December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

lp (134.222.35.2)?
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm sure some of you will have seen this, so sorry to toss logs on the listburn fire; still, it seemed worth reposting to CP--no, it's not entirely crypto-related, but nor is it a completely vague allegation. >From GovAccess.183.snoops: > The following is the transcript of an actual communications trace that a > friend ran, while I was sitting next to him, watching -- reprinted here > with his permission. > > He did a "traceroute" of two messages that he sent from his machine in > Switzerland (he'd telneted into it while we were at a computer conference > in California). > > Traceroute automatically reports each Internet node through which a message > passes, as it proceeds from origin to destination. > > He did two traceroutes. The first was from Switzerland to an addressee at > Netcom in San Jose, California. The second was from Switzerland to an > addressee in Israel. > > > Date: Fri, 21 Apr 95 02:54:58 +0200 > From: kelvin(a)fourmilab.ch (John Walker) > To: jwarren(a)well.com > Subject: Traceroute > > > /usr2/kelvin> traceroute netcom11.netcom.com > traceroute to netcom11.netcom.com (192.100.81.121), 30 hops max, 40 byte packets > 1 eunet-router (193.8.230.64) 2 ms 2 ms 2 ms > 2 146.228.231.1 (146.228.231.1) 326 ms 345 ms 307 ms > 3 Bern5.CH.EU.NET (146.228.14.5) 447 ms 408 ms 364 ms > 4 146.228.107.1 (146.228.107.1) 127 ms 37 ms 36 ms > 5 Zuerich1.CH.EU.NET (146.228.10.80) 37 ms 38 ms 175 ms > 6 (134.222.9.1) 65 ms 109 ms 252 ms > 7 lp (134.222.35.2) 196 ms 179 ms 405 ms > 8 Vienna1.VA.ALTER.NET (137.39.11.1) 191 ms 179 ms 313 ms > 9 fddi.mae-east.netcom.net (192.41.177.210) 336 ms 204 ms 303 ms > 10 t3-2.dc-gw4-2.netcom.net (163.179.220.181) 182 ms 251 ms 187 ms > 11 t3-2.chw-il-gw1.netcom.net (163.179.220.186) 305 ms 586 ms 518 ms > 12 t3-2.scl-gw1.netcom.net (163.179.220.190) 537 ms 693 ms 797 ms > 13 t3-1.netcomgw.netcom.net (163.179.220.193) 698 ms 549 ms 754 ms > 14 netcom11.netcom.com (192.100.81.121) 890 ms 1922 ms 1696 ms > > > /usr2/kelvin> traceroute jerusalem1.datasrv.co.il > traceroute to jerusalem1.datasrv.co.il (192.114.21.101), 30 hops max, 40 > byte packets > 1 eunet-router (193.8.230.64) 2 ms 3 ms 2 ms > 2 146.228.231.1 (146.228.231.1) 933 ms 853 ms 874 ms > 3 Bern5.CH.EU.NET (146.228.14.5) 1040 ms 450 ms 525 ms > 4 146.228.107.1 (146.228.107.1) 453 ms 424 ms 188 ms > 5 Zuerich1.CH.EU.NET (146.228.10.80) 64 ms 61 ms 47 ms > 6 (134.222.9.1) 80 ms 312 ms 84 ms > 7 lp (134.222.35.2) 270 ms 400 ms 216 ms > 8 Vienna2.VA.ALTER.NET (137.39.11.2) 660 ms 1509 ms 886 ms > 9 dataserv-gw.ALTER.NET (137.39.155.38) 1829 ms 1094 ms 1306 ms > 10 orion.datasrv.co.il (192.114.20.22) 1756 ms 1280 ms 1309 ms > 11 ... > > > Notice that both messages went through an unnamed site -- 134.222.9.1 and > then a strangely-named site, "lp (134.222.35.2)" -- then through the same > Vienna, Virginia (USA) site ... and thereafter, on to their destination. > I.e., the second message went through Virginia to get from Switzerland to > Israel. > > The whois servers at the InterNIC and at nic.ddn.mil for MILNET Information > report, ``No match for "134.222.9.1". '' and `` No match for > "134.222.35.2".'' > > Now let me see ... which spy agencies are located in or near Virginia? > > --jim

4 3

Photuris Primality verification needed
by William Allen Simpson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Folks, I was somewhat disappointed in the response to our previous requests for verification of the strength of the prime moduli. Recently, someone asked for a smaller prime of only 512-bits for speed. This is more than enough for the strength of keys needed for DES, 3DES, MD5 and SHA. Perhaps this would be easier to have more complete and robust verification as well. Here are two "important" primes for Photuris use. If you have some spare cycles, it would be beneficial for in-depth verification of these strong primes. Implementation Optional. A 512-bit strong prime (p), expressed in hex: da58 3c16 d985 2289 d0e4 af75 6f4c ca92 dd4b e533 b804 fb0f ed94 ef9c 8a44 03ed 5746 50d3 6999 db29 d776 276b a2d3 d412 e218 f4dd 1e08 4cf6 d800 3e7c 4774 e833 The recommended generator (g) for this prime is 2. Implementation Required. A 1024-bit strong prime (p), expressed in hex: 97f6 4261 cab5 05dd 2828 e13f 1d68 b6d3 dbd0 f313 047f 40e8 56da 58cb 13b8 a1bf 2b78 3a4c 6d59 d5f9 2afc 6cff 3d69 3f78 b23d 4f31 60a9 502e 3efa f7ab 5e1a d5a6 5e55 4313 828d a83b 9ff2 d941 dee9 5689 fada ea09 36ad df19 71fe 635b 20af 4703 6460 3c2d e059 f54b 650a d8fa 0cf7 0121 c747 99d7 5871 32be 9b99 9bb9 b787 e8ab The recommended generator (g) for this prime is 2. > From: Phil Karn <karn(a)qualcomm.com> > I've used the mpz_probab_prime() function in the Gnu Math Package (GMP) version > 1.3.2 to test this number. This function uses the Miller-Rabin primality test. > However, to increase my confidence that this number really is a strong prime, > I'd like to ask others to confirm it with other tests. > Bill.Simpson(a)um.cc.umich.edu Key fingerprint = 2E 07 23 03 C5 62 70 D3 59 B1 4F 5E 1D C2 C1 A2

1 0

Re: Telephone switch capacity -Reply
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:43 PM 11/3/95 -0800, Rich Graves wrote: > Of course the FBI doesn't have the staff to listen to all these lines, and > they need an individual court order to authorize each individual > interception, so this numbers game is a bit of a joke. This is false: The FBI is legally authorized to intercept phone lines by court order "or other lawful authority". >From the money it would seem that "other lawful authority" intercepts vastly exceed court ordered intercepts. You will recall the vast outcry in the liberal lapdog press when this vast new power was given to them -- You don't recall it?! Neither do I. This is one of the many vast extensions of government power that we see come down at a steadily increasing rate, to the accompaniment of total silence from a compliant and submissive mass media. > There is no controversy about the number of wiretaps that have been > authorized, except as manufactured by the Spotlight folks and other > conspiracy loons. If the only taps are court ordered wiretaps, it would seem we are paying about half a million to a million dollars per wire tap, which is a shade expensive even for government work. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

1 0

Version 2 Elliptic Curve Crypto
by Mike Rosing 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Howdy, I blew it the first time, but the correct elliptic.2.tar now sits on ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/ciphers. This version is twice as fast as eliptic.tar. A newer version of the elliptic.2.doc is being fixed right now, the only difference with what is posted is a correct reference to the CRYPTO '95 article on polynomial basis inversion. Enjoy. For a compiled version on Sun or under Borland C++ contact Steve Albrecht (eh(a)mcs.com) He is in the process of setting up macros to get this to compile under just about any unix system. He's also fixed quite a few bugs and is cleaning up a bunch of uninitialized data structures that I didn't notice. Last I heard it was working, so if you want to play on a specific platform, contact Steve directly. Hilarie Orman from U. Arizona (one of the authors of the CRYPTO '95 paper) thinks that calling elliptic curves "strong crypto" may be over selling it. I'm not enough of a mathematician to know how to argue, but it seems to me that almost perfect random output is about as close to strong crypto as one could get. Security thru obscurity doesn't work, elliptic curves are obscure and so far not studied to the same extent as RSA or DES. However, I'll make the claim that elliptic curves are "strong crypto" until proven otherwise. Along those lines, does any one have a classic text to encrypt for a plaintext/ciphertext challenge? I'll put something together and post it in the next few weeks. I'll use the symmetric encryption subroutine. If there is any interest, should I put out a public key challenge as well? Note, I ain't rich, so only token prizes (like $50 ecash and $50 real for each challenge). The point is to check if this is credable crypto, that's all. E-mail replies to cryptech(a)mcs.com. Thanks for reading this! Patience, persistence, truth, Dr. mike

1 0

Credentials Without Identity
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Rich Graves makes some very good points, but he said something I want to riff on. (And as a measure of how apologetic some folks are getting about discussing anything not on Perry's List of Approved Topics, Rich unfortunately labeled his post "[ID point semi-off-topic]..." In fact, the issue of credentials and identity is NOT off-topic, not even semi-off-topic. It is central to the themes of our list. I urge all to read Chaum's seminal work on "credentials without identity.") At 1:05 AM 11/5/95, Rich Graves wrote: >Proving legal residency requires a combination of two documents, one each >from specified lists. Most commonly a driver's license, green card (which >is actually pink), or birth certificate from list A, and a social >security card from list B. > >Chris Hibbert's SSN FAQ talks a little bit about how this works, and why >it's a Good Thing. Basically, for privacy and security reasons, it is a >very good idea to separate the issues of identity and authorization. > >I don't care how securely you can authenticate who I am -- by PGP, retinal >scan, whatever. I do not want a single digitizable token to be the key to >my identity. Even if that identity cannot be forged (and everything can be >forged), it can be used to track me, by the government, by the Direct >Marketing Association, by the private investigators of certain wacky .... Chris's (or Chris') points are admirable, but getting more and more irrelevant by the day. The notion of unlinking identity and authorization by separate pieces of identification is another form of "security through obscurity." The two forms of credentials can be linked in data bases. Just because one piece of ID has citizenship or voting status and another has other stuff is meaningless, provided the ID forms can be linked. As they can, in multiple ways. The credit tracking agencies can do this trivially, with names, social security numbers, driver's license numbers, addresses, phone numbers, etc. All are pointers into the cloud of numbers that constitutes one's dossier. Happily, Chaum's work on "credentials without identity," based essentially on the kind of "blinding" used in digital cash (with some differences, of course), allows for one to display a credential showing one is old enough to enter a bar or library (in 2005), without revealing a name (which is just another credential). --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

4 3

Re: using pgp to make an otp
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:58 AM 11/5/95 -0500, amp <Alan.Pugh(a)internetMCI.COM> wrote: >i want a source of data for use as a otp. .... >i'd like to know if there was a reason not to use the output of pgp Either PGP is a strong enough cryptosystem that you don't need to use a one-time-pad, or it's not, in which case you need better randomness than PGP will give you (I doubt it), or you have special applications for which PGP is impractical (like decrypting small amounts of data on a very wimpy machine in an environment that you can easily distribute OTP keys (for using ONCE ONLY)). Or you're just doing it for fun. A OTP can give you provably secure cryptography, given that the pad is only used once, and has real randomness behind it. If it's only pseudo-random numbers (e.g. generated from some algorithm), then it's as crackable as the source of random numbers, and therefore no longer provably secure. And of course, if you use it more than once, or your pad distribution isn't secure, you lose. >i still need a program to make use of the otp i've produced, Two alternatives - spend 5 minutes writing it in a language you know well, or pick a language you don't know very well and use it as an excuse to learn the language. It's slightly more complex than "hello, world", since you need to input data from two files and use XOR. >what are the holes in this? why would it be unadvisable to do it? The big problem with OTPs (other than getting people to use the pads ONLY ONCE, since they're otherwise hosed) is shipping them around; the traditional method is guys with briefcases handcuffed to their arms.... >otoh, would it be a good basis for a otp? Large quantities of good random numbers are hard to find. Small quantities can come from dice or throwing darts at the stock market pages; the zener diode or radioactivity methods people have been discussing will produce larger quantities if you've got the equipment. If you've got one of those new radio-tuner boards for your PC, tuning it to an unused station might be quite decent, and we've just been discussing whether video is any good. With many of these sources, it's probably worth grinding the numbers through some sort of compression or encryption algorithm just to smudge over any periodicity or other structure to it. #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

1 0

Re: Telephone switch capacity
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Please be aware that the current capacity of the >telephone system in the United States (and for that matter, >most of the developed world) is only capable of supporting >between 15 and 20 percent simultaneous telephone >conversations. If the FBI wishes to set up a system that is >capable of monitoring 1% of the total number of lines, that >equates to a ability to tap 5%, not 1% of all calls in progress. The FBI now says they only want to tap 1% of simultaneous capacity, not 1% of total number of lines. On the other hand, the actual utilization of the telephone network is also much lower than the number of lines - back when I was a voice-telephony geek, our estimates for busy-hour phone utilization were about 1/12 for residential and 1/6 for business (3 and 6 hundred call-seconds per hour); that was before widespread use of fax machines, modems, or LANs, so business utilization has probably increased. Equipped trunk capacity was typically enough to have a maximum of 1% blocking during busy hour, which means a certain amount of margin over average calls in progress, and switch capacity depends radically on technology - some kinds of switches are non-blocking, while others have various capacity limits. "One Bell System - It Works!" #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

1 0

The Crypto Applications we would rather not talk about
by anon-remailer＠utopia.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anonymous remailer and PGP Unusual applications I dont know if anyone else caught it last year but High Times discovered anonymous remailers and PGP for an article last year for anonymous remote control of grow rooms. PGP Wins again? and lately the thule people(bigoted and racist Nazis) have been learning to protect themselves also according to news reports from germany. Crypto and Privacy tools protect everyone from the hero to the anti-hero... the technology itself is neutral I wonder how long it will be before we hear news reports of some of the governments people being caught using internet casinos from the white house network. On other notes CCCF(the chaos computer club France) was shown to have had a high level plant from the french intel services, The founder of the CCCF himself. this story seems to repeat itself over and over when you are doing something of which the authorities DONT approve they WILL attempt to infiltrate and subvert from the inside. The answers are there and have been published in most books on tradecraft, 3 person cells organized as pyramids. Anonymous remail tech and crypto make this system possible with out Face to face contact. When does this lesson finally get learned? anon

2 1

Re: Video as a source of randomness
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:51 PM 11/4/95, Bill Stewart wrote: >Pointing the camera at a snowy TV or out the window or at a cat playing >with catnip can generate much more randomness if you need it. Which would make that "dev/cat," right? --Klaus!

1 0

Re: on topic!!
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:17 PM 11/4/95 -0800, VZNuri wrote: >if there were two key elements here, these conversations would probably >largely go away (instead of continually reappear) >- an unambiguous charter >- an active moderator > >unfortunately I suspect that a moderator does exist but he "prefers >to remain anonymous" ("pseudonymous"?). imho that is precisely >how *not* to succeed as a moderator. As an alternative, there was the Cypherwonks list, which worked just that way, and such conversations did rapidly go away :-) What's evolved here instead are a couple of filtered lists, such as cp-lite, where you can get the conversations that one or another monitor considers relevant instead of the whole firehose. It seems to work reasonably well for a lot of people. #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

1 0