December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: One Time Reply Blocks (was Re: strengthening remailer protocols)
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:06 PM 9/9/96 -0700, Lance Cottrell wrote: >At 4:19 PM -0700 9/9/96, Bill Frantz wrote: >>To paraphrase John Von Neumann, any system which uses reply blocks is in a >>state of sin. By this I mean that if there is a chain pointing at you, a >>sufficiently powerful attacker can walk down that chain and find you. >> >>Given that, I will join the state of sin by proposing a mechanism which >>will allow Alice to receive a reply from Bob, but change her mind at any >>time. The basic idea is to have a one-time reply block which either Bob or >>Alice can send to. If Alice thinks that too much time has elapsed, and >>powerful enemies are walking down her reply block chain, she can send >>herself a reply and break the chain. (She might send a reply thru each >>link in the chain to break all the links.) > >The reason the message is not resendable is that the remailers keeps track >of the serial number of that header. If forced, the log of serial numbers >could be deleted, and the operator would process the message. > >Unless you are assuming some key archived by each remailer for the reply >block, then I think it will be possible to repair the chain. I was thinking of storing a reply-key in each remailer. The protocol might go something like this (straw man proposal): (1) Alice picks n random ids (say 160 bits or so) and n random keys. (2) Alice sends the combination <id[i], key[i]> to remailer[i], i=0,n-1. (3) Alice builds a reply block which consists of the remailer return path, each element encyphered with the appropriate key and sends it to Bob. (4) When a remailer processes a reply block element, it removes it from the reply block, looks up the id in its database, decrypts the address of the next hop, removes the database element and forwards the message. If Alice becomes nervous, she sends n "replys" thru each remailer to cause the return path to be destroyed. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | "Lone Star" - My personal | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | choice for best movie of | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | 1996 | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Can you trust your ISP?
by Troy Varange 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

No.

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PIN_hed
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

9-9-96. BuWi: "Pinkerton and SAIC establish alliance to offer security solutions against high-tech gangs, cybercriminals" "Pinkerton's gumshoes with SAIC's spooks represent a unique resource for clients who must hide from the USG high-value, mission-critical assets," said Denis Brown, PKT prez. Bob Beyster, SAIC czar, said, "Our ex-TLAs are available around the clock to jigger-jive clients freaked by TLA-stories of computer hackers, criminals and insiders." PKT bill-pads more than 45,000 and SAIC 22,000; both underpay perps and taxes. "NCSA: policeman on the internet beat." NCSA employs a number of ex-law enforcement officers who try to infiltrate hacker networks and solve problems before they start. "We track hackers by going underground to their sites," Tippett said. "We pretend to be their friends, but they fuck with our heads." "Hi/fn Integrates Encryption With Data Compression For Efficient, Secure Networking." MUM 1.0 provides a processor independent software implementation of industry standard DES and Triple DES data encryption, HMAC-SHA, HMAC-MD5 keyed hash functions, and LZS(r) and MPPC (Microsoft Point to Point Compression) compression for Internet, intranet and client-server networks. ----- http://jya.com/pinhed.txt (14 kb for 3) PIN_hed

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Harry Browne a cryptographer
by Will Day 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Here's an interesting detail from an AP story: A short time ago, at a computer terminal far, far away, Steve L. Dasbach wrote: >From: 76060.3222(a)CompuServe.COM ("Steve L. Dasbach") >Date: 10 Sep 96 14:32:09 EDT >Message-Id: <57196.3235C30E(a)dehnbase.fidonet.org> >To: LPUS-PRES(a)dehnbase.fidonet.org (LP business - presidential) >Subject: APn Article on Harry Browne > > By KARIN MILLER > Associated Press Writer > FRANKLIN, Tenn. (AP) -- > Browne said he formed his attitude toward government when he entered the >U.S. Army three years after high school and became a cryptographer. The article didn't say anything more about his cryto past.. === Will Day <PGP mail preferred> * * * * * * * * * * * willday(a)rom.oit.gatech.edu HARRY BROWNE FOR PRESIDENT http://rom.oit.gatech.edu/~willday/ http://www.HarryBrowne96.org/ OIT, Georgia Tech, Atlanta 30332-0715 * * * * * * * * * * * =-> Opinions expressed are mine alone and do not reflect OIT policy <-= -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3 Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBMjXPcBDHlOdPw2ZdAQHVZwP7Bd5FJ1Usgq7TIzOGofhuC1ihc687zLg/ pPxzR5/8DpHj6x7agdLnKyivBROX9aTE616pzgjOfqup+/VWHdxRbChJ/S0twrn0 QPWOq4hkvrm9ygJlUSzmGMBEv4BeT/IIITlwrGUo7jaMtvemKPHiNnfE3u+Ii6xr b44iifT6ygg= =E9oM -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: ALPHACIPHER - An unbreakable encryption program.
by Ryan Russell/SYBASE 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Now there's a business I'd like to get into.... reselling pseudo-random bit strings.... Ryan ---------- Previous Message ---------- To: cypherpunks cc: From: roy @ sendai.scytale.com (Roy M. Silvernail) @ smtp Date: 09/10/96 07:14:33 AM Subject: Re: ALPHACIPHER - An unbreakable encryption program. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In alt.security, survival(a)aa.net writes: [ attribution scrambled ] >> True, but somehow I have a feeling that Alphacipher is not a one-time >> pad, and thus is breakable. > > This assumption is not true. ALPHACIPHER is, indeed, based upon an OTP. > We've solved all of the problems associated with pad creation, > distribution, packaging and many other concerns that have previously > limited the use of a cipher in this class. Their web page alludes to a OTP-like operation where you have to purchase key "refills". It doesn't say where they store the escrowed copies of the key material. > Visit our net page at http://www.aa.net/cyber-survival-hq for more > information, and read the reply in response to the unfounded attack by > Curtin, posted above. I recommend this page, if only for the great conspiracy theory about automated telephone line scanning. - -- Roy M. Silvernail [ ] roy(a)scytale.com PGP Public Key fingerprint = 31 86 EC B9 DB 76 A7 54 13 0B 6A 6B CC 09 18 B6 Key available from pubkey(a)scytale.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMjVcuRvikii9febJAQG1wQP+PPevphnwFiUnhwfHfi9eSLI/lJz++eaw X4Xo6Oa343rpnNoNw0D51aIRZbRmh9QRt1nhNbD3fPvNPjjvzxW58zgAtX5+kxfk b54pBzlVTEYcPBFXatfQuCjhhd95gjaMXYsKAx6rUNt02QFihGWqID48huN9nFOZ 0MlhN5IxIBk= =y4kc -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: forward secrecy in mixmaster
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:29 PM 9/10/96 +0200, Germano Caronni wrote: >Just a short note. The DH patent (#4200770), as held by Cylink expires at >the 29th of april '97. Afterwards DH enters the public domain. That's a >certain argument for using DH key exchange. RSA will go into the public >domain somewhen in 2002, if I remember correctly. The US patent for RSA expires September 20, 2000 according to Applied Cryptography Second Edition, p474. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | "Lone Star" - My personal | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | choice for best movie of | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | 1996 | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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QDY_nam
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Science, 30 August 1996: "Enforcing Coherent Evolution in Dissipative Quantum Dynamics" Cirac, Pellizzari, Zoller [Precis] The major obstacle to the preparation and manipulation of many-particle entangled states is decoherence due to the coupling of the system to the environment. A scheme to correct for the effects of decoherence and enforce coherent evolution in the system dynamics is described and illustrated for the particular case of the ion-trap quantum computer. The preparation and manipulation of N-particle entangled states is fundamental to the investigation of basic aspects of quantum mechanics and is the basis of applications such as quantum computation, teleportation, cryptography. and spectroscopy. The error correction schemes proposed so far have focused on preserving a given entangled state (memory errors). We introduce a method to correct for the effects of decoherence in the dynamical proccss of preparation and modification of entangled states (gate errors). We illustrate our scheme in the context of the ion-trap QC. ----- This 4-page paper is packed with equations. We will scan to JPEG for those without access to Science. Send us a blank message with the subject: QDY_nam We have to enlarge the fine-print originals to make readable images, usually in the 150kb range. Does anyone know of a program to do text and equations for easy- reading, easy access to a Web site?

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Re: Allo allo
by Brad Shantz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Tue Sep 10 15:46:47 1996 Si_Druid wrote: >in the day' i used to write some low level crypts that were relatively > impossible to break... > they were also impossible to decrypt, which meant that the only way to > use them was to work forward.... Hmmmm. "relatively impossible" I feel so secure. > mostly i did password encryption schemes, this one working the best: I'm still partial to a one way hash. Brad -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMjXv2a80j2q8tTgtAQFG7wQAlNFcTsiQ9q4xKXtquqgqxgE7NklvNpyc t6+ssuDutHfDzniclF0+exNH2VxbPPsAp8V+vhmcqPmZe4nyM7FGnDYJyQ+fFDA7 MOZf0xSDtVjnM+nXqdkKDK3/PnXTIWs7RqrN+UjJrxulUvw2AXXI0XieUU0K7YbC S7yi9Pv7sb4= =HqKR -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RE: Child Porn as Thoughtcrime
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: tcmay(a)got.net > >My point is this: For anyone who claims that "thoughtcrime" is something >the Evil Empire specialized in, i.e., totalitarian communist regimes, look >to the enforcement of laws about what can be viewed or accessed from the >United States. Thougtcrime. >......................................................................... > > >Those laws obviously (to me) don't have all that much to do with legality nor >all that much with thought, either; but more with a government aiming to >"looking good" in front of an audience of voters, presenting an image of >being more moral, or "better-than-thou" - in front of other nations, etc.; >that is, to gain favor, and therefore political support, from the Citizen >Units by sounding like Mother Superior/fatherly figures who are going to look >after All The Little Children (tm), plus all the similarly weak & >dispossessed. > >This posturing gives all the un-selfconfident people someone to look up to, >even if they don't really get anything (their memories being too short to >notice the failed promises, lack of follow-through, and blatant >inconsistencies, not to mention the 'legal' crimes committed along the way). > >Many people seek after sympathy towards their feelings (present and/or future >pain) more than to be respected for the ability to think. I imagine this >develops into a reduced sympathy towards certain kinds of thought or towards >thinking per se, eventually, promoting a general atmosphere of tolerance for >offenses like "thoughtcrimes". > >And of course anyone who is free to think about anything & everything (who >could therefore potentially think about what everybody else has forgotten) >will seem dangerous to those who wish to appear to be in total, beneficent >control. > > .. >Blanc

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Re: China joins Singapore, Germany, ....
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I respectfully disagree. I spend most of my time going through sites like cnn.com, hotwired.com, news.com, altavista.digital.com, yahoo.com, lycos.com, hotbot.com, eff.org, well.com, mit.edu, whitehouse.gov, and so on. Search engines and directories, in particular, are good chokepoints to block. Blocking 100 sites would certainly be significant to me -- as long as they're the right ones. Before the technical fixes, that is. -Declan Duncan writes: >You must admit >that a ban on 100 sites out of all the sites in the world is pretty >insignificant. The swamping effects of thousands and soon millions of sites >means the governments of the world won't even be able to evaluate a >significant percentage even if they want to. And all this *before* we apply >any of our technical fixes. > >DCF

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