December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: do NOT escrow communications keys
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk> writes: > I'm arguing that you should not backup, or escrow communications keys, > and that you should backup storage keys. Euphemism alert: when we are talking about the kind of data recovery we like, we call it "backup". When we are talking about the kind we don't like, we call it "escrow". Schneier did the same thing: Bruce Schneier: > Key escrow = someone other than the author or the intended recipient of the > message being able to decrypt it. > > There are valid reasons for data backup, but they have nothing to do with > crypto key recovery. You don't actually mean that you should backup storage keys, you mean you should provide a means for someone other than the user to decrypt that stored data. Schneier means the same thing with regard to "data backup". > (forward secrecy) This could be a good idea, particularly in terms of old keys leaking out, but it needs more work. It's not clear that any of the forward secrecy methods will work for email. You can't easily do a DH key exchange via email because of the multiple messages. Maybe you could piggyback on ordinary messages, and after a few have been exchanged, you can get a DH key for the next message, but this is very complicated. Synchronization isn't guaranteed with email, neither is reliable delivery. > (untransferable signatures) This is also a good idea, but it needs more work, too. There is a big education problem here. People barely understand the implications of regular digital signatures. Now you are throwing this new kind in, which guarantee the message came from another person, but aren't binding. What happens when an employee receives a message from a supplier signed with that kind of signature? Can he make a decision on that basis, or not? In paper business correspondence, there is no such distinction. A signed letter is transferable. Go beyond this and business will be scratching its heads. It's a solution looking for a problem. There may be patents on these technologies, too. > (re-encrypting email with an escrowed key for archival) This is going to require special archival software and special actions on the part of users. You won't be able to do it as a transparent plugin. The user can't save his mail the regular way (with some email packages), he has to remember to (also?) save it to the business access archive. If he forgets, the business owner has lost access. There will be extra training costs, and people will have to change their habits. Besides being more complex to design and implement, it will be harder to sell to customers.

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Open 4 new mirror locations ?
by staff＠tnlb.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: America as a Shake Down Extortion State
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Ryan Anderson wrote: >Tim May wrote: >>The debate over crypto almost certainly fits this pattern. If and when a >>domestic ban on crypto is likely to pass and be signed, companies like RSA >>and PGP will face extinction. This will then "incentivize" executives of >>these companies to release funds, in the form of campaign > >Actually, I think it's a little more likely that they'll get disgusted with >Congress, and collect some money for the ACLU to use to pay their lawyers in >the instant filing of the consitutionality challenge. > >Seems to be a much more productive way to spend your money (long-term). Bullshit! Fuck the lawyers! By wasting time and money in the courts bickering about the stupid laws that buffoons in Congress pass in order to justify their existence, we are only ignoring the real issue: you cannot use the system to change the system. What amazes me is the amount of time and energy well-intentioned folks piss away trying to convince legislators to "do the right thing". By paying attention to these idiots, we are in effect legitimatizing their actions. If enough people come to their senses and ignored this bogus legislation, we will all be much better off in much less time. Tim May wrote elsewhere: >Face it, Amerika is basically a Mafia shake-down operation, with the power >of the State used to shake down protection money. > >This is why I favor crypto anarchy: by concentrating on ignoring laws and >deploying technology, this extortion state system is bypassed. Exactly. Spend the money on deploying the technology. Don't waste it lining the pockets of scum legislators and their litigious brethren. The big question is do PGP, RSA, Netscape et al have the balls to stand up for themselves and tell the DC politcos to fuck off? We can only hope... [ Imastun ] - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCNAzQ+SNwAAAEEANhUVaFtM+8ZLhEhur55LhN0m/aUyemwVExEq96RUXkQlvBw H45ZcEMYzml7k2hM84rQiJEd/BPi18dhtXykz0vYqmke6BKDiAsR95ik+Jm3XXMU OQgHo0+asRJ85BOG+jm3424e4vY5/eTFaExNISW5T8XD+qgRgnC/ZQW0eQF1AAUR tBZJbWFzdHVuIDxsaWJlcnR5QHJpc2s+iQCVAwUQND5KIXC/ZQW0eQF1AQESOwP+ MPNlXlv/hzqoAaqXu4RpNR02XcMLOB5DwhG1pLij3Tt6uYfRqZul8eJ9LxvQ0R/R eT7g+j3dNpjcOSdCci4VYAPfdBK78esgDIn61cOiN29fGRwjJOO5rup9RvXBQt+T +Sf7D1gYlr/aDUGKMiBGGZhx2git7zpL7uqnvQn0WY8= =bXK7 - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBND5M5HC/ZQW0eQF1AQE4HwP+JJ1eiIFGVguO5PwRsRl0gAiVxYiSGpHP 6h8le1QAgNJTlCz7C/ObNjVmtHnw6vjcYewLXSsnF59cRPakAD/Y4NLSLP/vPzWk gbx6t9X8hb0vC2LWOA/UcXZQBoqfLEXexm4LehKU0LpDL7ggy6SBw8PDEOr3InSh f15W51XTv/0= =OBNd -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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anonymous poster quality up
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I notice that the quality of anonymous submissions to the discussion here on cypherpunks has increased markedly lately. I can see a couple of reasons why this might be: Monty Cantsin seems to write consistently good stuff, Tim May announced he may be using some nyms, and we have this big argument with PGP Inc where their employees may feel pressure not to speak out of line. One suspects that some of the anonymous contributors exploring the issues are actually PGP employees:-) Regardless of who the new anonymous contributors are, it's nice to see quality anonymous posts, keep it up! Adam -- Now officially an EAR violation... Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

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Spammers Plan Backbone
by Ross Wright 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.zdnet.com/chkpt/adt1010nk/www.anchordesk.com/story/story_1343.ht… Yippie! Spam wars intensify as bulk emailers plan own Internet backbone. AOL, other ISPs threaten to fight back. Spam is FREE SPEECH!!!! =-=-=-=-=-=- Ross Wright King Media: Bulk Sales of Software Media and Duplication Services http://www.slip.net/~cdr/kingmedia Voice: (408) 259-2795

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Re: do NOT escrow communications keys (Re: What's really in PGP 5.5?)
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Adam Back wrote: >About the only example of email in transit being considered storage >was a USENET article years ago by someone who considered it a kewl >hack that he had some games or something else which was in breach of >policy in his account and rumor went around that the admin was having >a purge. He tarred, gzipped & uuencoded the lot and emailed it to >himself down a _long_ ! fowarding path. It came back to him around 3 >days later after the purge. That's the kind of thing I mean when I >say you don't consider email storage. Sometimes you can use this trick to get around storage limitations at your ISP. Often mail in the spool file doesn't get added up for the disk quota. When you hit your limit, just e-mail yourself a bunch of megabyte messages. Sysadmins tend not to like this. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBND5t8JaWtjSmRH/5AQFf9wf/TQMiQH4wJXO3Xx/borwAobWIlKQCGmVQ BnflPYg5pDvHOc+vppprb/f5HLZ78p1WaOY9l7vc+aJ97NC346UQAzS8kGyr6WP7 YmHmWRx576CV8EsLWjMZFYB6fZXvvMQd6VGUPC9IKC9Zum2BV1GCUSxGIHFpwNDp ElfqFFlFdVqfh30XEi2e/XK7UKh6bzYMHgfHTEjv+FqV1grXpGlwDHQfWvPMv4s8 ZEO8XM7Sh6DOXEMnrZkKJ0dl9cW8FjphEeYbkePV9oPVuCqC8HF6gzFfGLtWMK6E nj7iuv1QoQPagk4nwogHRUjhuuFg0aDcHieDR7T1HivFReB5fZIHYQ== =HCXe -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Anonymous wrote: >> (untransferable signatures) > >This is also a good idea, but it needs more work, too. There is a >big education problem here. People barely understand the >implications of regular digital signatures. Now you are throwing >this new kind in, which guarantee the message came from another >person, but aren't binding. What happens when an employee receives a >message from a supplier signed with that kind of signature? Can he >make a decision on that basis, or not? > >In paper business correspondence, there is no such distinction. A >signed letter is transferable. Go beyond this and business will be >scratching its heads. It's a solution looking for a problem. How about arbitration? Two parties may wish to make an agreement to be judged by an arbitrator of their choosing. In certain cases, the State can be expected to intervene. If only the arbitrator knows the signatures to be valid, the State has no fair basis on which to make an intervention. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBND5vYpaWtjSmRH/5AQGzygf/TdMgevKLw87e6ZtJ6++pyrOKliu/OunT Z4uxcWzDGPEcyNchhOsb6B+NSOehcgvqIhxs4NNTJqMVICiJCBhBTZlsQt7bW6kq Ayz62YWFZZeMcYbsP87FmuGLxsyh/wW2Nh/s80J9obS6vn7HQJBUp/Ox7Ho9RPIp bdijOAw6nxtPt0SWcr38F8XVj/XpqA768nn5uWwdtd2aCAIQf7uLE7poZLVL7+UQ VMiHlgsRIlcHEakNbCExrBTuyCzyoKo5LY+PPzlLCTC93rzXyPIdO8Ain6p49qa5 i/7z+WbT8powUsmwj5BEfPSKOo1CcuHfdAUgeSI4JawfhqYJAnzpRg== =m09K -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Defeating MITM with Eric's Secure Phone
by John Kelsey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- [ To: cypherpunks, coderpunks, Perry's Crypto List ## Date: 09-Oct-97 ## Subject: Defeating MITM with Eric's Secure Phone ] >Date: Wed, 8 Oct 1997 23:48:33 +0100 >From: Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk> >Subject: computationally infeasible jobs for MITMs (Re: Secure phone) >How about this for a computerised method to do something similar. Aim >of the game: to make the MITMs job computationally infeasible. [Method using stegoed audio noise deleted.] I prefer to work on the more immediately useful problem: How can I secure my use of the (very nicely done) Comsec secure phones using existing infrastructure? I am concerned with the MITM voice impersonation attack, since that's the easiest attack on the system. (Actually, it's probably easier to physically tap my office, but I can't fix that right now.) The simple MITM defenses (like restating your checksum spontaneously in the middle of the conversation) take care of lots of this. Here's another way that may make some sense, though it's a little hard to use: 1. Exchange PGP-encrypted e-mail establishing a set of sixteen different words, labeled for 0..f in each direction. Thus: 0. Dilbert 1. Alpha 2. Cable 3. Swordsman ... f. Marxist Now, the checksum reading is very hard to spoof. Suppose I get 0x33f. I say ``My checksum is Swordsman Swordsman Marxist, or 33f.'' An attacker with digits besides 3 and f in his checksum simply doesn't know how to impersonate me to the other party. He lacks the secret information we've shared. Now, the problem with this is that it's too cumbersome. I would like the shared secret information to be usable with less effort. If we just want to detect the MITM eventually, then I can send the other participant a PGP-signed e-mail, in which I include the whole 6-digit checksum. That won't prevent the MITM attack from working once, but it will let us know after-the-fact if our conversation was exposed. If we find evidence that our conversation was intercepted, then we can start using my one-time word lists, or some other more paranoid mechanism. Still another approach, which may be applicable for some people, is to write a simple calculator-type application that uses a shared-secret to compute a checksum on the checksum. Thus, when I call Alice, I do the following: 1. Type the shared secret between Alice and me into the calculator app. 2. Make the call to Alice and push the ``secure'' button. 3. Type the six-digit checksum into the calculator app. 4. Read the calculator's first three checksum digits. 5. Listen to her next three digits. The simplest way to do this seems to be to just exchange a six-digit hex value as a one-time password for a given secure phone call. This is done using PGP or some other mail encryption package, and can legitimately be used to exchange a long list of one-time passwords at once. Then, use Windows' calculator application (with View set to Scientific, and Mode set to Hex) to add your one-time password to the checksum. Thus: 1. I pull up Alice's latest encrypted e-mail, and get today's phone password. 2. I open the Windows calculator, set it to View/Scientific and hex mode, and type in the password (a six-digit hex number) and ``+.'' 3. I call Alice, say hello, and push the ``SECURE'' button. 4. I type the six digit hex checksum into my calculator. 5. I read the first three digits of the result to her. She reads the next three to me. All of this (except for maybe re-reading the checksum in the middle of the conversation) is probably overkill. Still, it may be worth something to someone. Is there a clean way to have the secure phone box take input from the dialpad on the phone, without sending it out on the phone line? If so, then maybe some later version could include a PIN-secured mode, using EKE or SPEKE or something similar. (For a supported mode, the checksum wouldn't need to be read over the phone anymore. We would need to protect the shared PIN from brute-force attack, however.) >Adam --John Kelsey, jmkelsey(a)plnet.net / kelsey(a)counterpane.com - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCNAi5JqlEAAAEEAPCEHMBdDCAJ83/ibNM7ngCaaibv7YkTxcpKPjTO+WcjswFV SEzMeTqW4MX2wSKdfcMq1HembbgfYs7v2UCnUFkLPZF19s3yUSISGcS7JxlBc3q1 7uj8W5XfBoGpgCYQqYFL2+AB/+3tLu7lU5iiEYCnevY5GQkq0kHx57Ag8goBAAUR tCdKb2huIE0uIEtlbHNleSBKciA8am1rZWxzZXlAZGVscGhpLmNvbT6JAJUDBRAv 5uh7QfHnsCDyCgEBAQZ2A/9/OMeWK4YC+PnEzBTmgpF4WAOsVXfzRD3zAbzfNWY9 MEGo4gRF8Mr1lPHdK+0JOHp327mj9ZvYqQb1bV5fwc5dJa8/Z34VLPYlVg2rV7vJ Hd0YnrgkoaIerbRmtP8dmZGeygeFtrk8aDCdcnMm27+tTJACl5hv2yjFO9rxBq+R MLQpRXhwaXJlcyBmb3IgbmV3IHNpZ3MvbXNncyBvbiBEZWMgMzEsIDE5OTc= =pOyw - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNDy68UHx57Ag8goBAQGP1QP9H6Z9Infv1z1swBzpEsvn+VZyweMj20to EQNRFcfLvNFu140kWokWfgIcSXh1CBrsz93/CMoZgIb8l1cpGIU51kFgz/DTXGvj 5XQCFcUzBRAEraxeF7xFnEH+Ss35lcCvzAXaWaVLB6apBvXP5ZkZtFr/vUYLhrtF Y34E8AAXFrg= =AlX3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --John Kelsey, Counterpane Systems, kelsey(a)counterpane.com PGP 2.6 fingerprint = 4FE2 F421 100F BB0A 03D1 FE06 A435 7E36

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6502 ML programming
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Wed, 8 Oct 1997 23:10:26 -0400 > From: ghio(a)temp0132.myriad.ml.org (Matthew Ghio) > Subject: Re: [LONG, off-topic]] Interactive Programming > Reminds me of a time, years ago, where I was trying to modify a program > written in 6502 assembler. > Consider the following line of C code: > > result = function(x,y,z); > > One could write this in 6502 assembler as: > > JSR function > DATA x > DATA y > DATA z > STA result > > where x,y,z,result are pointers to storage locations. There in no 'DATA' construct in 6502 assembly. This is some sort of macro that either the assembler or programmer defined. All official Rockwell/Commodore [1] 6502 assembly mnemonics are three letter. There are NO official macro's from MOS Technologies under either Rockwell or Commodore other than the ORG. ORG simply defined the starting address for the target code. The most efficient way to store data in 6502 is to put it in the first 256 bytes of ram, then it could be called in no more than 2 clock cycles. Also, in 6502 good programmers use the branch instructions (BCC, BCS, BEO, BMI, BNE, BPL, BVC, BVS) because the JSR required three bytes versus 2 bytes for a Bxx. The only constraint was that the branch target must reside in the same 256 byte page as the branch itself. The biggest boo-boo committed here was not realizing that branch offsets that took you across the upper page boundary would leave you at the lower page boundary plus some remaining offset. Idealy a jump table was created that had the various target addresses for your routines. Then a Bxx followed by a indirect mode JMP (NOT a JSR). If that table was in the first 256 bytes it was possible to save a whole clock cycle AND a byte in the process. At 64k and 1Mhz clock these sorts of short-cuts were significant. Because of the architecture of the 6502 the 0 page of RAM was a very busy place indeed because any operation there automaticaly saved a byte and a clock cycle. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________| [1] Rockwell designed and sold the chip for several years and then in the late 70's Commodore bought MOS Technologies.

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SSZ Down hard today... (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: >From ravage(a)ssz.com Fri Oct 17 20:10:35 1997 From: Jim Choate <ravage(a)ssz.com> Message-Id: <199710180110.UAA00156(a)einstein.ssz.com> Subject: SSZ Down hard today... To: users(a)ssz.com (SSZ User Mail List) Date: Fri, 17 Oct 1997 20:10:34 -0500 (CDT) X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL23] Content-Type: text Content-Length: 1389 Hi Folks, Not shure exactly why, doesn't seem to be related to the OS or hardware, but you obviously are aware that SSZ had some serious problems this afternoon. I suspect (wild guess at best) that it was power related in some way. Anyway, I'll be watching it all weekend. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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