December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

SIFT service moving to Reference.COM
by Hector Garcia-Molina 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear SIFT Subscriber: Stanford University is pleased to announce a new partnership with InReference, Inc. which will significantly enhance your service. Under the terms of the agreement, Stanford is transferring the SIFT service to InReference. InReference will make the SIFT functionality available through its Reference.COM service (http://www.reference.com/) To minimize the disruption in your service, your queries will be automatically migrated to Reference.COM. The service will remain free of charge. We believe InReference is an excellent home for SIFT. The Company has the infrastructure and support necessary to provide you with a high quality service. In addition, InReference has added many interesting new features to the service: * More Content - 6+ month archive of more than 13,000 news-groups. - The Internet's largest archive of publicly-accessible mailing lists (soon to exceed 1,000). * Advanced Search Capabilities - Powerful filtering: Interactively refine your search using message header fields such as author, organization, conversational thread, newsgroup/e-mail list. - Query Templates: Identifying and entering the right newsgroups and mailing lists to search can be tedious. InReference has formulated a few query templates which pre-select the right newsgroups and lists for a particular topic. * Web and E-mail Accessible - Submit queries and receive results via e-mail or at the Reference.COM web site. You will receive a welcome notification from InReference in June, along with an (initial) username and password. In most cases, this should be identical to your existing SIFT username/password. Thank you for your ongoing interest in SIFT. Sincerely, Tak Yan, SIFT Architect Hector Garcia-Molina, Principal Investigator, Digital Library Project Department of Computer Science Stanford University Q: Who is InReference? A: InReference is a startup located in the NASA Ames Technology Commercialization Center in Silicon Valley. InReference has strategic partnerships with a number of well-known companies. These partnerships help provide the infrastructure to supply you with a first rate service: database technology from Oracle, search engines from Verity, servers from Sun, high speed Internet access from Pacific Bell, and high speed RAID storage from Storage Computer. InReference also has a great team of programmers dedicated to providing a quality service. Our technical team includes Eric Allman, the creator/developer of sendmail and Professor Hector Garcia-Molina, Principal Investigator of the Digital Library Project at Stanford University. Q: How will people access the Reference.COM service? A: Queries can be submitted and the results retrieved via the web (http://www.reference.com) or by e-mail. See their web page for details. Q: If it's free of charge, how does InReference pay for the service? A: Through the generosity of strategic partners, and advertising. Q: Is InReference's query syntax the same as SIFT's? A: No. To provide additional functionality, InReference has extended and changed the SIFT query syntax. Send e-mail to info(a)reference.com if you have further questions. Q: How do I discontinue my service? A: There is syntax to support an array of account management activities, including account termination.

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Senator, your public key please?
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I was running around the hill all morning and I thought I would drop in on Leahy to see what his key signing policies were. I gave Leahy a buzz to see if I could catch him in person but unfortunately it's a busy day on the hill and he sent me off to Beryl Howell instead. Ms. Howell is Senior Counsel for the minority staff of the Antitrust Subcommittee and handles all of Leahy's encryption gofering. I'd dealt with her on a limited basis once before, and I got a good 10 minutes to discuss some issues before she had to run off elsewhere. The issues she brought up were interesting. Firstly, Leahy wasn't advised to issue a public key, it was entirely his idea. No staff suggestion there. Secondly, the Ethics Committee was very interested in the issue. As of now they have ruled that "exchanging" PGP signatures is an "exchange in kind" and an ethics violation. Ms. Howell expressed exasperation over this lunacy, but put it much this way: "No, you guys don't understand what the issues are here, but I don't have 3 hours to explain it all to you either." Apparently the ethics committee is concerned that a signature from Leahy's key will constitute some sort of endorsement and the "you sign mine and I'll sign yours" looks like influence peddling. Part of the problem was that several politically oriented groups approached Leahy's office and descended like vultures on a carcass, all of them wanting to certify his key. No signing from Senator's keys for the time being. She said the ethics committee went so far as to prohibit them from soliciting signatures from others as well. Her conservative (and reasonable) interpretation was that she couldn't hand over a fingerprint of the key for signing purposes. As things stand now Ms. Howell intends to try and educate some of the key Ethics members over the August break and have a decent signing policy after the break itself. Welcome to the hill. Those of you who haven't might want to check out the May 2, 1996 version of the Promotion of Commerce on-line in the Digital Era (Pro-Code) bill. Nice choice snippet: The current strength of encryption the U.S. government will allow out of the country is so week that, according to a January 1996 study conducted by world-renowned cryptographers, a pedestrian hacker can crack the codes in a matter of hours. A foreign intelligence agency can crack the current 40-bit codes in seconds. Also: "Encryption expert Matt Blaze, in a recent letter to me, noted that current U.S. regulations governing the use and export of encryption are having a "deleterious effect... on our country's ability to develop a reliable and trustworthy information infrastructure." See: http://www.senate.gov/~leahy/ For some reason http:/www.leahy.senate.gov/ is also listed. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Autodocument signed iQCVAwUBMZtRLWqgui0rHO4JAQHRywQAgClfWZTLDCusKaAlefg53DShaCII6+vF O4X9a6vCZDWtIE0Nu7Nx/75K6zDo7AdjfqfYcAdLq4WW4F0FBH7u55+MYKUjDJ3X YFuxk9aPQSJzkgITK4EzGfHNswONkybuhAGo/6mcvJ8E2QW5rxUKRFxh7BLo7fmV CrEpvhzsycU= =uWRd -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --- My preferred and soon to be permanent e-mail address:unicorn@schloss.li "In fact, had Bancroft not existed, potestas scientiae in usu est Franklin might have had to invent him." in nihilum nil posse reverti 00B9289C28DC0E55 E16D5378B81E1C96 - Finger for Current Key Information Opp. Counsel: For all your expert testimony needs: jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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CSIS Supports Crypto (fwd)
by Steve Reid 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For what it's worth... ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 16 May 96 20:00:38 EDT From: David Jones <djones(a)insight.dcss.McMaster.CA> To: efc-talk(a)insight.dcss.McMaster.CA Subject: CSIS: growing threat of economic espionage CSIS warns that Economic Espionage is growing - Strong encryption may be one line of defence - by David Jones OTTAWA -- The Canadian Security Intelligence Service, CSIS, wants Canadian corporations and government departments to be aware of the growing problem of "economic espionage". This is distinct from "industrial espionage", which is just company-on-company spying; "economic espionage" is state-sponsored. I spoke briefly with Ted Flanagan, who is the National Coordinator for Economic Security and Proliferation Issues, for CSIS. After hearing him make his pitch on the TV news, I wanted to ask him about a possible conflict between, on the one hand, Canadian law enforcement, which seems reluctant to see strong encryption become widely used and, on the other hand, CSIS, which seems to be implying that government departments and private companies should take active steps to protect themselves, including the use of strong encryption. Here's a few of his comments, (paraphrased) It's sometimes surprising for people to hear that foreign states do have significant resources and can easily monitor telecommunications, *globally*. Companies have to be mindful of this. Encryption may not be necessary for everything, but for particular aspects of their business communications, such as bid proposals, online transactions, it may be appropriate. Obviously there is a law enforcement concern about criminal activity being shielded by the use of encryption, but encryption is now a commonplace and commercially available fact of life. The technology exists and if individuals are going to use it for illicit purposes, then they're going to use it. The reality, though, is that the Canadian government does have a security policy and they do have encryption requirements. Encryption is the sort of thing that an awful lot of Canadian companies are also using, depending on their resources and needs. We're working with a community who we feel have a legitimate requirement to ensure that proprietary information is protected. There's no way to reverse the trend of having commercially available software for encryption. So the bottom line for cops seems to be: Encryption is here to stay; get used to it. Ted Flanagan also explained CSIS's mandate. It doesn't deal with law enforcement per se, but it is concerned with national security. It advises government departments and alerts private organizations to potential threats. It operates within Canada in a "defensive" capacity. There's been some speculation that Canada needs an "offensive" intelligence agency that would be able to take steps in foreign countries to further our national interests. (Heck, if they're spying on us, maybe we should spy on them!) Don't bother signing up to be the next Canadian James Bond, though. There's no political support for such an agency any time soon. Part of the problem with raising corporate awareness of the threat of espionage is that serious incidents are often hushed up because of the damage that negative publicity would cause to the reputation of a big Canadian company. CSIS tries to work with companies on a confidential basis and keeps a private database of incidents they learn about. So, next time you read a newspaper article about two teenage boys getting busted for running a BBS with pirated software, keep in mind that elsewhere there's *real* cyber-crime that is going down, ... and although you may never hear about it, it's happening on a scale that makes those BBS pirates look like, well, mischievous children. Here's a random excerpt from the CSIS 1995 Annual Report "A foreign government is believed to have tasked its intelligence service to gather specific information. The intelligence service in turn contracted with computer hackers to help meet the objective, in the course of which the hackers penetrated databases of two Canadian companies. These activities resulted in the compromise of the companies' numerous computer systems, passwords, personnel, and research files." URL = http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/publicrp/pub1995e.html#economic - -

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Re: "Too cheap to meter"
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:54 PM 5/17/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >At 2:38 AM 5/16/96, Alan Horowitz wrote: >>Hey, let's build faster and faster fiber-optic networks. Let's create >>bandwidth so cheap that it won't even pay to meter it. > "Too cheap to meter" goes away pretty quickly. Don't be so sure about that, Tim. While it is probably true that service must be rationed, one way to do that is simply to charge based on the data rate of your modem. When, soon, fiber normally runs at that 20 Gb/sec rate of this new AT+T fiber, that represents about 700,000 connections at 28.8kbps, solid. Based on normal statistical useage, it's probably closer to 3-4 million connections. And that's only one fiber. Data-transmission companies need to make money, but they don't necessarily have to make that money by measuring actual transmitted data. This is similar to cable-TV companies who (with the exception of pay-per-view) don't charge based on how long you watch TV. The reason, obviously, is that it is no more expensive for them if you watch your TV 24 hours per day, than 5 minutes per day. Since fiber optic systems don't wear out with usage, and their capacities are exceedingly large, it would certainly be possible for these companies to start charging based entirely on maximum transfer speed. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Rural Datafication (Was Re: Edited Edupage, 9 May 1996)
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 15 May 96 at 15:03, Jim McCoy wrote: > US decided (via it's legislative system, regardless of whether or > not it was the "smart" thing to do) a long time ago that it was a > worthwhile goal to give everyone, regardless of where they lived, > equal access to certain parts of the national infrastructure. The US decided that the end justifies any means, and thus decided to > Actually they would put your money where your mouth is. If such > subsidies were not given then rural dwellers (those people who grow > all the food that keeps you alive...) would just add the cost to > food production and therefore add to the cost of what you eat. They are free to charge more. Oh, I forgot, prices are regulated... When grand'pa came to Canada in 1912 with his parents and his 11 brothers and sisters, he and they did not have a penny, nor did they speak the language nor had access to any socialistic programs. When he and his sister and brothers died, most of them were wealthy. And all they did all their life was to grow vegetables. They had very good reputations and I do not know any story of any one of them being con men. ` > It is rather amazing how this posting has drawn all of the militant > libertarians out of the closet. Why assume that I hid in some closet? I did not militate either. I do not endorse libertarian ideas. I've never read any "libertarian" litterature. I only read a bit of Ayn Rand, and the regular Objectivists will tell you that they are *not* libertarians. Actually they object to the libertarian doctrine. And again, I am no objectivist. Many of them refuse to talk to me. > > If there was such a perceived advantage, they would make it their > > priority. Parents would be willing to buy the necessary hardware > > and then, put the little extra that is required to connect. > > Remember, the costliest part of the internet is the hardware to > > run Netscape. >From a consumer standpoint, it is. Unless I am wrong. Can you bring up figures? > You have obviously never had anything to do with connecting people > to the internet, have you? After spending the last four years prior > to my current job bulding one of the largest ISPs in Texas I can > promise you that getting the dedicated line from one location across > a LATA into another where connectivity is a non-metered local phone > call from your subscribers is a very costly affair (the line charges > are per-mile, and here in the US you may have to run your wire > 100-250 miles to get to the next LATA) Why don't you just use a microwave link? Oh, I forget, the FCC might not permit it... And then, why don't you just get together all the bunch of peoples and decide to obtain a right of way for a community cable that would carry data? And while you are at it, maybe you can try a fiberoptic company to subsidize you, tax-deductible from their income... It's worth a shot! Oh, but again, the FCC and half a dozen other ministry might object. You don't find enough donations? No problems, simply sell your project, aided by your reputation, to every neighboor. Simply issue shares to raise money... Oh, again, I forgot, the SEC would object... How does a data link cost compare (long term and short term) to the initial expense of purchasing a computer? Like, since you mentionned it, how much did your project cost per user? > You seem to be falling into > the same line of thinking which most annoys me about Libertarians, You are too sensitive... :-) > you ignore the cost of building and maintaining the infrastructure > in the first place Not at all. We only realize that the cost of building infrastructures in *this* statist world is almost not affordable. Why don't you read about railroad history and come back later? JFA DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Limoges porcelain, Silverware and mouth blown crystal glasses JFA Technologies, R&D consultants. Physists, technologists and engineers. PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 Unsollicited commercial e-mail will be proofread at US165 $/h Any sender of such material will be considered as to have ac- cepted the above mentionned terms.

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Re: Why does the state still stand:
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"hfinney(a)shell.portal.com" "Hal" 16-MAY-1996 10:21:05.33 >From: "E. ALLEN SMITH" <EALLENSMITH(a)ocelot.Rutgers.EDU> >> I did not >> include offshore.com.ai in Anguilla due to its high cost; I consider anything >> over 25$ a month to be impractical. >Thanks very much for making this list. However I would not be so quick >to reject http://offshore.com.ai. It is run by long-time Cypherpunk >Vince Cate, apparently specifically for the kinds of purposes we are >discussing. His project was discussed in a recent issue of Wired, I >think the May issue. (I have no contact with Cate, and have never met >him as far as I can recall.) I was originally creating this as a list of places for me to look at for sponsoring a remailer, and then decided that the list might find it useful. I would find over 25$ a month impractical. However, in the 2nd edition I'll include http://offshore.com.ai, with a note on the cost (and on Vince Cate's political orientation.) >For doing something like running a remailer which will post material >which is illegal and/or copyrighted in the U.S., you are going to need a >service which can stand up to pressure. Presumably some monetary >incentive is going to be a necessity. Of course by this standard $25 a >month is pretty inconsequential. Yes. As I recall, there's supposed to be an ecash library coming out soon. I trust that someone involved in remailers is planning on making up one that charges ecash once those facilities are available? There's also the deposit idea for ones that serve an end-posting function; I didn't have this in mind when I created the list initially, again. >One issue is whether these banking-secrecy countries like Anguilla are >followers of the Berne convention or other international copyright >regulations. Banking secrecy and software piracy don't necessarily go >hand in hand. I hear a lot about copyright violations in China but not >in the Caribbean. So actually it isn't clear that this country is the >right location for a remailer that can post arbitrary material. Good point. I'll try to look up on the Berne convention. >As for the costs to the remailer operator, he simply passes those on to >his customers. I think in the long run onshore remailers will be forced >to take measures to restrict copyright-violating posts. So if your >choice is between paying nothing and not getting your whistle-blowing >message posted, or paying $10 and getting it out on the nets, then >hopefully it is worth that much to you. >We have discussed for-pay remailers and the consensus has been that no >one would use them when others run for free. However now I think the >false premise is being exposed, that free remailers simply will not be >able to run in the current mode for much longer. Once a single remailer >operator has been fined thousands of dollars because somebody posted some >copyrighted message, I don't think you will find many people eager to >sign up as operators. So this dream of a volatile collection of >remailers popping up and going away just doesn't work in my view. Why >would anyone offer a service knowing that he was exposing himself to >liability like this? It would be just a game of Russian roulette, >waiting to see whether it is your remailer which gets the bullet in the >form of a post which violates the copyright of someone with deep >pockets. I've discussed this somewhat above, but whether one needs to charge may depend on how one runs the remailer. If it only sends to other known remailers (ideally only to other mixmaster remailers), and the traffic analysis defeating features work properly, then it's going to be hard to charge you for some mail going through the net that may not have even gone through you. In other words, we may get a division into two types of remailers: A. those that charge, and do send messages other than to other remailers; these may also be nym servers demanding a deposit, with a confirmation as to who's who via signatures B. those that don't charge, and don't send messages other than to other anonymous remailers. A combination of the above could certainly work, also; just charge for messages going to other than other remailers. -Allen

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AST II Conference
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Panel suggestions are always welcome -d ------- Preliminary Conference Announcement ADVANCED SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES II Sponsored by Privacy International Electronic Privacy Information Center September 16, 1996 Citadel Ottawa Hotel and Convention Centre Ottawa, Canada ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- The rapid evolution of technology is leading to the creation of a seamless web of surveillance across much of the world. Powerful technologies originally developed for the military are being adopted by law enforcement and civilian agencies, and private companies to monitor entire populations. This has been further fueled by the end of the Cold War and increasing demands for greater bureaucratic efficiency. Existing laws and regulations have failed to keep up with these developments. This one day conference will examine a range of advanced surveillance technologies and their impact on privacy and other civil liberties. It will explore the process of planning and implementation of the technologies, their operating conditions, and the people and organizations responsible for them. The conference will also examine possible technical, regulatory and legal responses. The conference will also address in detail the findings of Privacy International's "Big Brother Incorporated" report which examined the international trade in surveillance technology and the involvement of the arms industry. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- PARTIAL LIST OF SPEAKERS Phil Agre, University of California, San Diego Dave Banisar, Electronic Privacy Information Center Colin Bennett, University of Victoria Simon Davies, London School of Economics & Director, Privacy International Wayne Madsen, Author, Handbook of Personal Data Protection Bruce Schneier, Counterpane Systems & Author, Applied Cryptography CONFERENCE SUBJECTS * Artificial Intelligence Systems * Biometric Identification * Digital Cash * Information Superhighways * Information Warfare * Infrared and Passive Millimeter Wave Detectors * Intelligent Transportation Systems * Other New Technologies ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- MORE INFORMATION More information on the conference will be available at the Privacy International mailing list at pi-news(a)privacy.org (subject: subscribe) or at the PI Home Page at http://www.privacy.org/pi/conference/ottawa/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- HOTEL The Conference will take place at Ottawa Citadel Hotel in Ottawa, Canada. A block of rooms has been reserved at the hotel at a discounted rate of CAN $81.00/night for a single $91/night for a double. The hotel should be contacted directly for reservations, mentioning the AST II Conference to get the special rates and early reservation is recommended. The address is Ottawa Citadel Hotel, 101 Lyon St., Ottawa, Canada K1R 5T9, attention reservations, fax 613-237-2351, phone 613-237-3600. In North America you can call toll free at 1-800-567-3600. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- OTHER EVENTS THAT WEEK There are several other conferences in Ottawa that week. On Tuesday, September 17, Industry Canada will be sponsoring a one day Symposium and Demonstration of privacy enhancing technologies. On September 18 - 20, the Privacy Commissioner of Canada will be hosting the 18th International Privacy and Data Protection Conference. Contact: 613-995-2410 or email jroy(a)nstn.ca. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- REGISTRATION Registration Fees [] Standard - $250 CAN ($175 US) [] Non-profit organizations/Educational - $125 CAN ($75 US) Information Name: ___________________________________________________________ Organization: ______________________________________________________ Address: _________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________ Phone/Fax: _________________________________________________________ Electronic Mail:_____________________________________________________ Credit card Number/Expiration Date: _________________________________ (Do Not Email!) Fax Registration form and credit card number to +1 202.547.5482 Send Check or Money Order in $US made out to Privacy International to: Privacy International Washington Office 666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301 Washington, DC 20003 USA 1-202-544-9240 (phone) 1-202-547-5482 (fax) pi(a)privacy.org(email) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- _________________________________________________________________________ Subject: AST II Conference _________________________________________________________________________ David Banisar (Banisar(a)epic.org) * 202-544-9240 (tel) Electronic Privacy Information Center * 202-547-5482 (fax) 666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301 * HTTP://www.epic.org Washington, DC 20003 * ftp/gopher/wais cpsr.org

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test
by an616864＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

test --****ATTENTION****--****ATTENTION****--****ATTENTION****--***ATTENTION*** Your e-mail reply to this message WILL be *automatically* ANONYMIZED. Please, report inappropriate use to abuse(a)anon.penet.fi For information (incl. non-anon reply) write to help(a)anon.penet.fi If you have any problems, address them to admin(a)anon.penet.fi

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Reputations
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:09 PM 5/15/96, Steve Reid wrote: >Another problem with reputations is that people are stuck until they get a >good one. A bad rep can always start over. In fact, a person/company can >look perfectly nice, but use a different identity for dirty work. Sure. And they do this today (use cut-outs or subcontractors to limit reputational damage or liability). >Naturally, you'd only trust dealings that involve a "nice" identity. Not necessarily. Many people play the numbers, implicitly trusting the Mafia to pay off on bets they win. (Many don't think the Mafia has a very "nice" identity, but your mileage may vary.) In fact, nearly all of the alleged problems with anonymous systems, especially the issues of defections, trust, expectation of payoff, etc., have parallels in other "extra-legal" situations. For example, the Mafia and other extra-legal or criminal operations. Do they sometimes defect (welsh)? Sure. Do they sometimes screw over the little guy? Sure. Do people trust them just enough to keep dealing with them voluntarily? Sure. (Before anyone mentions it, there are of course cases where people are forced to deal with criminal gangs nonvoluntarily, such as with shakedowns, hijackings of trucks, etc. But a large fraction of the dealings with the Mafia, Jamaican gangs, Russian mob, etc., are for market reasons, where a market need for drugs, girls, cheap cigarettes, gambling, loans, etc., is being filled by players who are outside the normal legal marketplace.) >Problem is, young people who are just starting out have a no-reputation >identity, and would be treated the same as the no-reputation identities >that are used for screwing people over. Sure, newcomers always have it rough. Whether the newcomer is Nancy the Nym, or Eustace T. Collins, III, Esq., just starting out in a law firm, the newcomer has little positive reputation. (It varies, and the degree may mean something, just as Nancy the Nym may have some reputation capital to show.) I mentioned "postive reputation." There is a real cost in throwing out, say, 30 years of accumulated reputation capital, and this will not be done lightly by many. Thus, in a given transaction, a lot may be at stake. (I don't mean for this brief article to be an essay on the many fascinating issues surrounding reputation and reputation capital. Cf. my Cyphernomicon for much more on this topic.) >Reputations could be very hard to create, and very easy to destroy. As in real life. People can destroy their reputations by being careless. (I disagree with your implied point that the opinions of others can easily destroy a reputation. In real life, it usually takes a lot more than just bad-mouthing. Even in nym-space, the same is apparently true.) >Well-known good reputations would be powerful and fairly hard to destroy, >so it's possible that the big reputations might try to crush little >reputations in an effort to gain some sort of reputation monopoly. Maybe. Implausible as a central problem, but all things will likely happen. This happens occasionally in the real world, as when a Big Reputation (e.g., Bill Clinton) belittles and marginalizes a Small Reputation (e.g., Paula Jones). There's a vast amount of stuff to think about with reputations. I applaud Steve for doing some thinking, but I don't think he's yet uncovered anything especially unique or worrisome. As a last point, see especially the role of anonymous escrow agents. A number of years ago the example I usually used was "Ace Escrow--You Slay, We Pay," to illustrate that an anonymous escrow holder (holding untraceable e-cash deposited by the purchaser of a murder contract) could pay off a murderer who presented certain evidence, all without any of the parties having any idea whatsover whom the other parties were. The problem is then one of whether the escrow company will simply pocket the money and not pay off. First, it can be set up (I think) that the e-cash is uncashable by the escrow company...but I'm not sure this is needed. A better solution is to rely on the basic nature of escrow or bonding services: their reputation capital is much more valuable to them than anything to be gained by defecting and burning their clients. Except if they are about to retire anyway...as with the bonded courier who defects to Rio de Janeiro with a bag of diamonds....the trick is to spread the escrow money around to multiple escrow agents, and to rely on "escrow testing services" which periodically ping or test the services.... There are many issues here. I'm not advocating murder markets, just noting that they provide an easy to understand and fairly "pure" example. If it can be done with murders for hire, it can be done with nearly anything. A few years ago, many valuable ideas were contributed in this area by Dave Ross, Phil Salin, Dean Tribble, Hal Finney, and Robin Hanson. You might search for their articles. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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RUL_net
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

May-June, 1996, Harvard Business Review. Two related articles which examine c'punks interests -- proposed business regulation of the Net; on-line security; copyright; encryption; authentication; E-cash; electronic commerce; protected communities to escape "frontier anarchy." Executive summaries by HBR: "Ruling the Net." Debora Spar and Jeffrey J. Bussgang The Internet promises a radical new world of business. But for many companies, it has yet to deliver. Although doing business in cyberspace may be novel and exhilarating, it can also be frustrating, confusing, and even unprofitable. Debora Spar and Jeffrey Bussgang argue that the problems companies face have little to do with a lack of technology or imagination. Their problems stem instead from a lack of rules. Without the order that rules create, business cannot be conducted. The authors explain why the informal rules that have developed on the Internet since the 1960s are no longer sufficient. Businesses thinking of allowing millions of dollars of transactions to occur on the wide-open Net need specific assurances. They require clear definitions of property rights, a safe and useful means of exchange, and a way to locate and punish violators of on-line rules. The authors believe that the key to commerce on the Internet lies in the creation of managed on-line communities. Such communities can be formed by service providers -- entities that will restrict on-line options, fine-tune offerings to match a select group of users, and provide some means of recourse in cases of fraud or abuse. Under those conditions, they will draw new companies on-line and increase the productivity of those already there. And, say the authors, the rewards for service providers will be substantial: Companies that make the rules on the Internet's emerging frontier have the opportunity to reap the greatest profits. [40 kb] "The Real Value of On-Line Communities." Arthur Armstrong and John Hagel III The notion of community has been at the heart of the Internet since its early days, when scientists used it to share data, collaborate on research, and exchange messages. But how can businesses best use its community-building capabilities? Not merely by putting their products or services on-line, the authors contend. Real value will come from providing people with the ability to interact with one another -- from satisfying their multiple social needs as well as their commercial needs. Companies that create strong on-line communities will command customer loyalty to a degree hitherto undreamed of and, consequently, will generate strong economic returns. The authors present four different types of community: communities of transaction, interest, fantasy, and relationship. Examples of each type already can be found on the Internet or through on-line services, but the successful community of the future will incorporate all four -- or as many as possible. As for economic value, the authors see four ways for a company to generate returns: through usage fees, content fees, transactions and advertising, and synergies with other parts of its business. In the near future, new business definitions may emerge around the notion of owning a specific customer segment across the full range of its interests and needs; owning specific products and services may no longer be so important. The authors urge businesses marketing to consumers to make the small investment required to "buy an option" on electronic communities in order to understand both their potential value and the radical changes they may cause. [33 kb] RUL_net (for the 2) ----- Reprints of "Ruling," No. 96309 and "Real Value," No. 96301 may be ordered from HBR for $5.00 each by email to: custserv(a)cchbspub.harvard.edu

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