December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: PGP CAKware & IETF controlled Open-PGP standard
by William H. Geiger III 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In <6661.wsimpson(a)greendragon.com>, on 10/10/97 at 10, "William Allen Simpson" <wsimpson(a)greendragon.com> said: >I'm getting a bit tired of the rants on this topic to the Open-PGP list. >Yes, there are problems, but the whole purpose of IETF review is to find >solutions to problems. I agree, I think the political debates can be better handled on the CP list rather than here. In that light I have created a PGP 5.5 digest that covers the various threads on this topic from the CP list, the open PGP list and the PGP Users lists (for the neswgroups you are on your own). I will also provide a daily digest as long as these threads continue (cut-off time 5pm central time zone). Anyone wishing to receive a copy let me know (digest, daily, or both). >The PGP staff have some ideas on how business message recovery can be >done. It seems there is a business need. It seems that they have >thought about it, and made some effort toward implementation. >What annoys me is that the PGP formats are now supposed to be "open", yet >no proposed formats for this new "feature" have been documented for our >review, and other folks' suggestions for a better K-of-N mechanism have >been ignored. >We don't even have the current formats. When will the PGP 5.0 >internet-draft be ready for review? >There is already a PGP 5.0 separation between signing and >communication keys; why not have separate message storage keys? >Why not have a K-of-N system for BMR? >Why have a communication enforcement filter, when the only usage is >supposed to be for recovering archival storage? >Let us decide _what_ the goals are, _how_ to solve the problems, and >_then_ decide the protocol details and formats to match the solution. An excellent suggestion. Perhaps you could detail your ideals on these areas so we can work on them. - -- - --------------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html - --------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3a Charset: cp850 Comment: Registered_User_E-Secure_v1.1b1_ES000000 iQCVAwUBND8W+o9Co1n+aLhhAQEW2wP/Ya18Xh44vRqsy/5uhPLeprw8C9z+MgWE MOdoRrKq8BvkCA9qoCEpm6bmFajR18IcvkEE1rurEV69yehpi0/YfYOQ4adntiEd xTIQ8OLpQ6DMion7FauBb9Y1/XeKef/jOqddlM4qmgUswpkzMA7RMdaHoL7yrLI+ jGjJnD6qmKk= =KxW9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Defeating MITM with Eric's Secure Phone
by John Kelsey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- [ To: Cryptography, cypherpunks ## Date: 10/10/97 ## Subject: Re: Defeating MITM with Eric's Secure Phone ] >Date: Thu, 9 Oct 1997 21:02:53 -0700 >From: Bill Frantz <frantz(a)netcom.com> >Subject: Re: Defeating MITM with Eric's Secure Phone >Cc: cryptography(a)c2.net, cypherpunks(a)Algebra.COM I wrote (and Bill commented on): >> 1. Exchange PGP-encrypted e-mail establishing a set of >> sixteen different words, labeled for 0..f in each direction. >> Thus: >> >> 0. Dilbert 1. Alpha 2. Cable 3. Swordsman ... f. Marxist >> >> Now, the checksum reading is very hard to spoof. Suppose I >> get 0x33f. I say ``My checksum is Swordsman Swordsman >> Marxist, or 33f.'' Bill responded with some nice reasoning: >Assume that the contents of the paper are secret between >Alice and Bob. When Alice calls Bob, she reads the word >coresponding to the first digit of the checksum. Either >Mallory is in the middle or he isn't. If he isn't, no >problem. The word list remains secure. >If he is in the middle, he has 15 chances in 16 of being >caught on the first exchange. He only survives if the first >digit of the Alice-Mallory connection is the same as the >first digit of the Mallory-Bob connection. He now knows the >word for one value and can continue to play 1 out of 16 >times. This is *almost* right. We need to add one more thing, though: 1. Alice calls Mallory, thinking she's calling Bob. She reads the first three digits to him. He makes the connection fall apart. At the same time, Mallory calls Bob, pretending to be Alice, and causes the connection to fall apart at the same time. 2. Alice calls Bob again, re-establishes their connection, and talks to him. Both seem to have had the same thing happen, so it's believeable that it was just noise on the line. (Where I am, this isn't so uncommon that it would imply an active attack.) 3. Mallory now knows three of these words in the dictionary. He lies low for the next few calls before trying the same trick again, until he learns most or all the dictionary entries. This implies a couple of things: First, Alice and Bob ought to be suspiscious of line noise that conveniently clobbers them during reading of checksums. Second, Alice and Bob shouldn't keep the same 16-word dictionary forever. If they change it once a week, this may be enough to make the attack I describe above unworkable. Note that this all works only when the phones/dictionaries are used only by single users. I also made a poorly-thought-through comment about using 6-digit hex secrets, and adding or XORing them into the checksums. This is vulnerable to a trivial attack, of course. The thing is, this doesn't need to be as complex or cryptographically secure as a hash function or MAC, because of the way it's used. We can probably also expect one-day-only keys for this application. I can think of dozens of things that *ought* to work here, and still be strong enough to resist the limited possible attacks, but I can't seem to convince myself of the security of any that are simple enough to use with a calculator. If I settled on one, it would be New checksum = (((old checksum * C0) mod P)+ C1) mod 2^{64}. where P is a random 64-bit prime, C0 is a random 64-bit number between 0 and P-1 inclusive, and C1 is a random 64-bit number. If P,C0, and C1 are all unknown, I *think* that's secure. An attacker given the high-order half of this doesn't seem to have the information needed to guess its low-order half on a different checksum, nor to reliably learn the value of P. This is essentially the IBC-Hash message authentication code, which is provably secure if the key is used once. I can't see a way that this could be attacked in this application, given one-time use of the keys. Can anyone else? (I may be missing something obvious again.) >BTW - I really like John's idea of doing another exchange >later in the conversation. Perhaps something like, "You >know, I was dancing the Foxtrot with my wife 9 days ago at >5AM." I wish I could claim this, but it's been around for a while. Didn't some of the PGPphone people come up with this idea? (Or was it users of older, government-issued secure phones?) >Bill Frantz | Internal surveillance | Periwinkle -- Consulting >(408)356-8506 | helped make the USSR the | 16345 Englewood Ave. >frantz(a)netcom.com | nation it is today. | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA --John Kelsey, Counterpane Systems, kelsey(a)counterpane.com PGP 2.6 fingerprint = 4FE2 F421 100F BB0A 03D1 FE06 A435 7E36 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBND8+LUHx57Ag8goBAQHgCAQA1a6JjY0CMymvvXkWC8L8xOkyy2oosmQU rJAGtN9pYOdv+fyxSwEu4Mh03jjbcmQ1YBKkkD5CVfrhIYN93FGMZq9tVT+hIVCE 04/ki48Os1AitU/vZI94GlJlajhssSPy0R9fcPbFtR96KAw8csuFICtX2quwBK6a +SkkfLZgaKc= =vGOh -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --John Kelsey, Counterpane Systems, kelsey(a)counterpane.com PGP 2.6 fingerprint = 4FE2 F421 100F BB0A 03D1 FE06 A435 7E36

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InfoWar Epilogue 1 / TEXT
by Monty Cantsin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- The True Story of the InterNet Part III InfoWar Final Frontier of the Digital Revolution Behind the ElectroMagnetic Curtain by TruthMonger <tm(a)dev.null> Copyright 1997 Pearl Publishing ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- InfoWar Table of Contents * Epilogue * Priscilla ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Epilogue ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- The sun was rising over the mountain peaks, crimson streaks of light streaming through the trees, striking the multi-colored falling leaves. As the tattered remnants of the Magic Circle slept soundly, after days of flight to the security of their last remaining hideaway, twin rays of light split the air in the cave above them, with silver leaves twisting lazily down from the skylight at its peak, turning to a blazing scarlet as they passed through the lower streak of light, like blood dripping off a chain saw This was a moment stranded in timenot abandoned, but suspended in the twilight which lay between the future and the pastbetween the beginning of time and the end of timeor vice-versa. A twinkling of time, wherein the sun was neither rising, nor settingmerely waiting for a whisper from the Tao before deciding which way to proceed in its journey toward eternity ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Priscilla Perhaps I look at life a bit differently from some of the remaining members of the Magic Circle, because I am a mother. That is probably why, of all Bubba's many stories of the characters in the legends surrounding the Magic Circle, I most enjoyed the ones concerning the Author and Bubba d'Shauneaux swapping stories about the Author's mother. My favorite remains the one of how she worked at a small newspaper, in a small town, at a time when it was unheard of for a woman to write a sports column. She simply took on a masculine nome-de-plume, put some obscure man's picture next to it on the column header, and proceeded to do exactly what she wanted to do. "To him who does what within him lies, God will not deny his grace." - Saint Augustine This is something that mothers instinctively understand, and their joy or heartache, if they have remained on a path with heart, is not from their children's success or status in the eyes of others, but in their child's own inner eye. Likewise in the Magic Circle. It's members recognize one another instantly, not from their outer appearances, but from an inner quality of being that is acquired only by being true to one's inherent soul-pattern and making choices that are in line with their true destiny in life. Bubba Rom Dos tells a story about the Author and d'Shauneaux I discussing members of the CypherPunks list. "Bianca was listening to them discuss whom on the list they would trust to vote for them. When they discussed Kent Crispin, the Author said, 'If he tried to cast my vote for me, I would be forced to kill him.' "d'Shauneaux asked the Author if he would trust Crispin to watch his back for him in the real world, and the Author replied, 'In a heartbeat.' "Bianca asked the Author, 'If he was your child, would you be proud of him?' and he replied, without hesitation, 'Yesbut I'd spank him, too.'" Cowboy once told me that he thought I had perhaps given one of the most astute definitions of the CypherPunks he had ever heard, and that it was a description that only a mother could give. I had told him that I thought they were "deranged saints with an attitude." I suspect that he was so grandly impressed with my description because it fit himself so well. As a child, I mean, of course (nod-nod, wink-wink;) The CypherPunks were an oddball assortment of scrappers and elitists, mathematicians, philosophers, physicists, lunatics and poetsad infinitum The CypherPunk mailing list, however, had a spirit of life about it, with even the most brutal of attacks usually having some basis of logic underpinning them. Meanness and pettiness were not the rule of the day and were seldom tolerated for long on the list without any one of a wide number of list members stepping in to give the originator an 'attitude adjustment.' Even in the midst of some of the CypherPunks' most ferocious of their legendary pissing contests, some poor bastard would shoot himself in the foot that he or she had put in their mouth, at which point the thread would often pause, like the Civil War hiatus wherein opposing sides would 'do lunch' and claim their dead, and everyone would join in soundly ridiculing the offending party before resuming their pissing party (or forgetting about it and moving on to less meaningful activities). After Vice-Admiral d'Shauneaux had taken over Pearl Harbor Computers, Inc., and had written the Epilogue to 'The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre' someone asked him what he liked most about the bizarre cryptographers he was following who had formed the CypherPunks mailing list. His cryptic reply was, "They're Troopers!" I asked Bubba once whether the Admiral was referring to the rumors that they were all double or triple agents of three-letter secret agencies of one sort or another, or to one of the Author's favorite musical groups, who sang, "We're here for a good time, not a long time, so have a good timethe sun doesn't shine every day." Bubba's answer was, "Both." If you are reading this, then I presume that the Trei Transponder is no longer functioning, and has transferred the InformEnergy from the Epilogue HydroCube which was meant only to be sent in the event that we were forced to abandon our last remaining safe house and beat feet to our mountain hideaway. No matter what your view of what the tattered remnants of a mythical group from the future have chosen to share with you, I hope and pray that you will learn as much from your future as we have from our past. You may not yet fully realize the full import of the story that you and we have woven together from what could have been, and what may yet be, but it will not be long before you will. Remember: "Patience comes to those who wait" ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" "WebWorld & the Mythical Circle of Eunuchs" "InfoWar (Part III of 'The True Story of the InterNet') Soviet Union Sickle of Eunuchs Secret WebSite ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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InfoWar Epilogue 1 (Part III of 'The True Story of the InterNet')
by Monty Cantsin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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No Subject
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Dimitri V*l*s <dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com> writes: >> Apparently a 'bot was installed on toad.com to discard my >> submissions from the "unedited" list _after my article which >> prompted the C2net threatening lawyer letter did make it through the >> "unedited" list (but was censored from the "flames" list by C2Net). > >Your claim has some plausibility, I'll grant. You were already >singled out for special treatment, in that John Gilmore did >unsubscribe you, and block you from re-subscribing. We know that much >because he admitted it himself. Some of us use the old-fashioned way: :0 * ^From.*bwalk.dm.com /dev/null My procmail log has a bunch of /dev/null entries coming from the unedited Cypherpunks list. Since spam gets tagged and filtered separately, it looks like they're V*l*s - he's the only one I know of on cpunx-unedited who's auto-killed by my mail filters without some kind of notification. I'll look more closely in the future. Not at his posts, but at the log.

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Re: PGP CAKware & IETF controlled Open-PGP standard
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hal Finney, now working for PGP <hal(a)rain.org> writes: > PGP now offers an extensible signature format. This allows key > signatures, both self-signatures by a key on itself, and ordinary key > signatures by keys on other keys, to do more than before. The extensions > are in the form of subpackets within the signature packet. Various > subpackets have been defined, and Open-PGP would be an excellent forum > to propose and design new subpacket types and corresponding data formats. OK, that means the correct technical term for my discussion is an argument over the GAK compliancy subpacket type. > Some of the subpackets are modifiers of ordinary userid-binding signatures. > These allow signatures to have expiration dates; to be marked as non- > exportable (so that the signatures are only for your own use on the > keyring); I really like this non-exportable signature option. It is highly useful. I have a couple of keys on my key ring with signatures on them that I have mentally flagged as non-exportable. This is because they are signatures by the True Name of nyms I happen to know the True Name of and are intended to allow me to transfer the trust to that Nym, but the Nym is trusting me not to make public this signature. It would be really kind of neat to extend this functionality so that I _couldn't_ export the key by making the certifcate a non-transferable signature, or a designated verifier signature. > And here there is the new corporate message recovery key (CMRK) > subpacket. This is the controversial object. I have been arguing in a couple of earlier posts today that this design is a bad idea from a security perspective, and from the point of view that it is a form of GAK compliancy when coupled with PGP's SMTP policy enforcer. The reason I say this is that if we get to the situation where many businesses are using PGP 5.5 + PGP policy enforcer, the clients "choice" to not encrypt to the message snooping second crypto recipient in the CMRK subpacket will have little practical meaning. The user will be forced to comply or be unable to send messages which don't bounce. A better place to do corporate snooping, and to avoid the extra security risk of sending messages over the internet encrypted to two rather than one long term encryption keys, is to snoop the plaintext after it has been decrypted in the PGP 5.5 mail client. Also, the message snooping functionality is reading between the lines; Jon's post no where mentioned this as a user requirement. What he said was that corporates had a need to recover encrypted email messages stored in encrypted mail folders. If this is truly the case, the functionality is even easier to achieve, just encrypt the mail folder to a company escrowed storage key after decryption. Easy to do, and more secure. Same flexibility in reflecting the internal structure of the company's trust and risk management in the storage key escrow architecture. > The CMRK subpacket allows a key to request that when a message is > encrypted to it, the message should also be encrypted to a specified > additional key. The subpacket includes a flag byte which is designed to > allow the key to give information about the circumstances under which this > should be done. Only two values are presently defined, one specifying > an optional request, and the other meaning that the message will not be > read by the recipient if the additional encryption hasn't been done. If PGP is going to forge ahead and try for this flawed message snooping architecture anyway, I would urge you personally to at least press upon them to remove the flag meaning that a message will not be received without the use of the message snooping key, and to remove the functionality preventing delivery in the SMTP policy enforcer. > I won't address the controversy about this feature, as that is being > thoroughly discussed in other forums. Let me make two points, though: OK. The controversy has technical basis too -- and seems to be starting to be discussed in this forum also. There is also a question of how this design interacts with the IETF policy of not allowing political issues to weaken protocol designs to discuss. > We would like to move towards a mechanism to allow more power for keys > to make assertions. Matt Blaze's (still vaporware?) PolicyMaker project > showed how powerful such a general mechanism could be. SPKI is also > working along these lines, defining a certificate format which allows > keys to make very general classes of assertions. I've read Matt's PolicyMaker paper. I can see the attraction of moving towards these generalisedl trust statement syntaxes. I would be nice to see the topic of the recipient refusing email based on policies relating to third party access to messages in transit being addressed in the standard when and if PGP gets to that stage. There are some nice uses for some types of recipient refusal. Ecash payment for message processing, or my less $ oriented hashcash proposal also. (The types of problem that can arise with real ecash payment for receipt, which hashcash avoids is that if applied to discussion forums, it can bias the forums to allowing through more of what rich people have to say. A similar argument perhaps applies to email following up to comments made in public forums, you can only reply to someone if you have the money. Busy people may set very high payment rates.) > The CMRK is one such type of assertion: "please cc to key X anything > encrypted for me". The key is requesting that the specified other key > by an additional recipient on encryption. I can see problems with this type of assertion. I hope when the time comes that a way to define a convetion or set of rules which disallows this as part of the standard. > If we move to a sufficiently powerful language to allow keys to make > useful assertions, it seems to me that we will probably inherently > allow keys to make assertions of a type which some people may regard as > politically unacceptable, like this one. But to artificially constrain > the language so that it can only say things which are politically correct > will make a an already-difficult design task into an intractable one, > I'm afraid. We'll see when we get to it. In the mean time, PolicyMaker & look-alikes are vapourware. > Ultimately, a fully general and flexible system of key assertions will > allow keys to say stupid things as well as smart ones. I believe that > the power gained from having such a language gives advantages which > outweigh the problems of misuse. (Note the similarities to the debate > over the PICS labelling technology, which some people oppose because it > could be misused.) It's similar to PICs in that third party rating services are fine (for example consumer product evaluations in various magazines), but centrally controlled ones are objectionable to many of us. > Secondly, with this type of assertion, as with others such as > the preferred algorithm packet, it is inherently in the sender's > (encryptor's) power to ignore it if he chooses. You can request that I > not use triple-DES, but I could still send you a message encrypted with > that algorithm. You would then have the choice to reject it or accept it. > This is a point which I owe to Phil Zimmermann. The problem with this point, which you say is PRZ's, is that it falls down for interoperability reasons when the system is widely deployed. Exactly how much "choice" do you have when 80% of businesses will bounce your mail if you don't comply. How much "choice" do you have a few years later when 95% of individuals and companies are using the same system, and the government is holding the master snooping keys. [1] The long term likely value of this choice is rather low, so the assertion that it leaves you empowered is a weak assertion. You would paradoxically in this case be much more empowered if the recipient did the escrowing silently after receipt by decrypting and storing his mail folder with an escrowed storage key. Of course it would be nice if this policy was advised in the public key also, to at least warn you, in case you mistook the persons email address as a private account. (Some ISPs have names which look similar to some companies names,... domain names ending in .com, if you are not familiar with the company name). > Likewise in PGP 5.0 the user can override the CMRK request even in > its strongest form (although not in 5.5, because that is intended > for business-to-business communications). I submit for the above reasons that this overriding feature will in the long term me fairly meaningless. What is the practical individual empowerment transferred in being able to override something in the sure knowledge that it will thereby be bounced and not delivered. > Therefore, I very much agree with Jon Callas that an implementation which > (perhaps optionally) allows overriding the requests which a key makes > in its self-signatures should still be considered compliant. That is > consistent with the nature of the sender's power to create the message. I strongly disagree for reasons stated in paragraph [1] above. Adam -- Now officially an EAR violation... Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

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Home Sweet Home!
by admax＠elan-vital.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, I was wondering if you would like a FREEoverview of a home business which can bring you both PERSONAL and FINANCIAL FREEDOM. If so, please reply with the word "freedom" in the subject header and I will send it right away. Sincerely, Dan Askew "Free at Home" Home Business Owner 801-325-5204 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ We belong to the Direct Email Advertisers Association and the On-line Marketers Association. Both of these organizations promote professional and responsible use of email marketing. If you need bulk email services, accounts, resources, flame-proof emailing, or any of a host of services, go to: http://www.thehitman.com Type "askew" in the "who referred you" field. P.S. Should you prefer not to receive notices, please reply with the word "remove" in the subect header. Thank you.

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Foreign Terrorist List (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: >From owner-travel-advisories(a)stolaf.edu Sat Oct 11 04:19:58 1997 Date: Thu, 9 Oct 1997 11:00:03 -0400 From: owner-travel-advisories <owner-travel-advisories(a)stolaf.edu> Subject: Foreign Terrorist List Sender: Wally Doerge <76702.1202(a)compuserve.com> To: travel-advisories(a)stolaf.edu Message-ID: <199710091103_MC2-235E-2001(a)compuserve.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Precedence: bulk STATE DEPARTMENT TRAVEL INFORMATION - Foreign Terrorist List ============================================================ Publication of List of Foreign Terrorist Organizations - Public Announcement October 8, 1997 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Office of the Spokesman The Secretary of State has designated as foreign terrorist organizations thirty organizations that engage in terrorist activity that threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States, pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132). Designation as a foreign terrorist organization carries legal consequences for persons who aid these organizations, for the organizations funds, and for representatives and members who seek to enter the United States. The list of foreign terrorist organizations was published in the Federal Register on October 8, 1997. The Department of State has no specific information regarding threats to U.S. citizens at this time as a result of the designation of foreign terrorist organizations, but believes some of the groups may consider changing their attitude toward targeting U.S. interests in reaction to their designation. American citizens traveling abroad should always seek to minimize their risks by being aware of their surroundings and exercising caution as to their activities. U.S. citizens planning to travel abroad should consult the Department of State's country-specific Travel Warnings, Consular Information Sheets, and regional travel brochures. This Public Announcement expires on January 8, 1998. ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- The "travel-advisories(a)stolaf.edu" mailing list is the official Internet and BITNET distribution point for the U.S. State Department Travel Warnings and Consular Information Sheets. To unsubscribe, send a message containing the word "unsubscribe" to: travel-advisories-request(a)stolaf.edu Archives of past "travel-advisories" postings are available at the URL: "http://www.stolaf.edu/network/travel-advisories.html" or via Gopher: gopher.stolaf.edu, Internet Resources/US-State-Department-Travel-Advisories

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Re: r.e. OpenPGP document status
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Rodney Thayer <rodney(a)sabletech.com> writes: > The message formats draft(s) are being worked on now. We've only > had official WG status for something like two weeks. A little > patience is in order, I think. PGP Inc is the group being impatient. They have been rushing ahead implementing things behind closed doors which some of us are arguing should be made non-conforming (WILL NOTs) in the standard. If PGP doesn't backoff a bit _they'll_ have non-conforming implementations, and will have to change them. The danger is that in a Netscape-like manner, they will use their implementation and deployment as arguments to justfiy their design decisions rather than being involved in open design decision justifications as part of the standardisation process. This is not how the IETF standardisation process is supposed to work. Trial implementation of proposals is fine, closed door design and sudden deployment and mass sale by the market dominator to pre-empt standardisation I think is not. Adam -- Now officially an EAR violation... Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

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More Quality PC Programming References
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, Another good souce of references for programming the PC architecture across the full range of processors and system extensions (ie PCMCIA) is the 'PC Systems Architecture Series' of books put out by Addison-Wesley for MindShare, Inc. Mindshare also has various training courses and seminars. If interested (I am in no connected to them nor do I receive any $'s from them): BBS: 214-705-9604 mindshar(a)interserv.com CompuServe: 72507,1054 ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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