peter Trei's software has been appearing on international servers, with bugs which don't match those in the original source code. Pointers to BryDES software have turned out to be misdirected, in many cases. I suspect that if the 'New Coke' had hired RSA's people, that we would all be drinking their 'imitation Pepsi' product, instead of 'Classic Coke', as God intended us to do. Crayola had the foresight to call upon RSA's expertise, and, as a result, the wool was pulled over the public's eyes and they came to accept the 'new' colors, even though they are part of the 'plot' against the Visual Illuminatti. Perhaps these new revelations will lead to people taking my posts to this list more seriously in the future. -- Toto ----------------------------- "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

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Re: Pro-CODE Bill
by E. Allen Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The following provision also causes me some doubts about exactly what will be allowed for export: (B) Exception.--The Secretary shall prohibit the export or reexport of particular software and computer hardware described in this subsection to an identified individual or organization in a specific foreign country if the Secretary determines that there is substantial evidence that such software and computer hardware will be-- (iv) intentionally used to evade enforcement of United States law or taxation by the United States or by any State or local government. which could be construed to cover anonymous remailers, fully anonymous digital cash, anything set up to verify gambling fairness, and various other things of interest to Cypherpunks (including the use of PGP by, say, a drug "kingpin"). Admittedly, the "identified individual or organization in a specific foreign country" will help in limiting this application. -Allen

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Re: Depends / Re: Senate spams
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

snow wrote: > I think that any reasonable person could assume that missives f > from "mailer-daemon" could safely be excluded from the list. It is doubtful > that anyone out there has such a login, and if they do, well, it is stupid > enough that ignoring it would be doing them a favor (After a while they > _might_ get the idea that no one with a clue SENDS mail "mailer-deamon", > and change their login. I'd like to see a show of hands to see how many list members have received any posts from nancy.net/sally.net/conentric.net that they didn't personally delete without reading. These people don't seem to realize that the CypherPunks aren't interested in finding out how to "Make Big $$$ At Home, Licking Your Own Dick", because we do it anyway, without any expectations other than our own, personal reward. I do find snow's post rather embarassing, however, since I just sent an email asking mailer-daemon to marry me. It's bad enough being rejected, but being auto-rejected really cuts to the bone. -- Toto http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

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Guardian on EU-FBI Wiretap Pact
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to CM. The Guardian Weekly, Volume 156, Issue 9 Week ending March 2, 1997, Page 4: UK to join FBI phone taps Richard Norton-Taylor and Alison Daniels BRITAIN has secretly agreed with its European Union partners to set up an international telecommunications tapping system in co-operation with the FBI, it was revealed on Monday. The agreement covers telephones and written communications -- telexes, faxes and e-mail. To make tapping easier, telecommunications companies will be obliged to give security and intelligence agencies the key to codes installed in equipment sold to private customers. Detailed plans are being drawn up by officials in a secret network of EU committees established under the "third pillar" of the Maastricht Treaty, covering co-operation on law and order issues. Civil liberties groups, while agreeing that there was a need for such an agreement to fight against serious crime, said the plans raised a number of privacy and data protection issues and must be the subject of a full public debate. Britain is an enthusiastic supporter of joint action in this area, which is conducted on an inter-governmental basis with no role for the European Commission, the European Parliament or the European Court of Justice. It is an area where the EU's "democratic deficit" is most evident. Key points of the plan are outlined in a memorandum of understanding signed by EU states in 1995, which is still classified. It reflects increasing concern among European intelligence agencies that modern technology will prevent them from tapping private communications. EU governments agreed to co-operate closely with the FBI in Washington as they work out detailed plans. ----- As posted yesterday, for a report on EU-FBI wiretapping: http://www.privacy.org/pi/activities/tapping/

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No Subject
by Bohus Simek 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Blowfish
by lucifer＠dhp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim C[retin] May prefers to have sex with little kids because his own penis is like that of a three-year-old. _ o |<)_/# Tim C[retin] May TT <T

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle ?"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"wazoo"} = "<remailer(a)wazoo.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"shaman"} = "<remailer(a)lycaeum.org> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"hidden"} = "<remailer(a)hidden.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 3 Mar 97 6:45:58 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de -++++++++-++ 1:22:34 99.99% hidden remailer(a)hidden.net *++.-# 5:22:40 99.98% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com ###--*.###-# 2:44:25 99.98% nym config(a)nym.alias.net +*#*#+**+-++ 16:11 99.98% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com *+#*#+#++#*# 2:24 99.95% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net ------------ 5:40:48 99.94% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net -+ *++*+ *** 28:51 99.63% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com __.._--__.-+ 22:39:55 99.55% replay remailer(a)replay.com --**++**+*** 15:52 99.41% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com ---+---._. 3:25:41 99.03% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com - -- -_*--- 2:17:36 98.95% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com -++++++ +++ 44:00 98.82% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net .- +- -. - 1:12:29 96.16% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ** *** +* 53:49 94.54% shaman remailer(a)lycaeum.org *+++++ + 24:17 91.73% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net ##-+*+ ## 9:05 91.47% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com . _ 91:28:31 89.63% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de -+++ 59:37 21.19% wazoo remailer(a)wazoo.com 37:27 -5.74% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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