December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

E-cash and distributed computing...
by Robert Rothenburg 'Walking-Owl' 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is probably not an original idea, but... Here's a potential use for E-cash: a server that doles out Java apps to clients; the clients run the apps, calculating whatever results are needed, and uploads the results in return for E-cash (perhaps a zero-knowledge proof that the result is accurate? another is to use only a trusted pool of registered and accountable users rather than anonymous clients). The server admins would be paid by those who need computations, keeping a percentage and using the rest to be offered as E-cash to clients with spare computing power. A lot of possibilities here... a configuration where a set price is offered for a computation (the user can check for the highest offer on a server, or refuse an offer below a certain amount). Or maybe applets would only be doled out to systems that meet a certain criteria (minimum computing power). A more complex system where 'bids' are placed based on computing power is possible too (those w/better systems would want more cash, or be willing to pay it). Problem: open to forms of 'abuse' (imagine a sysadmin making E-cash using his employer's machines overnight). It might make an interesting experimental project to work on. --Rob ----- "The word to kill ain't dirty | Robert Rothenburg (WlkngOwl(a)unix.asb.com) I used it in the last line | http://www.asb.com/usr/wlkngowl/ but use a short word for lovin' | Se habla PGP: Reply with the subject and dad you wind up doin' time." | 'send pgp-key' for my public key.

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Re: Enlightened commentary on Netizen.
by Jerry Basham 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have no idea why I received the below message. I don't know any of the people in it, and I don't care about the issue. ---------- > From: Alan Olsen <alan(a)ctrl-alt-del.com> > To: Anil Das <das(a)razor.engr.sgi.com> > Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: Re: Enlightened commentary on Netizen. > Date: Saturday, February 08, 1997 10:55 AM > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > At 08:41 PM 2/6/97 -0800, Anil Das wrote: > > > However, the question has to be asked, why the fuck should we non US > citizens go and buy > > cryptographic software that is deliberately coded to allow the US > government to read our mail? > > You shouldn't. > > Maybe someone should print up a batch of "Voyeur Enabled" stickers for all > the GAKed products (or should that be KRAP products, since it is the Key > Recovery Alliance, but that is redundant) we will be seeing at our local > software stores. > > Sometimes I think the reason for all this snake oil we have been seeing is > the Feds need it for extra lubricant so they don't chafe themselves while > getting off on reading our mail. > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: 4.5 > > iQEVAwUBMvyv1+QCP3v30CeZAQEGigf+PA45Q2ySEZ6iLwc8+fRURvXJRinStWwy > oNGWKDnyYHFJ91L8Z+11oKvMov45CC4MOISy36/Oz2CY9qyq8l5L1wTU7J8CezsS > 3QezDreJtUXr/OCmxRngOQbeHuGDkXuIocfTV7sZU/j7ARWj9hKCd39xf6J/MmZ6 > zjKS7olJmzMMyJrAWaNo5zaW4g/ER8wJiI0zbakvrd/8Y+VJkiTN05znbIfLiOTV > 0Olt/OaX4seWWNwZb5FaPv2y8ST3j+xm4Uv6fdc4Qo8QGWnGpuBAKo0D+q39KNkY > Ps47vKyf2VwQM6Ci49/uuU8um/l9TmDsuHkYYmsoDfsGpcZImEWzZw== > =Prg6 > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > --- > | "Mi Tio es infermo, pero la carretera es verde!" | > |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | > | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | > |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| > | http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/ |alan(a)ctrl-alt-del.com|

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Re: Encrypted filing of patents sans GAK?
by Bill Neugent 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Willis, My understanding is that Patty Edfors is overseeing *two* groups of pilots. One group to experiment with PKIs in government agencies and another group of ten, as David Aaron said, to "demonstrate the practicality" of key recovery. The quotes are from my notes of Aaron's talk at the RSA Data Security Conference. Aaron *did* mention as an example the "filing of patent applications to the patent office" as an activity that is to explore key recovery, but I know nothing of the specifics of that. Also, my understanding is that the intent is definitely *not* to store private keys used for signing. The GAO has issued a ruling that this is a no-no. I agree with your judgment that doing so would compromise the protection one expects from digital signatures. Besides, as one of the speakers noted at the Conference last week, the evidentiary value of data gained from wiretapping surely would lose some of its value if a third party were holding private signature keys of the culprit being wiretapped. Bill >-- >Folder: YES >-- >Sir: > >I believe that the words have been misleading. According to a briefing that >I heard in December at a meeting of the Computer System Security and >Advisory Board, Ms. Patty Efors of the Department of Treasury described a >group of 10 pilot projects designed to test the efficacy and application of >digital key signatures in government agencies. I recall no mention of key >recovery and in fact, I would assert that if the private keys used in >digital-signature schemes are in the hands of a 3rd party, the protection >expected from a digital signature will have been compromised. > >Presumably Ambassador Aaron and Ms. Edfors were talking about the same 10 >projects; and if so, then the Ambassador's presentation was confused. > > Willis H. Ware > Santa Monica, CA

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question on setting up for ipsec/linux
by Rodney Thayer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have 0.4 compiled and loaded on my 2.0.27 system. I have configured an FTP Software client appropriately for treating the Linux box as a tunnel for a far-end destination machine. I try doing a ping of the far machine. The FTP client sends a packet to the Linux box. Lan tracing and the printfs on the master console of the Linux box seem to indicate that the packet really did go to the linux box. However, what happens is: - the Linux box sends a "protocol unreachable" back to the FTP client. - the printf's on the console (a line starting with "ipsec_esp" new ip packet" shows the incoming PING packet Now I run AH (MD5) and ESP (DES) and the fact I see a fully decrypted PING packet on the Linux console is quite promising because that seems to prove I got the SPI's and keys and such configured correctly. I have checked the documentation that came with the release and the one thing I did not see was the message "ipsec_tunnel: tunnel: version v0.2b2". I suspect I have managed to NOT configure some tunnel thing and the IPSEC code itself is working properly. I suspect I have somehow misconfigured it such that, after the nice pretty IP packet is unwrapped from the ISPEC headers, it is not properly injected into the protocol stack properly. I'd be happy to read the source code to work on this but I'm not sure where to start looking. The missing message comes from ipsec_tunnel.c I know from tests sending it invalid SPI values that I really am executing parts of that file. Rodney Thayer <rodney(a)sabletech.com> +1 617 332 7292 Sable Technology Corp, 246 Walnut St., Newton MA 02160 USA Fax: +1 617 332 7970 http://www.shore.net/~sable "Developers of communications software"

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Re: What else do I need for an Internet Server
by Dale Thorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Otto Matic wrote: > >Otto Matic wrote: > >> What else do I need for an internet server? > >> HP Vectra Towers 2 each 486 cyrex chips 50 meg processor Need high > >> speed hard drives. These are the Tall Towers that have multiple > >> drives, these are server towers. > >> I think I have a router Hub. And a couple LAN cards. > >> That's all I have. But I just got them, and I want to use them. I assume I > >> will be using some kind of UNIX software. > >HP does some strange things to their BIOS software - you may want to > >get one of those net analyzer tools and some low-level software that > >can monitor what your HP's are sending and receiving, just in case. > >They don't normally use Vectras for UNIX, so what effects you can > >expect, I don't know. > Dale, Thanks for your reply. Really I'm not sure about UNIX, I was just > guessing. What I really need is a B.O.M (bill of materials). What other > 'hardware' will I need to round up in order to get this server up and running. Some of the guys in the HP user group have UNIX running on Vectras, but they also use a full raft of hardware tools, which I don't have access to. There's an actual HP-48 calculator, complete in every way including appearance, running on that version of UNIX. Don't remember the name, but it comes on a few CD's, and costs around $50. To me, 486 and 50 mhz suggest something HP is getting far removed from, so don't expect much help there. Few if any computer outlets will be able to handle the HP peculiarities. You shouldn't have any trouble getting the general parts list off the internet here and there, and there used to be HP forums to provide off-line support on Vectra hardware, but it might be harder with older equipment. Suggestion: Call HP Palo Alto at 415-857-1501, and tell them you need to talk to someone who knows internet domain names for info on Vectras and the like. Don't let them slough you off - if they don't have the info, make them give you another name and number. If you get a runaround after several calls, let me know who you talked to, on what phone #'s, at what time, and I'll give it a shot myself.

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Re: anonymous remailers
by Jerry Basham 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I don't know what you're talking about. Who is "cypherpunks," and who are you? Please don't answer...I'm just trying to figure out how I started getting these wierd e-mails from people I never heard about discussing something I never cared about. I truly want you to have a great life...but please leave me out of it. ---------- > From: Mark M. <markm(a)voicenet.com> > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: Re: anonymous remailers > Date: Saturday, February 08, 1997 11:11 AM > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > On Sat, 8 Feb 1997, Jeremiah A Blatz wrote: > > > Ummm, if you run your own remailer, and don't get lots of people to > > use it, then traffic analysis will reveal that you are the sender > > quite quickly. It will pretty much make everything in the chain before > > your remiler useless. If you send your message through remailers a, b, > > c, and d like this: > > > > you -> a -> b -> c -> d -> alt.drugs.and-other-various-horsemen > > > > and only you use c, then your effective chain is: > > > > someone who could only be you -> d -> alt.drugs.and-other-various-horsemen > > This is assuming that it is a reasonable assumption that all traffic going > through remailer c originated from the owner. If there is one non-corrupt > remailer in the chain before c, then this would not be a valid assumption > because traffic from the owner would be indistinguishable from traffic sent > by anyone else. If the remailer has low traffic, the solution is, of course, > to make it higher traffic. Chain a bunch of messages that get sent to > /dev/null through the remailers, being sure to include c somewhere in the > middle of the chain. If Mixmaster is used, then it would be virtually > impossible to differentiate between "real" messages and messages destined for > /dev/null. It would be a little easier with Type I since the size of the > ciphertext decreases after each hop. This all assumes that encryption is being > used, of course. > > > Mark > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: 2.6.3 > Charset: noconv > > iQEVAwUBMvyzcCzIPc7jvyFpAQHRpQf+LusfAS8dhDczpYTHGjgIRo38gPHeDdVn > +qmmikRNravoEiPD9GIrZ4OeYKOs6zykvhWuMoTtsVi/a7p1HZyWzl5A5KkxofUv > nLOUoPriQ9Ps8fzc3B31G5nwj5d6Es7nnfZbGk1dV5KS5bN7fyu9umBeFiW7jNcj > eTf8GmFH7Rxi5aoUc0uMMR/YffMNl0fHo+wooPNnTBMppLouTIr9iQdCxDOJ7eJc > QAFyEXYWtRP8AqrnB0/pVAXUtrnui+Ev1waOkMYKbWuiQ8tkHbLAvcmpAVnD67jX > 4f3ZQkhXG6C4VbYF3fTlL0ujZgRal0csG0X4u6x/5ID4Blle9hwtIQ== > =BqMW > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- >

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Re: POST: The Frightening Dangers of Moderation
by Jerry Basham 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ok...this is the fourth junk e-mail I've received that I don't want. Your account is in jeapordy, and my advice is for you to just stop sending me this junk. Take me off your e-mail list, NOW. If this e-mail from me, being mad at you, is what makes you happy, and is how you have fun, then you just have a personal problem and I feel sorry for you. Do what you can to heal yourself...meanwhile, don't send me anymore...your isp provider is next on my e-mail list. ---------- > From: Dale Thorn <dthorn(a)gte.net> > To: freedom-knights(a)jetcafe.org; cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Cc: Against Moderation <antimod(a)nym.alias.net>; InterNet Freedom Council <ifc(a)pgh.org> > Subject: Re: POST: The Frightening Dangers of Moderation > Date: Saturday, February 08, 1997 10:54 AM > > ??? wrote: > > [some text deleted] > > > > Before I explain what has happened, I want to make one thing > > > absolutely clear. Though I've thought the moderation of cypherpunks > > > was a terrible idea from the start and am even more convinced of it > > > now, I don't assign any blame to Sandy. I believe he offered to > > > moderate the list with the best of intentions, and I sincerely > > > appreciate his efforts to try to revive what was once a fantastic > > > mailing list, even if in my opinion those efforts have backfired. > > This is the fatal mistake, assuming it's really a mistake. > I've worked under several corporations where, at a certain > point in time, things just "went crazy", and the owners/ > managers were scrambling desperately to plug as many holes > in the dike as they possibly could, to no avail. > > People don't understand why things just "go crazy" at a particular > point, and so they accept the coincidence theory ruse, lacking any > other evidence. Use your head, folks. This is not a list made up > of sewing-circle nannies, these are security people, NSA, CIA, and > all the ugly things you shut out of your conversations because you > don't want to admit the truth. "Paranoia is a way of knowing". > > Today I saw an old picture of Albert Einstein in full Indian regalia, > smoking a peace pipe with some Hopi people. I thought of the Capone > mob and the "kiss of death", or Judas and Jesus, you get the picture. > > So Einstein puts his name and reputation and personal seal of approval > on the creation of the Doomsday Device, the atom bomb, knowing full > well that it will be used to murder millions of people. What does he > do for an encore? Plants the "kiss of death" on the Hopis, whose > environment is co-opted by the mad bombers and their Nazi-infested > thug "scientist" cohorts, for the experimentation and storage of > nuclear and other hazardous materials. You know, Nevada, Arizona, > New Mexico, all those "useless, desert lands" occupied by the > Indians. >

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Re: John's: In anarchy -everyone responsible
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:35 AM 2/6/97 -0600, snow wrote: >> At 09:05 PM 2/4/97 +0000, Attila T. Hun wrote: >> >on or about 970204:0312 Greg Broiles <gbroiles(a)netbox.com> said: >> >+ Is the desire for an anarchic community at odds with a desire for >> >+ good use of resources? >> Actually, it is quite possible that an "anarchic community" is _more_ >> efficient in the use of resources than some sort of organized community. >> It is explained, for example, that the reason there are so many different >> kinds of life on earth is that there are so many ecological niches to fill. > > Good does not necessarily mean efficient, and efficient does not >necessarily mean good. Since the definition of "good" above wasn't specified, I substituted "efficient." > Picture--if you can--the "perfect" centrally planned economy where all >possible market conditions, wants and needs are taken into account. Factories >are placed optimally for access to natural resources and distribution to >consumers etc. Also assume that the people running this society _are_ intersted >in efficient production methods, and activly look for new and better ways of >getting things done--benign facism/socialism if you will. This would (assuming >perfect people, but bear with me) be the _most efficient_ method of producing >and delivering goods, but it would introduce certain "choke points", one >natural disaster or war could cripple production of necessary items. Let me suggest, however, that in addition to the "choke point" problem, it is also impossible, maybe even theoretically so, for a similar reason "Maxwell's Demon" is. Maxwell's Demon, for those unfamiliar with thermodynamics, was a gate which was postulated to allow the passage of molecules of energy greater than average, and stop the passage of molecules of energy less than average. The net result would have been, theoretically, a separation of a gas into two halves of dramatically different temperatures. However, given such a heat separation, it should be possible through some heat engine to extract energy from this difference, and return the gas to its prior statistical distribution of energies. Was this "something from nothing"? Obviously this appeared to be a serious contradiction, given the various laws of thermodynamics, and it was. It turns out that the source of the contradiction is the false presumption, implied above, that it is possible to identify and thus separate molecules without using appreciable amounts of energy. Perhaps not surprisingly, the amount of energy needed to do the separation is at least as great as whatever amount of energy you could theoretically extract from the system, almost magically balancing the books. I suggest that centrally-planned economic theory may fail for a very similar reason: Implicit in that analysis it is assume that it is possible to do a "cost-free" plan, where in reality costs do occur. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: ISPs vs Bells - Email FCC
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:26 AM 2/7/97 -0500, Derrick Storren wrote: >By Michelle V. Rafter >LOS ANGELES - Regional phone companies and Internet service providers >are waging a war of words over Internet traffic on the nation's local >telephone network and who should pay for upgrades as the online boom >continues. [snip] >In one corner, Pacific Bell, Bell Atlantic and other regional phone >carriers say the growth of Internet traffic is pushing local telephone >networks to the breaking point. > >Pacific Bell, for example, says Internet surfers use its phone lines an >average of 45 minutes a day -- more than twice the amount the network >was built to handle. Heavy Internet use in Silicon Valley led to brief >service outages in that area earlier this year, the company said. This is an "excellent" example of lying with statistics. Contrary to the implication above, telephone switches aren't designed to handle a certain amount of telephone traffic per day; Rather, they are designed to handle a certain peak amount of traffic. This, and the knowledge about the typical usage patterns that communities generally see in their telephones allows a statistician to estimate how much traffic that switch will actually see per day, in the real world. However, change the pattern of usage, perhaps by adding usage to previously-underused time periods, and you could dramatically increase the daily traffic statistics for a given telephone switch. If, say, 2% of the population were to suddenly decide to make 6-hour phone calls daily between 12 midnight and 6am, a time of very low usage, you might increase the average daily usage by 50%, but with absolutely no increase in the peak usage during the daytime hours nor need for new switches. While that's a fanciful example, a similar effect occurs, I think. I've seen a set of graphs showing the typical usage level for the Teleport ISP, and it appears that while usage reaches a level of about 70% between about 8 am and 4 PM, it continues to increase after 4pm, solidly peaking between 8 pm and 11 pm at about 98% usage. This is long past the time that most humans make voice phone calls. The implication is that easily 3/5 of Teleport's traffic occurs after 4 pm and 6 am next morning, a time frame which is definitely post-peak hours. (Traditionally, pre-Internet, telephone usages peaks at about 11 am and 3 pm.) Since modern telephone switches don't wear out, unused call capacity is simply wasted. It makes no sense to charge people more for services which cost the supplier no more to provide. >If, for example, Internet providers passed through an access fee of 1 >cent a minute, a subscriber spending 10 hours online a month would pay >an extra $6 -- hardly a deterrent, said David Goodtree, an analyst with >Forrester Research in Cambridge, Mass. Even that is unacceptable. If an average ISP's phone line was busy 50% of the time, with "only" an extra charge of 1 cent per minute, that would be an average charge of $7.20 per day, or $216 per month, as compared to a typical business line which might cost, say, $40 per month. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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RRE: Proposed satellite monitoring of car movements in Sweden
by E. Allen Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In reply to Dr. Agre's comment, I'd point out that one normally has more than one insurance company to choose from... not the case with governmentally-imposed road taxes. -Allen From: IN%"rre(a)weber.ucsd.edu" 9-FEB-1997 02:12:23.32 To: IN%"rre(a)weber.ucsd.edu" CC: Subj: Proposed satellite monitoring of car movements in Sweden [If it wasn't taxes, it would be insurance.] =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= This message was forwarded through the Red Rock Eater News Service (RRE). Send any replies to the original author, listed in the From: field below. You are welcome to send the message along to others but please do not use the "redirect" command. For information on RRE, including instructions for (un)subscribing, send an empty message to rre-help(a)weber.ucsd.edu =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Date: Thu, 6 Feb 1997 19:04:07 -0800 (PST) From: risks(a)csl.sri.com Subject: RISKS DIGEST 18.81 RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Thursday 6 February 1997 Volume 18 : Issue 81 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 29 Jan 1997 20:39:29 +0100 (MET) From: Feliks Kluzniak <feliks(a)carlstedt.se> Subject: Proposed satellite monitoring of car movements in Sweden The new issue of "Dagens IT", no. 3, dated 28 Jan - 3 Feb 1997 (a Swedish paper aimed at information technology professionals), contains an item that might be of some interest to those RISKS readers who followed discussions about automatic highway toll booths in the US and related subjects. My (probably imperfect) translation follows. Car users will be be put in "feetcuffs" (written by Margaretha Sundstroem) With the help of a new satellite system car users might pay different taxes, depending on when and where they drive. This is what the State communications commission is said to be discussing. According to (the newspaper) "Dagens Politik", the State communications commission is discussing a proposal to use satellites for determining car taxes in the future. It is proposed that all of Sweden's 3.5 million cars should be equipped with a little reader fastened to the instrument board. Car users would then buy cards that can be inserted into the reader. The card would communicate with a satellite that would register where you drive and for how long. The car tax would then be withdrawn from the card. The proposal has been put forward by the State institution for communication analysis. They estimate that just the Stockholm (tax) authorities would be able to earn six billion crowns by using this system. The costs for car users would thereby increase. - - - - The reference to "feetcuffs" (by analogy to "handcuffs" - ankle shackles?) is an allusion to radio transmitters that are irremovably fastened to the ankles of some criminals in this country so that the authorities can monitor their compliance with the rules of house arrest. The word "communication" is meant to include car traffic etc. The word "billion" is given in its US meaning: a thousand million. The risks? Apart from the risks of having very complex systems automatically determine how much you have to pay, there are the usual privacy considerations. Some cry out "big brother". Others say you are already in this situation if you carry a cellular phone. Feliks Kluzniak, Carlstedt Research & Technology, Gothenburg ------------------------------ End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 18.81 ************************ Standard Risks reuse notice: Reused without explicit authorization under blanket permission granted for all Risks-Forum Digest materials. The author(s), the RISKS moderator, and the ACM have no connection with this reuse.

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