December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Defeating fingerprints
by David K. Merriman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 03:19 PM 05/17/96 -0700, you wrote: >ON >> >> On Tue, 14 May 1996, Be Good wrote: >> > > Burglars and safecrackers sand the ridges off. >> > >> > This sounds like it'd work, but quite tedious. >> >> Belt sander and a light touch. > >I'm going to try this sanding experiment sometime. >When I get around to it, I'll post the results here. >(pressing hard with inkpad and paper) > >Shellac or epoxy glue does NOT work, if the thickness is at all managable. >Tried it, The ridges always find a way to get through. >It also provides a weaker bond to dry skin than you'd expect. >The thicker the more likelihood of peeling off. >Even Krazy Glue. (The UL BS is false.) Krazy glue _will_ glue fingers, if applied properly. I proved this to a fellow sailor in 1976 by gluing his thumb and forefinger around a JP-5 vent pipe aboard the U.S.S. Enterprise. Some folks might want to try liquid latex, contact adhesive, silicon sealers (RTV), or similar products. Soft, flexible, relatively convenient when applied, and can be 'layered' to the desired thickness. Liquid latex can usually be found in hobby/craft stores. Dave Merriman PS - Pls note new email address; old ISP proved to be unreliable. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMZ0MlcVrTvyYOzAZAQEkiAP7BCf2mrem6K6N/5dcbUeGLCUu/un2yEst nks1RZBUUeV8q2fojxm6d9y+WJI6NXDJWARkSCCt0YphA7oGQtJwiNzI08NWD5Ed EHM+yXW7BM+z68eZ+kIL8UNW/64CkGCoMZNkRW2v5ZKMqYOFri6qdgKFm7D40JIN z0BL1+dkLVE= =Z73q -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------- "Giving money and power to government is like giving whiskey and car keys to teenage boys." P. J. O'Rourke (b. 1947), U.S. journalist. <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> http://www.shellback.com/personal/merriman/index.htm

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Re: anonymous companies
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 14 May 1996, Hal wrote: > It might be interesting to make a list of all the problems people can > think of why this idea won't work, paired with proposed solutions and > workarounds - sort of a mini FAQ for this important (some might say > ultimate) cypherpunk model. Another interesting question is how you do personnel selection for an anonymous enterprise. One possibility would be anonymous reputation passing, but I don't know any protocols for this. A participant would also want to take any positive reputation accruing away when the enterprise finished. (And the rest of us would want any negative reputation to stick as well.) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: Past one terabit/second on fiber
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:38 PM 5/15/96 -0400, Alan Horowitz wrote: >Hey, let's build faster and faster fiber-optic networks. Let's create >bandwidth so cheap that it won't even pay to meter it. > >Yes, the world's problems will be solved if we have more and more people >talking longer longer and longer on the telephone, sending each other >more and more pages of faxes and e-mails, creating more Web pages, >playing virtual reality games. Anything and everything must be done to >encourage people to occupy and consume bandwidth. > >Now that's progress, don't you think? Yes, I do! Because these activities don't just happen by themselves, they take the place of other activities which were formerly done in their place. The trivial example of sending letters has been replaced by email. Shopping (by foot or by car) is now a web activity. Telecommuting for many is an option, and will be more so in the future. In fact, I would say that one of the best results of Internet connectivity has been a strong increase in political awareness. We just recently had the "Tax Freedom Day" which should alert you that our own time has been co-opted by government for its own ends. Web activity is low-energy consuming, not particularly risky, and is actually fun for many. Eventually, people may take "Virtual Reality Vacations" where they can visit without travel. Since you spend more time at home, you are less subject to crime. Is this progress? Damn right it is! It saves gas, food, human lives, and what will eventually be a great deal of money that won't have to be spend on transportation facilities. It will eventually get us out from under the yoke of tyranny, which should be the ultimate goal. True, it's _different_ than what we're used to, but that's okay. If anything, that's why some people will resist it, but that doesn't make them right. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: SEVERE undercapacity, we need more remailer servers FAST
by Rich Burroughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:38 PM 5/16/96 -0500, snow <snow(a)smoke.suba.com> wrote: [snip] > No, rich is a good excuse for _not_ doing it, unless it can be >done with total anonymity. If I set up a remailer, on my home computer, as >an individual, then I am a very little target. I have nothing (well, damn >little) for anyone to sue me over. What would be the point? They threaten >to sue me for what? They would spend FAR more than they could ever get out >of me, and as long as I don't violate any laws, I _might_ be able to get >"big guns" like the ACLU, EFF etc. on my side to make it a nasty fight for >no return. [snip] This assumes that they are trying to win. Hubbard said, "The purpose of the suit is to harass..." CoS has a huge legal coffer, and they've used it against people who weren't rich before. They're not after the money from the lawsuits, IMHO -- it's miniscule compared to the amount they make in their bait-and-switch scheme (where they sell people on Dianetics and then lead them down the path to ridiculous OT powers). That's what they're fighting to protect. >From this perspective, the person without money is a much easier target, IMHO -- they don't have the resources to fight back against sustained and intense legal pressure (as well as illegal harassment by PI's and other agents) and will probably cave. That's the return. Judge Brinkema, in an opinion last November in the "Church's" case against the Washington Post, DGS, and Arnie Lerma, wrote: "The Court finds that the motivation of plaintiff in filing this lawsuit against the Post is reprehensible. Although the RTC brought the complaint under traditional secular concepts of copyright and trade secret law, it has become clear that a much broader motivation prevailed--the stifling of criticism and dissent of the religious practices of Scientology and the destruction of its opponents. L. Ron Hubbard, the founder of Scientology, has been quoted as looking upon law as a tool to [h]arass and discourage rather than to win. The law can be used very easily to harrass and enough harrassment on somebody who is simply on the thin edge anyway, well knowing that he is not authorized, will generally be sufficient to cause his professional decease. If possible, of course, ruin him utterly." CoS are the biggest threat to the remailers right now, and it's a mistake to view their use of the legal system based on how you or I might use it -- their purpose is to crush their opposition by whatever means necessary. They have to handle things that way, because Hubbard said so. Paulette Cooper, whose "crime" was writing a book critical of CoS, had 19 lawsuits filed against her at the same time by the "Church." Your plan would work if tons of people set up remailers, but barring that, rich people are actually worse targets for CoS, IMHO, as they have the resources to fight back, especially if the suit doesn't have any merits. And the support of the "big guns" is definitely dicey -- they've not provided counsel for any defendant in a CoS case, AFAIK. Groups like ACLU and EFF don't have the resources to deal with every problem they'd like to, and people shouldn't expect to be rescued by them (you said _might_, I know :) I would encourage anyone who is concerned about the remailers, that doesn't have much info on CoS' legal tactics, to spend some time on alt.religion.scientology or on Ron Newman's excellent web site http://www.cybercom.net/~rnewman/scientology/home.html (he has a ton of info there and you can do Excite searches). I think that if people are not willing to stand up to CoS, the remailers are history. Rich ______________________________________________________________________ Rich Burroughs richieb(a)teleport.com http://www.teleport.com/~richieb See my Blue Ribbon Page at http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/blueribbon New EF zine "cause for alarm" - http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/cause

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Remailers & what they get out of it...
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From: Alex Strasheim <cp(a)proust.suba.com> > Subject: Re: SEVERE undercapacity, we need more remailer servers FAST > Date: Fri, 17 May 1996 13:18:24 -0500 (CDT) > > The remailer net won't stand up to challenges of any strength because no > one gets anything for running a remailer. It doesn't matter if the > challenges are strong enough to win, or if they ultimately have any merit. > If you don't get anything for winning and you'll get burned if you lose, > the expected value of the game is negative no matter how unlikely losing > is. As long as the remailer is run a 'grins & giggles' affair you are right. The moment they are run as a business enterprise then the game changes. Several of the Austin Cypherpunks and myself have set up a remailer here in Austin (kourier.ssz.com) using MixMaster. The intent is that once we get out of testing the software and other mods we are in the middle of we will have a commercialy viable service. I am currently discussing with a couple of local lawyers possible strategies we can employ if CoS or others start legal motions. The idea that we are exploring is a defence by offence. One aspect is 'work in progress' protection of both our development mods as well as our customers work. I also hope to build part of the defence on the fact that to bring the remailer down denies access to the public key-server which is integrated into the remailer as a value-added service. (NOTE: don't waste your time trying to get to kourier over the next few weeks. A more public announcement is in the works) To me the biggest problem with the crypto work right now is that not enough professionals are involved. If more remailers and such were initiated as a business there would be legal avenues to explore. Also, in this vain is the apparent lack of support for commercial ventures by developers of such apps as MixMaster (whose license explicity prohibits commercial use). And for the record, yes, we expect to charge real $$$ for access. Our current plan is $10/month for each account. Money orders prefered. We have at this point pondered e-cash methods but it doesn't seem popular enough at this juncture. > If you want the remailer system to stand up you have to make the expected > value positive. The expected value of bookmaking is positive, even though > it's illegal to take sports bets in most states. As a consequence it's > not hard to find someone to take a bet. Individual bookies may come and > go, but the system will always be there. If the expected value of running > a remailer was positive, the remailer system would thrive even if it was > illegal to run one. > > To make the expected value positive, you have to (a) make it profitable to > run a remailer, and (b) set up a protocol that gives someone who runs one > a fighting chance of not getting busted. (a) is easy enough in theory, > but I don't know how you could do (b), at least not if you wanted to let > people do public things with the remailers (like post to usenet). > I agree with (a) completely. The way to make a remailer profitable is to charge for access. As to (b), step one is get a lawyer on board from the get go. One aspect of (b) is that it should be no more illegal for me to allow my users to post to usenet anonymously via my guest account than to do it via a remailer. In fact, one could argue that if anonymous remailers are truly illegal then so are 'guest' or other demo accounts on systems that don't get personal info (and verified at that) prior to accessing any system services. This means that systems such as l0pht.com or ssz.com are illegal to operate. Jim Choate \\///// "Don't have a cow, man" | | / (.) (.) ===========================oOO==(_)==OOo========================== Tivoli an IBM company CyberTects: SSZ Customer Support Engineer SOHO Consulting/VR/Robotics 9442 Capitol of Texas Highway North 1647 Rutland Suite 500 #244 Austin, TX 78759 Austin, TX 78758 Email: jchoate(a)tivoli.com Email: ravage(a)ssz.com Phone: (512) 436-8893 Phone: (512) 259-2994 Fax: (512) 345-2784 Fax: n/a WWW: www.tivoli.com WWW: www.ssz.com Modem: n/a Modem: (512) 836-7374 Pager: n/a Pager: n/a Cellular: n/a Cellular: n/a ===================================================================

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key signing at cyberpayments?
by P.J. Ponder 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

if anyone is attending the cyberpayments conference in Dallas June 17th or so and is interested in PGP key signing, please advise in private mail or to the list. Thank you. -- pj ponder

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Re: Any DLL's that handle Public Key Encryption or Key Exchange?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:40 AM 5/17/96 +1200, pgut001(a)cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote: > The second is that if you're in the US you're probably going to run >into legal hassles using this code unless someone wants to do an >alternative RSAREF implementation which you can plug in in place of the >existing RSA code. There's an RSAEURO drop-in clone of RSAREF that's on ftp.ox.ac.uk, so you could write a version of your software that lets Yankees and non-Yankees drop in whichever version is appropriate without worrying about patent or copyright problems. Any* RSAREF system used in the US has the problem that it's limited to the "official" interfaces, which means you can't do fully general RSA without permission. (* There was one RSAREF version that didn't insist on this in its license; don't remember which one.) # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215 # goodtimes signature virus innoculation

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CDT Policy Post 2.19 - 27 Reps Urge President to Abandon Key-Escrow EncryptionPolicy
by bobpal＠cdt.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

----------------------------------------------------------------------------- _____ _____ _______ / ____| __ \__ __| ____ ___ ____ __ | | | | | | | | / __ \____ / (_)______ __ / __ \____ _____/ /_ | | | | | | | | / /_/ / __ \/ / / ___/ / / / / /_/ / __ \/ ___/ __/ | |____| |__| | | | / ____/ /_/ / / / /__/ /_/ / / ____/ /_/ (__ ) /_ \_____|_____/ |_| /_/ \____/_/_/\___/\__, / /_/ \____/____/\__/ The Center for Democracy and Technology /____/ Volume 2, Number 19 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- A briefing on public policy issues affecting civil liberties online ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- CDT POLICY POST Volume 2, Number 19 May 17, 1996 CONTENTS: (1) 27 Representatives Urge President Clinton to Abandon Key-Escrow Encryption Policy (2) Join Sen Leahy At HotWired, Wed 5/22 to Discuss His Crypto Bill (3) Subscription Information (4) About CDT, contacting us ** This document may be redistributed freely with this banner in tact ** Excerpts may be re-posted with permission of <editor(a)cdt.org> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- (1) 27 REPRESENTATIVES URGE PRESIDENT CLINTON TO ABANDON KEY-ESCROW POLICY A bi-partisan group of 27 Congressmen, led by Reps. Bob Goodlatte (R-VA) and Tom Campbell (R-CA) on Wednesday (5/15) sent a letter to President Clinton urging the President to abandon the Administration's key-escrow encryption proposal and "instead immediately liberalize export controls on non-key escrow encryption technology." Expressing "serious concerns" about the impact of current U.S. encryption policy on individual privacy and US competitiveness, the bi-partisan group wrote: "The ability of companies and individuals to ensure that the information they send over communications and computer networks is secure is a prerequisite to exploiting the potential of the Global Information Infrastructure." The letter was signed by several prominent members from both parties, including Bob Goodlatte (R-VA), Tom Campbell (R-CA), Anna Eshoo (D-CA), Rick Boucher (D-VA), Bob Barr (R-GA), Pat Schroeder (D-CO), Carlos Moorehead (R-CA), and 20 other members. The bi-partisan call to President Clinton to abandon the Administration's key escrow policy is yet another encouraging sign of increasingly strong Congressional support for reform of US encryption policy. Congress is currently considering several bills designed to encourage the widespread availability privacy-protecting technologies for the Internet by lifting export controls on strong encryption: * HR 3011, the "Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act of 1996", sponsored by over 30 members including Reps Goodlatte (R-VA), Campbell (R-CA), Eshoo (D-CA), Boucher (D-VA). * S. 1726, the "Promotion of Commerce On-Line in the Digital Era (Pro- CODE) act of 1996, sponsored by Senators Burns (R-MT), Leahy (D-VT), Pressler (R-SD), Dole (R-KS), Wyden (D-OR), and Murray (D-WA) * S. 1587, the "Encrypted Communications Privacy Act of 1996", also sponsored by Senators Burns and Leahy. Hearings on HR 3011 (Rep Goodlatte's bill) and the Burns/Leahy S. 1726 (Pro-CODE) are expected in June. INTERNET SECURITY DAY - A NATIONAL DISCUSSION ON THE NEED TO REFORM US ENCRYPTION POLICY In July, CDT and over 25 other organizations will hold a daylong education event in California's Silicon Valley in July. The "Internet Security Day" will bring together industry leaders, members of Congress, encryption experts, and others to discuss the need to reform US encryption policy. Similar events, to be held throughout the US and on the Net, are also being planned. Sponsors of the event include the Voters Telecommunications Watch (VTW), EFF, Americans for Tax Reform, AT&T, Pacific Telesis, America Online, Netscape, the Business Software Alliance, the Software Publishers Association, and several others. FOR MORE INFORMATION ON THE ENCRYPTION POLICY DEBATE & TEXT OF THE LETTER Background information on the encryption policy debate, full text of the various legislative proposals, detailed analysis, the text of the Goodlatte/Campbell letter, information on the July Silicon Valley event, and transcripts from online appearances by Senators on the Encryption issue, can be found at CDT's Cryptography Issues Page: URL:http://www.cdt.org/crypto/ Or at the Encryption Policy Resource Page: URL:http://www.crypto.com/ --------------------------------------------------------------------- (2) SENATORS GO ONLINE TO DISCUSS PRIVACY AND SECURITY ONLINE Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), the "Senior Senator from Cyberspace", ardent proponent of Net.Freedom and co-sponsor of 2 bills to repeal encryption export controls, will hold an online "town meeting" on Wednesday May 22 to discuss privacy and security online. DETAILS ON THE EVENT * Wednesday May 22, 4 - 5 pm ET (1 pm Pacific) on HotWired URL: http://www.hotwired.com/wiredside/ To participate, you must be a registered HotWired member (there is no charge for registration). You must also have RealAudio(tm) and a telnet application properly configured to work with your browser. Please visit http://www.hotwired.com/wiredside/ for information on how you can easily register for Hotwired and obtain RealAudio. Wednesday's town meeting is another in a series of planned events, and is part of a broader project coordinated by CDT and the Voters Telecommunications Watch (VTW) designed to bring the Internet Community into the debate and encourage members of Congress to work with the Net.community on vital Internet policy issues. Events with other members of Congress working on Internet Policy Issues are currently being planned. Please check http://www.crypto.com for announcements of future events ------------------------------------------------------------------------ (3) SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Be sure you are up to date on the latest public policy issues affecting civil liberties online and how they will affect you! Subscribe to the CDT Policy Post news distribution list. CDT Policy Posts, the regular news publication of the Center For Democracy and Technology, are received by more than 9,000 Internet users, industry leaders, policy makers and activists, and have become the leading source for information about critical free speech and privacy issues affecting the Internet and other interactive communications media. To subscribe to CDT's Policy Post list, send mail to policy-posts-request(a)cdt.org with a subject: subscribe policy-posts If you ever wish to remove yourself from the list, send mail to the above address with a subject of: unsubscribe policy-posts ----------------------------------------------------------------------- (4) ABOUT THE CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY/CONTACTING US The Center for Democracy and Technology is a non-profit public interest organization based in Washington, DC. The Center's mission is to develop and advocate public policies that advance democratic values and constitutional civil liberties in new computer and communications technologies. Contacting us: General information: info(a)cdt.org World Wide Web: URL:http://www.cdt.org/ FTP URL:ftp://ftp.cdt.org/pub/cdt/ Snail Mail: The Center for Democracy and Technology 1634 Eye Street NW * Suite 1100 * Washington, DC 20006 (v) +1.202.637.9800 * (f) +1.202.637.0968 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- End Policy Post 2.19 5/17/96 -----------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Past one terabit/second on fiber
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:08 PM 5/15/96, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: > One problem with the development of such high-end technologies is that >they tend to increase economies of scale to the point where it's impractical to >have anything but a monopoly or ogliopoly. As well as concerns about the degree >of control such an organization may be able to exert in and of itself (acting >like a government, in essence), there's also that such an organization is >easier to pressure than a lot of small providers. Anyone have a suggested >solution, or reasons that I shouldn't be so worried? Personally, I'm not terribly worried by such concentrations (for reasons I'll mention at the end). But I'll note that Eric Fair's recent post described the far-from-geodesic traffic situation, with a relatively small number of "super-nodes" (like "MAE-West" and her sisters) handling huge fractions of traffic. These super-nodes are obvious points of attack (in the nuclear war--or terrorist--scenario oft-cited as the motivation for packet-switching) and lessen the "geodesic" nature of the Net. Economies of scale may be pushing us away from the "full-distributed" geodesic nature toward super-nodes. The reason I am not really too worried is that encryption and remailers allow a kind of "meta-geodesic" network to be (virtually) layered on top of the physical network. (In the famous network hierarchy of network levels, it seems we can add a new level.) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Is Chaum's System Traceable or Untraceable?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:35 PM 5/17/96, jim bell wrote: >At 10:09 AM 5/16/96 +0200, bryce(a)digicash.com wrote: >>Let me get this straight. You are asking for full payee/payor >>anonymity so that you can institute a program of anonymous >>assassination contracts, right? > >It's not just for me. I seem to recall a comment around here (Tim May, >perhaps?) who said that when he first read of digital cash in the late >1980's, the feature of payee anonymity was present, and that he was >surprised later to see early implementations not containing this. Yes, this was I (or "me"). I first read of Chaum's work in late '85, in his CACM article, and then "rediscovered" it when I was doing some review work for Phil Salin's AMIX information market startup in 1987. Certainly the text of Chaum's articles implied both payer and payee anonymity, though certain details may've been unclear to some of us. When Chaum unveiled his "payer is anonymous, but payee is traceable," some of us were surprised. (On the other hand, I have had a longstanding faith that the system can be made to be both payer- and payee-anonymous. Moneychangers, for example.) >Deal with the devil? > >Any "complete" digital cash implementation has to provide for payee anonymity. > I agree with Jim Bell on this completely. I don't know if Chaum has been seduced by the Dark Side, or is looking to get digicash widely deployed by "respectable" institutions, or is telling the truth (that his system _never_ provided for real untraceability), but I know that Cypherpunks should always strive for full untraceability. One-sided traceability is not enough. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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