December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

[off-topic] Re: Verdict in "MTV" Case
by Daemon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:15 AM 8/23/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: As the youngest Cypherpunk in the world (or at least i am aware of) I think a little reply is in order from my self. > "Like, like the kids are, like, >goofin' off. Besides, MTV doesn't like play enough old stuff, like Zeppelin >and Floyd." Thats what those old records are for. (no offense) If they are sueing MTV why not other TV stations.... If I was going to sue someone for not doing my homework i would sue Jarkko Oikarinen, the creator of IRC. I just think that this is really pathetic.... but then again I am famous for my flame replys in the past. Why not make the school pay MTV for keeping kids away from there station while they are doing homework (hehehe) FYI i thought this reply out. Blake Wehlage ========================================== Blake Wehlage <jwilk(a)iglou.com> ±» RëVðLû¡ØÑ Bø+ ©ÖmP@ñ¥ «± Goto: http://members.iglou.com/jwilk

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Some cypherpunks-relevant Risks articles
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In regards to the first part (the 911 transcript), I was considering the idea (common in cyberpunk RPGs) of a privately-set-up ambulance and emergency room service, with monitors (possibly with action capabilities) on registered clients. You'd want the data flow from and to the monitors encrypted, of course. -Allen From: IN%"rre(a)weber.ucsd.edu" 20-AUG-1996 22:41:21.74 To: IN%"rre(a)weber.ucsd.edu" CC: Subj: Risks: Atlanta 911 transcript, SSN's, web plagiarism [If you've never seen the famous Olympic Park 911 transcript, it's worth reading closely. I'm embarrassed to say this, but it always reminds me of the time I couldn't get a taxi in Chicago because I could tell the dispatcher what intersection I was standing on but I could not see any of the street addresses anywhere around me, and her dispatch computer needed an address to dispatch a cab. Dispatch systems requiring addresses are one of those absolutely classic cases of system being driven by the database designer rather than by the people who know how the system will actually be used. Database designers are fine people, but they shouldn't be doing requirements analysis unless they're trained for it. Also in this issue of Risks is an interesting message from Robert Ellis Smith about managing social security numbers and other identifiers for privacy, and a funny/scary piece about web plagiarism.] =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= This message was forwarded through the Red Rock Eater News Service (RRE). Send any replies to the original author, listed in the From: field below. You are welcome to send the message along to others but please do not use the "redirect" command. For information on RRE, including instructions for (un)subscribing, send an empty message to rre-help(a)weber.ucsd.edu =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Date: Mon, 19 Aug 1996 18:11:10 -0700 (PDT) From: risks(a)csl.sri.com RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Monday 19 August 1996 Volume 18 : Issue 35 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 16 Aug 96 10:45:34 PDT From: "Peter G. Neumann" <neumann(a)csl.sri.com> Subject: The Atlanta 911 transcript [The following transcript of the Olympic 911 bomb call and the ensuing conversation suggests that many of our nontechnological risks are not being adequately addressed. PGN] http://www.cnn.com/US/9608/09/olympics.bomb.911/911.transcript.wir/transcri… Excerpts from a transcript released Thursday by the Atlanta Police Department regarding the bomb threat telephoned to 911 on July 27. Times have been converted from military time to standard notation, and punctuation and spelling have been edited. Parenthetical notes are part of the police transcript except where labeled as an editor's note. The transcript refers to these police terms: Code 73, bomb threat; and Zone 5, a police precinct near Centennial Olympic Park. The transcript did not explain the Zone 5 dispatcher's references to Code 17 and Code 8, which apparently were unrelated to the bomb call. 12:58:28 a.m.: [Call to 911] 12:58:32 a.m.: Atlanta Police Department 911 Operator: "Atlanta 911." Caller: "There is a bomb in Centennial Park, you have 30 minutes." 12:58:45 a.m.: Caller hangs up. 1:01:20 a.m.: 911 operator calls APD Agency Command Center (all lines busy). .... 1:01:30 a.m.: 911 operator calls Zone 5 and notifies Zone 5 of Signal 73 and requests address of Centennial Park -- unable to get street address. Dispatcher: "Zone 5." 911 Operator: "You know the address to Centennial Olympic Park?" Dispatcher: "Girl, don't ask me to lie to you." 911 Operator: "I tried to call ACC but ain't nobody answering the phone ... but I just got this man called talking about there's a bomb set to go off in 30 minutes in Centennial Park." Dispatcher: "Oh Lord, child. One minute, one minute. I copy Code 17. OK, all DUI units are Code 8 and will not be able to assist on the freeway. Oh Lord, child. Uh, OK, wait a minute, Centennial Park, you put it in and it won't go in?" 911 Operator: "No, unless I'm spelling Centennial wrong. How are we spelling Centennial?" Dispatcher: "C-E-N-T-E-N-N-I -- how do you spell Centennial?" 911 Operator: "I'm spelling it right, it ain't taking." Dispatcher: "Yeah." 911 Operator: "Centennial Park is not going. Maybe if I take 'park' out, maybe that will take. Let me try that." Dispatcher: "Wait a minute, that's the regular Olympic Stadium right?" 911 Operator: "Olympic Stadium is like Zone 3, though. Centennial Park." Dispatcher: "That's the Centennial Park?" 911 Operator: "It's near the Coca Cola Plaza, I think." Dispatcher: "In 5?" 911 Operator: "Uh huh." Dispatcher: "Uh, hold on. Sonya, you don't know the address to the Centennial Park?" 2nd Dispatcher (in background): "Downtown." 911 Operator: "Male, about 30." Dispatcher: "1546, Code 17, 23." 911 Operator: "White." Dispatcher: "Uh, you know what? Ask one of the supervisors." 911 Operator: "No, Lord help me, you know they don't know." Dispatcher: "I know, but it gets it off you." 911 Operator: "Alrighty then, bye." Dispatcher: "Bye." 1:02:40 a.m.: 911 operator calls APD ACC for address (telephone line problem; operators cannot hear each other.) ... 1:02:50 a.m.: 911 operator calls APD ACC again and requests address for Centennial Park and is given the telephone number. ACC: "Atlanta Police, Agency Command Center." 911 Operator: "Hey, can you hear me now?" ACC: "Uh huh." 911 Operator: "OK, can you give me the address of the Centennial Park?" ACC: "I ain't got no address to Centennial Park, what y'all think I am?" 911 Operator: "Can you help me find the address to Centennial Park?" ACC: "I can give you the telephone number of Centennial Park." 911 Operator: "I need to get this bomb threat over there to y'all." ACC: "Well." 911 Operator: "But I need the address of Centennial Park. It's not taking, the system is not taking Centennial Park, that's not where it came from, but you know the system is not taking Centennial Park, that's where he said the bomb was." ACC: "No particular street or what?" 911 Operator: "He just said there's a bomb set to go off in 30 minutes in Centennial Park." ACC: "Ooh, it's going to be gone off by the time we find the address." 911 Operator: "Are you kiddin'? Give me that, give me that." ACC: "I mean I don't have an address, I just have phone numbers." 911 Operator: "Give me the phone number." ... 1:05:10 a.m.: 911 operator calls Centennial Park for street address and is placed on hold. Receives address at 1:07:10 a.m. Centennial Park: "Centennial Park, this is Operator Morgan." 911 Operator: "Hi, can you give me the address to Centennial Park?" Cen Park: "The address?" 911 Operator: "Uh huh." Cen Park: "Uh, hold on a second." 1:06:30 a.m.: 911 operator notifies Communications Supervisor, Sgt. Montgomery. 911 Operator: "Does anybody -- Sgt. Montgomery, do you know the address of Centennial Park? Do you know the address to Centennial Park. Well, I need to get the address of Centennial Park 'cause, I mean I don't mean to upset nobody, but we got a bomb threat over there." (Editor's note: The transcript does not further indicate whether this comment about a bomb threat was directed only to Sgt. Montgomery in the 911 center or to Centennial Park's Operator Morgan, who is shown to come back on the line just after the comment.) Cen Park: "Ma'am." 911 Operator: "Yes." Cen Park: "OK, it's 145 International Boulevard." 911 Operator: "145 International Boulevard." Cen Park: "Uh huh." 911 Operator: "OK." Cen Park: "All right, uh huh." 911 Operator: "Thank you. Bye bye." 1:08:35 a.m.: 911 operator sent call to dispatch. 1:11:10 a.m.: Dispatcher: "1591. Radio raising 1594." Unit 1594: "1594. You call?" 1:11:20 a.m.: Dispatcher: "1594, that's affirmative, got a Signal 73 at 145 International Boulevard. It came from the pay phone at the Days Inn. The caller is advising that he has one set to go off in 30 minutes at Centennial Park. Sounded like a white male." (Editor's note: The same information is then given to Unit 1593 and the dispatcher calls Unit1546.) 1:12:30 a.m.: Dispatcher: "Did you copy?" 1:12:40 a.m.: Unit 1546: "1546. I copy. Advise the state police, they police that park. I'll go the Days Inn and see if I can locate the caller." Dispatcher: "OK, that's affirmative." (Editor's note: There are sporadic entries over the next seven minutes. Another officer, designated Unit 1593, also instructs the dispatcher at 1:18:50 a.m. to "contact the state police supervisor." The transcript contains no indication, however, that state police were notified.) 1:20:00 a.m.: Unit 2924: "2924 to Radio, be advised that something just blew up at Olympic Park." ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 16 Aug 96 15:24 EST From: Robert Ellis Smith <0005101719(a)mcimail.com> Subject: Alternatives to Social Security Numbers Last spring, I asked readers of RISKS for suggestions on alternatives to Social Security numbers in organizations with large data bases of information about individuals. Many such organizations find they do not need to use SSNs, and avoid privacy problems associated with using them. For a copy of all of the responses, send a request to us and specify whether you want hard copy or electronic edition of our August issue, and provide postal address or e-mail address. Robert Ellis Smith, Publisher, Privacy Journal newsletter, Providence, RI, 401/274-7861, e-mail 5101719(a)mcimail.com. Excerpts from the suggestions follow: * FROM WASHINGTON, D.C.: Maryland uses Soundex (of name and birth date concatenated [linked in a chain]) both for driver and vehicle registrations. * FROM CAMBRIDGE, MASS.: "Against Universal Health-Care Identifiers" in the JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL INFORMATICS ASSOCIATION 1:316-319, 1994, by Dr. Peter Szolovits of MIT and Dr. Isaac Kohane of Children's Hospital in Boston, discusses a number of ways in which cryptography- based health care identifiers can be used to preserve privacy while remaining manageable for typical medical purposes. This is publication #49 (in Postscript format) at http://medg.lcs.mit.edu/people/psz/publications.html. * FROM YARDLEY, PA.: One way is to use a simple scheme like three letters from last name, the first initial, and some digits; another is just to use sequential numbers. Another is an MD5 hash of the full-name string [a one-way mathematical function as a stand-in for the name that makes translation back to the original name impossible]. This is always unique for a unique string, so you might need to add some numbers. * FROM MADISON, WISC.: When I was working on the development of the Wisconsin Student Data Handbook - we tried to develop what we called an "SSN surrogate," also of nine bytes per individual. It involved an algorithm which combined year, month, and date of birth with sex and two consonants each extracted from the first and middle names. * FROM CYBERSPACE: I worked with a banking software company that set up employee records simply by exact hire date and time. Since they never hired anyone at exactly the same time, it gave each person a unique number. You could do the same for any data base in which records are added gradually one at a time - just number them based on exact date and time added. * FROM PALO ALTO, CAL.: At Stanford University we made a decision long ago not to use SSN for identification except where required by law (payroll taxes, for example). We use a unique Stanford University ID (SUID), which is a lifetime number and applies to all students, alumni, faculty, staff, and patients. It serves all the same purposes that the SSN would do if it were used. ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 14 Aug 1996 00:03:42 +0200 From: "Roy Dictus, NET" <roy(a)net.be> Subject: The risk of plagiarism with Websites My company recently got ripped off by a competitor. We build Websites and thus had constructed a site detailing our products and services. A rival Website constructor (!) copied practically the entire site, changing the background color, changing our name into theirs, and making other slight changes like alignment, add and delete a word or phrase here and there... I complained about it, not only to them directly, but also on a local USENET newsgroup (we're both located in Belgium, so the newsgroup was be.providers). On the phone they just laughed at me and admitted to copying, but on USENET they claimed I had copied their site! There's nothing I can do to prove them wrong, even though we both know what happened. The risk: if you put your materials on the Internet, where they can be freely copied, make sure you have some way to prove you made them yourself, and when you did it. Roy Dictus, NET bvba, Internet Projects & Consulting roy(a)net.be http://www.net.be [Interdictus becomes Enter Dictus. PGN] ------------------------------ End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 18.35 ************************

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Re: CyberTerrorism
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Aug 23, 1996 18:34:42, '"Institute for Security and Intelligence" <isi(a)hooked.net>' wrote: >John: > >Your message regarding my comments on CyberTerrorism was forwarded to me. >Rather than waxing poetic beration, how about some actually useful >perspective? > >If you have experience in this area, let's talk. If you have something to >contribute, let's get it out where it can be useful. > >It's time to put up, or shut up John. > >Regards, >Barry C. Collin --------- Dear Mr. Collin, Thank you for writing. And for the cyber-terrorism hoot, which helps purge ignorant fears with insightful laughter. The best way I know for citizens to ease their induced- panic of terrorism in all forms -- gov, com, edu, org -- is to become more informed. And to be wary of "terrorist threats" in all their burgeoning guises -- "national security" being one of the most deceitful. To counter Nat Sec snake oil in the rising commerce in "cyber-terrorism" (a residue of the natsec oil tank) citizens should participate in the wit and wisdom of wide-open Internet mail-lists dealing with computer privacy and security. The best of these is the list Cypherpunks. (E-mail "info" to majordomo(a)toad.com.) Cypherpunks, far more tolerant and less treacherously commercially self-serving than all others, explores an amazing range of CompSec issues, technologies, policies, strategies and fantasies. Its archive of several years offers a historical treasure on the transformation of state control of comp tech to its service of the citizenry. This is exemplified by Cypherpunks primary focus, cryptography, and the diverse ways it has moved from narrow use to conceal privileged power to widespread application to protect individual privacy (especially those dissenting to heirarchical authority -- gov, com, edu, org). Your agent provocateurist comedy on cyber-terrorist inebriation could be enriched by hanging on Cypherpunks, say, your buffoonery for secret briefing. "If you knew what I knew" is a natsec-butt joke there, as it is becoming globally to liberated citizen-units bellowing "FA." Congrats on exposing TLA-dementia of cyber-terrorism and defanging its counter-agents by encouraging belly- laughing at the all-too-blatant hype-artistry. Only Jim Kallstrom does it better. Best regards, jya

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SecureDrive News 8/24/96
by Edgar Swank 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- SecureDrive Users: It's been brought to my attention that users who attempt to compile SecureDrive 1.4b using Turbo C++ 3.00 are haveing a problem in that the MD5 routine does not produce a correct result, so that the key generated from a given passphrase will not be the same as the pre-compiled version. This is a bug in Turbo C++, not SecureDrive! However, a bypass for the problem is possible by modifying SD source as follows - ------------------------------cut here----------------------- *** C:\SECDR14B\UNC\MD5.C Sun May 09 19:38:36 1993 - --- MD5.C Wed Aug 14 00:58:46 1996 *************** *** 12,17 **** - --- 12,20 ---- * of the MD5 routines in RSAREF. Due to this alteration, this * code is "derived from the RSA Data Security, Inc. MD5 Message- * Digest Algorithm". (See below.) + * + * Simplified some expressions to avoid incorrect compiles with + * some compilers, e.g. Turbo C 3.0 EWS 8/96 */ /* *************** *** 135,145 **** - --- 138,158 ---- /* transform if necessary */ if (mdi == 0x40) { + #if defined (__TURBOC__) for (i = 0, ii = 0; i < 16; i++, ii += 4) + { + in[i] = (((UINT4)mdContext->in[ii+3]) << 24); + in[i] |= (((UINT4)mdContext->in[ii+2]) << 16); + in[i] |= (((UINT4)mdContext->in[ii+1]) << 8); + in[i] |= ((UINT4)mdContext->in[ii]); + } + #else + for (i = 0, ii = 0; i < 16; i++, ii += 4) in[i] = (((UINT4)mdContext->in[ii+3]) << 24) | (((UINT4)mdContext->in[ii+2]) << 16) | (((UINT4)mdContext->in[ii+1]) << 8) | ((UINT4)mdContext->in[ii]); + #endif Transform (mdContext->buf, in); mdi = 0; } *************** *** 167,178 **** padLen = (mdi < 56) ? (56 - mdi) : (120 - mdi); MD5Update (mdContext, PADDING, padLen); ! /* append length in bits and transform */ for (i = 0, ii = 0; i < 14; i++, ii += 4) in[i] = (((UINT4)mdContext->in[ii+3]) << 24) | (((UINT4)mdContext->in[ii+2]) << 16) | (((UINT4)mdContext->in[ii+1]) << 8) | ((UINT4)mdContext->in[ii]); Transform (mdContext->buf, in); /* store buffer in digest */ - --- 180,201 ---- padLen = (mdi < 56) ? (56 - mdi) : (120 - mdi); MD5Update (mdContext, PADDING, padLen); ! /* append length in bits and transform 1.4c*/ ! #if defined (__TURBOC__) ! for (i = 0, ii = 0; i < 14; i++, ii += 4) ! { ! in[i] = (((UINT4)mdContext->in[ii+3]) << 24); ! in[i] |= (((UINT4)mdContext->in[ii+2]) << 16); ! in[i] |= (((UINT4)mdContext->in[ii+1]) << 8); ! in[i] |= ((UINT4)mdContext->in[ii]); ! } ! #else for (i = 0, ii = 0; i < 14; i++, ii += 4) in[i] = (((UINT4)mdContext->in[ii+3]) << 24) | (((UINT4)mdContext->in[ii+2]) << 16) | (((UINT4)mdContext->in[ii+1]) << 8) | ((UINT4)mdContext->in[ii]); + #endif Transform (mdContext->buf, in); /* store buffer in digest */ - ------------------------------cut here----------------------- This code will be inserted into any future version of SecureDrive, but no new release is planned at this time. For those users of Win95 and SecureDrive who are concerned about loss of 32-bit disk access, I've recently learned that use of Secure Device ftp.demon.co.uk:/pub/ibmpc/secdev/secdev14.arj instead avoids this requirement. Although the Secure Device virtual drive is listed as in compatibility mode, the real drives are not so affected. And since the virtual drive is mapped to a dos file on one of the real drives, I believe you get 32-bit phyical drive access there as well, although access is still slowed by CPU time necessary to encrypt and decrypt. Edgar W. Swank <edgar(a)Garg.Campbell.CA.US> Edgar W. Swank <EdgarSwank(a)Juno.com> Edgar W. Swank <Edgar_W._Swank(a)ilanet.org> Home Page: http://members.tripod.com/~EdgarS/index.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCUAwUBMh7d4t4nNf3ah8DHAQHNdAP3RKd07B55fkW5CazT8mMaGUoTtjxSvUBv 3ykPvBhHvu7egb4EB1/XcBTM3K/6QeE8Dt10XJVX15Fd9nHY+XI0c0VB8Trlb/NB 0ymq+/SchedtUNmCgDeycbF104bfirpuXKy0OChDfpgMe0d/ifCXny6Co0BqIbRi fQyKtXzOxQ== =h1RT -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- edgar(a)Garg.Campbell.CA.US (Edgar Swank) The Land of Garg BBS -- +1 408 378-5108

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"----- Message body suppressed -----"
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:10 AM 8/21/96, Skip wrote: > ----- Message body suppressed ----- > Sounds good to me. Keep it up. --Tim May -- [This Bible excerpt awaiting review under the U.S. Communications Decency Act of 1996] And then Lot said, "I have some mighty fine young virgin daughters. Why don't you boys just come on in and fuck them right here in my house - I'll just watch!"....Later, up in the mountains, the younger daughter said: "Dad's getting old. I say we should fuck him before he's too old to fuck." So the two daughters got him drunk and screwed him all that night. Sure enough, Dad got them pregnant, and had an incestuous bastard son....Onan really hated the idea of doing his brother's wife and getting her pregnant while his brother got all the credit, so he pulled out before he came....Remember, it's not a good idea to have sex with your sister, your brother, your parents, your pet dog, or the farm animals, unless of course God tells you to. [excerpts from the Old Testament, Modern Vernacular Translation, TCM, 1996]

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Re: Anonymous Remailers
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:52 PM 8/23/96, Chris J Samuelson wrote: >When you mail an item through more than one anonymous remailer, how does >that make it anymore anonymous, or doesn't it? When only a single remailer is used, the remailer can see the mapping between the sender and the receiver. When two remailers are used, the first remailer can see the sender, but not the final recipient. The second remailer can see the final recipient, but not the original sender. Of course, the two remailers can get together and "collude," thus deducing the mapping between sender and recipient. With N remailers, the likelihood of collusion amongst the N remailers is less likely, possibly extremely unlikely. This is the core theory of mixes, or remailers. (And of course one can include one's self as a remailer, to further increase one's confidence that collusion has not occurred.) --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: FW: Cryptography Revisited
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:21 PM 8/23/96, Paul Robichaux wrote: >Anybody want to give this guy The Business? Earlier attempts didn't seem >to sink in. >>From: btcarey(a)primenet.com (Brent A. Carey) >>Newsgroups: comp.sys.mac.programmer.help >>Subject: Cryptography Revisited >>Date: 23 Aug 1996 01:15:01 -0700 .... >>I am now porting the application to the Mac with the intent to sell it to >>a private contractor that is developing RISC-based computers for >>specialized use in the government. I have been assured that a PPC native I think it better that we not discourage him. If he can sell his "Snake Oil Cypher System" to the government, this will be a Good Thing. It will slow them down, lull them into false security, and distract them as they are cleaning up the mess. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: "----- Message body suppressed -----"
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:25 PM 8/23/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >At 1:10 AM 8/21/96, Skip wrote: >> ----- Message body suppressed ----- >> > > >Sounds good to me. Keep it up. It looks like an internal mailing list version of Cypherpunks at Netscape is feeding back into the regular list with weird results. --- | "Remember: You can't have BSDM without BSD. - alan(a)ctrl-alt-del.com "| |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano(a)teleport.com |

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Electronic Money Conference
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Fri, 23 Aug 1996 20:44 EDT From: Somebody Subject: Electronic Money Conference To: rah(a)shipwright.com http://www.occ.treas.gov/emoney.htm How to Register . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . Speakers' Photos Toward Electronic Money & Banking: The Role of Government A Conference Sponsored by the United States Department of the Treasury A Conference Sponsored by the United States Department of the Treasury A Conference Sponsored by the United States Department of the Treasury [Image] [Image] Sheraton Washington Hotel Washington, DC September 19-20, 1996 Thursday, September 19, 1996 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7:00 a.m. - Registration and Continental Breakfast ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8:15 a.m. - Opening Address KEYNOTE ADDRESS The Honorable Robert E. Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9:45 a.m. - Panel Session International Cooperation A discussion of the major issues facing the international financial regulatory and law enforcement communities as electronic money systems and banking on the Internet become a reality. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10:45 a.m. - Address SPEAKER ADDRESS The Honorable Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11:15 a.m. - Panel Session Consumer Issues An exploration of the impact of emerging electronic money and banking technologies on consumers, including consumer disclosure requirements, assignment of liability, and challenges and opportunities for consumer access and acceptance. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12:30 p.m. -Luncheon LUNCHEON ADDRESS The Honorable John Reed, Chairman and CEO, Citicorp ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2:15 p.m. - Panel Session Security and Authentication A discussion of industry's interest in the commercial use of strong cryptographic techniques and the government's national security concerns, and a look at the role industry and government standards play in the implementation of encryption and authentication technologies. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4:00 p.m. - Concurrent Panels Payment System Issues A discussion of domestic and international payment system issues raised by electronic money and banking systems, including consideration of new and future operational, settlement, and systemic risks. E-Money Systems: Case Studies A look at actual experiences with operational E-money systems and pilot tests in Europe and the United States, impediments to consumer and merchant acceptance, and perspectives on the role of government. Privacy Issues An examination of consumer privacy issues raised by the use of personal information generated by electronic commercial and banking transactions, and a look at industry and government responses. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6:00 p.m. - Reception ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7:00 p.m. - Dinner DINNER ADDRESS The Honorable Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Friday, September 20, 1996 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7:30 a.m. - Continental Breakfast ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8:30 a.m. - Opening Address KEYNOTE ADDRESS The Honorable Michael N. Castle, Chairman Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy House Committee on Banking and Financial Services ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9:00 a.m. - Panel Session Law Enforcement Perspectives A look at law enforcement issues raised by the emerging technologies, including the effectiveness of the current regulatory scheme, traditional investigative techniques and analysis, and international jurisdictional responsibilities. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10:45 a.m. - Panel Session Electronic Money: Perspectives on Issuers A discussion of the institutional, financial, and operational criteria for successful issuers, including an exploration of the roles government and market forces play in establishing minimum requirements. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12:00 p.m. - Luncheon LUNCHEON ADDRESS Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2:00 p.m. - Conference Closes ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Questions: E-mail Fax: E-Money Conference 202-874-5436 --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "'Bart Bucks' are not legal tender." -- Punishment, 100 times on a chalkboard, for Bart Simpson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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Remailer
by 81764205＠cshore.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Help!!!! I need a good Anonymous remailer, can somebody send me a program that does just that. Thanks

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