December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: [Off-Topic] "Curfews"
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 1 Jun 96 at 21:59, Duncan Frissell wrote: > I'm afraid that some courts have explicitly held that "the child does not > have a right to liberty but only a right to custody." That is old law, > however. Kids have lost many rights recently too including gun rights, etc. ....which dates back to laws that said women and children were mens' possessions. Very archaic. A case from several years ago comes to mind. Apparently a federal(?) court ruled that a 16-yr-old girl's parents were in the legal right to burn her krshna books and ban her from practicing it. [There was a protest in downtown SF sometime in 1989 or '90 about this.] --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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How can you protect a remailer's keys?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Encryption is critical for protecting against traffic analysis, but it's tough to protect a remailer's keys. Unlike regular email, where you can type the key in as you read it, remailers need to run automatically once you set them up. Some of the choices are: - leave it around in plaintext with only Unix file protections (Ghio2 works this way - does Mixmaster? My ghio2 version has it compiled into the binary, and I try to delete it from source.) - type it in to a long-running remailer process (with human intervention to start) - SSL-based remailers, where the web server handles crypto on a per-machine basis instead of per-remailer - use unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman (either hanging off a TCP port somewhere instead of mail, or 3 pieces of email) - off-line or off-site remailer such as a POP3 winsock remailer that makes it Somebody Else's Problem, and separates the remailer's public interface from the working parts - human intervention on every message (which may not be totally worthless for moderated news postings, if you want to take that approach to spam prevention.) Anybody have any other approaches? These are mostly weak, annoying, or both. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs # Rescind Authority!

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RE: Riding online elevators (Was CNN: Anonymous Stock Tips)
by blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Anonymous In my mail this morning was this bit of spam, I never heard of this guy before, Likely scooped my mailing address from misc.invest.stocks. -Newman ..................................................................... No, I received it as well. Must have taken names@addresses from the list. .. Blanc --Fwd-- >http://chancellor.stockpick.com > >I just got wind that Chancellor Group is reporting big quarterly earnings. >SGA Goldstar is just sending out a "buy" recommendation. I understand other >investment advisors are looking to recommend CHAG. The company has a >strong book value. The short sellers need to cover. This looks like a >good situation to me. What do you think? They are located at: > >http://chancellor.stockpick.com > >Bruce Keller, 203-869-8137 > >To terminate from my Internet Investment Opportunities, Reply to >term(a)portlandweb.com with "remove" in the subject field.

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Re: WSJ on "IRS-bashing"
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:01 PM 5/29/96 -0700, Rich Graves wrote: >Fascinating. Could you provide citations to these laws so that people in >this plane of reality might take a look at them? Over here, any such law >would be invalidated by R.A.V. v. St. Paul. The only exceptions are >restrictions on "fighting words" that meet the tests in Chaplinsky v. New >Hampshire and "hostile working environment" discrimination, which I assume >is what you're talking about, in some elliptical way. Pittsburgh Press vs Pittsburgh Human Relations Commission (sex specific help wanted advertizing outlawed). Various Fair Housing Laws ("we don't rent to your kind here" punishable by confiscation of property). Civil Rights Act of 1964 (verbal expressions of discrimination in the course of employment, housing, or service in public accommodations punished in numerous ways). Expressions of ill-will towards the President or members of his family punishable as threats in circumstances where similar comments made about anyone else would not be actionable. Note that work is a big part of most people's lives and there are substantial governmental restrictions imposed on speech in the work place with fellow employees and customers. DCF

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Re: Riding online elevators (Was CNN: Anonymous Stock Tips
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 2 Jun 96 at 1:00, Harry Bartholomew wrote: > > In my mail this morning was this bit of spam, I never heard of this guy > > before, Likely scooped my mailing address from misc.invest.stocks. [..] > No. Seems to have gone to all cypherpunks. I've never heard of > misc.invest.stocks. The only time I saw it was in that post... thankfully. --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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No Subject
by John D. Ervin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

list John D. Ervin Also known as "Felix1" jervin(a)netpath.net

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Re: Saw this on CNN: Anonymous Stock tips over IRC as bad???
by minow＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >One of the oldest tricks for running a stock up (or down) is >to put rumor teams on elevators in the financial district of >major cities. It would be more efficient to talk about the rumor on a cellular phone. Probably make a nice sting scenario, too. Martin Minow (who expects a cut of the reward money). minow(a)apple.com

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Re: Java Crypto API questions
by minow＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Today, CP's own Marianne Mueller was scheduled to give a talk at JavaOne on >the eagerly awaited (at least by this user) Java Crypto API. Here are my notes (and between-the-lines observations) from the Java crypto sesions (which were very well received). Watch the Java web sites for transcripts from JavaOne sessions. (but I don't know if the BOF will be available). -- Security is *important* -- zero tolerance for security bugs. Gosling said in his keynote that it changes things when people send their bug reports to USA Today. -- They're working with standards folk: W3C, IETF. -- Clean, simple design, paying attention toll aspects of security design: language, virtual machine, components (libraries). -- Adding digital signatures to code enables greater trust -- the user can allow an applet to "escape from the sandbox." -- Policies = Assertions + Capabilities. That's what my notes say -- I think it means that the user can use a signature to authenticate the applet's author/publisher and allow it greater capabilities. For example, a stock trading applet might be granted the capability to access a stock price service (Dow Jones) *and* a stock trading service. The current applet model only allows remote connection to the site that distributed the applet. -- Java will allow signing archives (a set of classes and resources). -- Network-centered security: digital signatues, encryption, key exchange, hash, bignum, random number generators. -- Packages (third-party applets) communicate with security packages through an abstract layer. There may be multiple packages. -- They will provide a secure key storage (like Apple's PowerTalk today, I presume) where "all" of your keys are held under a a single password. Rogue applications (applets?) can't leak keys. -- Feedback to security-api(a)java.sun.com. -- There's a white paper on the verifyier on the sun web site. -- They're writing a security policy for applications (applications function like "ordinary" Unix/Mac/whatever applications. -- User preference to designate capabilities for signed/unsigned applets. ---- ---- ---- Notes from the security birds of a feather session ---- ---- ---- -- Need multiple security managers: if any say no, reject the request. -- Servet, applet need different security managers. -- Problem with firewalls: client accesses server via firewall via proxy servers. May not be able to open a URL directly. -- Java Commerce API coming for payment functions. -- Problem with foreign applet vendors: how can a non-US security class vendor certify a class to be used (outside the US). Currently, it must be imported and signed by Sun. But, then it can't be exported without a Commerce Department license. No (current) plans to establish a signing authority outside of the U.S. Martin Minow minow(a)apple.com

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premail manual info
by test921148＠alpha.c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Whopee! Just installed premail. But I have a Question on how to use it. I need some Manual explaining how to use Premail and what can I put into its Configuration-file. I use Version 0.43 of Premail. The perl Script is somewhat readable but it is better if some User-manual was available. Send Answers to test921148(a)alpha.c2.org

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INFO: Sen. Burns urges White House to follow NRC recommendations (6/2/96)
by Voters Telecommunications Watch 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

============================================================================= ____ _ _ _ / ___|_ __ _ _ _ __ | |_ ___ | \ | | _____ _____ | | | '__| | | | '_ \| __/ _ \ _____| \| |/ _ \ \ /\ / / __| | |___| | | |_| | |_) | || (_) |_____| |\ | __/\ V V /\__ \ \____|_| \__, | .__/ \__\___/ |_| \_|\___| \_/\_/ |___/ |___/|_| SEN. CONRAD BURNS URGES CLINTON TO REASSES ENCRYPTION POLICY AND ANNOUNCES HEARINGS ON THE ISSUE for 6/12/96 REP. RICK WHITE (R-WA) SCHEDULED FOR HOTWIRED CHAT 6/5/96 9-10PM EST SEN. CONRAD BURNS (R-MT) SCHEDULED FOR HOTWIRED CHAT 6/11/96 10-11PM EST Date: June 2, 1996 URL:http://www.crypto.com/ crypto-news(a)panix.com If you redistribute this, please do so in its entirety, with the banner intact. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table of Contents News Text of Sen. Burns' letter to President Clinton How to receive crypto-news ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- NEWS Sen. Conrad Burns (R-MT), principal co-sponsor of legislation to ease restrictions on encryption, yesterday sent President Clinton a letter urging the Administration to reassess its encryption policy in light of a recent report by the National Research Council. The findings contained in the NRC study, released at a briefing in Washington DC on Thursday, raise serious questions about the rational for the Administration's current approach to cryptography policy. The study states explicitly, "Current national cryptography policy is not adequate to support the information security requirements of an information society." In his letter to the President, Senator Burns said that the NRC study presents overwhelming evidence that the current approach to encryption policy has failed. Burns also pledged to hold hearings in the Senate Commerce Committee on June 12 and 26. The night before the hearings (June 11 at 10 pm ET), Senator Burns will be live online at HotWired (http://www.hotwired.com/wiredside) Be sure to save the date and stop by to talk with the Senator about his efforts to encourage the widespread availability of strong encryption and get a preview of the hearings on the Pro_CODE bill. Information on Senator Burns' legislation, as well as information on the NRC report, is available at http://www.crypto.com DON'T FORGET! Representative Rick White (R-WA) will be on HotWired Wednesday June 5th at 9pm EST at http://www.hotwired.com/wiredside/ You can tune in and listen to the chat with the RealAudio software (http://www.realaudio.com) You can ask questions of the Representative through a moderator and get real, immediate responses. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- TEXT OF SEN. BURNS' LETTER TO PRESIDENT CLINTON May 30, 1996 The President The White House Washington, D.C. 20500 Dear Mr. President, I urge you to reassess the administration's position on cryptography policy in light of the report released today by the National Research Council, "Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society." The report was put together by the NRC Committee to Study National Cryptography, which included members from across the spectrum of the business, academic, defense and intelligence communities. The fact that such a diverse roster of our brightest minds could achieve consensus after taking two years to pore over the details of encryption policy is remarkable, and their recommendations should be taken most seriously. The acronym of the report's title-CRISIS-is especially apt given the massive economic and national security costs of the current policy, which severely restricts the export of software containing strong encryption. As the report states, "Current national cryptography policy is not adequate to support the information security requirements of an information society. Indeed, current policy discourages the use of cryptography, whether intentional or not, and in so doing impedes the ability of the nation to use cryptographic tools that would help to remediate certain important vulnerabilities." As the Chairman of the NRC Committee to Study National Cryptography, Kenneth Dam, states in the report "the crisis is a policy crisis, rather than a technology crisis, an industry crisis, a law enforcement crisis, or an intelligence-gathering crisis..." The most recent version of the administration's policy, as reflected in the draft white paper of the interagency working group on encryption, unfortunately reveals a continuing commitment to government-imposed mandates rather than private-sector solutions. The proposal, which was quickly dubbed "Clipper III" because of its close alignment with the earlier rejected Clipper schemes, has the support of neither the software industry nor the Net community. Indeed, as the Committee noted, an essential flaw behind the administration's policy is the continuing reliance on the national security and law enforcement communities to drive the policy through administrative diktat rather than open legislative action. As the report states, rather than vainly attempting to reign in the inevitable widespread use of strong encryption, the administration should be actively promoting it. The use of strong encryption has become vital to both ensuring the privacy of individuals and fostering the growth of the Global Information Infrastructure into the 21st century. As for the national security aspects of encryption policy, the report states that cryptography can protect proprietary information and reduce economic espionage. In addition, strong encryption can protect nationally sensitive information systems and networks against unauthorized penetration. Therefore, the use of strong encryption serves to protect national security rather than hinder it. Simply put, "on balance, the advantages of more widespread use of cryptography outweigh the disadvantages." I further call your attention to specific recommendations by the Committee: *National cryptography policy should be developed by the executive and legislative branches on the basis of open public discussion and governed by the rule of law. *No law should bar the manufacture, sale, or use of any form of encryption within the United States. *Export Controls on cryptography should be progressively relaxed. *The U.S. government should promote the security of the telecommunications networks more actively. *The U.S. government should take steps to assist law enforcement and national security to adjust to new technical realities of the information age. *Aggressive government promotion of escrowed encryption is not appropriate... *The debate over national cryptography policy can be carried out in a reasonable manner on an unclassified basis. *National cryptography policy affecting the development and use of commercial cryptography should be more closely aligned with market forces. A core recommendation of the Committee is that the administration foster an open public debate so that a national consensus on cryptography can be developed. I agree wholeheartedly and hope that the public hearings beginning on June 12 in the Commerce Committee's Subcommittee on Science, Space and Technology, which I chair, will help foster this process. Many of the NRC's recommendations are reflected in the "Burns Pro-CODE bill," S. 1726, which will be debated on that date, with an additional hearing to be held on June 26. Now that some of the best scientific and technical minds in the country have essentially endorsed the position that business and policy advocates have been taking for years, it's time for the administration to come around as well. In conclusion, I can only agree with the Chairman Dam's statement: We believe that our report makes some reasonable proposals for national cryptography policy. But a proposal for action. What is needed now is a public debate, using and not sidestepping the full processes of government, leading to a judicious resolution of pressing cryptography policy issues and including, on some important points, legislative action. Only in this manner will the policy crisis come to a satisfactory and stable resolution. Sincerely, /s/ Conrad Burns U.S. Senator ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- HOW TO RECEIVE CRYPTO-NEWS To subscribe to crypto-news, sign up from our WWW page (http://www.crypto.com) or send mail to majordomo(a)panix.com with "subscribe crypto-news" in the body of the message. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- End crypto-news =============================================================================

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