December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

RE: What remains to be done.
by jfricker＠vertexgroup.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:32 AM 7/9/96 +0100, Andy Brown wrote: >On 09 July 1996 02:04, John F. Fricker[SMTP:jfricker@vertexgroup.com] wrote: > >> One of these days Microsoft will officially release NT's IFS SDK. A few >> "preliminary" and incomplete copies of a 1993 beta release do float around >> but for a mere $50K there's a company that will sell you the complete source >> for an IFS. It's a crime that Microsoft hasn't shipped this SDK yet as the >> Installable File System is one of the great powers of NT. > >You can do this with the existing device driver kit since they supply the >entire source code to the AT hard disk driver. I took a look and decided >that it would be too much work for me alone. They also seem to suggest that >you can write "filters" that extend the capability of existing drivers. > >> So, if someone is interested in coughing up the $50K I know a couple NT >> programmers just chomping at the bit to build cool IFS's like PGPDrive, etc. > >I'm one of them, but this low level device driver stuff makes me shudder! > > >- Andy > > That's why the IFS SDK is so important. Writing device drivers is one thing and nasty at that but the IFS is higher level and exactly what is needed to create a PGPDrive that could exist on scsi, ide, tape, network drives, floppies, cd-roms, etc. A device driver implementation would be married to a particular controller type. --j

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A case for 2560 bit keys
by David F. Ogren 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Mon Jul 08 23:06:11 1996 Here is a few thoughts on RSA key sizes. There is nothing new or revolutionary herein, but I think it does provide a good case for using large RSA keysizes. Traditionally, we examine the threat model and determine the approximate ability of the attacker to factor secret keys. Then a keylength is selected that exceeds the attackers ability to factor in a reasonable amount of time. For example, if we assume that the NSA can factor any number with the speed of the special number sieve, and has 10^9 mips of computing power (doubling every 1.5 years) we can make the following estimations:_1_ Using these assumptions, the NSA could crack a 1024 bit key in ~11 days, a 1536 bit key in 10 years and a 2048 bit key in 26 years. _2_ Note that this would require the full resources of the NSA, however. Thus, even the mighty resources of the NSA could only crack 42 1024 bit keys in 1996 (including Moore's law). _3_, _4_ Similarly, a large corporation with 10^7 mips in computing power (and the same super-efficient factoring algorithm) could crack a 1024 bit key in 2 years, a 1536 bit key in 20 years, and a 2048 bit key in 36 years. My interpretation of these results: 1024 bit is probably safe for most reasonable threat models. Only individuals with extremely high threat models should be concerned about 1024 bit keys in 1996. Even those with extremely high threat models should be satisfied with 1536 bit keys. Despite the above, there are convincing arguments for longer RSA keys. Instead of asking "Why should we have longer keys?", perhaps we should be asking "Why _shouldn't_ we have longer keys?" In a hybrid cryptosystem such as PGP, very little of the computational process is consumed by RSA encryption. Only a tiny fraction of the message is RSA encrypted (the session key), and thus the time-critical operation is the symmetric crypto system (IDEA for PGP). As an experiment generate a 2047 bit PGP key and a 512 bit PGP key. Encrypt a file (preferably of a reasonable size) using both keys. Depending on the computer you are using, the time difference between the two keys will be a matter of few seconds or even a fraction of a second. And so we have to ask ourselves, why _not_ use a 2047+ bit key. It has greater longevity and greater security. Why not be overcautious when the cost is so small? It seems foolish that we use RSA keys that are less secure than our IDEA session keys. Our RSA keys are much more valuable than our session keys. I will use my RSA key to encode hundreds of messages. Each session key I will use only once. An attacker who learns one of my IDEA session keys can decrypt only that message. An attacker who learns my RSA key can decrypt any of my messages, past or present. (He can also impersonate my signature, but that's another discussion entirely.) If I send one message weekly that my attacker is interested in, and change my RSA key every two years, my RSA key is at least 104 times more valuable than any individual key. Does it not make sense that the RSA key should ideally be 104 times more difficult to crack? If increasing the RSA keylength was overly cumbersome to the process then designing the RSA keylength to meet minimum acceptable standards could be understood. But since increased RSA keylengths are cheap in terms of computing power, would it not be better to pick RSA keylengths that are more secure than the session keys? And thus, 2560 bit keys are not unreasonable. They are not significantly slower to use (most of PGP's time is spent IDEA encrypting), and yet are effectively invulnerable. By "invulnerable" I mean that any attacker capable of cracking your RSA key would have an easier time hacking your individual IDEA session keys, and would never have any need to hack the RSA key itself. And if you have threat models this severe you are a) hopelessly paranoid, b) SOL. Footnotes: _1_ These approximations of factoring difficulties and the computing resources are taken directly from Applied Cryptography by Bruce Schneier, page 161. _2_ Taking into account Moore's law, the amount of processing power spent during a period of time is the integral of Power * 2^(t/1.5)dt (from 0 to x) = Power * 1.5 / (ln 2) 2 ^(t/1.5) (also evaluated from 0 to x). Which is approximately equal to Power * 2.164 * (2^(x/1.5) - 1). Thus in three years a corporation starting with 10^7 mips could produce 10^7 * 2.164 * (2^(3/1.5)-1) = 6.492 * 10^7 mips-years. _3_ Any attempt to determine the computing power and cryptanalysis power of the NSA should be taken with a grain of salt. There are several very critical and arbitrary assumptions made in order to obtain these numbers. _4_ Additionally, any attempt to discern the future of cryptanalysis should also be taken with a grain of salt. Who can tell what computers will like be in ten years? - -- David F. Ogren | ogren(a)concentric.net | "A man without religion is like a fish PGP Key ID: 0x6458EB29 | without a bicycle" - ------------------------------|---------------------------------------- Don't know what PGP is? | Need my public key? It's available Send a message to me with the | by server or by sending me a message subject GETPGPINFO | with the subject GETPGPKEY -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMeHMpOSLhCBkWOspAQH4gwf+NiP184ve2W06ClO92uEfjbaHpn3l9zAz 1ckt8PE8kMxkq8etcq/NM/IZ3QuTIBbeOr4ey6dIptQafmarb7sSMAx0KGgPALp8 v6a77as2RUCaJYjjviYlXh/0OIt+c7c+w9HbVZCmgpru/VQjT7++6eAa1f4K+225 K12wEX2TXou4s8+qYVUAT3B0iesuq/Z2iBzO942+v3u7rkCHLMghYlLIXR+SP43l E15IQRez5nHkMb7VB9kL8ku/aDlXfKjURDQji8LBm+V+3i/9tcR/9+4EjKAqo1nB qnXCFBKrzWRev4bbI9tbVnTc83VWeJRXGZxlpXhzc40kov7GbrT9Bg== =B0h0 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: What remains to be done.
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 8 Jul 96 at 18:04, John F. Fricker wrote: [..] > One of these days Microsoft will officially release NT's IFS SDK. A few > "preliminary" and incomplete copies of a 1993 beta release do float around > but for a mere $50K there's a company that will sell you the complete source > for an IFS. It's a crime that Microsoft hasn't shipped this SDK yet as the > Installable File System is one of the great powers of NT. > > So, if someone is interested in coughing up the $50K I know a couple NT > programmers just chomping at the bit to build cool IFS's like PGPDrive, etc. Coughing up a mere $200-500 (depending on the cmpany) to write a few freeware drivers for Windows NT/95 or OS/2 is a bit much for poor hackers like myself. A GNU/FSF project should be to develop freeware DDKs for Windows or OS/2. There'd be many grateful people out there. Rob --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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Re: Word lists for passphrases
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:10 PM 7/8/96 -0500, Igor Chudov @ home wrote: >Ben Holiday wrote: >> If you have access to a shell, and to the news spool, you can generate >> some quick lists by hopping into the directory of any newsgroup that >> interests you and doing: >> >> cat * | tr -cs A-Za-z '\n' | tr A-Z a-z | sort | uniq > my-big-ol-wordlist >> >> With most unixes that will generate an alphabetized list of all the unique >> words in your source text, converted to lowercase. I've had some problems >> with tr on a few machines, however. Adding a '-c' after 'uniq' will tell >> you how many times each word occured (useful for grepping out words that >> appear too infrequently, or too frequently) .. > >Actually I am fairly sure that your selection of words will be mediocre >at best. There are words (such as nethermost, insatiable, insufferable) >that are almost never used in news. If the purpose is for use with "Crack" or some similar program, it might be better than you would think. You won't get the "unusual" words, but you will also get the words in common usage that do not appear in dictionaries. (Such as fnord, jedi, killfile, and the like...) You will also get alot of proper names, which may have been used as passwords. The idea is that words in common usage may be more likely to be used as passwords. Another thing to look for when choosing dictionaries/wordlists for crack is not sticking to english. If you have a userbase that is known to have a certain percentage of people of a non-english background, you will want to find lists of words from that background. (I had a sysadmin asking me about Yiddish and Hebrew wordlists for just that reason.) These can be a bit harder. (Especially for unusual languages.) But knowing your userbase can make all the difference in what it might take to crack the passwords from the outside. --- Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "We had to destroy the Internet in order to save it." - Sen. Exon "Microsoft -- Nothing but NT promises."

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ACLU: NJ Alert! Personal Data Chip in DL! (fwd)
by Julian Assange 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: >From notes(a)igc.org Tue Jul 9 15:12:01 1996 Date: Mon, 08 Jul 1996 19:48:10 -0700 (PDT) Reply-To: Moderator of conference "justice.polabuse" <bwitanek(a)igc.apc.org> From: Bob Witanek <bwitanek(a)igc.apc.org> Subject: ACLU: NJ Alert! Personal Data Chip in DL! To: Recipients of pol-abuse <pol-abuse(a)igc.apc.org> Message-ID: <APC&1'0'a9f989e8'c0a(a)igc.apc.org> X-Gateway: conf2mail(a)igc.apc.org Errors-To: owner-pol-abuse(a)igc.apc.org Precedence: bulk Lines: 32 Posted: sspnj(a)exit109.com *Computer Chips in Driver Licenses?* NEWARK, N.J. -- The Associated Press reported today that drivers may soon be using a new high-tech driver's license to pay tolls and do banking in New Jersey. The soon to be tested "Smart Card" will carry a data packed computer chip that will provide authorities with access to private information including fingerprints and medical records. The pilot cards will be limited to standard driver's license information. By the time the cards are issued to all New Jersey drivers in July 1997, they would also contain fingerprints and an "electronic purse" to be used to pay bus and train fares, the AP said. Civil libertarians said the new licenses raise privacy concerns. Ultimately, the AP said, the license will contain arrest records, medical records, vehicle registration, and could be used as a debit card to pay for groceries and do banking. "I think citizens should be extremely scared about loss of privacy," David Rocah of the New Jersey ACLU told AP. "They could store tax data. They could store medical data. They could store driver's records, insurance data, virtually any data in the government's possession." The ACLU also warned that the potential for misuse of the information --government surveillance or telemarketing research - - could pose potential problems. ---------------------------------------------------------------- -- "Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_ +---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+ |Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union | |proff(a)suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = | |proff(a)gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 | +---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+

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Re: Word lists for passphrases
by stevenw＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>AwakenToMe(a)aol.com, in a profound display of stubbornness, continues >to insist that his program to enumerate all possible words of length N >(that is, aaaaa, aaaab, aaaac, etc.) is somehow interesting. I am >therefore forced to drive in the nail with a sledgehammer. Forgive me. >------Cut Here------ >/* > This could be more elegant, but the point is obviousness. >*/ >#include <stdio.h> > >int main() >{ > char i[6]; > > for (i[0] = 'a'; i[0] < 'z'; i[0]++) > for (i[1] = 'a'; i[1] < 'z'; i[1]++) > for (i[2] = 'a'; i[2] < 'z'; i[2]++) > for (i[3] = 'a'; i[3] < 'z'; i[3]++) > for (i[4] = 'a'; i[4] < 'z'; i[4]++) > printf("%s\n", i); >} >------Cut Here------ > >Perry I agree with you, but it could also be correct. Since the char array is allocated on the stack as an auto, its contents are not guaranteed. So i[5]='\0'; is needed as the first statement. And of course it will never include a 'z' because the '<' will not permit it. Replace all the '<' with '<='. Plus there is the small matter of non-ASCII character representations breaking the increments and comparisons. Oh, and don't forget that main() returns an integer. This will generate at least a warning from the compiler, since the code does not return anything. It may well return a random number or something that will be interpreted as an error code. (also less than a minute's work) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Steven Weller | Technology (n): | | A substitute for adulthood. stevenw(a)best.com | Popular with middle-aged men.

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Metered Phone
by Jerome Tan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone have any ideas about this metered phone? I am from Philippines and heard some news that it will be existing in 1997. Quite a big problem! Every dial will be counted, every seconds will be measured...

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Metered Phone
by Jerome Tan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone have any ideas about this metered phone? I am from Philippines and heard some news that it will be existing in 1997. Quite a big problem! Every dial will be counted, every seconds will be measured...

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Metered Phone
by Jerome Tan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone have any ideas about this metered phone? I am from Philippines and heard some news that it will be existing in 1997. Quite a big problem! Every dial will be counted, every seconds will be measured...

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FUD-Con V: DC
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 8 Jul 96 at 14:10, winn(a)Infowar.Com wrote: [..] > Historically, civil defense has meant to protect citizenry against hostile > military actions. Today, with the specter of Information Warfare representing > new challenges to late-industrial and information age nation-states, the rules [..] Are these really "new" challenges? > - The Power grid is the basis of most of modern society. With it gone, > not much else happens. If you think this is just a matter of building more > generators, think again--what happens if the factories that *make* the > generators are taken down, too? You haven't lived in a hurricane prone area and lost your electricity for most of a month, have you? Many of the generators are already in place. The power grid is not centralised, so it's difficult to take down everything for a long period of time (long enough to be truly detrimental to a lot of people) quickly enough (that would require some non-informational real-life bombing and warfare). > - The Communications infrastructure: land, sea, air and satellite. 95% > military communications go over the public networks, and 100% of all financial > and industrial communications. Is it worth protecting? Is it so easy to take a whole network down? What about various radio operations (HAMs, Marineband, FM, etc.)? And don't forget automobiles and roads as last-resort communications. > - The Global Financial structure depends upon the first two > infrastructures, and is perhaps the most vulnerable to theft and denial of > service attack. 99+% of all "wealth" is digital--what happens if it vaporizes? I'm skeptical of that figure (many institutions maintain several printouts and have contingencies to do things by hand... for no other reason than computers go down without human interference). > - Transportation systems rely upon the other three. The air traffic [..] Not really. Automobiles and buses rely on very little. In major disasters there are ways to keep limited air and train traffic running. > Without all of these infrastructures properly and reliably functioning, the > private sector and the national security community cannot function. No heat, no [..] You sound as if you have not been in a place hit by natural disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes, major floods, etc. These cause much more damange to infrastructures as well as human life than any organized action could, save for an all-out physical war. Life still manages to go on. > air conditioning, no food distribution, no light, no radio or TV, no Internet. > Are we prepared? Do we have a a crisis response for the day money as we know > it vanishes? Isn't that what FEMA is for? Do you want FEMA involved with the 'net? Or would you rather get the DoD, NSA, FBI also involved with "Emergency Management"?!? > Electronic Civil Defense will soon become a critical component of any nation's > well being while the needs of both the private sector and government converge. > The convergence of military and civilian interests that Mr. Schwartau predicted Yes... it's called key escrow. > two years ago is happening before our eyes. Defensive and commercial postures > have so intertwined as to make them indistinguishable. That still implies empowering the state rather than allowing entities (individuals and corporations) to protect themselves. I'm skeptical of much of the InfoWar hype. Yes, there are important security issues (data integrity and preservation). But these also cross over with non-info disaster preparations. I also question whether large corporations and banks have compatible interests with individuals. It seems entirely possible that measures could be taken to protect the former at the expense of the latter. It's also dangerous to give LEA's another bogeyman to use. Very dangerous. Rob --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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