December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: crosspost re remailers
by Matts Kallioniemi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 15:43 1996-05-18 -0700, Bill Frantz wrote: >At 7:07 AM 5/18/96 +0200, Benjamin Brochet wrote: >>WHO IS THE MODERATOR OF THIS LIST ? >> >>I've been victim of a spoofing from a german.... he suscribed me to 2200 >>mailing list... also I'd to be unsuscribed from your list ! >> > >There is no moderator. I am just a subscriber like yourself (except I >asked for it.) Did you get a welcome message which included information >like the following? If he was indeed subscribed to 2200 mailing lists, you can assume that he didn't read all the "welcome messages." For people who are stuck with old fashioned mail systems (no filters, no macro language) this is a serious problem. It would be rude to call the victims clueless and subscribe them to even more "clueless mailing lists." Matts

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Re: SEVERE undercapacity, we need more remailer servers FAST
by Matts Kallioniemi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 18:29 1996-05-15 -0400, Black Unicorn wrote: > >I would really like to see a remailer that is somehow blinded. > >I don't know enough about how mail paths are generatered, but is it >impossible to conceal the origin of remailer postings? IP spoofing would do this nicely.Since SMTP doesn't require any significant responses, you can send blind and fake your IP address. To do that you need root access on your mailer machine and an ISP that doesn't sniff and filter its network for spoofing attacks. See ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-95:01.IP.spoofing for a good description of spoofing attacks and defenses. If you're not up to writing spoofing code into your (re-)mailer, then an easier solution is to send everything through anon.lcs.mit.edu after you have removed all headers that point at you. Matts

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News from Burma
by camcc＠abraxis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ASIA 'Excommunication' An anglo-Burmese businessman friendly with pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi has been sentenced to thre years in jail for owning unauthorized telephones and fax machines. James Leander Nichols, also known as Leo Nicholas, was punished for having two fax machines and a telephone switchboard with nine lines in his home, a spokesman for Suu Kyi's political party said. In an effort to discourage contact between Burmese citizens and the outside world, Burma's military government requires people to get permission to own a fax machine, satellite dish, or sophisticated phone system. News Services The Atlanta Constitution/The Atlanta Journal Alec -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMZ9ArCKJGkNBIH7lAQFrrAQAw7g/OeEU0IbK+4haxL4r7CWez9R1MqH6 W0Zq1l59XlRDkCCPj34HqrXGchg1Wnnw6LMK7B41JMRl68jvkVLmLnZ9FHwehZ9V R2WzRM+VzHwcpxQ4Fha1pwdq4Lm5naeS+3FiTQDcbTATT7hpBSiLOXhMNSlxFcBP G2KtNA2iZAM= =g8jc -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Interactive Week exclusive - White House to launch "Clipper III"
by rodger＠interramp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 5/18, Tim May wrote: >A question for Will Rodger: Is this "White Paper" ("The newest proposal is >contained in a 24-page White Paper, a draft of which hit Capitol Hill >earlier this week") related in any way to the one being prepared by Herb >Lin and a bunch of other folks? It was due out about this time, and the >topic seems similar. A bunch of us gave input to Herb and his panel at the >CFP in '95...if this is the same White Paper, looks like we might just as >well have saved our breath. Don't know. This did have full input from security agencies, however. >I read the stuff at the URL, and at first blush it looks to say nothing >about _domestic_ (within the U.S. and Canada) encryption. I'll be anxious >to see what the White Paper says about domestic encryption. > No restrictions domestically nor in Canada. Even so, these CAs and the policy body above it clearly give the govt. more of a role in controlling crypto. >However, as with other proposed crypto laws and "trial balloons," there are >several questions which arise: > >1. Will there be pressures put on the browser companies (Netscape, >Microsoft, etc.) and the e-mail companies (Qualcomm, Microsoft, Claris, >Lotus, etc.) to produce a "world version" that meets export standards with >a single shrink-wrapped package? > >(Recall that last fall some of the various companies stated as their goal >having a single package that could be shipped worldwide. Some of them >claimed having two versions, a domestic U.S. version and an international >version, was too onerous. I am skeptical of this, given that they have >multiple platforms to support, multiple operating systems, etc. But they >claim it is.) > >2. Interoperability. How will U.S. users exchange messages with >international users? Will a U.S. user have to register with the Authorities >to get the proper credentials, protocols, etc.? No indications they would. Idea is each authority could talk to the other and request escrowed keys or info. a la interpol. Of course, as today, there's no guarantee that agreements will always be in place, nor honored. > >3. With products like PGP, there are already international users (lots of >them). Thus, no "export laws" are involved. So, will I be able to >communicate with them using my existing PGP methods? Under the White Paper, yes. > >And if U.S. users can continue to interoperate with international users as >they are now doing, this puts the lie to claims about how key escrow will >be useful for law enforcement. Which makes it look a lot like the old proposal. > >4. And of course there is always the issue of _superencryption_. How a >GAKked program can detect that superencryption is being used has never been >adequately explained (to my satisfaction at least). Entropy measures won't >do it, and forbidding any encryption of messages already containing "BEGIN >PGP" will clearly just be a klugey bandaid. > >5. What about U.S.-based corporations with offshore offices? Is a company >supposed to replace its entire intranet corporate network with a GAKked >system if even a single user is outside the U.S.-Canada? If it's legal now, the paper suggests it should be legal in the future. > >6. What about U.S. persons travelling abroad? > >7. What about packets zinging around the world? Lots of complications if >GAK is insisted upon. And lots of new avenues for "packet laundering." > >8. The issue of why other countries would insist that their citizens GAK >their keys when U.S. citizens don't have to!! >("Yes, Herr Glomlutz, we are insisting that all Germans using Netscape 4.0 >must deposit their keys mit der Key Authority. No, we are not requiring our >own citizens to do this." I don't think this will fly too well.) > >I can't see how other countries will go along with this. The Paper is quite unclear on this, as well. Presumabyt other countries will have equally spiffy stuff they will require be escrowed for export under COCOM. ALl of this, of course, assumes cooperation from OECD, et al. > >And what about the usual problem of "rogue nations" like Iraq, Iran, North >Korea, Israel, and Liberia? Same as before. > >9. Many other issues. (They never answered the similar questions raised the >last time, so I doubt they will this time.) > > >Clipper III, if it turns out to be another worthless proposal which is >laughed out of Washington, will be no real threat. If Clipper III actually >outlaws or places limits on domestic use of crypto (as I think it must, >else it can be too easily circumvented completely), then it will be a >rallying cry which will likely see our membership increase still further, >the anti-Washington rhetoric escalate, and likely some new developments in >the war. Stay tuned.... Will Rodger Washington Bureau Chief Interactive Week.

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Re: Sendmail Question (was: SMTP Server for sending to anonymous remailers?)
by camcc＠abraxis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 12:09 AM 5/19/96 -0700, you wrote: >If you use popmail (like Eudora), then just tell it the server to use in >"SMTP Host". > > -Lance > I have been following this with no little interest. Using Eudora Pro when I attempt to replace host: smtp1.abraxis.com with *SMTP Host*, I receive the message *Attempting to resolve host: SMTP Host*, and dat's all until I stop the send command. Thanks Alec -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMZ9PJyKJGkNBIH7lAQGamwP/e1L3bWlOxCLfcEcSCUK7L2NPyDn3lNoe n4omNWrcUUOzBpQXg2fxPgmfsBDvao84neqbnkLv4HlPdFqDT/WgbNKzaJILYazS 2W2XsuDY5fxDNizKPmv+BSiPCYCMqCdD96g+Pl52Im1F6D9oEYkbe1Kvpb+iZTOj UyQUePJKtbk= =70bm -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Interactive Week exclusive - White House to launch "Clipper III"
by Dave Farber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The "White Paper" (if it exists) from the White House is different from the National Research Report. The NRC is independant from the White House and the Government. Dave >From my IP mailing list: Date: Fri, 10 May 1996 08:50:41 -0700 Reply-To: farber(a)central.cis.upenn.edu (Dave Farber) To: interesting-people(a)eff.org (interesting-people mailing list) Subject: The National Research Council Study of National Cryptography Policy Please post this message widely I am writing to let interested parties know about the imminent release of the NRC's study of national cryptography policy. If all goes well, we hope to release it on May 30, 1996. However, prior to that time, we won't be able to comment on its contents. For current information on release, visit the web site http://www2.nas.edu/cstbweb/220a.html When you visit that site, you'll have the opportunity to be put onto a mailing list so that we can inform you by e-mail when the report is available in print and/or electronically, as well as any public events associated with the report (e.g., public briefings). Herb Lin Cryptography Policy Study Director Computer Science and Telecommunications Board National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council 202-334-2605

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Re: Why the Poor are Mostly Deserving of their Fate
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:32 PM 5/18/96, Sean Gabb wrote: >On Sat, 18 May 1996, Duncan Frissell wrote: > >> It was understandable to be poor when all the world was poor. It is >> understandable to be poor in those nations today that make the >> accumulation of wealth a crime for most people. It is not understandable >> to be poor (for long) in the US where one can reliably get out of poverty >> simply by doing three simple things: >> >> 1) get a high school diploma >> 2) get married >> 3) get any job >> >> Only about 2 tenths of 1% of those who satisfy those three requirements >> incomes below the official poverty line. >I've done all these things - and rather more in the way of education. But >while I don't fall on or near the poverty line, I'm still poor as a church >mouse. What am I doing wrong? * Point Number One: Sean Gabb <cea01sig(a)gold.ac.uk> ^^ * Point Number Two:"...not understandable to be poor (for long) in the US" ^^ Q.E.D. Actually, I think Duncan's "high school + marriage + any job" point is a bit simplistic, and I'm surprised about the ".02%" estimate. As someone else noted, there are a lot of folks in the rural South, Appalachia, and other places, who graduated from high school, are still married, and have some sort of job, and yet who make $6-8 an hour or less. I think more is needed. I would have added "savings/investment" and "hard work." Those who can force themselves to set money aside for investment get the compounded returns later on. And of course hard work--including taking a second job, having the extended family work, etc.--is also key. (Many immigrant Asians arrive penniless in the U.S., then get help from immigrant Asian who arrived earlier, live in crowded houses and apartments, have 4-6 wage-earners in a household, save as much as they can, and then open a small business. Success is almost inevitable. Hence the cycle continues. This tradition of the various Asian subcultures is almost completely lacking in certain other subcultures in America. More's the pity.) Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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No Subject
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cypherpunks is not a political newsgroup. From: camcc(a)abraxis.com X-Sender: camcc(a)smtp1.abraxis.com Date: Sun, 19 May 1996 11:40:11 -0400 To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: News from Burma Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ASIA 'Excommunication' An anglo-Burmese businessman friendly with pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi has been sentenced to thre years in jail for owning unauthorized telephones and fax machines. James Leander Nichols, also known as Leo Nicholas, was punished for having two fax machines and a telephone switchboard with nine lines in his home, a spokesman for Suu Kyi's political party said. In an effort to discourage contact between Burmese citizens and the outside world, Burma's military government requires people to get permission to own a fax machine, satellite dish, or sophisticated phone system. News Services The Atlanta Constitution/The Atlanta Journal Alec

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Re: Remailers vs Nyms - conflicting assumptions?
by Bruce Baugh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:10 PM 5/18/96 -0700, Raph Levien wrote: >The fact that you can refresh nyms makes the problem you bring up much >less severe. Certainly refreshing it every few weeks/months is a good idea anyway. It's just that I (at least) seem to have this remarkable knack for having important mail try to get me immediately after a nym server goes down and before I get the news. That's happened to me three times in the last year. Refreshing deals with the long-term problem, but not with the short-term one. Maybe I need to settle for a higher level of mail loss than I'm comfortable with, but precisely because I'm not comfortable with it, I do remain interested in alternatives. -- Bruce Baugh bruce(a)aracnet.com http://www.aracnet.com/~bruce

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Re: Instant Remailers
by middle-man-admin＠alpha.c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 19 May 1996, Timothy C. May wrote: > >It is possible for someone to operate an anonymous remailer anonymously. > >Just get a UNIX shell account under a fake name, pay with cash, and set up > >the remailing software. The identity of the operator of such a remailer > >would be difficult, if not impossible, to discover. > > I'm always surprised that this hasn't been happening; maybe it will when > the new clients become available. I'm currently working on a version of Mixmaster that allows an individual to run a remailer anonymously. The idea is to set up the primary address of the remailer as a nym. That was easy. I've almost finished the modifications to Mixmaster to allow it to call Raph Levien's premail package. I've set it up to cause all outgoing mail to chain through 2 more random remailers before the message is delivered to the destination. This effectively allows me to operate as a "hidden remailer-in-the-middle". I'll provide more details when I finish the code and it's been thoroughly tested. middle-man-admin

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