December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

No Subject
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Dimitri V*l*s <dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com> writes: >> Apparently a 'bot was installed on toad.com to discard my >> submissions from the "unedited" list _after my article which >> prompted the C2net threatening lawyer letter did make it through the >> "unedited" list (but was censored from the "flames" list by C2Net). > >Your claim has some plausibility, I'll grant. You were already >singled out for special treatment, in that John Gilmore did >unsubscribe you, and block you from re-subscribing. We know that much >because he admitted it himself. Some of us use the old-fashioned way: :0 * ^From.*bwalk.dm.com /dev/null My procmail log has a bunch of /dev/null entries coming from the unedited Cypherpunks list. Since spam gets tagged and filtered separately, it looks like they're V*l*s - he's the only one I know of on cpunx-unedited who's auto-killed by my mail filters without some kind of notification. I'll look more closely in the future. Not at his posts, but at the log.

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Re: PGP CAKware & IETF controlled Open-PGP standard
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hal Finney, now working for PGP <hal(a)rain.org> writes: > PGP now offers an extensible signature format. This allows key > signatures, both self-signatures by a key on itself, and ordinary key > signatures by keys on other keys, to do more than before. The extensions > are in the form of subpackets within the signature packet. Various > subpackets have been defined, and Open-PGP would be an excellent forum > to propose and design new subpacket types and corresponding data formats. OK, that means the correct technical term for my discussion is an argument over the GAK compliancy subpacket type. > Some of the subpackets are modifiers of ordinary userid-binding signatures. > These allow signatures to have expiration dates; to be marked as non- > exportable (so that the signatures are only for your own use on the > keyring); I really like this non-exportable signature option. It is highly useful. I have a couple of keys on my key ring with signatures on them that I have mentally flagged as non-exportable. This is because they are signatures by the True Name of nyms I happen to know the True Name of and are intended to allow me to transfer the trust to that Nym, but the Nym is trusting me not to make public this signature. It would be really kind of neat to extend this functionality so that I _couldn't_ export the key by making the certifcate a non-transferable signature, or a designated verifier signature. > And here there is the new corporate message recovery key (CMRK) > subpacket. This is the controversial object. I have been arguing in a couple of earlier posts today that this design is a bad idea from a security perspective, and from the point of view that it is a form of GAK compliancy when coupled with PGP's SMTP policy enforcer. The reason I say this is that if we get to the situation where many businesses are using PGP 5.5 + PGP policy enforcer, the clients "choice" to not encrypt to the message snooping second crypto recipient in the CMRK subpacket will have little practical meaning. The user will be forced to comply or be unable to send messages which don't bounce. A better place to do corporate snooping, and to avoid the extra security risk of sending messages over the internet encrypted to two rather than one long term encryption keys, is to snoop the plaintext after it has been decrypted in the PGP 5.5 mail client. Also, the message snooping functionality is reading between the lines; Jon's post no where mentioned this as a user requirement. What he said was that corporates had a need to recover encrypted email messages stored in encrypted mail folders. If this is truly the case, the functionality is even easier to achieve, just encrypt the mail folder to a company escrowed storage key after decryption. Easy to do, and more secure. Same flexibility in reflecting the internal structure of the company's trust and risk management in the storage key escrow architecture. > The CMRK subpacket allows a key to request that when a message is > encrypted to it, the message should also be encrypted to a specified > additional key. The subpacket includes a flag byte which is designed to > allow the key to give information about the circumstances under which this > should be done. Only two values are presently defined, one specifying > an optional request, and the other meaning that the message will not be > read by the recipient if the additional encryption hasn't been done. If PGP is going to forge ahead and try for this flawed message snooping architecture anyway, I would urge you personally to at least press upon them to remove the flag meaning that a message will not be received without the use of the message snooping key, and to remove the functionality preventing delivery in the SMTP policy enforcer. > I won't address the controversy about this feature, as that is being > thoroughly discussed in other forums. Let me make two points, though: OK. The controversy has technical basis too -- and seems to be starting to be discussed in this forum also. There is also a question of how this design interacts with the IETF policy of not allowing political issues to weaken protocol designs to discuss. > We would like to move towards a mechanism to allow more power for keys > to make assertions. Matt Blaze's (still vaporware?) PolicyMaker project > showed how powerful such a general mechanism could be. SPKI is also > working along these lines, defining a certificate format which allows > keys to make very general classes of assertions. I've read Matt's PolicyMaker paper. I can see the attraction of moving towards these generalisedl trust statement syntaxes. I would be nice to see the topic of the recipient refusing email based on policies relating to third party access to messages in transit being addressed in the standard when and if PGP gets to that stage. There are some nice uses for some types of recipient refusal. Ecash payment for message processing, or my less $ oriented hashcash proposal also. (The types of problem that can arise with real ecash payment for receipt, which hashcash avoids is that if applied to discussion forums, it can bias the forums to allowing through more of what rich people have to say. A similar argument perhaps applies to email following up to comments made in public forums, you can only reply to someone if you have the money. Busy people may set very high payment rates.) > The CMRK is one such type of assertion: "please cc to key X anything > encrypted for me". The key is requesting that the specified other key > by an additional recipient on encryption. I can see problems with this type of assertion. I hope when the time comes that a way to define a convetion or set of rules which disallows this as part of the standard. > If we move to a sufficiently powerful language to allow keys to make > useful assertions, it seems to me that we will probably inherently > allow keys to make assertions of a type which some people may regard as > politically unacceptable, like this one. But to artificially constrain > the language so that it can only say things which are politically correct > will make a an already-difficult design task into an intractable one, > I'm afraid. We'll see when we get to it. In the mean time, PolicyMaker & look-alikes are vapourware. > Ultimately, a fully general and flexible system of key assertions will > allow keys to say stupid things as well as smart ones. I believe that > the power gained from having such a language gives advantages which > outweigh the problems of misuse. (Note the similarities to the debate > over the PICS labelling technology, which some people oppose because it > could be misused.) It's similar to PICs in that third party rating services are fine (for example consumer product evaluations in various magazines), but centrally controlled ones are objectionable to many of us. > Secondly, with this type of assertion, as with others such as > the preferred algorithm packet, it is inherently in the sender's > (encryptor's) power to ignore it if he chooses. You can request that I > not use triple-DES, but I could still send you a message encrypted with > that algorithm. You would then have the choice to reject it or accept it. > This is a point which I owe to Phil Zimmermann. The problem with this point, which you say is PRZ's, is that it falls down for interoperability reasons when the system is widely deployed. Exactly how much "choice" do you have when 80% of businesses will bounce your mail if you don't comply. How much "choice" do you have a few years later when 95% of individuals and companies are using the same system, and the government is holding the master snooping keys. [1] The long term likely value of this choice is rather low, so the assertion that it leaves you empowered is a weak assertion. You would paradoxically in this case be much more empowered if the recipient did the escrowing silently after receipt by decrypting and storing his mail folder with an escrowed storage key. Of course it would be nice if this policy was advised in the public key also, to at least warn you, in case you mistook the persons email address as a private account. (Some ISPs have names which look similar to some companies names,... domain names ending in .com, if you are not familiar with the company name). > Likewise in PGP 5.0 the user can override the CMRK request even in > its strongest form (although not in 5.5, because that is intended > for business-to-business communications). I submit for the above reasons that this overriding feature will in the long term me fairly meaningless. What is the practical individual empowerment transferred in being able to override something in the sure knowledge that it will thereby be bounced and not delivered. > Therefore, I very much agree with Jon Callas that an implementation which > (perhaps optionally) allows overriding the requests which a key makes > in its self-signatures should still be considered compliant. That is > consistent with the nature of the sender's power to create the message. I strongly disagree for reasons stated in paragraph [1] above. Adam -- Now officially an EAR violation... Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

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Home Sweet Home!
by admax＠elan-vital.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, I was wondering if you would like a FREEoverview of a home business which can bring you both PERSONAL and FINANCIAL FREEDOM. If so, please reply with the word "freedom" in the subject header and I will send it right away. Sincerely, Dan Askew "Free at Home" Home Business Owner 801-325-5204 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ We belong to the Direct Email Advertisers Association and the On-line Marketers Association. Both of these organizations promote professional and responsible use of email marketing. If you need bulk email services, accounts, resources, flame-proof emailing, or any of a host of services, go to: http://www.thehitman.com Type "askew" in the "who referred you" field. P.S. Should you prefer not to receive notices, please reply with the word "remove" in the subect header. Thank you.

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Foreign Terrorist List (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: >From owner-travel-advisories(a)stolaf.edu Sat Oct 11 04:19:58 1997 Date: Thu, 9 Oct 1997 11:00:03 -0400 From: owner-travel-advisories <owner-travel-advisories(a)stolaf.edu> Subject: Foreign Terrorist List Sender: Wally Doerge <76702.1202(a)compuserve.com> To: travel-advisories(a)stolaf.edu Message-ID: <199710091103_MC2-235E-2001(a)compuserve.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Precedence: bulk STATE DEPARTMENT TRAVEL INFORMATION - Foreign Terrorist List ============================================================ Publication of List of Foreign Terrorist Organizations - Public Announcement October 8, 1997 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Office of the Spokesman The Secretary of State has designated as foreign terrorist organizations thirty organizations that engage in terrorist activity that threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States, pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132). Designation as a foreign terrorist organization carries legal consequences for persons who aid these organizations, for the organizations funds, and for representatives and members who seek to enter the United States. The list of foreign terrorist organizations was published in the Federal Register on October 8, 1997. The Department of State has no specific information regarding threats to U.S. citizens at this time as a result of the designation of foreign terrorist organizations, but believes some of the groups may consider changing their attitude toward targeting U.S. interests in reaction to their designation. American citizens traveling abroad should always seek to minimize their risks by being aware of their surroundings and exercising caution as to their activities. U.S. citizens planning to travel abroad should consult the Department of State's country-specific Travel Warnings, Consular Information Sheets, and regional travel brochures. This Public Announcement expires on January 8, 1998. ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- The "travel-advisories(a)stolaf.edu" mailing list is the official Internet and BITNET distribution point for the U.S. State Department Travel Warnings and Consular Information Sheets. To unsubscribe, send a message containing the word "unsubscribe" to: travel-advisories-request(a)stolaf.edu Archives of past "travel-advisories" postings are available at the URL: "http://www.stolaf.edu/network/travel-advisories.html" or via Gopher: gopher.stolaf.edu, Internet Resources/US-State-Department-Travel-Advisories

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Re: r.e. OpenPGP document status
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Rodney Thayer <rodney(a)sabletech.com> writes: > The message formats draft(s) are being worked on now. We've only > had official WG status for something like two weeks. A little > patience is in order, I think. PGP Inc is the group being impatient. They have been rushing ahead implementing things behind closed doors which some of us are arguing should be made non-conforming (WILL NOTs) in the standard. If PGP doesn't backoff a bit _they'll_ have non-conforming implementations, and will have to change them. The danger is that in a Netscape-like manner, they will use their implementation and deployment as arguments to justfiy their design decisions rather than being involved in open design decision justifications as part of the standardisation process. This is not how the IETF standardisation process is supposed to work. Trial implementation of proposals is fine, closed door design and sudden deployment and mass sale by the market dominator to pre-empt standardisation I think is not. Adam -- Now officially an EAR violation... Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

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More Quality PC Programming References
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, Another good souce of references for programming the PC architecture across the full range of processors and system extensions (ie PCMCIA) is the 'PC Systems Architecture Series' of books put out by Addison-Wesley for MindShare, Inc. Mindshare also has various training courses and seminars. If interested (I am in no connected to them nor do I receive any $'s from them): BBS: 214-705-9604 mindshar(a)interserv.com CompuServe: 72507,1054 ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Nuke Denver!
by Tim C. McVeigh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.hoffman-info.com/essay7.html The Show Trial of the Manchurian Candidate Has Concluded According to the Script The masterfully choreographed show trial of Manchurian candidate Tim McVeigh has concluded according to the script, thanks to a government-mouthpiece "news media," a suborned jury, a crooked Federal judge and an incompetent (or perhaps worse) "defense" team. Part of the script has been McVeigh's tendency toward self-incrimination: Immediately after the bombing of the Federal building, as TeamInfinity notes, McVeigh did "everything but send up a flare to draw attention to himself... speeding out of the state of Oklahoma at almost 100 mph in a yellow car with no license plate, virtually guaranteeing that he would be stopped...Timothy McVeigh is a highly trained combat NCO who won a Bronze Star for courage under fire in the Gulf. Having been stopped by a state trooper, being armed with a pistol, and knowing that he now faced either execution or imprisonment for the rest of his natural life, why did McVeigh make no move at all to defend himself or escape, instead surrendering like a little lamb?" >From his arrest onward, Mr. McVeigh has filled the same role as Sirhan Sirhan, James Earl Ray, Arthur Bremer (George Wallace's assailant), Charles Manson and David Berkowitz: he has failed to contradict, in the course of the investigation preceding his conviction, the tale the government wove around him. If McVeigh continues to fulfill the pattern, after the klieg lights have been turned off and the national spotlight is dimmed, when he becomes a convict on death row, rather than a defendant in the trial of the year, he will begin to chirp certain truths that the script decreed would not be emitted during the "trial." The credibility of those revelations will be greatly reduced since they will be written off by the media as "jail-house conspiracy theories by a desperate death-row inmate." The same pattern emerged with "Son of Sam" David Berkowitz, another mind-controlled patsy who only divulged truthful details concerning his co-conspirators and the other shooters, after he was entombed in Attica prison with a sentence of 300 years. A similar pattern may be observed in the passive behavior of Ted Kaczynski, the alleged "Unabomber," who I also believe to be a mind-controlled scapegoat. --Michael A. Hoffman II Copyright©1997.

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Information Warfare
by ZOG 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Campaign for Radical Truth in History http://www.hoffman-info.com PO Box 849, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 .Visit our Bookstore ZOG Advances Control over Information with Clinton's Executive Order 13010 for "Information Warfare" by Michael A. Hoffman II Copyright©1997. All Rights Reserved Excerpt: "Managing the new risks inherent in an information-based society requires a different type of information exchange within the industry and between industry and government...Key to its success will be protecting the privileged information from both government and the private sector from unauthorized disclosure." -- Robert T. Marsh, Chairman, President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection The Zionist Occupation Government (ZOG) further advanced Communist-like controls over American infrastructure, and underscored the cooperation between the Communist and Capitalist mentalities, when U.S. President Bill Clinton, with virutally no scrutiny from the Establishment news media, signed totalitarian Executive Order 13010 last July (1997). This Order established a new wing of the secret, banker-controlled government of the United States. While Clinton's Executive Order itself is written in the lingo of the bureaucrat and hence is largely insipid, its "fruits" are not. Executive Order 13010 is concerned with cyberspace "threats" to the power structure; with computer hackers who have the ability to interefere with government, business and industry operations. Well, that's the cover story anyway. In practice, the Executive Order authorizes a commission of bankers, industrialists and secret policemen (and police women) to gather intelligence on dissidents, government critics and anyone who is a potential threat to the continuing hegemony of the Aryan-Zionist ruling class. Here is a portion of the remarks delivered at a meeting (chaired by Janet "The Witch of Waco" Reno), by Robert T. Marsh, Chairman, President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, at the Bankers Roundtable, Washington, DC on September 11, 1997: "One of our toughest problems -- across all infrastructures -- is the sharing of information. There is already a heavy volume of information passed by industry -- especially banks, as you well know -- to government as part of the regulatory process and through law enforcement. "Managing the new risks inherent in an information-based society requires a different type of information exchange within the industry and between industry and government. Furthermore, managing these new risks calls for partnership at many different levels, from policy-making aimed at preventing a crisis to responding if such a crisis occurs. The Commission has some specific proposals in this regard: "We will recommend the establishment of an Information Sharing, Analysis, and Warning "Organization" -- a public-private organization that embodies the trust essential for the partnership between government and the owners/operators for successful infrastructure assurance. "We envision an 'information clearinghouse' staffed by up-and-comers from both government and industry who will receive relevant information from all sources -- public and private, anonymous or attributable -- analyze this information to assess what is happening in the infrastructures, decide on the necessary protective measures to be taken, then disseminate needed information to both government and the private sector. Key to its success will be protecting the privileged information from both government and the private sector from unauthorized disclosure. "Would you be willing to take turns providing a talented young banker from your company to represent the banking and finance sector inside such an organization? "Enhance industry's information sharing capability by creating Sector Information Assurance Coordinators that best suit each infrastructure's information-sharing needs -- either through an existing association or by creating a new entity. In essence, we are proposing that each industry designate a representative to be the channel for exchanging information with the government. Your reaction? "Create a National Infrastructure Assurance Council -- a very high level council comprised of senior CEOs from throughout the critical infrastructures, meeting regularly with selected Cabinet Officers... "These recommendations lay the foundation for the 'trusted environment' to achieving the public-private partnership essential for protection into the next century." What we are seeing here is the establishment of a thought police agency within the Federal government with links to law enforcement, concealed under weasel words such as "Information Clearinghouse" and "Sector Information Assurance." This recalls the Pentagon term for the slaughter of Iraqi civilians by the U.S. Air Force-- "collateral damage." Dr. Goebbels at least had the relative honesty to call his agency the Ministry of Propaganda. The Zionist Occupation Government refers to their propaganda and secret police functions with the bland title of "National Information Assurance Council." They're not propagandists, they're "Sector Information Assurance Coordinators." Mr. Marsh's reference to the gathering of "anonymous" information is of interest. Here is the keystone of all totalitarian powers--the anonymous snitch who turns in the hated old lady next door as a witch only because he can do so without attribution. Our Anglo-Saxon Common Law requires two witnesses and the U.S. Constitution insures the right to face one's accusers, but ZOG is operating on other principles. Chairman Marsh: "The objective is to achieve voluntary participation of all players within each infrastructure and to assemble and exchange information without fear of attribution to specific sources." That is the chairman of a government commission speaking. This is not conspiracy theory. These remarks are on the record. They constitute the Revelation of the Method (cf. my book, "Secret Societies and Psychological Warfare"). The System is becoming increasingly vulnerable, especially the banking system which is the biggest con-game of all, since it is based entirely on the confidence of the public in a commodity which in itself has zero value--paper notes referred to as "money." Wealth is created and dynastic families within the Aryan-Zionist ruling class are maintained, by the circulation or withdrawal of worthless Federal Reserve paper to which the public is taught to attribute value. In a similar fashion, the worthless mandates and orders of the Federal government, promoting a gigantic military-industrial complex in the service of War-Zionism and the Novus Odo Seclorum of Satan, sodomy and aborticide, are advanced almost entirely through the value of the fear and awe the public is taught to have for the Federal government. As both our funny-money and our funny-government become more and more obviously worthless in the eyes of even some of the masses of goyim, the confidence game can no longer be manintained on the basis of psychological warfare principles alone. The risk factor inherent in the System's "Truth or Consequences" gambit (discussed at length in my book) has reached the point where the risk must be "managed" by the function of cyber police. This is what Clinton's Executive Order 13010 establishes-- a gigiantic listening post for the secret police through the auspices of business and industry. Banks having been informing on their customers for years--since the administration of Ronald ("Super Patriot") Reagan who rubber-stamped the most onerous bank-reporting rules in our nation's history. Chairman Marsh admits this: "There is already a heavy volume of information passed by industry -- especially banks, as you well know--to government as part of the regulatory process and through law enforcement." Now the "turn in your neighbor" ethic of the banks is being mandated for all levels of U.S. commerce through the recruitment, in Mr. Marsh's words, of "elite CEOS." The whole point is to shore up flagging confidence in the Federal government's con-game, as Marsh admits: "Both the financial service industry and government require strong public confidence -- the industry in order to derive growth, and the government in order to derive political viability. Each is central to the daily lives of virtually every American, and the degree of trust the public is willing to place in them depends directly on the reliability of the services provided. Infrastructure, as the carrier of the communications and transactions which deliver those services, is, therefore, critical to the performance of both. With the retention of public confidence as a common bond, how might the industry and government better cooperate to assure that critical financial services are secured in the information age?" The chairman of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection is saying that bankers have an interest in deceiving the people just as government has. The bankers' interest is in continuing to reap profits and the government's interest is to maintain itself in power against populist opposition forces. Chariman Marsh says that the public will only continue to be deceived ("trust"), if the shylocks can keep the game running smoothly. Of course, that's quite a hat trick in view of the fact that the public is becoming increasingly aware that the objective of ZOG's game is their own enslavement. The focus of ZOG in this regard is the "information age." ZOG's desire is to redouble their spying on us and to further institutionalize that spying at all sectors of business and commerce and then link it to the secret police ("law enforcement") for various sorts of economic, political and career reprisals and penal sanctions. Here is Mr. Marsh, this time in a speech to the New York Federal Reserve bankers, September 24, 1997 on what they fear most: "But, as you well know, major trends of change -- globalization, industry restructuring, Internet banking, and cyber cash --combine to create new risks. This is true within the financial services industry as well as the telecommunications and electric power industries upon which financial services heavily depend...it is the vulnerability to a possible coordinated attack on physical operations centers, or on the complex 'system of systems' which enables this industry to function world-wide, that is of rising concern." Marsh before a meeting of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, Sept. 20, 1997, speaking about "illegal" government activity in connection with "information warfare": "Let me talk briefly about a recent Joint Staff exercise with which some of you are probably familiar. This was just one in a series of no-notice exercises, but this one focused specifically on information warfare. Some of the issues raised were quite troubling -- including the fact that the Joint Staff ended up fighting this war, which was not only bad but illegal. They include many of the questions that the Commission has been grappling with for the past year: Who should take the lead in responding to a cyber attack on the United States? Should there be a Commander In Chief for information warfare? Where are the borders in the cyber age? What are the jurisdictions? Is this a law enforcement or a defense problem?" Chairman Robert Marsh's ties are to the military-industrial complex. He is the former CEO of Morton-Thiokol Corporation, a notorious polluter and builder of components for nuclear warhead-laden missiles. Mr. Marsh currently is a trustee of the MITRE Corporation. According to investigative reporter Stephen Knight in his book, "Jack the Ripper: The Final Solution," London's Mitre Square was a dumping ground for the Ripper's victims. Knight states: "Mitre Square has strong Masonic significance. In fact it is fair to say it was the most Masonic of all places in London, except for the Great Hall of the Grand Lodge itself." (London: Grafton Books, 1977, p. 175). I am not here implying that Mr. Marsh is necessarily a murderer or in league with Jack the Ripper, only that his relationship with the Mitre name is a synchronicity worth noting. (For the significance of "synchronicity" to the ruling class cf. the predictive modeling of the commodities markets and the "catastrophe theory" studies of Prof. Christopher Zeeman of Warwick University). Stephen D. Mitchell of the US Justice Dept. is a member of the Marsh commission. Here he discusses the "insider threat"--the fear the government has of patriots and dissidents being hired in "critical infastructure" areas such as banks and of how to screen these "insiders" out of employment. He also expresses the government's frustration with state privacy laws: "Privacy is trickier. Our outreach revealed a degree of frustration among infrastructure owners and operators, some of whom wanted to take greater employee security precautions than some laws might otherwise allow....The importance of individual privacy has made obtaining background information on a potential or current employee a fertile area for strong state laws. Though grounded in best intentions, this has resulted in unpredictable disparities of approaches across state lines. The bottom line: a critical infrastructure owner and operator may in some instances be discouraged if not prevented from asking many of the types of questions that could help identify and prevent a growing insider threat to our infrastructures." --Department of Defense, Worldwide Anti-Terrorism Conference, Aug. 21, 1997. Other members of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Merritt Adams, ATT Corporation. Richard P. Case, IBM. Dr. Mary Culnan, Georgetown University. Peter Daly, U.S. Treasury. John C. Davis, National Security Agency. Brenton Greene, Dept. of Defense. William B. Joyce, CIA. Stephan D. Mitchell, Dept. of Justice. Irwin Pikus, Dept. of Commerce. John R. Powers, FEMA. Susan Siemans, FBI. Frederic Struble, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve bank. Nancy Wong, Pacific Gas and Electric. Relevant Links: President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection: http://www.pccip.gov/index.html Executive Order 13010: http://www.pccip.gov/eo13010.html ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- archives / bookstore / news bureau / home

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Re: Information Warfare
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ZOG translated from the Talmud: > Stephen D. Mitchell of the US Justice Dept. is a member of the Marsh > commission. Here he discusses the "insider threat"--the fear the government > has of patriots and dissidents being hired in "critical infastructure" areas > such as banks and of how to screen these "insiders" out of employment. Too late... > He also expresses the government's frustration with state privacy laws: > "Privacy is trickier. Our outreach revealed a degree of frustration among > infrastructure owners and operators, some of whom wanted to take greater > employee security precautions than some laws might otherwise allow.... Yep, Corporate America is crying out for GAK and the right to keep their employees interned in Government Work Camps. > The bottom line: a critical > infrastructure owner and operator may in some instances be discouraged if > not prevented from asking many of the types of questions that could help > identify and prevent a growing insider threat to our infrastructures." "Before I send you for your drug-test and prostrate exam, I'm going to need to know your bra/condom size." > --Department of Defense, Worldwide Anti-Terrorism Conference, Aug. 21, 1997. Shit! I thought I was at the Cypherpunks physical meeting. I mean, Kent Crispin and Hallam-Baker were there... Say, you don't think... YellowWireMonger

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Building the Surveillance State
by Tim May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I predict that nearly every company which enforces the PGP 5.5 corporate snoopware will in fact routinely convert every incoming and outgoing message to plaintext for searching by keywords, topics, etc. This would be analogous to every phone call, incoming and outgoing, being recorded. Except that instead of having security people _listen_ to each recording, the messages can be glanced at quickly, marked for further review, compiled into dossiers, or searched for the keywords of interest to the security people. (Please note that I am not saying such phone call or e-mail monitoring is illegal, or should be illegal. A property owner is free to define his own policies for how he uses his own property. This includes company phones, company computers, and even the time of employees while they are on his premises. The issues are not the legality or ethicality of such recordings and monitorings, but the dangers. And whether people such as ourselves should help build or deploy such surveillance capabilitities. Or work for companies with such surveillance policies.) I further predict that this will actually _increase_ the amount of e-mail surveillance being done. Whereas today it is of course easy for companies to surveil unencrypted employee mail, I doubt that most of them do. But the adoption of snoopware like PGP 5.5 will raise the consciousness of company security people. "Hmmhh, maybe we ought to buy some of those e-mail keyword analyzers and combine them with our new purchase of PGP 5.5? If our employees are encrypting, we'd better keep tabs on them." By building in such easily-enforceable snooping capabilities, and by building in such things as the ability to reject even _incoming_ e-mail which has failed to encrypt to the corporate key (as I understand the product), this greatly moves us toward a surveillance era. Is this what "Pretty Good Privacy" really stands for? - --Tim May The Feds have shown their hand: they want a ban on domestic cryptography - ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, ComSec 3DES: 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^2,976,221 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQA/AwUBND+11FK3AvrfAt9qEQKOZQCdFRS6Ogl3da7TDFxmFF7E9kE16RsAoPaG iFjXzww6H5c1no3iYGvL6BGD =wt4J -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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