December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

John Grubor and me
by Lucifer Remailer Operator 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just for the record, I am not John Grubor and had never even heard of him before I did an Altavista search on his name earlier today. The concept that some net.loon like Grubor would get another account with DHP to run an anonymous remailer for whatever reason is laughable. From what I have read, Grubor spams newsgroups quite often, something I have not done nor plan on doing. I was expecting people to be posting paranoid rantings about how I am obviously a spook...

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ALERT - DOJ TO APPEAL CDA says Interactive Week
by rodger＠interramp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From a draft to be posted shortly at http://www.zdnet.com/intweek By Will Rodger Wahington Bureau Chief Inte@active Week The Department of Justice will appeal to the Supreme Court a federal court decision that stayed enforcement of a controversial Internet indecency law, sources close to the court challenge told Inter@ctive Week Thursday. Department of Justice lawyers gave Sen. J. James Exon, D-Nebr. news of the appeal in a three-line letter delivered to the law's chief sponsor Wednesday. A copy of the letter was obtained by Inter@ctive Week. Exon welcomed the news. "We needed the Justice Department to make a final decision on the appeal, which I am pleased that they have done with the full support of the White House," Exon said. "This will now go to the Supreme court and I believe we will get a more thoughtful decision out of the top court than what the court in Philadelphia ruled." Attorneys on the other side seemed equally pleased. "This is wonderful news because it means the Supreme Court will have a chance to speak on these issues," said Mike Godwin, staff counsel of the Electronic Frontier Foundation. "We feel certain the Supreme Court will uphold the lower court's finding that the statute is unconstitutional." The Communications Decency Act, passed as part of telecommunications reform legislation last February, would have banned indecent images and speech from any areas open to minors on the Internet. Under the law, operators of Internet sites would have been required to segregate indecent content into adults-only areas that required a credit card or other form of positive identification for access. Drafters based their restrictions in large part on regulations governing broadcast media which still prohibit indecency over the airwaves, as well as some local ordinances which require segregation of indecent materials from others. But a coalition of civil liberties groups, for-profit and non-profit organizations challenged the Act in a consolidated suit before a federal court in Philadelphia. The law, plaintiffs claimed, was unconstitutional since it set up restrictions on indecent but constitutionally protected speech. The CDA, moreover, would place a "chilling effect" on free speech as Internet users unnecessarily limited their speech in order to comply with an impermissibly vague law, plaintiffs claimed. In place of the CDA, plaintiffs suggested evolving technologies in the hands of responsible parents would better protect children while preserving adults' First Amendment rights. The Philadelphia Court agreed with the plaintiffs on all counts, striking down the law June 12. In a unanimous decision, a three-judge panel found that the democratic nature of the Internet entitled it to at least as much protection as print, traditionally the least regulated of all media. The court also found that the statue was impermissibly vague and would thus unnecessarily restrict speech. The court also ruled the government had failed to show the law was enforceable with current technology. Cheers. Will

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FTS2000 and Encryption?
by nson＠kpmg.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I trying to find out if there are any talks, decisions or even standards being discussed for encryption and FTS2000? Anything will be helpful.

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New mix/ghio.remailer.2 remailer up: jam
by Ian Goldberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- As anticipated, I've put up a ghio.remailer.2. The email address is <remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca>. Here's the public key: Type bits/keyID Date User ID pub 1024/734C3A3D 1996/06/28 John Anonymous MacDonald Remailer <remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> sig 734C3A3D John Anonymous MacDonald Remailer <remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCNAzHUH7sAAAEEAKi9dAsHtUYzWu8u/0O3HKfWMYYfuwlo9y5W1x+lvNdZ9RL0 T1znvGaaoGmVF76qzl3aAabuoiKTdeGyUtZ5kZ/Ka+DpMaRQUaTY7i4wf3vD8u1I y2mTGYv945BwBdhcpDeTVCK81J6krnY1iAi6o8GqtATQHeJskDz5wkNzTDo9AAUR tDtKb2huIEFub255bW91cyBNYWNEb25hbGQgUmVtYWlsZXIgPHJlbWFpbGVyQGN5 cGhlcnB1bmtzLmNhPokAlQMFEDHUH+c8+cJDc0w6PQEBIC0D/jMBXNlMBSokNveZ 7LvWpWKfOlHwNSNGT3p403o21bIG9txsPk9e/wDurG310hJglKBuovoenqwClxy/ m6lldAe+11VMpLimzUCE0W4LeJxW84N+Jg/SGmP7YF1N0OmAc0snfvJhhgI0kWHl DMu+pWAc6UXLEPln0wtb936TFxbA =WL1j - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- It also accepts Mixmaster messages: jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca c2178bf3018c062a8d0fabd066e50ed9 2.0.3 - -----Begin Mix Key----- c2178bf3018c062a8d0fabd066e50ed9 258 AATgExB26IdURw+itvFEQsWjv/mQFgg3Tu2avLU2 fdW55aqKqKDeiIWf8nY24HG+i08s65cp8zCm2w7E ZvzgcBxLQu91Sg1UbQlkYMYqx8NpeKjxnkU+5KqC mswqrAbOn0qqcmNz7/3TsGS0p22+Dsw9rLjwDk4o udzR2maCUTuDvwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB - -----End Mix Key----- Note that the above mix line should be used instead of the one (called "jammix") I posted yesterday. For Raph's remailers file: $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; - Ian -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMdQs3UZRiTErSPb1AQHC9gP+KT5KfwsHdK6S7Urg2iVxbLAqci5+gZhi E6UKqsolDv8BMCr5nJuMClEHfdJBGrGeyrazgcxESmOzAoj/TfHbIU6seg46/q9c pSpASazX39YE8Os5hMomgcEfFBVFE8+m9XUWGNnpCvyO8ZtlfVyQS+vG0aS2o0hE /59pTd0iTAM= =J5Hd -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: CIA Fears UmpTeen InfoNukes
by Rick Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

frantz(a)netcom.com (Bill Frantz) writes about the miserable state of computer security, and I'll comment on some statements, hopefully taken not too far out of order and context: >I think that backward compatibility requirements are a significant part of >the reason we see this problem. The other part is, of course, that there >is no market for security. The phrase "backward compatibility" is, in my experience, a code phrase for peoples' annoying habit of wanting to stay with things they've finally made useful as opposed to having them replaced by something "better" that is more expensive, less convenient, and in general less familiar. The components of the latest release of MS Office come to mind as a good example, and they didn't even include public key crypto to atone for it. I agree that it's seductive for us security weenies to think the tail wags the dog, but let's remember what's really supposed to be happening. The requirement isn't "backwards compatibility," the requirement is that people get their work done. If the security threat keeps them from getting their work done, then backwards compatibility is no longer a major requirement. >The problem, in general, isn't the system administrators. If management >gave the same priority to security that it does to joining new users or >installing new hardware, sysadmins would have the time to install the >patches. Most sysadmins are up to their asses in alligators. Security is >something to put off. If the managers were judged on the security of their >systems (perhaps via independent audit), then they might give the problem >some priority. The problem (or at least the difference) is in the priorities established by an organization's culture. Some would rather take the risks and do things in a fairly open, if unpredictable, environment. Some prefer and even thrive on predictability. Either approach can and does produce valuable results. However, few people want to use a bank that takes the "open, if unpredicable" approach. Banks have auditors. >The ideal situation for them would be to use public key authentication >because it would be entirely user-transparent. ... Nonsense. The mere fact that it's not currently deployed guarantees that it won't be user transparent. Vendors will include it on some rewrite of whatever software it's embedded in. Memory requirements go up and delays are introduced when the crypto computations are performed. Security will be added only if it gives customers more things they can do, so there'll be other functional changes as well. In any case, working crypto *can't* be entirely user transparent. People need to handle keys, choose the one to use, and update them occasionally. There is a lot of training and cultural awareness involved here that just doesn't exist yet. And there will be *billions* in fraud before people finally learn, then maybe it'll attenuate to mere millions (and I'm probably still optimistic by orders of magnitude). Look at credit and ATM cards. A dozen years ago a bank issued us some ATM cards, and the clerk insisted on writing the PIN code ON the cards. Very few banks do that any more. Rick. smith(a)sctc.com secure computing corporation

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Re: [NOISE] Ga Law/No False Identity
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:43 PM 6/27/96 -0400, AwakenToMe(a)aol.com wrote: >falsely id a person?? Well it seems to me ya just wanna get the messages >OUTTA there and arent trying to 'act' as that person in the sense that you >are posing to NO person that you really are that person. I just wonder how the law is going to effect all those web servers posing as nobody (uid #-1). "When SUID is outlawed, only outlaws will become sysadmins." --- |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano(a)teleport.com |

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DUO_pol
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We offer cypherpunk Jim Ray's column in The Miami Herald of June 24 on suppression of political freedom in Florida by the Democrat-Republican duopoly. http://pwp.usa.pipeline.com/~jya/duopol.txt (5 kb) DUO_pol

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Yet another mailing list
by droelke＠rdxsunhost.aud.alcatel.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For those of you who are privacy-cypherpunks - there is another list (run by big-brother) out there on the issue. >From the list-of-lists: PRIVACY Subscription Address: PRIVACY-REQUEST(a)FTC.GOV Owner: John Audette <ja(a)mmgco.com> Last Update: 12/28/95 Description: A mailing list created bt the US Federal Trade Commission to allow interested parties to discuss the issues surrounding the privacy interests of consumers visiting web sites. It is part of the FTC's "Privacy Initiative" to investigate whether the information collected at websites (either that affirmatively submitted by a visitor via a form or information collected based upon a visitor's selection of pages at a site to reflect personal interests) should be the subject of regulation by the FTC. ------------------------------------------------------------------ Dan Oelke Alcatel Network Systems droelke(a)aud.alcatel.com Richardson, TX

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Re: CIA Fears UmpTeen InfoNukes
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:51 AM 6/28/96 -0500, Rick Smith wrote: >frantz(a)netcom.com (Bill Frantz) writes: >>I think that backward compatibility requirements are a significant part of >>the reason we see this problem. The other part is, of course, that there >>is no market for security. > >... > >The requirement isn't "backwards compatibility," the requirement is >that people get their work done. If the security threat keeps them >from getting their work done, then backwards compatibility is no >longer a major requirement. Absolutely. However, from a vendor's point of view, customers have a wide range of security problems. Some run in an open environment and have no use for security. They may still be using those VT100s. These are the customers the vendor considers when thinking of backwards compatibility. >>The ideal situation for them would be to use public key authentication >>because it would be entirely user-transparent. ... > >Nonsense. The mere fact that it's not currently deployed guarantees >that it won't be user transparent. Vendors will include it on some >rewrite of whatever software it's embedded in. Memory requirements go >up and delays are introduced when the crypto computations are >performed. Security will be added only if it gives customers more >things they can do, so there'll be other functional changes as well. There are several "users" at issue. I fully agree that those administrators responsible for upgrading the software and hardware for the change will notice. The people who have to pay for it all should also notice. But the actual end user may find the logon simplified. If is sufficent to mearly identify the machine and not the person, then the new software can eliminate end user involvement in the logon. The administrator is responsible for installing the private key in the machine and the end user never sees it. On the other hand, if users still must be identified, it is possible to give them a logon interface which is unchanged from the old, non-one-time-password, interface, while still giving them the benefits. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | The Internet may fairly be | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | regarded as a never-ending | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | worldwide conversation. | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: E-Cash promotion idea
by Matt Carpenter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Lucky Green wrote: >At 23:19 7/22/96, Anonymous wrote: > >>How about getting the CyberCafes to accept ecash? Just pull out your >>Newton/HP48/PDA and point the IR beam at the cash register. Now that's >>an ecash application I'd like to see!! > >So would I. And one day we will. Though not not on the HP48. Actually I've been doing some more thinking about this recently, and it may be possible even on an HP48, if you're willing to limit your spending flexibility a little in order to gain the advantages provided by ecash. A couple months ago there was a similar thread on using ecash with Newtons, PDA's, palmtops, and so on. I mentioned an idea of having an "ecash ATM" on an online machine, which would allow you to download ecash coins to your portable device. You could then carry the ecash around with you. This way you wouldn't need a full blown ecash client on the portable, just a simple program that would ask you for the payment amount and send off the appropriate coins. The main problem with the idea seemed to be that I suggested getting change from the merchant. Ian Goldberg pointed out that with the current ecash protocol, accepting change not only eliminates your anonymity, but that you also have to go online to make sure you aren't being cheated. Anonymous's post got me to thinking about this again. Since I know many of you are more knowledgeable about ecash than I, let me know if you can add more detailed information or see any problems with the approach below (other than a certain lack of convenience, which may be the major issue with this approach). What if we just forget about change? One of the neat things about ecash is that it allows for coins of (fairly) arbitrary values. We can use this to our advantage, since we can guarantee that we can make a single payment of any value with a small number of coins. (People familiar with ecash know all this already I'm sure, but I'll describe it in some detail for others who may not have thought about it as much). Here's the basic formula: Number of required coins = ceiling( log2( P/L ) ) where P is the maximum payment amount available to spend on a single transaction, and L is the "loss limit", or the upper limit of money we are willing to lose on a single transaction. For example, if we want to be able to make a $50 payment to the nearest cent ($.01), we need: ceiling(log2( 50/.01)) = 13 coins So with only 13 coins, we are guaranteed to be able to make any single payment from $.01 - $50 to the nearest cent. Since we are dealing with base 2 logarithms, if we increase the maximum amount to $100, we only need a single additional coin. The algorithm to generate the coin values is simple. Basically you start at P and just keep dividing by two until you reach L. For the above example, we could use 13 coin values of: $25, $12.50, $6.25, $3.13, $1.57, $0.79, $0.40, $0.20, $0.10, $0.05, $0.03, $0.02, and $0.01. This actually gives us a total of $50.05 due to rounding, but we are guaranteed of being able to pay to the nearest cent any amount between $0.01 to $50.00, with multiple possible combinations for certain values. Now, I'm not sure what the average size of an ecash coin is (anybody?), but the few I've seen floating around the net in "ASCII armor" have been around 500-600 bytes (of ASCII text), I think. So guessing (hopefully conservatively) that the average coin size is about 1k or less, then we need about 13k worth of storage space to make any single payment of $50 or under. We can do a little better if we are willing to lose a little money in the transaction. For instance, if L=$0.10, then we only need 9 coins (and we will lose less than $0.10 in the transaction). For L=$0.40, 7 coins. Of course this probably isn't cost effective in most cases, but might potentially be useful, if you are tight on storage space or something. So, with a storage space of approximately 64k (close to 5 x 13k), we are guaranteed of being able to make any 5 payments of $50 dollars of less, to the nearest cent. Of course, we also need some software, but it should be fairly simple and small. Just a little database to keep track of which coins we have, and a simple user interface to prompt for payment amount, select the appropriate coins, and beam them off to the payee (probably also a transaction log, and encryption capabilities). A few points: * This should be doable with current technology. All we need is a fairly small storage space, say 128K or less (more gives us more flexibility), and something like IR, wireless, or even a serial port connection via cable to send the coins to the payee. This seems to allow things like Newtons, HP Palmtops (and perhaps higher end calculators), USR Pilots, etc. to be used as unconnected ecash "wallets". This assumes the payee is online, since they will want to clear the coins to make sure they are good. * This is less expensive than requiring both parties to be online. The payee doesn't need to provide a net connection to the payer; the payer doesn't need to utilize memory space (and possibly additional hardware) for more complicated software to carry out the online transactions and payment generation. All the payee needs (besides the standard ecash software and a net connection) is a method of receiving coins, like IR, and some fairly simple software. * Although one may be carrying around $250 with the above example, it is much safer than carrying cash. Ecash maintains the advantage of cash-like anonymity, but we can keep a back-up of the money on our home machine, and we can encrypt the coins we carry to avoid having them spent by someone else, in case our portable device is lost or stolen. (Of course we do lose a possibly expensive portable device.) * With the proper software and connections to the "ecash ATM" we can have our portable device automatically recharged when we get home (and also update the records of which coins were spent). The ATM also gives us complete control over our spending configurations. There could even be several default set-ups for frequently used cases, each assigned to a single button. Just connect your portable device, click a button, and you're ready to go. For example, if you are going to work, you might generally want to have the capability of several smaller payments for snacks, lunch, and such. For grocery shopping you may want a few larger payments, etc. Also the software could automatically keep track of your purchases (like a credit card statement, or checking account log, but you'd be the only one who has access to it). Plus you don't need to run off to find an ATM; you can get cash from "the comfort and privacy of your own home". * The main problem seems to be the loss of flexibility. After you make your maximum number of guaranteed payments you may have money left over, but it may not be useful for buying what you want. You may only have a $25 coin left to purchase that $1.00 item. Personally, as a possibly paranoid technophilic cypherpunk, I don't see this as a major problem. It means you have to plan ahead a bit, but it gives you the same anonymity as cash, with less chance of having you're money lost or stolen. Those with PDD (Paranoia Deficit Disorder (cypherpunks, are there drugs to treat this? :-)) may not have the same view, and be more likely to use less private, more "convenient" methods of payment. But with the proper software setup and user interface, this approach could probably be made acceptable to many. * I'm not sure how easy this would be with the existing ecash software. Browsing over the ecash API (http://www.digicash.com/api/Home.html) I see there is a EC_pocket_begin_withdrawal() function which looks like it may automatically do something similar to the guaranteed payment thing I described above (I've been salivating over the ecash API for a while, but haven't actually had to time to play with it yet). Things may get tricky if you pick funky values of L, the "loss limit". In any case, it seems like this would be possible, even on an HP48. Probably not all that useful/usable though until you move up to something a little more powerful (how much memory does the HP48 have? I have an old HP28S with 32k, so I'm guessing the '48 has more than that). Once I finish up my thesis, find a job, and find some free time (hopefully all within the next month and a half :-) I plan to play with this idea. Unless someone else beats me to it, or there is something important I'm missing. Comments? - --Matt - -- mcarpent(a)mailhost.tcs.tulane.edu -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMfX32ijtJAMyBnp9AQGD+gf/TOe/ouunmhRz7jL+y65iqU57OaZAK1g0 gLIRDFQDTYMX7387FMBKlQ66RMJx4K80lW59oCAaa3/GyBDZR6Kn9bj2m7aZbYkL 4UDV7HoSJrV8qJv08HXnPibi7kmv+bAztHOAx7M7qo5qUayYCFrMeib65ksrrQYY nnlnCPfLWAPMHeFYUSA3fv9XwQB9NZVSCgr8Z2vhnfCAERqLLukaXHJq9InSPmWw XFIdU1x/cPzOUJx7rxth6qBonz5DD9AMof9Qqk8VY/AzohqHylKirog/IJRTefNl p1xEdI/iBhH3m3azvNhtkEIl0MAzBGU26hBIjB2P9P+08shtMfznow== =vR9P -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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