December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Tack of Internet censorship
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>nobody(a)replay.com wrote: >Six months ago, the Internet censors and Exon wannabees took the >tack of "the Internet is too hard to censor". > >Now, their motto is "There will be some who get around our >censorship, but we will try anyway." > >Unfortunately, I believe these censorship strikes will >keep happening unless we find a way to stalemate them. > >What I am proposing is that Apache or other WWW servers >have a way to allow access to site B's URL at site A, >similar to the old trick of finger user@sitea.com@siteb.com. > >Implementation should be simple. However, I wonder what >is a good standard way to specify this in the URL or >a site. Whatever happened to Ray Cromwell's Decense <http://www.clark.net/pub/rjc/decense.html> project ? Decense, "a cgi script designed to provide a double-blind pseudonym scheme which allows a site to hide behind a chain of http servers which 'proxy' for it. Neither the user [ID] requesting the document, nor the ultimate address of the destination web site is immediately available to prying government eyes. -- Steve PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear, N7ZEZ | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Voice: 1-702-655-2877 Sacred Cow Meat Co. | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 7075 W. Gowan Road, #2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | --------------------------------------------------------------------- Just say NO to perscription DRUGS.

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Re: rc2 export limits..
by P. J. Ponder 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

keywords: ITAR, SHA, beneficial and innocuous crypto The persistent reputation known as Bill Stewart wrote: >Date: Wed, 04 Sep 1996 23:09:17 -0700 >From: Bill Stewart <stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com> >To: Kent Briggs <72124.3234(a)compuserve.com> >Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Subject: Re: rc2 export limits.. > >I'm afraid my source is "Read it on the net and was surprised to hear it". >My assumption is that the limit is for software that implements >both signature and verification, since ITAR doesn't ban export of >pure-authentication software. The FIPS Pub (?180? ?181?) for the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) states in the fine print at the beginning that SHA is export controlled. I don't have the document to refer to right now, but it plainly states that SHA falls under ITAR. As a cryptographic hash function, why would it be controlled in this way? How can I use SHA to encrypt something for someone else to decrypt? I know how to use it for authentication; am I missing something here? ANFSCD: I tried that OnNet32 e-mail software from FTP software. It runs under Windows95. It is a lot of material to download, and way too intrusive to install. It wants to metastasize itself into the innards of Microsoft Exchange and Inboxes, etc. What is it with all this complexity anyway? Why not just have a POP client that will check mail on the server? It also wants you to store your mailbox password in it, as opposed to letting you enter it on a session-by-session basis. I don't like that. sticking with PINE, PGP, and Xywrite II for now....

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Tack of Internet censorship
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Six months ago, the Internet censors and Exon wannabees took the tack of "the Internet is too hard to censor". Now, their motto is "There will be some who get around our censorship, but we will try anyway." Unfortunately, I believe these censorship strikes will keep happening unless we find a way to stalemate them. What I am proposing is that Apache or other WWW servers have a way to allow access to site B's URL at site A, similar to the old trick of finger user@sitea.com@siteb.com. Implementation should be simple. However, I wonder what is a good standard way to specify this in the URL or a site.

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Re: What is the EFF doing exactly?
by Omegaman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> If anyone objects the officals responsible make a wide gesture and say "We > didn't take away your phones, CRIMINALS took away your phones." Indeed. It appears the Unabomber has taken away the privelege of dropping stamped mail weighing over 16ozs into street-side mailboxes. One is now instructed to take these packages to a post-office mail clerk for mailing. (Of course it's unclear just what would be done if a package weighing over that magical 16ozs was left in a mailbox) > The real question is this, what are you going to do to anihilate anonymous > communication, because if you think its harmful that's what you have to > do. > What strikes me as odd is that the arguments against anonymous communication are nearly identical to those against strong crypto. ie. the same four horsemen flare up in these discussions. Yet we have parties who are ostensibly pro-crypto but anti-anonymity. To put it in a nutshell, in a free society I can have a private conversation, but I must essentially announce that I am having one and who I am having that conversation with? Do you believe the benefits of privacy outweigh the costs? Do you feel the same about cryptography and believe it to be an essential tool to advance the privacy of individuals? Then you _must_ be an advocate of anonymity and anonymous communications. Privacy as a right and a reality does not exist without the capability for anonymity. me -------------------------------------------------------------- Omegaman <mailto:omega@bigeasy.com> PGP Key fingerprint = 6D 31 C3 00 77 8C D1 C2 59 0A 01 E3 AF 81 94 63 Send a message with the text "get key" in the "Subject:" field to get a copy of my public key. --------------------------------------------------------------

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German prosecutors redouble attack on Net, subversive leftists
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Note www.anonymizer.com doesn't seem to be blocked. --Declan] --- Date: Thu, 5 Sep 1996 01:59:36 +0200 (MET DST) From: Ulf Moeller <um(a)c2.net> To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: German Internet Censorhip: http://www.xs4all.nl The German Generalbundesanwaltschaft (Chief Federal Prosecutor's office) has "advised" the Internet providers to block access to http://www.xs4all.nl:80 and http://www.serve.com:80 due to supposedly illegal contents at the URLs http://www.serve.com/spg/154/, http://www.xs4all.nl/~tank/radikal//154/ and http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/angela1/radilink.htm. The commercial ISPs have blocked the routes to the servers. Their statement (in German) is at http://www.anwalt.de/ictf/p960901d.htm "Radikal" (http://www.xs4all.nl/~tank/radikal) is a publication from the radical left that is illegal in Germany, but not in the Netherlands. --- Date: Wed, 4 Sep 1996 22:15:42 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: Re: German Internet Censorhip: http://www.xs4all.nl I heard about this a few days ago, but I was unable to verify it. Yesterday I bounced mail through a German university to xs4all.nl back to EFF, and it came through just fine. I also tried golden-gate.owl.de and wserver.physnet.uni-hamburg.de, both of which have no problems talking to xs4all.nl. From those tests, I can say there's no complete ban, though I can't confirm or deny any partial ban. However, just in case the German government is successful in this censorship gambit, I've mirrored the three embattled web sites at: http://www.well.com/~declan/mirrors/ This is a quick grab of the files in question; I'll work on a formatted intro page later. (As background for more recent subscribers to fight-censorship, this isn't the first time the German government has tried this. A similar move came early this year when German prosecutors tried to cut connections to webcom.com in California, where some of Ernst Zundel's Nazi "Holocaust Revisionist" propaganda was hosted. I and a few other folks including Rich at Stanford and Blake at Penn held our noses and mirrored it around the country, prompting the Gemans to lift the ban. I had thought the German prosecutors smarter than to try this again. I guess I was wrong.) My global Net-censorship roundup is at: http://www.eff.org/~declan/global/ -Declan

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Satellite Movement?
by Blak Dayz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was out buying groceries and after they scanned the shit through they told me that all the ATMs in the City were out due to connection problems. So i go home and start trying to scan for the shits and i cant find them. If anyone knows what the hell happened i would appreciate the details. I believe it may have been a solar flare that caused the companies to redirect their satellites. It would do me alot of help considering i had to pay CASH (i hate paper) for the stuff and i would like to complain to the fucking JPL and satt. operators about them warning the public.

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[less paranoid NOISE] Re: Odd Satellite observations
by jfricker＠vertexgroup.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ok well like I said it was just paranoid noise. So the sats can locate ships at sea. I wonder what else? At 01:58 PM 9/9/96 GMT, Jim wrote: >On Sun, 08 Sep 1996 11:45:45 -0700, I wrote: > >>I saw three satellites gliding across the sky (east to west) in >>a tight right triangle formation. The entire formation was not >>bigger than my hand at arms length. Has anyone else observed >>this? > >John: You probably saw one of the NOSS (Naval Ocean Surveillance >System) constellations. There are several of these groupings -- all >in triangular arrays. They use some form of interferometry to locate >ships at sea. > >Jim > > >

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Lexis-Nexis Database
by Andrew Fabbro 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Note: personal experience indicates that L-N can remove you without your SSN, so there's no need to provide it, though they'll ask for it. Expect to attend a mandatory on-hold-music concert with a 20-25 minute program. L-N won't verify if your name is in the database, but will "performa process which will remove you if you are there". Andrew Fabbro <afabbro(a)umich.edu> ITD Marketing Research http://www-personal.umich.edu/~afabbro/ PGP mail preferred; finger for key ---------------------------------------------------------------------- PRIVACY Forum Digest Tuesday, 3 September 1996 Volume 05 : Issue 17 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 3 Sep 1996 11:22:15 -0400 (EDT) From: Larry Hunter <hunter(a)intr.net> Subject: Lexis-Nexis personal information database Lexis-Nexis sells a commercial database called "Ptrax" which holds detailed personal information on nearly all Americans (L-N claims it contains 300 million names). This database includes name, current address, up to two previous addresses, phone number, birth-date, social security number, mother's maiden name and possible other personal information. This database is kept quite current. Through the Nexis Express service, this information could be available to any individual with a credit card. As most readers will are aware, such information could easily be used for theft of identity and other frauds. It is possible to have one's name removed from this database by making a telephone request. Call (800)543-6862, select option 4 ("all other questions") and tell the representative answering that you wish to remove your name from the Ptrax database. You may also send a fax to (513)865-7360, or physical mail to LEXIS-NEXIS / P.O. Box 933 / Dayton, Ohio 45401-0933. Sending physical mail to confirm your name has been removed is always a good idea. As word of the existence of this database has spread on the net, Lexis-Nexis has been inundated with calls, and has set up a special set of operators to handle the volume. In addition, Andrew Bleh (rhymes with "Play") is a manager responsible for this product, and is the person to whom complaints about the service could be directed. He can be reached at the above 800 number, selection option 4 and then ask for extension 3385. The information in this note has been been confirmed by me, and was originally provided in forwarded messages from Russell Whitaker, Jason Werner, Vern Winters, Katherine Florman and Reuben Snipper. Larry Hunter hunter(a)intr.net ------------------------------ End of PRIVACY Forum Digest 05.17 ************************

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Re: Los Angeles Times article on Helsingius and anon.penet.fi
by Hallam-Baker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

John Gilmore wrote: > PS: I would counsel against the kind of false anonymity provided by > the Finnish server, though. Providing information under the promise > that it will "never be revealed or misused" is a lot more dangerous > than never providing it at all. E.g. "Anonymous cash" that is really > based on dossiers or account-numbers isn't anonymous at all. Even > physical cash is getting easier to trace; the British government has > been tracking money by serial numbers for years, with custom machines > in the banks, to de-anonymize Irish freedom-fighters (oops, I mean > terrorists). Anonymity is another area, like privacy, where changes > from technology can make big social differences. There is a massive difference between anonymous speech and anonymous transactions. Anonymous speech can create problems (defamation etc.) but in the main these are not problems the courts are particularly good at dealing with. In the UK the libel laws are not so much a redress for legitimate grievance than a way for a senior Tory to obtain a nice lump sum towards his pension if he should happen to be filmed handing over 5000 quid in a breifcase to a prostitute he'd never met. The "problems" encountered by the Church of Scientology demonstrate that the court process itself can be imeasurably more harmfull than any imagined grievance. Should society have laws to protect trades secrets? Probably , but not to protect the likes of the CoS. If the Internet makes such laws difficult to enforce then we should return to the original concerns that prompted society to create the laws in the first place and see if the Internet provides better was of achieving the same result. Anonymous transactions are a rather different matter. It is more difficult to argue for anonymity. The extreeme examples of Chaumian cash create considerable difficulties such as making a perfect conduit for ransom proceeds and the profits of drug trafficing. Simply ignoring these problems will result in the proponents of anonymity simply being ignored. The principle fear of the authorities appears to be terrorist rather than normal criminal activities. Terrorism is no longer limited to far off irredentist struggles that ex-patriates can harbour romantic thoughts about. The reality the the IRA is an organisation that murders children by placing a bomb in a rubbish bin outside a MacDonalds has been brought home to the suporters of Noraid through the bombings of the World Trade Center, Oaklahoma and Atlanta. If one lives in a country where there is little terrorism it is easy to imagine that people driven to extreeme actions are driven by a extreeme situation. If one is faced with the reality of terrorism one soon reaches the conclusion that its perpetrators are simply ordinary psychopaths. Having stated that terrorism is an important concern for the state it is necessary to ask whether it is necessary to restrict freedom to combat terrorism. In answering one must bear in mind that a central part of most terrorist strategies is to force the state to respond with disproportionate measures (here recent events in Chetchnya indicate that Trotsky was not widely read in the USSR). Absolutely anonymous cash may create problems, but what if it were possible to generate small quantities of "marked bills" within an otherwise anonymous system. If the circumstances under which the marked bills could be distributed were limited to a small set of tightly controlled circumstances the legitimate need of the government to oppose terrorism and organised crime could be met without imposing a Singapore style system with total monitoring. In effect what is taking place is a negotiation between two groups, the government and civil rights activists. If one side refuses to consider the needs of the other they will be marginalised. Absolutism in politics is usually a bad thing. Politics usually works through compromises. The art being to ensure that one compromises the inessential terms in order to defend the key items. In the present Presidential race the one policy area in which Clinton is potentially vulnerable is privacy. Its the one area which the Republicans could raise and claim it as their own (whether justifiable or not). The Clinton camp could not move from their current position without dropping Freeh overboard, since Freeh has run the FBI without any Ruby ridge or Waco style cockups on his watch I don't think that is likely to happen. If privacy is raised as a policy concern in this election it will reoccur in the next and both parties will have to justify their policies in terms of personal privacy as well as everything else. Just because the election is practically settled does not mean that the campaign will not affect what happens during the administration. Clinton clearly wants Gore to be his successor and is going to want to make it as easy as possible for him to win. Clinton is the kind of politician I can trust - give him an issue and I trust him to look at the opinion polls. If Dole makes any kind of headway in '96 with a privacy plank then Gore will have to have one in 2000. Phill

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Snake-Oil FAQ
by wlkngowl＠unix.asb.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Subject: Snake-Oil FAQ's New Maintainer From: Rob Rothenburg Walking-Owl <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> C. Matthew Curtin <cmcurtin(a)research.megasoft.com> will be taking-over the "Snake-Oil FAQ". I no longer have the time to finish (let alone maintain) it. - --Rob -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3b Charset: cp850 iQEVAwUBMjRWPATNlSxdPy6ZAQEnIwf+PXgXNNBZP7ylTfMhugeH8FuFDY/zybNb poSIWCRUhM7EEndYkuyzaTYC44aE0ltAkiN7HvaqXbExQEmEv34aYTa+u9ISabOK BOEQdgi8oCHJlQ3R6lBTMWKfpFELpORsjDJbsKt/Gcgef+uInMUG8RF7F3Va40dh CTar/Nr4Quj/EkkVaY6hkaXsMF0CvWq+cKZmo8KR0v4vPeWEKHskslfgXSpfPR9d uXYyUVD21HRSG5YTZmdm3PJn3GUvgXuQdz1pooQ+x+u8EXsOFRjAEiaFtMey2DYW imHub+XewnbS93JGZ+q+J93hHpL2OE8LMQFB8ViUe6K05uj7RBi06Q== =wMjQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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