December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Rogue Governments Issuing Policy Tokens
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:33 AM 11/20/96 -0800, John Anonymous MacDonald wrote: >Most "dual-use" items are export-restricted to Lybia. That means US >businesses will have trouble selling any computers or even things like >trucks to Lybia. For crypto tokens not to be available there does not >seem to be a huge deal, in comparison with everything else. Particularly since Libya bought a bunch of "oil drilling rig transport trucks" from Oshkosh Truck Corp in the '70s and hired a bunch of Brits to convert them into tank transporters. Didn't help them against the deadly Toyota pickups of the Chadian Defense Forces though. DCF

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SSLeay Legality FAQ
by cjh＠osa.com.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Folk, Here's version 1.4 of the SSLeay Legality FAQ. Additions since 1.3 are in the areas of import/export controls in various countries. Enjoy! ---------------------------------- Cut Here ---------------------------------- SSLeay Legality FAQ Version 1.4 Outline: Disclaimer Legality/Patent Rights table Export Considerations Patent Considerations References For more information Credits Disclaimer: This document may contain gross errors, and neither Clifford Heath nor Open Software Associates Limited accept any liability for same. Users should do their own research and receive professional legal advice. With regard to the legalities of using SSLeay, there is a number of geographical considerations, and a number of kinds of legal considerations. Legality/Patent Rights table: I've broken the legal considerations into "legal" (will the govt come after you :-) and "license" (who do you need to pay patent royalties to). Algor: Location: Purpose: Legal: License: Ref: DES world-wide any mostly# public domain RSA US indiv/free only RSAref free RSA RSA US commercial RSAref/BSAFE from RSADSI* RSA DH US ? mostly# Cylink+ DSA/DSS (based on Diffie-Hellman) RC4/2 US any mostly# from RSADSI RSA RC4 elsewhere any mostly# seems safe IDEA US/Europe/Japan indiv/free mostly# free ASCOM IDEA US/Europe/Japan indiv/commercial mostly# $US15, ASCOM ASCOM IDEA US/Europe/Japan company site mostly# from ASCOM ASCOM IDEA elsewhere any mostly# free SAFER world-wide any mostly# free Safer MD2 world-wide PEM only yes free@ rfc1319 MD5 world-wide any yes free@ rfc1321 SHA world-wide any yes free Any(!) France any only with (almost unobtainable) permit Any(!) Russia any only with permit Notes: * RSADSI's patent on RSA (#4,405,829) runs out on 20 Sep 2000. RSAref is free under certain terms, otherwise can be licensed through Concensus. BSAFE is stronger and has RC4 but requires purchase and royalties: $25K up front, royalties the larger of 2% or $2, royalty prepayment of $5000 per annum required in subsequent years covers 50% of royalties over the following year. + DH by itself cannot be used for digital signatures - the El Gamal extension provides this. CYLINK claim their DH patent covers El Gamal. The US patent #4,200,770 runs out on 29 April 1997. The Canadian patent (#1,121,480) registered 6 April, 1982, runs out in 1999. @ Acknowledgement is required - see the RFC. # Many countries have nominal export controls, including the UK and Australia, but I only know of them being enforced in the USA. MD2/5 and SHA are not subject to export controls anywhere that I know of. Export considerations: The USA has regulations under ITAR (International Trade in Arms Regulations) which categorises "cryptographic and ancillary devices" as munitions. Two classes of export licenses are granted: Distribution Licenses or DL's and Individual Validated Licenses or IVL's. To get an IVL you must say who the customer is and why he needs DES (or 3X DES, etc.). One may then use the IVL to export to the approved end user. Thousands are granted every year and very few applications are rejected. Systems which use cryptography for decryption only, authentication only (e.g. Kerberos authentication as available from Cybersafe and others), or can only be used for protecting financial data (e.g Cybercash etc., as long as it cannot be used for arbitrary messaging) are more-or-less readily granted a DL. DLs have also been granted for some implementations of RC4/40 bits (e.g Netscape). Canada has back-to-back agreements with the USA's ITAR controls, so it's easy to get crypto from the USA to Canada but you can't export from Canada. More information is available from Customs Canada (Revenue Canada) and Department of External Affairs and these URLs: http://axion.physics.ubc.ca/ECL.html - Excerpts from the Export Control List of Canada, and http://insight.mcmaster.ca/org/efc/pages/doc/crypto-export.html Canada's export controls. Many other countries have export controls (UK, Australia and others), but enforcement is less stringent than in the USA. In Australia, export of cryptographic software is controlled by Customs Regulations 13B (military technology) and 13E (Dual Use Technology). The regulations are administered by the Defence Signals Directorate - mail to "Director, Strategic Trade Policy and Operations, Dept of Defence, Anzac Park West Offices APW1-1-OA1, Canberra, ACT" or fax (06)266-6412 and ask for their "Australian Controls on the Export of Technology with Civil and Military Applications". The Australian regulations are also online at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp.pl/au/legis/cth/consol_reg/cer43… Software is defined as "one or more programs fixed in any tangible medium of expression", which explicitly leaves electronic shipment uncontrolled. Don't carry or mail media with SSLeay-based software out of Australia - email or FTP it instead! The UK Gov't is funding a project at Royal Holloway College which contains Key Escrow provisions. Watch for the EC DGXIII introducing European legislation under the banner "European Trusted Services", or visit http://www.modeemi.cs.tut.fi/~avs/eu-crypto.html, ftp://ftp.dcs.rhbnc.ac.uk/pub/Chris.Mitchell/istr_a2.ps, ftp://ftp.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/euroclipper.ps.Z France disallows *import* and use of crypto technology without a permit, and Russia requires a permit for use also. Patent considerations: According to 35 U.S.C. 271 (a), "whoever makes, uses, offers to sell, sells or imports ... infringes the patent." In other words, you better ensure that you *compile out* and patented algorithms unless you intend to license them, even if the code is not executed. In fact, if you are in the USA, merely ftp'ing SSLeay into the USA is a breach of various patents. (Eric, you might consider splitting it into two ftp archives, one for the USA and an additional one for the rest of the world.) References: RSA: http://www.rsa.com/ CYLINK: http://www.cylink.com/products/security/ ASCOM: http://www.ascom.ch/Web/systec Safer: ftp://ftp.isi.ee.ethz.ch/pub/simpl/ For more information: http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/lawsurvy.htm - Crypto Law Survey Credits: Thanks to to Eric Young, Rich Salz, Donald Lewine, Holger Reif and Bruce Schneier (author of Applied Cryptography), Peter Trei, Remo Tabanelli, Ben Laurie, Ulf Moeller, Michael Taylor for their contributions. ------------------------------------------------------------ Clifford Heath cjh(a)osa.com.au Open Software Associates Limited 29 Ringwood Street / P O Box 401 Phone +613 9871 1694 Ringwood VIC 3134 AUSTRALIA Fax +613 9871 1711 ------------------------------------------------------------ Deploy Applications across the Internet and Intranets! Visit our Web site at http://www.osa.com

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Social Security workers in bribery plot
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Copyright c 1996 Nando.net Copyright c 1996 From staff and wire reports NEW YORK (Nov 20, 1996 4:42 p.m. EST) - Several Social Security Administration employees have been charged with giving confidential consumer information to credit card thieves in exchange for bribes as low as $10, authorities said on Wednesday. [...] The investigation began in February when investigators for Citicorp's Citibank found that a large number of Citibank credit cards had been sent to customers but never received. But the cards had been activated. [...] The Social Security Administration then conducted security reviews to determine if any employees had accessed files of individuals. Gimlett said the investigation was significant because it demonstrated "the reality that employees of government agencies or corporations who have access to personal information may take advantage of their position of trust to steal personal information and sell it for financial gain." [...]

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No Subject
by Giulio 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Unsuscribe Cypherpunks Giulio <gexing(a)mbox.vol.it>

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Re: US supporting dissidents? (was Re: Rogue Governments Issuing Policy Tokens)
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:52 PM 11/20/96 -0500, Jeremiah A Blatz wrote: >Trademarks are not copyrights. There is no fair use for trademarks. In >addition, civil suits are not criminal trials. The USG can't throw >your ass in jail for making "big brother inside" stickers, but Intel >can sue your ass off. >In a related note, you may be safe from lible suits... Make you wonder how Mad magazine has gotten away with it all these years... (Maybe we could get Mad to print them! Would make an interesting cover...) ObSpyVSSpy: Mad TV (on Fox) has been running animated Spy V.S. Spy cartoons. (Usually one or two per episode.) Probibly best thing about the show. (I mentioned this because one "prominent Cypherpunk" at Orycon had not known about them.) --- | "Remember: You can't have BSDM without BSD." - alan(a)ctrl-alt-del.com | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano(a)teleport.com |

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RE: FUCK YOU punk
by nobody＠zifi.genetics.utah.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

_______________________________________________________________________________ From: aga on Wed, Nov 20, 1996 15:24 Subject: FUCK YOU punk/was:Taking out the garbage To: freedom-knights(a)jetcafe.org Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >If you try to make or enforce any rules and YOU DIE cocksucker! You might want to watch yourself. It would be hard to *not* see this as a direct threat... >Your presents shall be totally eliminated form this InterNet! ^^^^^^^ Yeah, Lucky! You better watch out, or there'll be NO CHRISTMAS!! :-) >Your connection will be TERMINATED at once! Suddenly, agatha is everyone's sysadmin... >fuck you punk, and fuck all of your "rules" Whether stated or not, there _are_ certain guidelines (or rules) we all should follow, just so we aren't *ASSHOLES*... >-aga

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Re: Anon
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:06 PM 11/20/96 -0700, Roderick Simpson wrote: >Who has made the strongest case _against_ anonymity on the Net that you >have ever heard? Someone intelligent and theoretical rather than trapped in >some child porn or commerce pov. > >Thanks, >Rod Recruiting for a future Brain Tennis I take it? The Thursday Computer columnist for the WSJ (whose name escapes me) is a possibility. I don't know how strong he is but he is consistently opposed. I wouldn't recommend L. Detweiler though he is opposed to anonymity. How about Esther Dyson? DCF

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Re: Anon
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As I mentioned a couple of days ago, science fiction writer David Brin has an argument against not only anonymity, but _privacy_ as well. Where cypherpunks tend to think of privacy as both beneficial and inevitable, Brin sees it as harmful and doomed. He has an article in the December 1996 issue of Wired discussing his ideas. BTW cypherpunk Doug Barnes is also quoted several times in the long article in that issue by Neal Stephenson (Snow Crash, The Diamond Age) about the undersea cables that carry most transnational information traffic. Hal

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Re: Why I Don't Read SF Much Anymore
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Duncan Frissell <frissell(a)panix.com> > The problem with straight SF for me is that computers and networks have > changed the future so much that (in the words of the motto of the SF > Writer's Association) The Future Ain't What It Used to Be. The science > fictional futures of my childhood are now dead as doornails. And I can't > enjoy contemporary SF that doesn't include a healthy dose of computers and > networking. I find this to be largely true as well. The cyberpunk genre does the best job at grappling with the impact of communications tech but it is traditionally dystopian. It would be nice to see a story about better living through crypto. What fiction can people recommend which presents crypto/privacy issues realistically? How about this new book that Neal Stephenson is working on, does anyone know what it's about? His short story, "Hack the Spew", a few months ago (in Wired, I think?) had a strong crypto flavor. Hal

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Re: Stewart Baker on new crypto rules
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: "Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law" <froomkin(a)law.miami.edu> > http://www.steptoe.com/oped.htm > > argues that industry won't accept any system that threatens to cut off > backwards compatibility after 2 years, hence DES export liberalization > will have to extend beyond the proposed period. I take a slightly different moral. Baker (former NSA attorney) writes: > If buying key-recovery encryption means customers must give up all > of their legacy encryption systems, key recovery products will carry a > near-fatal burden in many markets where encryption is now used widely. The > transition to key recovery will have to be gradual or it won't happen > at all. What I see this as is a call to come up with architectures that will allow transparent phase-in of government key access (so-called "key recovery") technology. The current HP proposal fits in very well with this model. The appear to be planning on using standard API's so that applications will be able to switch to using key escrow software without changing the applications themselves, just the OS. Maybe there could be a transition period where both the old and new crypto would both be accepted, then after a period of time the old wouldn't work any more. As Baker goes on to say: > Three years ago, no one in the PC world would have bought an operating > system that didn't run MS-DOS. Three years from now, we'll be happy to buy > an operating system that is backward-compatible with Windows 95 but not > with MS-DOS. And then, at last, we'll throw out all our old DOS programs. This suggests to me that we need to be vigilant in watching for systems that will allow for easy "drop in" of key escrow. Hal

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