December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Brit conference asks for more cyberspace violations
by Attila T. Hun 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- *** Fraudbusters seek fresh angles as cybercrime grows Crimebusters must devise more ingenious ways of combating fraud and will need new international policing powers to stem a rising tide of high-tech economic crime, experts say. Delegates at an economic crime conference in Cambridge, England, this week complained they lacked the tools and power to take the fight to the organized criminals whose only barrier was the speed of their modems. Culprits were hard to pin down, said Rosalind Wright, head of Britain's Serious Fraud Office. It was harder still to "swat the fly-by-nights," she said. See http://www.infobeat.com/stories/cgi/story.cgi?id=4974072-ff5 ______________________________________________________________________ "attila" 1024/C20B6905/23 D0 FA 7F 6A 8F 60 66 BC AF AE 56 98 C0 D7 B0 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 Comment: No safety this side of the grave. Never was; never will be iQCVAwUBNB9t9704kQrCC2kFAQGLEQP/Xo9+l5MV3KE3X1X7hCdJpaWr8gprctKR jIm2k+2RwHIVBT9IzQ0s/VEWI+8ftO43b18qlYYdbyiSGCPnJsoZtXOmivTTdcg3 U8FAJNTrbILZ4lcTYbxsAUm0U12xc4flOjK16UWzKrI3gli8Y/YPO2hMbxkBcH6P aknorOx6BpY= =1+3N -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: Digicash will not fly (not)
by msprague＠owens.ridgecrest.ca.us 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"James A. Donald" <jamesd(a)echeque.com wrote: >While Chaum is a brilliant cryptographer, he is an incompetent businessman > >He has demonstrated this in numerous ways. > >The latest being "Cash" where the bank skims off 4% to 10% every time. > >No one is going to use digicash under these kinds of terms and >conditions. Doesn't just about everyone do precisely this when they pay sales tax? Every time a buck arrives or departs a hand one pays a tax yet the system (you and I)continues accepting these terms albeit painfully. > --------------------------------------------------------------------- > | >We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ >and our property, because of the kind | >of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald >derives from this right, not from the | >arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

2 1

Re: Digicash will not fly (not)
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:41 AM 10/30/95, M. F. (Pat wrote: >"James A. Donald" <jamesd(a)echeque.com wrote: >>While Chaum is a brilliant cryptographer, he is an incompetent businessman >> >>He has demonstrated this in numerous ways. >> >>The latest being "Cash" where the bank skims off 4% to 10% every time. >> >>No one is going to use digicash under these kinds of terms and >>conditions. > > >Doesn't just about everyone do precisely this when they pay sales tax? >Every time a buck arrives or departs a hand one pays a tax yet the system >(you and I)continues accepting these terms albeit painfully. Many types of business dealings are exempt from sales tax, through arrangements for resales. I don't know if the "skims off 4% to 10% every time" point accurately describes how the current Digicash model works, but certainly this will not fly as a long term rate. So many monetary transactions happen in the course of business that even a 4% fee _per transaction_ would rapidly wipe out most of the value. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

3 2

Cuban Security Conference
by Ross Anderson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mr Guevara of the Cuban embassy in London asked me to post this announcement. Pass it on. CALL FOR PAPERS INFORMATICS 96 International Conference Center Pabexpo, Havana, Cuba March 4-9, 1996 INCLUDING 3rd Ibero-American Seminar on Protection against Computer Viruses and Security of Information Technologies * Antivirus and protection software * Security of information technologies, including - diagnostic and security plans - risk analysis, contingency and recovery plans - technical aspects: identification and authentication, cryptography, security models - security organisation and management, security policy, information sorting, training of users and authentication - security evaluation - integration of security systems - audit trail * Experience Chairman of the organising committee: Jose Bidot Pelaez, Chairman, National Committee for Data Protection AND 1st International Seminar on Information Audit * Information audit in business and financial management * Information audit and current technology * Tools for information audit * Controls and risks in information systems * Information audit for information systems Chairman of the organising committee: Fransisco Deiros, President, Information Audit Group, National Committee of Informatics Papers should be sent to the convention secretariat: Lic. Nancy Batard Najarro INFORMATICS 96 Executive Secretary Palacio de las Convenciones Apartado 16046, La Habana, Cuba Tel: +537 33-1466 / 20-6850 Fax: +537 33-1657 / 33-1708 Email: infor96(a)cenisi.cu

1 0

Re: Important Digital Cash Question...
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>What's the right name to use for the Banker? I've been using "Nick", >after Nick Leeson; any other suggestions? How about "Pip", J. Pierpont Morgan's childhood nickname. OK, OK, I'll sit down now... Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Shipwright Development Corporation, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 323-7923 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

1 0

List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33a.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post ek reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"syrinx"} = "<syrinx(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut reord mix post"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub"; $remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash mix cut ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)gate.net> cpunk"; $remailer{"precip"} = "<mixmaster(a)mix.precipice.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<remail(a)ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- ideath remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com -.-.-.---.- 7:12:57 99.97% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl ************ 9:03 99.95% rmadillo remailer(a)armadillo.com ++++++++++++ 42:02 99.93% ecafe remail(a)ecafe.org **####+*##*# 1:37 99.93% wmono wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net ************ 13:17 99.91% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi ---------+++ 2:58:18 99.74% robo robo(a)c2.org ###--*# 25:08 99.71% spook remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net ******** *+* 16:41 99.69% replay remailer(a)replay.com *****+* * ** 6:34 99.52% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ---- -- --- 1:44:59 99.46% c2 remail(a)c2.org + +++-- * 53:17 98.82% syrinx syrinx(a)c2.org - _ ____ .+ 55:55:41 97.38% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu *** # #-+# 24:49 97.23% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net * **+* 24:32 92.21% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net * +*** 10:39 90.65% rahul homer(a)rahul.net ***#*+ +#*** 2:53 99.79% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu +++#**-*+# 7:27 86.61% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com **##*#-### 5:38 86.60% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de ____.-- 38:06:00 86.33% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com - . - - 5:24:35 63.83% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

1 0

Re: Digicash will not fly (not)
by Michael J Gebis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >While Chaum is a brilliant cryptographer, he is an incompetent businessman > >He has demonstrated this in numerous ways. > >The latest being "Cash" where the bank skims off 4% to 10% every time. > >No one is going to use digicash under these kinds of terms and > >conditions. > Doesn't just about everyone do precisely this when they pay sales tax? > Every time a buck arrives or departs a hand one pays a tax yet the > system (you and I)continues accepting these terms albeit painfully. Theoretically, when I pay sales tax I get something in return (better roads, nicer schools, improved NSA wiretaping, and other government services.) With digicash, you're paying for the use of the money itself. What sort of charges do Visa/Mastercard impose upon merchants? I thought it was 3%; if so, I would suspect that this is the level of "off-the-top" skim that the market will sustain, and DigiCash should probably use a similar rate. -- Mike Gebis gebis(a)ecn.purdue.edu Corporate Operating Systems Still Suck

2 1

Re: Digicash will not fly (not)
by Dave Farber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >What sort of charges do Visa/Mastercard impose upon merchants? I >thought it was 3%; if so, I would suspect that this is the level of >"off-the-top" skim that the market will sustain, and DigiCash should >probably use a similar rate. > >-- >Mike Gebis gebis(a)ecn.purdue.edu Corporate Operating Systems Still Suck > Pricing is usally set so it includes the 3%. Cash prices are usually by agreement the same as credit card. Will Digicash be an extra %age or will the credit card agreements be changed Else it is 3% plus digicash for those goods that offer the credit card option

1 0

Re: Cuban Security Conference
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> International Conference Center > Pabexpo, Havana, Cuba > March 4-9, 1996 > 3rd Ibero-American Seminar on Protection against > Computer Viruses and Security of Information Technologies I wonder if they'd be receptive to talks on private communications, digicash, tax avoidance through digital technology, anarchy and collapse of government power, etc. :-) (Maybe they would; Cuba's got to do something to get their economy out of the post-Soviet-subsidy doldrums, and with the US preventing free trade in sugar for them, maybe allowing capitalism will be their only choice...) For any Yankees interested in going, you generally need to be a journalist of some sort to avoid the Trading With The Enemy Act restrictions, but in cyberspace, that's easily arranged. #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

3 2

Re: Pinkerton Risk Assessment & "Security 2000"
by Joel McNamara 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For even more, free information of this type, see the Counter-Terrorism page: http://www.interlog.com/~vabiro/ An interesting collection of links and data... Joel

1 0