December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Microsoft Metaphors
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What are the best metaphors to use when talking about a browser and an operating system? Is the combination like a car and an engine, or a car and a roofrack? A pair of gloves? Or is it even useful to talk about a browser/OS metaphor in the case of Microsoft, since IE has been glued into the operating system in the form of .DLLs? Might that be more like the wheels of a car? -Declan

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Microsoft Metaphors (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Thu, 15 Jan 1998 10:09:09 -0500 > From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> > Subject: Microsoft Metaphors > What are the best metaphors to use when talking about a browser and an > operating system? Is the combination like a car and an engine, or a car and > a roofrack? A pair of gloves? It seem to me to be like a car and a road map. It simply lets you address the multiplicity of resources (ie destinations) out there in a convenient model. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The most powerful passion in life is not love or hate, | | but the desire to edit somebody elses words. | | | | Sign in Ed Barsis' office | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: how to release code if the programmer is a target for coercion (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi Ryan, Thanks for the clarification. I've added a few issues that have occured to myself and Doug Floyd (operator of the dh-l mailing list) during several short discussions we've had over the last year. Forwarded message: > Subject: Re: how to release code if the programmer is a target for coercion (fwd) > From: Ryan Lackey <rdl(a)mit.edu> > Date: 15 Jan 1998 05:19:25 -0500 > The problem reduces to one of distribution of public keys. Agreed. > In my model > (er, actually Lenny Foner's model, in this case), you distribute something > that has intrinsic verifiability -- the eternity source. If I understand this you mean to use the code itself as the key? So you require all the eternity servers to use the same source? Doesn't this imply at some point a single point of distribution and hence another point of attack? > So whether > or not rdl's eternity-dds signing key is compromised is irrelevant to > the users -- in fact, the assumption is that since I am a known target, > I've been killed or compromised. So, there's this potentially untrusted > code out there. I am unclear as to what you mean by 'known target', are you refering to a particular eternity server, the eternity server code itself, the document the user is looking for, or the provider of the document? I suspect the provider of the document. Doesn't the fact that you can't address issues of key validity become an issue? How does this model handle key aging or do you propose to leave the same keys out there for extended periods of time (ie decades after your death)? Doesn't this extended lifetime represent a threat to the validity of the keys since it provides mallet an exceptional period of time in which to mount the attack? Especialy since nobody is checking the keys? It further seems to me that the main motive of most law enforcement is going to be going after the user of the data the majority of the time since this is much more time critical than knowing who provided the data. After all simply knowing who did the original sourcing is not enough to remove the problem after the fact. Eternity servers are after intended to be long lived mechanism, this provides the authorities much time to follow the data and analyze the network traffic. Wouldn't it be important to provide some sort of delivery mechanism that provides a full encryption envelope around the data until it is delivered to alice? I recognize this exacerbates instead of alleviates the key server security issues. > People who have known public keys then inspect and sign the code. It is > assumed these people have distributed their public keys far and wide, signed > by lots of people, etc. As long as you can assume the "PGP web of trust", > the distributed software signing thing works. Ah, ok. So we again are assuming everyone is using the same particular piece of technology. In this model, would it not add security to the mechanism to have the eternity server deliver the encryption software (ie PGP)? How does this model handle the physical contact that is required in the PGP web of trust? In particular how does it verify that the actual physical contact occured? Can you address the key distribution mechanism and how it addresses the issue of a mallet producing their own key server with their own keys signed sureptitiously by their own multiplicity of 'nyms? Do you see a group of 'Johny Appleseeds' roaming the country in person dropping little dolops of signed keys off? Or, do you believe some sort of key verification service will need to be generated that compares keys for individual 'nyms on the various servers and publishes a list of keys that don't match (something that would to my thinking be prime data for a data haven server). Doesn't such a 'trusted' service have the same sort of 'user end' threats as the eternity servers themselves? Assume for a moment that mallet wants to monitor a particular alice. Alice makes her request which goes through mallets tap. Outbound traffic is uneffected so that the actual keys sent to the server are good. However, no the return stroke mallet intercept the traffic, provides their own bogus keys and signed document. How do you see alice finding a way to recognize this? The threat with this model is that alice might be turned and therefore condemn any co-participants in whatever activity alice is supposed to be involved in (eg ingesting lettuce or leading a freedom cell in Burma)? > I agree that the current state of PGP use is probably not enough for > the "PGP web of trust" -- I've *never* used a key and found it signed by > anyone I know. However, I think even the current system puts a pretty high > barrier to fraud, and if there started to be fraud, people would start > signing each other's keys. I agree with all the points but the last. When the cost becomes too high (ie inconvenient) they simply won't use it. I just can't seem to grasp why people would spend even more money (which would provide a flag via monitoring of funds) to physicaly meet a group of others who they probably don't know and therefore probably shouldn't trust at such a fundamental level. > A keyserver serving keys like "rdl's eternity-dds release signing key" might > be subject to traffic analysis, true. However, as you suggest, you could > put the keyserver inside Eternity. Then, the problem just gets shifted -- now > you need (a) pgp signing key(s) which has/have signed all of those keys. I believe it is a fundamental mistake to have the key server inside the eternity server, just as I object to anonymous remailers that provide such service. The key servers should be on different machines to provide physical independance & legal indipendance - these are long lived keys after all and there is no reason architecturaly to put the keys at threat if the data haven is at threat, and finaly technological indipendance - it should not require a upgrade of the eternity software (and visa versa) to upgrade the key server software. Another issue that was raised previously, neither I nor anyone else addressed it at the time, is this acceptance of latency of distribution. Since we are talking about providing potentialy damaging documents (to who is intentionaly left vague) doesn't this latency provide opportunities for attack? Unlike a remailer network where it defeats traffic analysis in the data haven model it seems like a perfect means to get the processing window to actualy mount a trace. Anyway, since I am still about 3-6 months from actualy implimenting any of my own Plan 9 based (network level anonymity) model this is all conjecture. Hope it provides at least a seed for something useful. Ta ta. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The most powerful passion in life is not love or hate, | | but the desire to edit somebody elses words. | | | | Sign in Ed Barsis' office | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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FW: IRS/Co$ Secret Agreement web page (fwd)
by Ray Arachelian 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----Original Message----- Subject: IRS/Co$ Secret Agreement web page http://www.primenet.com/~cultxpt/irs-cos.htm The IRS gave the Church of Scientology a sweetheart deal on October 1 1993, granting it privileges that no other tax exempt organization gets. The above web page includes the Secret Agreement, IRS tax code portions at issue, US Supreme Court ruling that the Secret Agreement violates, and other important information. I update it almost daily.

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FBI to search school shooters computer [CNN]
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > SUSPECTED HIGH SCHOOL GUNMAN TO MAKE COURT APPEARANCE > > FBI will search his computer for evidence of motive > > January 15, 1998 > Web posted at: 9:36 a.m. EST (1436 GMT) > > PADUCAH, Kentucky (CNN) -- The teen-age suspect in last month's > Kentucky school shooting was scheduled to make his first public > court appearance Thursday morning, as the FBI announced plans to > search the contents of his personal computer. > > Michael Carneal, 14, is accused of opening fire on an informal > prayer group in the lobby of Heath High School, where he was a > freshman. Three students were killed and five wounded in the > December 1 attack. > > Carneal was indicted as an adult on three counts of murder, five > counts of attempted murder, and one count of burglary. The > commonwealth's prosecutor has said he'll pursue the maximum penalty > of life in prison, which would mean Carneal, if convicted, would > have to serve 25 years before he could be considered for parole. > > In a search for a possible motive into the deadly shootings, the FBI > has agreed to search the contents of Carneal's personal computer. > Lobby Heath High School lobby where the shooting occurred ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The most powerful passion in life is not love or hate, | | but the desire to edit somebody elses words. | | | | Sign in Ed Barsis' office | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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re: Microsoft Metaphors
by Thomas Porter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, Jan 15, 1998 at 10:09:09AM -0500, Declan McCullagh thoughtfully expounded: > What are the best metaphors to use when talking about a browser and an > operating system? Is the combination like a car and an engine, or a car and > a roofrack? A pair of gloves? > > Or is it even useful to talk about a browser/OS metaphor in the case of > Microsoft, since IE has been glued into the operating system in the form of > .DLLs? Might that be more like the wheels of a car? I might look at it like air conditioning in a car: If present, it requires significant alterations to the basic vehicle, and might be difficult to remove cleanly, _but_ air conditioning in no way affects the basic operation of the car, and cars can be bought without air conditioning. Hmmmmm, actually A/C does affect the car's operation: uses more gas and degrades performance! A better metaphor than I thought. -- Tom Porter txporter(a)mindspring.com ------------------------------------------------------------------------ "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi

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Music Boulevard Storewide Sale
by http://www.musicblvd.com/ 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Microsoft Metaphors (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi Dan, Forwarded message: > Date: Thu, 15 Jan 1998 11:26:03 -0500 > From: Dan Ritter <dritter(a)bbnplanet.com> > Subject: Re: Microsoft Metaphors (fwd) > The computer is a building. A building once built doesn't change and it's a pain in the ass to change the rooms and such. A general purpose stored program computer is intentionaly designed to get around these limitations. Computers before the stored program paradigm most certainly fit the building model however. > The OS makes it a supermarket. The OS provides a multiplicity of resources for me to use (purchase) at my leisure? I don't think so, unless you want to model the user as the company that loads the shelves. In a computer, unlike a store, each time I want to use a jar of tomato paste (program) to build lasagna (job) I don't have to go out and buy a new jar of tomato paste. > The browser is the map of the store showing what foods are in what aisles. That one I'll buy (figuratively). ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The most powerful passion in life is not love or hate, | | but the desire to edit somebody elses words. | | | | Sign in Ed Barsis' office | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: (eternity) God's Own Backup Medium
by Ryan Lackey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dan Fabulich: > I must be insane, because this seems simple to me. Don't listen. It's simple conceptually, just some of the technical details are multi-axis tradeoffs which need to be made explicit. > > Presume that the goal is a secure anonymous storage/retrieval system, paid > for with e$. Armed with a persistent naming system for each document, we > set up e$ protocols to pay for storage of a (possibly encrypted) document > OR to pay for retrieval of a particular named document. I broadcast that I > want up to ten people to store my XMB document and that I'm prepared to pay > $Y/mo. to each participant. My document is then secure for as long as I'm > prepared to pay for it. It is anonymous to the extent that information can > be transferred anonymously between me and the other willing participants; > it is therefore a remailer problem, not an Eternity problem. It's an Eternity problem if you want your eternity system to have better performance than the remailers have. What you really need is a multi-level security infrastructure, where someone (the owner of the data, the individual intermediate server operators, etc.) can choose the level of security they will provide to meet certain Quality of Service levels. Yes, for a lot of the data you're handling, remailers are a good model. However, steganographically-protected streams hidden inside other streams work better for certain things. Perhaps quantum channels work better for other things. Perhaps hand-carried optical tapes are best for others. The system should have a way of handling these formats in a suitably abstract way. > Alternately, if a document is in high demand, someone might offer money to > anyone who can provide a particular document given by name. Any willing > sellers could then exchange information/e$ via e-mail. (One might even > imagine data-traders who would seek out valuable information at a bargain > and sell them to others at market value.) Again, the mechanism is only > anonymous to the extent that e-mail is secure. Which helps both security and performance. A very good mechanism. > > Note that the system is profitable to all of its participants no matter > WHAT the broadcast mechanism is. The more automation, the more profitable. > The more participants, the more profitable. The more information online, > the more profitable. Yes. That's why I'm including market-based techniques in Eternity DDS -- I think market-based arguments are as powerful as statistical ones -- perhaps not as powerful as mathematical/cryptographic proof, but close. > The missing link here, of course, is anonymous e$. Despite the success of > the remailers, I've never been convinced that they're not vulnerable to > traffic analysis. (Possibly this is why no one has ever bothered to shut > them down?) > And even if we COULD set up automated daemons to monitor the broadcasts and > negotiate trades, there's still no good way to distribute money over the net. I know with high confidence there will be a deployed quality anonymous e$ system in 1998. > > At any rate, keeping the system independent of its broadcast medium (which > can be done pretty easily by just making sure that the program communicates > in [encrypted] plaintext,) should make the system autocatalytic... At that > point, just let it run, get as many people running it as possible and let > the market take over. Yes. Both Eternity-USENET and Eternity DDS are only secure once they grow to a certain size. Market pressure is (I think) the best way of getting a system to scale to that size. (Eternity-USENET is vulnerable to technical Denial of Service attacks with the current small number of indexing servers, even if it is protected from legal issues. I think illegal or extralegal attacks are as dangerous as the legal ones) -- Ryan Lackey rdl(a)mit.edu http://mit.edu/rdl/

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Re: Crypto Kong penetration.
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- At 05:31 PM 1/15/98 +0000, Steve Mynott wrote: > Ummm why reinvent the PGP wheel Well I am not "reinventing the wheel". Crypto Kong implements a different identity model. It does not suppose that there are "true names". This leads to substantially easier identity management (largely by abolishing identity management) As a necessary consequence of this, if you happen to be communicating with two different Bob Jones, Crypto Kong does not attempt to discover which one is the one true Bob Jones and which is the evil man in the middle Bob Jones. It merely keeps them distinct by applying different labels to them. Secondly, PGP simply is not being adopted by the masses. Of course right now, two weeks after release, Crypto Kong is not being adopted by the masses either, but with very little identity management, it is far easier for the masses to use. If you try and shove that identity stuff onto people they will not do it. Too much like hard work. They will happily let the government licensed authorities do it for them. The PGP model clearly has not flown yet, and it is not going to fly. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG mMObRqZXvGz3OkHZyNWBCEGt5ZpZtUG5Y19i3tsX 4SfFX2/pUCYwhAm6n1u5xBLG/xL9LYsSZcznxXI8S --------------------------------------------------------------------- We have the right to defend ourselves and our property, because of the kind of animals that we are. True law derives from this right, not from the arbitrary power of the state. http://www.jim.com/jamesd/

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