December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Mondex vs. Digicash (was: Godzilla vs. Mothra)
by cman＠communities.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I disagree with Michael's assertion that Mondex will necessarily win over Digicash. Here's why: o The availability of Digicash in the US, for real, with spender anonymity, will be announced very soon; reporter activity on this subject is consistent with an embargoed press release for Monday or Tuesday. From posts to the list it's clear that a fully working system, ready for customers, will be announced. o When doing market research on this subject, it became clear that low-value payments are largely going to be used for impulse purchases. If the Digicash system allows people to set up their accounts without getting out of their chairs (which I suspect will be the case, if they do it right), it will initially get more adopters. o One or both systems could be found to have serious security problems; who knows what the outcome of their discovery & exploitation would be? I know at least one group of people who believe they have a good line on a serious security problem in Mondex. o Even if the Mondex hardware were given away for free, think how much fun it is for the average user to add a new piece of hardware to their machines... ever install a sound card and CD-ROM drive on a PC? I remember reading something like 20% of all "multimedia" kits were returned, largely due to user install problems. If there is a competing method that costs the same and _doesn't_ require the hardware, people will tend go with this. o In my conversations with state and federal regulators, it is clear that it _is_ possible to issue spender-anonymous e-cash. If you ask them, "Hey, can I create fully anonymous digital cash?", they go apeshit, but if you explain that the money uses existing (auditable) channels going in, and existing (auditable) channels going out, and that only spenders are anonymous, they relax considerably. They may change their minds later, but we're about to get an existence proof. o It's not clear that _either_ system is going to win completely in the next 10+ years. Although there's been considerable shakeout in the last ten years, there is still a huge variety of non-electronic payment methods -- how can you be so sure that Mondex will win over Digicash, and that they won't co-exist like, say, money orders, currency and cashier's checks (three instruments with both similar and dissimilar attirbutes)? Douglas Barnes Electric Communities

1 0

Remailer-in-a-Box, Everyone a Remailer
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:02 PM 10/22/95, Lance Cottrell wrote: >I think one solution to this problem is to encourage (require) the use of >pseudonym servers. Having a server like alpha as the entity on the from >line has several advantages. > >1) Less Spam since it takes some effort to set up the nym and it will be taken >away as soon as the spam starts. > >2) The operator can take firm action. When people complain they want you to >punish the abuser. Typically they want you to pull the offenders account. >With a remailer there is no account to pull, but with a nym server it is >easy to kill the account, making the complainer happy. I fully agree with this point, and have argued for this approach before. There is no logical or other reason why "physical machine site = a remailer," even though that has until recently been the norm. ("I have a machine--I'll run a remailer.") Rather, a single physical machine site can and should be able to run many remailers, out of user accounts. (Accounts on systems like Sameer's C2. Or Hal's remailer running on Portal. Or maybe some of the Mixmaster clients.) This has a couple of salutory effects: 1. It separates the logical function, and responsibilities, of running a remailer from the function of maintaining a site. 2. It puts the "risk" on the account holder, not the site owner. (The site owner can plausibly deny knowing the account was remailing messages.) 3. A proliferation of nyms can be used, as Lance notes, with the "offending nym" cancelled when trouble arises. (I'm not especially keen on seeing sysops bow to pressure to kill accounts, but if it happens, better it happens to a "disposable nym.") 4. Multiplication. Having remailer accounts instead of remailer sites means an N-fold increase in the number of remailers. 5. A single person could have multiple remailer nym accounts, perhaps having differing policies. 6. Search warrants and legal speed bumps. If the cops have to get separate search warrants for N accounts, on M different sites, this will slow things down. (Hint: The remailer "Ralph" can choose to route messages through N extra steps, perhaps on several of his own accounts on _distant_ machines. Faced with a search warrant on "his" account, a la the visits to Penet, he doesn't have to implicate himself by saying he also owns the N other hops. Of course, he can do the same thing with remailers operated by others....I'm just noting that having N remailers under one's own control has certain elegant advantages.) >3) The nym server could have a policy of only accepting messages encrypted >to it, and logging the address the message came from. If confronted, the >nym server could point to the last remailer in the chain. But that remailer >could not have known the contents of the message since it was encrypted to >the nym server. 7. Competition. Picking up on Lance's point, having multiple remailer accounts under one's own control allows one to experiment with various policies and operational modes, and to see which are most popular. Great for evolutionary purposes. 8. Finally, and most importantly, the "remailer in a box" idea, for turn-key remailers, allows even the timid to operate a remailer FOR THEIR OWN USE! That is, they don't have to publicize the public key, or the existence at all of the remailer. But they can use it in their own chain of hops, for their own messages or for whatever. This facillitates the "everyone a remailer" idea. It also increases protection ("always include a remailer under your own control"). I'll stop for now. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

Re: airport security
by Dan Harmon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Another aspect of the reqiurement for the name on a ticket is to discourage the development of a secondary, uncontrolled market in tickets. Dan

2 1

Interesting Newsletter - GSSN Oct 1995
by mjsus＠atlanta.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

GLOBAL STRATEGIC SYSTEM NEWSLETTER October, 1995 Information Security System Responsibilities, Structure and Development Is your vital business information safe or are you just assuming that this information is safe? Have you established an adequate Information Security System (ISS) to protect your key information against unwanted external or internal visits and use? The changes in the usage and utilization of the information technology have created new requirements for both the information management and its security. However, still too often businesses and companies do not take the information protection seriously enough to establish proactive information security systems and other controls. If some controls have been established, these controls often focus primarily on the physical security instead of the company-wide information security. The business information such as business plans, market strategies, trade secrets and others is a very valuable organizational asset, and it would be foolish not to initiate adequate security controls to protect this key asset within the whole organization including physical facilities, employees, external contractors, computers systems, contract negotiation processes and any other business process. Who is responsible for the information security? Everybody. However, the extent of this responsibility varies from one function to another or from one person to another. Fundamentally, the top management including the organization's CEO is responsible for establishing the information security system. The top management is responsible for defining, documenting and comunicating the company-wide information security policy to all levels of the organization. In addition, the executive management may establish either specific or general information security objectives to transform the organization from one situation to a more protected situation. The executive management is also responsible for appointing the Information Security Officer (ISO), who performs and acts as the Management Representative and has the authority and responsibility to establish, implement and maintain the information security system. All other members of the organization are responsible for implementing the information security policy in their daily activities. Some individuals may have additional responsiblities such as ISS auditing and monitoring in accordance with the documented and planned information protection arrangements. The top management is responsible for reviewing the performance and suitability of the system periodically to ensure its suitability and any need for revising the policy, objectives or the system itself. The structure of ISS is unique to each organization. The responsibilities and authorities are different in all systems, because organizations are unique. However, there are some general requirements that can be used to design and develop the unique ISS for any organization, but still meet basic and fundamental information protection requirements. These requirements can include all or some of the following main categories: Management Responsibility, Client / Customer Contract Security, Information Systems Design and Development, Document and Data Control - & Configuration Management, Purchasing Information Security, Facility Management and Physical Security, Information Systems Management, Information Security System Audit, Personnel and Employee Security, Legal Information Security Matters, Counter Information Security System Activities and Information Security Insurance Administration. Each of these general categories have more detail and specific requirements including both documentation, activity recording and data control requirements. Using these requirements and any guidelines, the business can establish its unique information security system that protects the integrity of the information effectively and accurately. The information security system has to be designed and then developed to eliminate any potential security risks. This requires planning and proactive thinking. The development can start from the Information Security Policy and Objectives that is developed by the executive management. After this the completed system manual can be developed by the Information Security Officer. This ISS manual should make reference to all applicable additional procedures and instructions that are used within the system. Typically, these procedures (such as Information Security Disaster Plan and Procedures) described WHOs, WHATs, WHENs, WHEREs and in some cases also HOWs such as back-up instructions and methods. If it is necessary, additional security plans can be developed for any specific project or process. These plans should be consistent with an overall ISS. The masterlists or other equivalent methods should be developed and maintained to control all ISS plans and documentation. The planning of the information security system provides an excellent opportunity for the management to evaluate and analyze all information risks and design practical and useful approaches to eliminate these risks. Nobody should underestimate the need for the ISS, but this need should not be artificially created either. The information security system as any system has to be practical and really bring tangible benefits. This is one reason why the information security assessment should be performed prior to the development project. This assessment can identify both weaknesses and strengths in the information security. Careful evaluations can help the business to focus on real issues, and not to develop the system that meets some imaginary requirements, but fails to address those key areas and functions of the organization, where additional controls would really be needed. The information security system should be developed for the management, but the ISS users do also include all employees within the organization - and as in many other organizational development, the complete implementation of the ISS shall be dependent on the employee security and their awareness.

1 0

Re: BlackNet in "Hardware" (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >No book report here, but it was as gripping as the rest of her efforts. > >It's "about" people rather than computer hackery, but the computery bits > >were done quite well. Does an Amiga 2000 <really> have PC and Mac > >compatibility options? I don't know, and it doesn't matter anyway. > > I recollect that the Amiga had some gizmo--I think it was called > "MagicSack" or something like that--that let it run Macintosh programs, > sort of. It never really caught on, at least as an alternative to real > Macs. And I think something similar was available for DOS. This was all > several years back, before the Amiga faded out. > > Amiga users and former Amiga users can probably tell us more. > The Amiga has both hardware and software emulation of both Dos and Mac. The hardware Mac emulator runs faster than an actual Mac. The software emulator runs ok, but is about 2-3 times slower than an equivalent Mac. The Amiga 2000, 3000, and 4000 have PC compliant slots that harbor a co-computer in the guise of a bridgeboard. The software emulators pretty much suck because they are slow. There are currently 6 Million Amiga users, hardly 'faded out. The Amiga did not fail because it lacked in either hardware or software. It failed because of market momentum and a lack of marketing savy at Commodore. Only somebody who has never used an Amiga for an extended time would ever make a comment implying they were inferior in any technical way. Their hardware architecture in still way ahead of both Windows and Mac as is their operating system. Just remember, nobody ever lost their job by buying IBM. Jim Choate CyberTects ravage(a)einstein.ssz.com

1 0

request for binary: ec211u16.exe
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm wondering if anyone has the following binary from digicash: ec211u16.exe . If so please contat me. Thanks. -- sameer Voice: 510-601-9777 Community ConneXion FAX: 510-601-9734 The Internet Privacy Provider Dialin: 510-658-6376 http://www.c2.org (or login as "guest") sameer(a)c2.org

1 0

Re: NYT on Internet Flaws
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:46 AM 10/22/95 -0400, MDresser(a)aol.com wrote: > Generalizing about > reporters is about as intellectually valid as generalizing about hackers. On the contrary: Hackers are self selected, and so are very diverse. Reporters are selected from above by an incestuous elite who have their hands in each others pockets, and so are very homogenous. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

1 0

How can e-cash, even on-line cleared, protect payee identity?
by Bryce 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Well I've decided that the best way to learn is to stick my neck out and say something probably stupid in public. So here I go again: In an on-line clearing e-cash scheme, Chaum's "double-spender identifier" fields are unnecessary, but a "serial number" type field to uniquely identify the e-coin is still necessary. Using blinding, this serial number may be unknown to the bank, but it will be known to the payer. If the payer and the bank are collaborating to identify the payee, then they can simply use this serial number to identify the recipient of the coin. Is there a scheme which will prevent this collusive payee identification, and if so where can I read about it? (On-line is preferable of course, but I don't expect to be that fortunate.) Now even if it were the case that the payee is always identifiable by a collusion of the bank and the payer (such as is the case in DigiCash Ecash), all this means is that you shouldn't accept a coin using one nym, and deposit it in the bank using another. You need one bank account per nym, as well as one bank account per anonymous transaction, and then you have complete control over revelation of your identit(y/ies). I can imagine a future in which this requirement is not difficult to meet. Perhaps it will be the case that you can accept a coin, open up a new ("anonymous") account with the bank, deposit the coin, withdraw a new coin of the same amount, close the account, and now have an untraceable coin all in a fraction of a second. Bryce signatures follow "To strive, to seek, to find and not to yield." <a href="http://ugrad-www.cs.colorado.edu/~wilcoxb/Niche.html"> bryce(a)colorado.edu </a> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Auto-signed under Unix with 'BAP' Easy-PGP v1.01 iQCVAwUBMIrRpvWZSllhfG25AQFWTQQAgxDWvYrBpoM5D0Idn7ZeCHbZSxMGFr50 Ut40sE83Yfctb6nJdrA+trpynEcu1wJkBbZ7zKDw/TFEUHZy1v4lhZPe+yxmYZcD w9fPC5HaJQqcTp/hhiw9L4iMswdbrmJu/SkUz85ZVosy8blasdOgFwcoZTIFpZHk tyATeEGYygo= =xqJ6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 2

Re: airport security
by farber＠central.cis.upenn.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ever think that the one real payoff for the ID at airports is to kill the market for re-sold frequent flyer certificates and partially used tichets that then get sold to others (like at most schools)

1 0

Re: airport security
by jgrubs＠left.webcasters.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Alan Horowitz <alanh(a)infi.net> writes: > measures, etc, etc. The other side *has already won* the terror war, > merely by virtue of having set the agenda, and making us spin in tighter > and tighter circles - reacting, not initiating. What, then? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: LIBERTY!! Use it or lose it!! iQCVAwUBMIrYyN74r4kaz3mVAQFI4AP/ZDZnldBk7lG3lgIScGIlWJIK8LjiYB7R OXo0gm4zHfQ610puxnBcfq/BQdDJ7DvDW6RegZXonZedNJbvMVWwpttvZW608Rve v9+pUgrjsbQ7QC8RbyKSKAqyjTo7fjjoNVt5NvcL27OVs9ORC5yKEeeWaPtRoQ6V 3MjZqThCmHI= =JS0t -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- WebCasters(tm) James C. Grubs jgrubs(a)webcasters.com 6817 Maplewood Avenue Tel.: 419-882-2697 Sylvania, Oh 43560 Fax: 419-885-2814 Internet consulting, HTML programming, Information brokering

2 1