December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

[Quasi-RFC] RNG_DEVICE Standard
by Robert Rothenburg 'Walking-Owl' 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The URL below has a proposal/ideas for an RNG_DEVICE standard: http://www.asb.com/usr/wlkngowl/rng_std.htm Comments and suggestions would be appreciated. (This isn't an official RFC.) Please feel free to forward this message to interested parties. Rob ----- "The word to kill ain't dirty | Robert Rothenburg (WlkngOwl(a)unix.asb.com) I used it in the last line | http://www.asb.com/usr/wlkngowl/ but use a short word for lovin' | Se habla PGP: Reply with the subject and dad you wind up doin' time." | 'send pgp-key' for my public key.

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Re: Export proposal
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:56 AM 12/30/96 -0800, Dale Thorn wrote: >What about a fax? That has to make things more complicated, yes? A fax is transmission in electronic form. Clearly banned under the regulations. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred Make your mark in the history of mathematics. Use the spare cycles of your PC/PPC/UNIX box to help find a new prime. http://www.mersenne.org/prime.htm

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Tired of VuliSpams?
by Ray Arachelian 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It's simple, if you are tired of this turd's posts, just send a message to PSI. here's all the relevant info. Don't bother sending complaints to postmaster(a)dm.com, vulis owns that domain so he is the postmaster of it. However, to quote the last PSI guy I spoke to: "If he continues, it becomes contractual" In other words, Vulis gets to find himself without a provider. Thanks. sundernet1# whois dm.com D&M Consulting Services (DM-DOM) 67-67 Burns Street Forest Hills, NY 11375 Domain Name: DM.COM Administrative Contact: Administration, PSINet Domain (PDA4) psinet-domain-admin(a)PSI.COM ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ (703) 904-4100 Technical Contact, Zone Contact: Network Information and Support Center (PSI-NISC) hostinfo(a)psi.com (518) 283-8860 Billing Contact: Andrews, Ken (KA16) domain-fee-contact(a)PSI.COM ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 703-904-4100 Record last updated on 31-Oct-96. Record created on 19-Jun-91. Domain servers in listed order: NS.PSI.NET 192.33.4.10 NS2.PSI.NET 38.8.50.2 The InterNIC Registration Services Host contains ONLY Internet Information (Networks, ASN's, Domains, and POC's). Please use the whois server at nic.ddn.mil for MILNET Information. =====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos============== .+.^.+.| Ray Arachelian | "If you're gonna die, die with your|./|\. ..\|/..|sunder(a)sundernet.com|boots on; If you're gonna try, just |/\|/\ <--*-->| ------------------ |stick around; Gonna cry? Just move along|\/|\/ ../|\..| "A toast to Odin, |you're gonna die, you're gonna die!" |.\|/. .+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"| --Iron Maiden "Die With Your Boots on"|..... ======================== http://www.sundernet.com =========================

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Re: New crypto regulations
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Mike McNally <m5(a)tivoli.com> > solman(a)MIT.EDU wrote: > > The government's claim is that in the interests of national security, > > export of cryptography must be prevented. By limiting the policy's > > applicability to media which are in, or can easily be converted to, > > electronic form ... > > Does anybody seriously believe that nbody writing these policies has > an understanding of OCR software? An on-line form of code printed > in a book is just a quick trip to a scanner away. They know that. The regs, as Lucky pointed out, do hint at restrictions on OCR fonts in the future. However this is obviously doomed since as OCR technology advances the distinction between OCR and non-OCR fonts will vanish. I imagine that a special purpose character recognition engine could be built to work on any known, monospaced font, as is typically used for source code. In this light, the explicit exemption for printed materials is really quite welcome. It has never been 100% clear that a book of source code is exportable. Yes, we've had some favorable court cases recently but none of these have been fully resolved. Rumors were posted here that the NSA came very close to trying to stop the export of the original PGP source code book from MIT Press (and supposedly arranged for MIT to be punished later for its audacity). Having all sides agree that crypto source code can be exported in printed form is an important step in the right direction. We can still contest the issue of restrictions on machine readable exports. In an era where electronic publishing is becoming as important as paper publishing for expressing ideas, we can continue to push to extend the exemption to machine-readable images of the pages of the book, and later to actual source files. Hal

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Re: With my deepest regards....
by AwakenToMe＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a message dated 96-12-29 16:00:50 EST, dthorn(a)gte.net (Dale Thorn) writes: << Adam Breaux wrote: > I am withdrawing from this list. Not because of the volume of > email...that I can deal with...but what I cannot deal with is the > volume of garbage and egotistical ranting that seems so prevalent in > what should for all sakes and purposes be a discussion of cyphering > and security. Apparently the name of this list is designed to > mislead...because of all the posts, a grand total of 5% proved worth > reading at all. Note to cypherpunks: This guy complains about the problem, but he *is* the problem. *He* wants to tell us *he's* leaving. Talk about ego- tistical ranting! What a hypocrite. BTW, 5% is a pretty good percentage in my book. >> Since I never said I dont contribute to the problem.. I think Ill point out... that in a reverse notion...He isn't the problem. What you replied back is the problem. I DONT see this list (the other 95%) filled with people saying that they dont like the list. So..since he isnt the other 95% (maybe >0.5% complain) and you with a useless post... are (is) the porblem. I know this post back doesn''t 'help' but I think it brings to light problems with a list that exists for a purpose. Think of it as a democracy on a list. It exists for a reason.. and the people support THAT existence.

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[STEGO] BBN
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timothy May has been fired from Intel for stealing office supplies. ( )( )________ Timothy May /00 \ _ O_\\--mm---mm /_______)

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Re: New crypto regulations
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:57 AM 12/30/96 -0800, Hal Finney wrote: >The regs, as Lucky pointed out, do hint at restrictions on OCR fonts in >the future. However this is obviously doomed since as OCR technology >advances the distinction between OCR and non-OCR fonts will vanish. >I imagine that a special purpose character recognition engine could be >built to work on any known, monospaced font, as is typically used for >source code. It seems to me that the authors of the regulations have come to the same conclusion. Which is why the ban on scannable text is not in the current version of the regs. But the regulators want to see scannable source banned that much is clear. At the same time, they do not want to run up against the wide ranging protections printed speech enjoys. I expect the solution ultimately employed to use a method similar to what is currently used in color copiers and digital audio mastering equipment. Normal color copiers will copy just about all colors except the particular shade of green used in US currency. Consumer digital audio recording equipment makes use of copy protection features. Only hideously expensive "professional" equipment has the copy protection turned off. We might see something similar for printed source and OCR programs. Printed source will have to be printed in a specific font. A font that OCR programs are required to not recognize. OCR programs that do recognize this specific font will of course be export controlled. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred Make your mark in the history of mathematics. Use the spare cycles of your PC/PPC/UNIX box to help find a new prime. http://www.mersenne.org/prime.htm

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(Fwd) Re: Mr. May's Posts. Other Things.
by Ross Wright 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is the message I got in response to my post regarding Mr. May's offensive, racist, and bigoted post about ebonics. I have made overtures towards peace and tried to explain that I thought that the Doctor's verbal slapping was not as bad as it seemed, maybe even he deserved it!. He refuses to answer. He's just a pussy, I guess. Like's to make terroristic threats. To Nam vets, yet. Ballsy, Tim! Maybe the Doctor is not to far from wrong. I would rather have discussed this with you in private e-mail, or over a few beers, but you refuse to answer my e-mail. Received: from you.got.net (root(a)scir-gotnet.znet.net [207.167.86.126]) by adnetsol.adnetsol.com (8.6.12/8.6.6) with ESMTP id UAA29906 for <rwright(a)adnetsol.com>; Fri, 27 Dec 1996 20:25:14 -0800 Received: from [207.167.93.63] (tcmay.got.net [207.167.93.63]) by you.got.net (8.8.3/8.8.3) with ESMTP id UAA13732 for <rwright(a)adnetsol.com>; Fri, 27 Dec 1996 20:17:45 -0800 X-Real-To: <rwright(a)adnetsol.com> X-Sender: tcmay(a)mail.got.net Message-Id: <v03007800aeea52e5d282(a)[207.167.93.63]> In-Reply-To: <199612230801.AAA24862(a)adnetsol.adnetsol.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Date: Fri, 27 Dec 1996 20:32:00 -0800 To: "Ross Wright" <rwright(a)adnetsol.com> From: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> Subject: Re: Mr. May's Posts. Other Things. X-PMFLAGS: 35127424 0 ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- Date: Fri, 27 Dec 1996 20:32:00 -0800 To: "Ross Wright" <rwright(a)adnetsol.com> From: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> Subject: Re: Mr. May's Posts. Other Things. At 12:09 AM -0800 12/23/96, Ross Wright wrote: >hard on him. This latest rant of his has made me reconsider your >rough treatment of Mr. May. I kinda think he deserves a slapping >right now. Go ahead with your "slapping." Of course, I'd treat a "slapping" as an assault. I'd love to put a clip of hollowpoints through your chest. Your place or mine? Just say "No" to "Big Brother Inside" We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------: ---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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So secure no technology avail in the world capable of breaking it
by ! Drive 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From Risks 18.70... Date: 20 Dec 96 15:13:17 EST From: Andrew Weir <100637.616(a)CompuServe.COM> Subject: ATM gangsters Much British media panic has been devoted to the recent conviction of an "ATM gang" of high ambition. A collection of high-grade villains with impeccable pedigrees in robbery, gangsterism and drugs dealing over 30 years compelled a software expert who was in prison for attacking his wife and child to help them in their enterprise. The man revealed his role to a prison chaplain and subsequently acted as an undercover informer on his release. [...] Code-breaking gangsters? But could they have got that far? Newspaper reports failed to emphasise the all-important question as to whether the encrypted information could be decoded. Defence counsel were scathing about the possibilities and called experts to testify that it was effectively impossible. One of the defence barristers said: "The basic method was fatally flawed ... because the encryption system used by the banks is so secure that no current technology available in the world, not even the combined expertise of the world's leading scientists, is capable of breaking it." The judge appeared to accept this, with a proviso. Addressing the defendants, he said in sentencing them: "It was not possible for you, with the equipment and expertise then at your disposal, to carry out this fraud to a successful conclusion. There is, in particular, no evidence that the cards recovered by the police would then work or that the codes had then been broken. However, beyond that I'm not prepared to go. I do not believe it is necessary to go further but for the avoidance of doubt I make it clear that it would, in my judgment, be irresponsible and wrong on the basis of the information before me to accept any additional assurances along the lines that this is a fraud that no one could ever commit." Lawyers being what they are, the judge could not exclude the possibility that the decryption was possible, even though the remoteness of that possibility does not seem to have struck home, particularly when it is considered that the gang's only computer expert was working against them. The gang's expert claimed no expertise in cryptography and yet said in evidence that there had been a successful decryption dry run. This was not corroborated elsewhere, and the judge did not accept it. [...] http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks

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No Subject
by Bovine Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:15 PM 12/29/1996, Timothy C. May wrote: >This fascist move by the U.S. government is a huge threat to our liberty. >It may be time to simply give up on communicating with these assholes and >give them the treatment they have earned. > ... >And this a very big one indeed. Not only does it probably put organizations >like C2 out of business, at least in terms of supporting the development of >things like the South African and British Web products, but it also may >mean the *Cypherpunks list itself*, and some of its members, are ipso facto >in violation of this "giving comfort to the enemy" (to paraphrase) language! > ... >This very list advocates violation of the ITARs in various ways (I speak of >"the list" as a person in the sense of the consensus of the list...there >may not be unanimity, but the consensus of the vocal members of the list is >obvious). > > >It may be time for us to go underground. It may be time to take much, much, >much, much more extreme steps. This fascism is unacceptable. While Tim May has had many many great ideas, this is not one of them. To paraphrase Joseph Stalin: Tim, how many divisions do you have? The cypherpunks have virtually no force at all. If the battle is moved to that arena, the cypherpunks (and everybody else) lose big time. If the cypherpunks manage to pull off some sort of "extreme step", those who aren't shot while resisting arrest will go to prison. Worst of all, most people will applaud the action. "Extreme steps" legitimize the radical proposals of the Clipper crowd. While I wouldn't go so far as to say "I feel your pain", I am sympathetic with the frustration you must feel when your own government is the greatest threat to all that it is right and decent. But, "extreme steps" are the wrong approach and play right into the hands of the defense establishment. It saves them the trouble of implementing a "strategy of tension." The right approach is to continually reiterate that the cypherpunks are mainstream and fairly conservative. Many of us like the "bad boy" image, but most of what has been proposed is very solidly rooted in American traditions. If the ITAR regulations can be amended to make discussions on this list a "conspiracy", then they are very likely unconstitutional. Article I, Section I, "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a congress of the United States..." Pretty unambiguous. We should not underestimate the broad public support for private communications which exists in the United States. Even people who are unfamiliar with the issue are shocked when they learn that the U.S. government is trying to gain access to all communications. The only people who want GAK are in the government. There is no constituency in the population which wants it, and quite a few that do not. The more publicly the issue is discussed and the more actively we scrutinize the lies and deceptions of the U.S. government, the more successful we will be. The GAK crowd have not been honest or forthright in their public statements on their plans. We must reiterate this again and again and again. If they cannot be honest about their proposed policy, how can we trust them to hold the keys? Obviously, we cannot. This will be obvious to most Americans, and even some reporters. Red Rackham

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