December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Netscape announces position against GAK
by Frank Stuart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) >Subject: Re: Netscape announces position against GAK > >Credit where credit is due. > >I for one am satisfied--and even pleased--with the Netscape position on GAK. > >It remains to be seen how steadfast Netscape, as the major player in the >Web browser business, remains in the face of (likely) pressure from the >government. > >It seems to me that we have have been quick to criticize Netscape--which is >good, the quickness part--and thus we should be equally quick to praise >them. To be sure, various of us might've written the Netscape position >statement slightly differently, but this does not change the basic point: >that Netscape has come out against the Administration's position on GAK. > >For this they deserve our praise. I agree with all of Tim's sentiments (well, in this message, anyway :>). I'd especially like to thank Jeff Weinstein for his hard work keeping both us and Netscape management informed. I think he's done us both a great service. To avoid just saying "me too", I'll throw out another idea on making the U.S. version of Netscape available to U.S. users over the Internet. How about a phone number to call to get an access id of some sort that can be used to FTP the software. When you call the number, you can use caller-id to verify that the person is calling from within the U.S. You could set up a BBS-type system to do this automatically, or make the phone number a 900 number and charge a few dollars to cover your costs. You could also set up the access id so that it can only be used once. | (Douglas) Hofstadter's Law: Frank Stuart | It always takes longer than you expect, even fstuart(a)vetmed.auburn.edu | when you take into account Hofstadter's Law.

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ideath remailer temporarily down
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The remailer located at remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com is currently unavailable because the local freenet (which handles DNS and MX service for goldenbear.com) is making some configuration changes. Apologies for not warning anyone, but I didn't get a warning either. Incoming mail for goldenbear.com should be spooling on sender's machines; I haven't received any since late Thursday (12/7) evening. I don't know when they'll get this fixed but I'm kinda pissed off about it and am exploring alternatives. Doh. I'm reachable as gbroiles(a)darkwing.uoregon.edu as well. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMMofY33YhjZY3fMNAQG7rwP/cLSbiqtDCm1frYSOqxTIitTaP/36v/7g W+azO+zC1+k6ozWaGwcCqtgwi2Kmbv/XtCnDbzzQdSI6k0rJFwhbw5rDkxQ4W5sQ 9PNHO9UC1F7JyAEs7kTiZSxZpkqRdzx98P06wRfy4Hwkzy7OuoYm2jHYNlHDojcv 9Jx6wYWVlIo= =QLxL -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Warning about Pegasus Mail and PGP (fwd)
by Siberia 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Okay, here's how I understand things with PGP and Pegasus. You have two options with Pegasus depending on the set-up options you choose. You can either send upon completion of your out-going email, or you can have your mail queued until you press the send out-going mail button. The actual PGP process does not occur until you actually send the mail. So the answer would be: don't queue your mail. On 9 Dec 95 at 16:24, Jon Lasser wrote: > On Sat, 9 Dec 1995 anonymous-remailer(a)shell.portal.com wrote: > > > I just installed the "Open Encryptor" PGP interface for Pegasus Mail. > > I found that when you sign a message and queue it, it stores your password > > in the clear on the hard drive. Apparently > > it doesn't sign or encrypt the message until just before > > transmitting it. So it stores your PGP private key password > > with the message until it sends it. > > Can anyone verify this? > > Kinda brings new meaning to the term "Open Encryptor," huh? > > Jon > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Jon Lasser <jlasser(a)rwd.goucher.edu> (410)494-3072 > Visit my home page at http://www.goucher.edu/~jlasser/ > You have a friend at the NSA: Big Brother is watching. Finger for PGP key. > > > Namaste' Kimberly Long klong(a)phoenix.net What is life? It is the flash of a firefly in the night. It is the breath of a buffalo in the wintertime. It is the little shadow which runs across the grass and loses itself in the sunset. ~Crowfoot 1821-1890 )O(

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Re: Warning about Pegasus Mail and PGP (fwd)
by Jeff Hupp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On 9 Dec 95 at 18:29, Siberia wrote: : Okay, here's how I understand things with PGP and Pegasus. You have two : options with Pegasus depending on the set-up options you choose. You can : either send upon completion of your out-going email, or you can have your mail : queued until you press the send out-going mail button. The actual PGP process : does not occur until you actually send the mail. So the answer would be: : don't queue your mail. That's not really a solution in the Windows environment, if you have a swap file, you never know what gets written out to it. The solution is run w/o a swap file or run an encrypted file system. I run an encrypted file system. Pegasus will indeed save your key with your message in the outgoing queue. This is a problem with the design of pegasus, not with the design of the add on encryptor. : : On 9 Dec 95 at 16:24, Jon Lasser wrote: : : > On Sat, 9 Dec 1995 anonymous-remailer(a)shell.portal.com wrote: : > : > > I just installed the "Open Encryptor" PGP interface for Pegasus Mail. : > > I found that when you sign a message and queue it, it stores your password : > > in the clear on the hard drive. Apparently : > > it doesn't sign or encrypt the message until just before : > > transmitting it. So it stores your PGP private key password : > > with the message until it sends it. : > : > Can anyone verify this? : > : > Kinda brings new meaning to the term "Open Encryptor," huh? : > : > Jon : > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ : > Jon Lasser <jlasser(a)rwd.goucher.edu> (410)494-3072 : > Visit my home page at http://www.goucher.edu/~jlasser/ : > You have a friend at the NSA: Big Brother is watching. Finger for PGP key. : > : > : > : -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMMpJNDUjeCeeebC9AQFsdAf+OY1FPLqSbHYyB+MnUl56dau9gFouoLKf y5UDCE9d4w2ndo6iKOGk7UzfTR3vYQaJmfEI2og+37hi2au01mHm/T0IAUOFYOYr owr6Xn8TZ8vHPOEe71LYRdad60ZdlkPr7H3Nxc9l7O9ueZp0SAM4xPMZmMPUkb8V d4j2m1kbLOHHNmqFmHWjxXvKLaowF/38cgbV9VuDFatySZuM9TdaVQEbazum0uDE LOgUzrQqs2GqlDOB1WMkvJv947SPHhjCJQTcygtS6SoGJv6AzLCL0LtstmBnCOgI zRIrX5wgFSp49BRdmE0/xp62+TuaGCZ6ml8iW/zS9ab7GSeOA2Qs6Q== =GINp -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- JHupp(a)gensys.com |For PGP Public Key: http://gensys.com |finger jhupp(a)gensys.com Animals can be driven crazy by placing too many in too small a pen. Homo sapiens is the only animal that voluntarily does this to himself.

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test
by Anonymous User 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

this is a test of the cypherpunk w3 anonymous remailer interface. author is N..... B...

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anonymous remailer
by Fred Nix 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hey... How do I gain acess to the remailer? Thanks! Fred Nix

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Re: More FUD from First Virtual
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"frissell(a)panix.com" "Duncan Frissell" 8-DEC-1995 16:15:52.58 At 02:52 PM 12/8/95 -0500, Jon Cooper wrote: > The US government can stop it. It is irrelevant what *should* stop >it, but it's extremely useful to note that the US government's political >climate of paranoia and FUD in general will certainly not allow truly >anonymous cash systems inside of our country in the forseeable future. But who's going to ask? If an anonymous payment system springs up outside the US, we can use it as a store of value if nothing else or for shopping overseas. Domestically, we can convert non-anonymous payment systems into semi-anonymous ones. What counts is difficulty of transaction and market demand not legal structure. Thus, about five minutes after the "temporary VISA card" travelers check substitutes are issued, I can start selling them for (discounted) cash to all comers. Likewise Ecash laundry servers letting anonymous people use non-anonymous Ecash. It remains to be seen how much customers value anonymity. There should be a niche market in any case. ---------------------- I would also add that what one is doing when trading digital cash is bartering for information. While the government has been successful in placing limits on point-based bartering systems such as recordkeeping and taxes, the lack of central books will make it quite hard to do so for digital cash. Trying to outlaw barter arrangements, when what is being bartered is an apparantly random string of numbers, is quite simply not going to work. -Allen

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Re: The Elevator Problem
by Daniel Miskell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There is an easy way to develop a secret key in front any number of eves, be they experts or not, without the eves knowing what the key is. Even if they tap your phone/comm line, ect. There was an article in Discovery Magazine a couple of years ago, talking about how to use photons and their randomness as the perfect, uncrackable code. Use of the photons aside, there was a key generation method discussed, simple, yet secure enough to work out on a tapped phone. Let me root around. Regards, Munster. --- _________________________________ *!Cheese Doctrine:!* Though cultured over time, and aged to perfection, one must not yield to produce mold. One must also not belittle themselves by conforming to the "whiz", but melt over the unprocessed ideas of Ghuda. _________________________________

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Re: Still more on the Digicash protocol
by daw＠lagos.CS.Berkeley.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <Pine.3.89.9512081312.A23124-0100000(a)unicorn.com>, Rev. Mark Grant <mark(a)unicorn.com> wrote: > > Exactly.. once you have an active attack set up, it's trivial, but setting > that up is quite hard. > But before everyone pats themselves on the back, congratulating themselves on how hard an active attack is to set up, look at http://www.EnGarde.com/software/ipwatcher/ Yes, folks, a commercial program which mounts an active attack. (Check out the GUI! Click on the `Watch Mail' control! Activate the `Take over' button! Whee, mom, hacking is fun!) Active attacks may not be trivial, but they aren't exactly rocket science, either -- and they're for sale. - -- Dave `is capitalism the best thing since sliced bread, or what?' Wagner - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMMqY/ioZzwIn1bdtAQEkGQF/WdJBqbP5HwTDxldi0UDCmP2RZAFz5p2q cPMSoOIgkFbaBS34k4LSFPKcvegw3tJk =Ptyf -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Whew!
by Ed Carp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just finished leafing through Schneier's "Applied Cryptography", second edition. Lots of new stuff, good and very thorough coverage of protocols and implementations, including weaknesses and processes behind same. If an idiot like me can understand this stuff (and if you don't believe I'm an idiot, just ask Perry), anyone can. I highly recommend the book, it's an absolute bargain at $50 USD. Should be required reading for anyone before being allowed to post here. :)

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