December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

TIM MAY IS A CYPHERWEENIE
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think we ought to just throw TIM MAY out of the list. let's EXCOMMUNICATE HIM. its becoming increasingly clear that he is the source of all our problems. I mean, isn't it obvious that our progress has stalled? who has written any code within the last 3 days? if we got rid of him, it would be EVOLUTION IN ACTION. this is ERIC HUGHES' mailing list, and eric hughes knows how to write some decent code. I mean, TCM's signature doesn't even have any geek code, and he hasn't changed it in 4 years or so, at least since my last grandparent died (and she was considerably more skillful at programming than TCM by knowing how to make toast). get rid of all the pricks who continually spout and spew conspiracy theories. let TCM go and find himself a new mailing list. that would be a fair comeuppance if he found that he couldn't learn to do squish because he doesn't have the slightest clue. he's a leech, a parasite, sucking on the work of others, pretending that he is at the forefront of our cause when he is only at the forefront of maniacal egomania. what has he contributed to the cause? SQUAT. just a lot of ranting about conspiracy theories and his Stock Pick of the Week crap. "the web is really growing. people should focus on it". well, THANK YOU VERY MUCH, MR. BRILLIANT COMMENTATOR AND VISIONARY, T.C.MAY, I would have never have THOUGHT of that in a zillion years, but now that you point it out, I GUESS YOU'RE RIGHT.

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Re: IPSEC goes to RFC
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Don Eastlake has actually done a draft RFC on using the DNS for key distribution. It may be found at ftp://ietf.cnri.reston.va.us/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnssec-secext-04.txt He briefed the W3C security working group about this recently, and a number of people raised objections, notably * database bloat * zone transfer bloat * increased hits on root servers due to a new class of inquiry. There was some discussion as to whether these were valid objections, and the people running prototype code said they had had no problems. Peter Trei Senior Software Engineer Purveyor Development Team Process Software Corporation trei(a)process.com

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Re: \"S1\" encryption system
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is it possible that there are multiple levels of encryption included in the "S1" algorithm? This question is prompted by reviewing the DoD's Multilevel Security (MLS) Program at: http://www.disa.mil/MLS/mls_home.html One of the features of this program is to design means to simultaneously transmit data with different levels of security, so that communicants send and/or read the data according to their levels of security clearance. This is amplified in Section 3 of the program description at: http://www.disa.mil/MLS/info/basics/sec3.html#2 Excerpts: Multilevel security allows information systems to provide capabilities that augment its existing single-level data processing and data communications services. Data of multiple security levels are processed and transferred by the system, which also separates the different security levels and controls access to the data. ... When a system operates in the multilevel mode, it allows data of two or more security levels to be processed simultaneously when not all users have the clearance, formal authorization, or need to know for all data handled by the system. The system is able to separate and protect the data according to these restrictions. To amplify the definition, an MLS system might process both Secret and Top Secret collateral data and have some users whose maximum clearance is Secret and others whose maximum clearance is Top Secret. Another MLS system might have all its users cleared at the Top Secret level, but have the ability to release information classified as Secret to a network consisting of only Secret users and systems. Still another system might process both Secret and Unclassified information and have some users with no clearance. In each of these instances, the system must implement mechanisms to provide assurance that the system's security policy is strictly enforced. In these examples, the policy allows access to the data by only those users who are appropriately cleared and authorized (e.g., having formal access approval) and who have an official need to know for the data. A related mode of operation is the partitioned mode, also known as compartmented mode. Although similar concepts and solutions are involved for compartmented mode operations as are for the multilevel mode, there is also a key difference. In the compartmented mode, all users have clearances for all the data processed but may not have authorizations for all the data; whereas for multilevel mode, some users may not even be cleared for the highest level. Because the compartmented mode is often envisioned for the intelligence community, all such users would have Top Secret security clearances and often authorizations for one or more, but possibly not all, compartments in the system. End excerpts. There are also descriptions of the soft and hardware implementations of MLS. Would anyone care to comment on how this differentiation of levels of security is done, by a single encryption program or multiples, and if multiples, their arrangement? Is feature then embedded in the hardware, such as the Fortezza card system cited in the program?

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Re: SSL bruting progress
by aba＠dcs.exeter.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Will Kinney <kinney(a)bogart.colorado.edu> writes on cpunks: > > We've not managed to isolate the cause of it, as (two people) have > > nearly swept the entire keyspace (heh they had a bit of spare compute) > > and no key has been forthcoming so far. > > Um, if you're going to sweep the whole space yourself before you release > the code, what's the point in a public sweep? Surety. Nothing as disappointing as throwing all your spare compute joyfully into such a fun cpunk project, and then finding no key comes from it. Witness the RC4 bruting, which lots of folks thought fun, but unfortunately (well it should have been expected, and it was in part, as there were no specs, all we knew was microsoft said it was RC4 in some way, nothing more) no key. Also the private sweeping wasn't planned, just Eric Young said, hey I've started at 8000 I'll sweep up from there till you're ready. (Eric already had his own SSL bruting code). Then David Byers asked for a copy of Andrew Roos brute ssl to port to the maspar he has access to, and next thing he said, hey I got it working at 1.5M keys/sec and left it running, it'll reach Eric's start in a couple of days. As it turned out that they haven't found anything yet, their keysweeping is going to be very useful to figure out what's wrong. It's much harder to track down problems, accidentally unswept keyspace etc, when there are 100s of sweepers. Anyway, when we're as sure as we can be that it will work, we'll probably try to persuade Hal for another sample session. So that it will be a challenge, that we don't know the answer for. Perhaps it would be fun to have a regular key crunching ring set up once it's all verified, and proven to work. Part of the problem with this is the legal implications, you probably can't expect to get away with breaking SSL sessions no questions asked - give us a SSL session key startup and we'll brute it - at least not openly. A central key distribution point kind of blows this, as it gives legal beagles somebody to go after. The other key distribution architecture, is an unknown machine out there somewhere in cyberspace :-) Ie a blacknet style address and 2048 bit public key: brute(a)cyberspace.nil with a charge levied in anon digital cash. A sweepstake perhaps, he who hits the key first gets the anon digital cash remailed to him (tax free of course). An architecture resilient to interference on both legal and ill-meaning key-sweepers sides (the possibility exists for someone to reserve keyspace and not sweep it) is to just search randomly. Very simple architecture, but somewhat wasteful of resources, least likely to be detected, as there is less communication. One drop off of 'the session' to cpunks, and another of the result by the euphoric lucky person who happened to start in the right place. Adam -- HAVE *YOU* EXPORTED RSA TODAY? --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ --rsa--------------------------8<------------------------------- #!/bin/perl -s-- -export-a-crypto-system-sig -RSA-3-lines-PERL $m=unpack(H.$w,$m."\0"x$w),$_=`echo "16do$w 2+4Oi0$d*-^1[d2%Sa 2/d0<X+d*La1=z\U$n%0]SX$k"[$m*]\EszlXx++p|dc`,s/^.|\W//g,print pack('H*',$_)while read(STDIN,$m,($w=2*$d-1+length($n)&~1)/2) -------------------------------8<------------------------------- TRY: rsa -k=3 -n=7537d365 < msg | rsa -d -k=4e243e33 -n=7537d365

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Re: Australia, EU crypto ill news, crypto wars
by aba＠dcs.exeter.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > a) Lobbying - hopeless IMO, they aren't interested in listening, the > > politicos are just too easy to manipulate and the "masses" aren't > > clueful enough of what crypto means to understand the implications, > > or even notice. > > The "masses" are not that clueless (remember the 80% against Clipper > in a US poll a year ago). It depends how it is packaged to the voter, if it is even presented at all (as you note below so much gets quitely swept through, and presented fait-a-compli once they've already signed some euro deal). The US at least makes a token of having public debate, I wouldn't be suprised to see little to no coverage of this in the UK for instance. If it was worded as 'government wants to force taps on all your phones' as presumably the clipper vote was, then you might get a reaction, but if it's worded as a way to keep tabs on all those evil child pornagraphs who teem in the countless millions on the internet, well it's not so eady to convince people. Some folks still have a mistaken belief that because that nice police man says that we need to do this to protect our children then it is so. Also note that Clipper wasn't completely quashed, Clinton elected to use it for government contractors, and government official business where crypto would be used, by presidential decree. Not a very democratic move, and still a ploy to get the thing accepted by misspent government money in creating a market for the things, and mandating it's use in defense contracting work for the government. > The problem 'here' in the EU is the smartly construed distance > between commons and rulers. We vote for members of a debate club > (who are very generously paid out of tax money) lacking any power > whatsoever. The EU decision on crypto-policy will emerge from closed > chambers of the Commission, and in every member country the local > politicians will announce that 'it has been decided by EU and there > is nothing we can do about it, even if we would like to'. Sure that's exactly the approach taken to ram these things down our throats with out public debate. > But this doesn't mean that national freedom-of-(crypto)speech > campaigns will be useless. Civil disobedience, still very common > amongst European citizens faced with ridiculous EU regulations, will > be more likely to thrive if the legitimacy of crypto regulations is > publically questioned in a continuous mode. Civil disobedience is a nice way to protest obvious nonsense, of course, but doesn't help financial institutions who will be by law required to use escrowed encryption with the AU govt holding the keys (in the case of the AU example government current line). Where's your privacy then? You must fight for it, whilst your very efforts are illegal, and these ludicrous laws can then be selectively enforced depending on the whims of some arbitrary power. > A significant difference between (for example) Sweden and USA is the > punishment scales. Suppose Sweden had an ITAR (which it > hasn't). Almost everyone would laughingly export PGP and Wei's > library anyway, because the remote possibility of prosecution > (assuming similarities with the current situation in the US) would > hardly feel like a threat. A conviction would result in a few 100$ > fine, maximum. Liveable, as you could view it as a 'freedom tax', but unjust. > An *enforced* ban on crypto in Scandinavia is remote enough that I'm > confident 'SuperStego for Windows' will be out in ver 7.3b by then. Well there's several issues: should they be allowed to do this (no way), and will they get away with it in the current level of crypto awareness (probably IMO), and will it be an effective deterrant (depends, the US one seems to keep US companies out of crypto, even though it has probably aided rather than hindered PGPs popularity), and is it enforceable (well ultimately no, due to good stego - your 'SuperStego for Windows' v 7.3b). If you're confidence in Swedens resistance to big brotheresque crypto regs is justified, well perhaps a bevy of political thought criminals will come live in Sweden to escape their own repressive regimes. Hows the job market for unix hackers? Adam -- HAVE *YOU* EXPORTED RSA TODAY? --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ --rsa--------------------------8<------------------------------- #!/bin/perl -s-- -export-a-crypto-system-sig -RSA-3-lines-PERL $m=unpack(H.$w,$m."\0"x$w),$_=`echo "16do$w 2+4Oi0$d*-^1[d2%Sa 2/d0<X+d*La1=z\U$n%0]SX$k"[$m*]\EszlXx++p|dc`,s/^.|\W//g,print pack('H*',$_)while read(STDIN,$m,($w=2*$d-1+length($n)&~1)/2) -------------------------------8<------------------------------- TRY: rsa -k=3 -n=7537d365 < msg | rsa -d -k=4e243e33 -n=7537d365

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Re: PRZ encrypted voice software release imminent
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:36 PM 8/11/95, Ray Cromwell wrote: > My question is, how portable is it, and does it work over TCP/IP rather >than just modem connections (I suggested this about a year ago)? My ideal >implementation would function on the following architectures: > >Unix: can be used through either /dev/tty?? or Socket (probably want >to use UDP). Works on Solaris, IRIX, AIX, NetBSD/FreeBSD/BSDI and Linux. >(audio devices are all proprietary) > > >Windows: uses Window's sound card device drivers, works via either >comport or WinSock > >Mac: uses Mac sound drivers, uses Mac modem port or MacTCP >From the "MacWeek" article, it initially runs on the Macintosh, using the sound capabilities built into (nearly) all Macs. Direct modem connections, with Internet versions to follow. (Windows to follow, too.) Sound quality with 9600 baud modems said to be pretty good, quality with 14.4 modems said to be very good, and quality with 28.8 modems said to be better than standard phone quality. The Mac may be a strange platform to develop on, to many of you, but it has some advantages. The sound tools are relatively standardized and are even built into the OS. Developers can thus count on what users will have. But why the developers actually picked the Mac to do first is something they can talk about. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net (Got net?) | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-728-0152 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Corralitos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: PRZ encrypted voice software release imminent
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:36 8/11/95, Ray Cromwell wrote: > My question is, how portable is it, and does it work over TCP/IP rather >than just modem connections (I suggested this about a year ago)? My ideal >implementation would function on the following architectures: I can't comment on the features of PGPFone. However, know that Internet telephony (as all "real time" services) work overe UDP only, not TCP. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Euro Comm Adopts Privacy Directive (NewsClip)
by nobody＠valhalla.phoenix.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

European Commission Adopts Privacy Directive Brussels, Aug. 11, -- The European Commission is now well on its way towards affording a high level of protection to personal data held on computer systems, following the formal adoption of a Directive on the protection of personal data, Newsbytes has learned. "I am pleased that this important measure, which will ensure a high level of protection for the privacy of individuals in all Member States, has been adopted with a very wide measure of agreement within the Council and European Parliament," said EC Single Market Commissioner Mario Monti, announcing the measure. According to Monti, the Directive will also help to ensure the free flow of information society services in the "Single Market" by "fostering consumer confidence and minimizing differences between member states' rules." "Moreover, the text agreed includes special provisions for journalists, which reconcile the right to privacy with freedom of expression," he said, adding that the member states must transpose the Directive within three years (i.e., write it into their own legislation), "but I sincerely hope that they will take the necessary measures without waiting for the deadline to expire so as to encourage the investment required for the information society to become a reality." Monti claims that the Directive will establish a "clear and stable" regulatory framework necessary to guarantee free movement of personal data, while leaving individual EU countries room for maneuver in the way the Directive is implemented. According to the Directive, free movement of data is particularly important for all services with a large customer base and depending on processing personal data, such as distance selling and financial services. In practice, however, banks and insurance companies process large quantities of personal data on such highly sensitive issues as credit ratings and credit-worthiness. If each member state had its own set of rules on data protection, for example, on how data subjects could verify the information held on them, cross-border provision of services, notably over the information superhighways, would be virtually impossible and this extremely valuable new market opportunity would be lost, the EC claims. According to the EC, the Directive aims to narrow divergences between national data protection laws to the extent necessary to remove obstacles to the free movement of personal data within the EU. As a result, any person whose data is processed in the EC will be afforded an equivalent level of protection of his rights, in particular his right to privacy, irrespective of the member state where the processing is carried out. The EC claims that, until now, differences between national data protection laws have resulted in obstacles to transfers of personal data between EC member states, even when these countries have ratified the 1981 Council of Europe Convention on personal data protection. This has been a particular problem, the EC notes, for multinational companies wishing to transfer data concerning their employees between their operations in different member states. According to the Commission, such obstacles to data transfers could seriously impede the future growth of information society services. The Directive establishes the principle of "fairness," so that a collection of data should be as transparent as possible, giving individuals the option of whether they provide the information or not. The Directive requires all data processing to have a proper legal basis. The legal grounds defined in the Directive are: consent, contract, legal obligation, vital interest of the data subject, and the balance between the legitimate interests of the people controlling the data and the people on whom data is held (i.e., data subjects). This balance gives member states room for maneuver in their implementation and application of the Directive, the Commission claims. Press & Reader Contact: European Commission, +32-299-1111 --

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Re: PRZ encrypted voice software release imminent
by cman＠communities.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Of course, if it was a substantial improvement over the other "Internet Phone" stuff that's out there, and had a good way of dealing with switching, etc., then people would use it to make "free" l.d. phone calls on the net, and the cryptography would get a free ride. Generally, you are right in suggesting that anything that requires people to crawl behind their computers, attach new cables, purchase and debug a sound card under Windows, and generally engage in techno-weenie hardware manipulations will have less appeal than something plug and play. Even given the extremely user-hostile elements of PGP the software, I would be surprised if PGPFone became as popular.

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No Subject
by Bryan Strawser 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a previous message, Timothy C. May said... > > What is your working definition of "nym server"? There have been discussions concernign this before both on here and other mailing lists, such as remailer-operators. A nym server is an operation similar to anon.penet.fi, but more secure. Sameer has two of these operating now that uses PGP encrypted reply blocks and such. [omega.c2.org and alpha.c2.org, both of which use different operating methods] What John is attempting to do is have a nymserver like anon.penet.fi, where folks can create an alias and send/recieve mail/postings to it. However, unlike Julf's system, a secure nymserver would prevent the owner from being able to divulge who the real-life person is behind the alias because of the PGP encrypted reply block and other options involved. Bryan -- Bryan Strawser, Gondolin Technologies, Bloomington, IN USA Remember Waco feanor(a)gondolin.org Live free or die

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