December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

PGP Enhanced Messaging (PEM)
by Rick Busdiecker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I've made my PGP Enhanced Messaging (PEM) available via anonymous FTP on H.GP.CS.CMU.EDU in /usr/rfb/pem/. This is free software available under the terms GNU Public License. I'm enclosing some information from the +Read.Me+ file for the distribution archive (ftp://h.gp.cs.cmu.edu/usr/rfb/pem/) as well as the one for the the software itself. Changes since the most recent distributed version include: - New keybindings that meet RMS specifications. - Some fine tuning related to generating and verifying `header signatures' for messages that include lines starting with either "From " or ">From ". If you pick this up, please send mail to me <rfb(a)cmu.edu> to let me know. Rick ====================================================================== This is a distribution archive for PGP Enhanced Messaging (PEM). The files contained here are: +Read.Me+ This file pem.tar.gz compressed (with gzip) archive pem.tar.gz.asc PGP signed and armored compressed archive pem.tar.gz.sig detached signature for pem.tar.gz rfb(a)cmu.edu my public key block Notes: - There is no uuencoded file. pem.tar.gz.asc can be mailed safely. - If you're concerned about tampering at this archive site, you should fetch my public key block from elsewhere. The public key server at pgp-public-keys(a)pgp.mit.edu is a good place to get it. ====================================================================== PGP Enhanced Messaging (PEM) should not be confused with the Privacy Enhanced Mail standard (PEM). Information on integrating PEM into your GNU Emacs environment is included at the end of this file. The idea behind PEM is to provide a set of Emacs Lisp functions to augment common mailers and newsreaders with PGP related operations. PEM is implemented in layers. There are customization variables defined at each level. They are described later in this document. At the highest level, each supported messaging package has a file that implements the functions that are specific to that package. Currently there are: pem-mhe.el For use with mh-e.el, and Emacs interface to the MH mailer. pem-gnus.el For use with the GNUS newsreader. Appropriate hook functions are defined which add standard function bindings to the various modal key maps. Typically, the following bindings will be in place in any message related buffer: C-c C-d Decrypt next PGP block in current message C-c C-e Encrypt current message C-c C-i Insert a public key into a message C-c C-n sign aNd encrypt current message C-c C-s Sign current message C-c C-v Verify next PGP signed block in current message C-c C-x Extract next public key from message [ Note: This is a change from previous versions where, for example, C-c d and C-c D would be defined. RMS says to do bindings this way and leave those other bindings for users ] Where possible, in buffers which are for composing messages, the standard mechanism for committing (sending or posting) a message will be augmented to support signing and/or encrypting. In buffers which are not for composing messages, the upper case versions are also defined without the C-c prefix, e. g. "D" will decrypt the current message. A notable exception to this is the GNUS *Summary* buffer which has the following default bindings: D gnus-summary-mark-as-read-backward N gnus-summary-next-article V gnus-version X gnus-summary-delete-marked-with Note that in some contexts, some of these bindings don't make sense. They are still bound, however, the function to which they are bound signals an error indicating the operation is inappropriate. For example, it does not make sense to insert your public key into the body of a news article that you are reading. However, some `obvious' restrictions are relaxed when dealing with mail. When you attempt to encrypt a mail message which you are reading, it may be `self encrypted', that is, the message body will be encrypted such that only you can decrypt it. Each of the package specific files are built on functions defined in pem.el. It contains generic message operations and deals with issues like parsing headers and addresses, and identifying PGP armored regions. At the core is npgp.el -- New pgp.el -- so named as to avoid conflicts with the pgp.el, maintained by Gray Watson <gray(a)antaire.com> and Jack Repenning <jackr(a)wpd.sgi.com>, which is available through various elisp archives. This runs PGP asynchronously and is able to deal with the erratic prompting that PGP sometimes does. For example, the first time that you use an untrusted key, PGP will prompt asking if you're sure that you want to use it. npgp.el passes the question on to you, using standard Emacs prompting to get the answer from you. PEM also uses passwd.el by Jamie Zawinski <jwz(a)mcom.com> to read passphrases. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLttV6JNR+/jb2ZlNAQF26AP/fyq+fxLEeqlpaP7bu5oBakgDhkm4pTlf ejo6kmlm052y+g+ax/5LF3ZsHZw0GFKyg4ltL2C8rDcgPo8dPOqv49GfHeeuS1lE HsL/wWBmhwWqijw1bOu0KAogL1I0mumSx+oeYP0Rlea9rRb2cyYYta7X5r0dGFuDWwGoXOIb9yc= =7/tF -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQCNAi3iH2wAAAEEAMjRQMS6OEvdPUFX0HwxA0kYGAXUOde0Kklbdj/Gsf6QCgrA vfrLlW2jIv6Gqn345NZXQ5S45z+m4YlEZV78Ln3G1alxd22lXlo8RChs8QVdxgCX dkfVKJlcpJQfNWfrNHLMtaAB9+22p8nhGjBmTnuX5K0BQgMLCZNR+/jb2ZlNAAUR tB1SaWNrIEJ1c2RpZWNrZXIgPHJmYkBjbXUuZWR1PokAVQIFEC3iIcaIwD3rAd2b uQEBF4UB/iCxzTUBT+eAJCINmk9qkZYNWFhtt12zfyPSK9Ub2ruK6PGkjqE5HQ/b a7Fz49FX9Z70LOpJz11P9pPEmQ8CW3aJAJUCBRAt4iD6Fpk0o882PjUBATWEA/wP +WGx6GKaSHmEdtfNfGQPF70FPFRYKpugAwI/wZBHjtvNnsgTcI92Oby+b9QQDzgJ oXlerHeeoqeGpi8ZiKwIXproR5JBkB/4UuVkmIS1pP5T1D6BIUH27K6k87Yvz8JW GAqHfinoN3YOW4Fx9qZdo46aoRCGcYhTzTuXwyKxTIkAlQIFEC3iIIaTUfv429mZ TQEBmo8EAIHrwdeJ9sFb6Ro4iWxlED1OEMD+KYxfB2vu39uKGXEP1SB488uR1N7z jxcFHqZPliZ0tc2DhrUPpBY85JmI1IjtXXhS8Fbqc5Dp1Pnua+XjndaRpSSD29VH CgNvkf1S35w33GBAh8bVSgjvl8kZKOoDBV4v9ZbqG39+raZ+imAVtCBSaWNrIEJ1 c2RpZWNrZXIgPHJmYkBsZWhtYW4uY29tPokAlQIFEC48n6yTUfv429mZTQEBVwwD /iXo9pv/wFISdSwNKniNcHqogQLHjnZryzvjXNkDTvi0miBlzayozl/Q21a2nMEc 1MI8K3gNv/mP98Qw7xw5FD8F5zuY3XiFYr0GK4m0bqwixUfxkjBacb67mflCvaFS h8+K2k7Db6V0/MpV9t/VOzqjF4h5CFkoWAd+1Cr21OuQ =ruN3 -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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PGP Enhanced Messaging (PEM)
by Rick Busdiecker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I've made my PGP Enhanced Messaging (PEM) available via anonymous FTP on H.GP.CS.CMU.EDU in /usr/rfb/pem/. This is free software available under the terms GNU Public License. I'm enclosing some information from the +Read.Me+ file for the distribution archive (ftp://h.gp.cs.cmu.edu/usr/rfb/pem/) as well as the one for the the software itself. Changes since the most recent distributed version include: - New keybindings that meet RMS specifications. - Some fine tuning related to generating and verifying `header signatures' for messages that include lines starting with either "From " or ">From ". If you pick this up, please send mail to me <rfb(a)cmu.edu> to let me know. Rick ====================================================================== This is a distribution archive for PGP Enhanced Messaging (PEM). The files contained here are: +Read.Me+ This file pem.tar.gz compressed (with gzip) archive pem.tar.gz.asc PGP signed and armored compressed archive pem.tar.gz.sig detached signature for pem.tar.gz rfb(a)cmu.edu my public key block Notes: - There is no uuencoded file. pem.tar.gz.asc can be mailed safely. - If you're concerned about tampering at this archive site, you should fetch my public key block from elsewhere. The public key server at pgp-public-keys(a)pgp.mit.edu is a good place to get it. ====================================================================== PGP Enhanced Messaging (PEM) should not be confused with the Privacy Enhanced Mail standard (PEM). Information on integrating PEM into your GNU Emacs environment is included at the end of this file. The idea behind PEM is to provide a set of Emacs Lisp functions to augment common mailers and newsreaders with PGP related operations. PEM is implemented in layers. There are customization variables defined at each level. They are described later in this document. At the highest level, each supported messaging package has a file that implements the functions that are specific to that package. Currently there are: pem-mhe.el For use with mh-e.el, and Emacs interface to the MH mailer. pem-gnus.el For use with the GNUS newsreader. Appropriate hook functions are defined which add standard function bindings to the various modal key maps. Typically, the following bindings will be in place in any message related buffer: C-c C-d Decrypt next PGP block in current message C-c C-e Encrypt current message C-c C-i Insert a public key into a message C-c C-n sign aNd encrypt current message C-c C-s Sign current message C-c C-v Verify next PGP signed block in current message C-c C-x Extract next public key from message [ Note: This is a change from previous versions where, for example, C-c d and C-c D would be defined. RMS says to do bindings this way and leave those other bindings for users ] Where possible, in buffers which are for composing messages, the standard mechanism for committing (sending or posting) a message will be augmented to support signing and/or encrypting. In buffers which are not for composing messages, the upper case versions are also defined without the C-c prefix, e. g. "D" will decrypt the current message. A notable exception to this is the GNUS *Summary* buffer which has the following default bindings: D gnus-summary-mark-as-read-backward N gnus-summary-next-article V gnus-version X gnus-summary-delete-marked-with Note that in some contexts, some of these bindings don't make sense. They are still bound, however, the function to which they are bound signals an error indicating the operation is inappropriate. For example, it does not make sense to insert your public key into the body of a news article that you are reading. However, some `obvious' restrictions are relaxed when dealing with mail. When you attempt to encrypt a mail message which you are reading, it may be `self encrypted', that is, the message body will be encrypted such that only you can decrypt it. Each of the package specific files are built on functions defined in pem.el. It contains generic message operations and deals with issues like parsing headers and addresses, and identifying PGP armored regions. At the core is npgp.el -- New pgp.el -- so named as to avoid conflicts with the pgp.el, maintained by Gray Watson <gray(a)antaire.com> and Jack Repenning <jackr(a)wpd.sgi.com>, which is available through various elisp archives. This runs PGP asynchronously and is able to deal with the erratic prompting that PGP sometimes does. For example, the first time that you use an untrusted key, PGP will prompt asking if you're sure that you want to use it. npgp.el passes the question on to you, using standard Emacs prompting to get the answer from you. PEM also uses passwd.el by Jamie Zawinski <jwz(a)mcom.com> to read passphrases. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLttV6JNR+/jb2ZlNAQF26AP/fyq+fxLEeqlpaP7bu5oBakgDhkm4pTlf ejo6kmlm052y+g+ax/5LF3ZsHZw0GFKyg4ltL2C8rDcgPo8dPOqv49GfHeeuS1lE HsL/wWBmhwWqijw1bOu0KAogL1I0mumSx+oeYP0Rlea9rRb2cyYYta7X5r0dGFuDWwGoXOIb9yc= =7/tF -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQCNAi3iH2wAAAEEAMjRQMS6OEvdPUFX0HwxA0kYGAXUOde0Kklbdj/Gsf6QCgrA vfrLlW2jIv6Gqn345NZXQ5S45z+m4YlEZV78Ln3G1alxd22lXlo8RChs8QVdxgCX dkfVKJlcpJQfNWfrNHLMtaAB9+22p8nhGjBmTnuX5K0BQgMLCZNR+/jb2ZlNAAUR tB1SaWNrIEJ1c2RpZWNrZXIgPHJmYkBjbXUuZWR1PokAVQIFEC3iIcaIwD3rAd2b uQEBF4UB/iCxzTUBT+eAJCINmk9qkZYNWFhtt12zfyPSK9Ub2ruK6PGkjqE5HQ/b a7Fz49FX9Z70LOpJz11P9pPEmQ8CW3aJAJUCBRAt4iD6Fpk0o882PjUBATWEA/wP +WGx6GKaSHmEdtfNfGQPF70FPFRYKpugAwI/wZBHjtvNnsgTcI92Oby+b9QQDzgJ oXlerHeeoqeGpi8ZiKwIXproR5JBkB/4UuVkmIS1pP5T1D6BIUH27K6k87Yvz8JW GAqHfinoN3YOW4Fx9qZdo46aoRCGcYhTzTuXwyKxTIkAlQIFEC3iIIaTUfv429mZ TQEBmo8EAIHrwdeJ9sFb6Ro4iWxlED1OEMD+KYxfB2vu39uKGXEP1SB488uR1N7z jxcFHqZPliZ0tc2DhrUPpBY85JmI1IjtXXhS8Fbqc5Dp1Pnua+XjndaRpSSD29VH CgNvkf1S35w33GBAh8bVSgjvl8kZKOoDBV4v9ZbqG39+raZ+imAVtCBSaWNrIEJ1 c2RpZWNrZXIgPHJmYkBsZWhtYW4uY29tPokAlQIFEC48n6yTUfv429mZTQEBVwwD /iXo9pv/wFISdSwNKniNcHqogQLHjnZryzvjXNkDTvi0miBlzayozl/Q21a2nMEc 1MI8K3gNv/mP98Qw7xw5FD8F5zuY3XiFYr0GK4m0bqwixUfxkjBacb67mflCvaFS h8+K2k7Db6V0/MpV9t/VOzqjF4h5CFkoWAd+1Cr21OuQ =ruN3 -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Re: Transparent Email
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by eric(a)remailer.net (Eric Hughes) on Mon, 28 Nov 9:54 PM >I am still considering the "sign-or-delay" proposal for >the toad.com >server, that is, sign your articles to the list or >they'll be delayed >and eventually rejected. Does not everyone get a complete header like the one below from Eric's post with incoming mail? This is presented automagically by The Pipeline's system. I had assumed that because every mail received here has such a header that everyone else could also see who sent my mail, signed or not. That is why I have not signed my posts. BTW, Pipeline does not allow anonymously-sent direct mail -- as a take it or leave it policy. So we cannot manipulate headers to forge from this Windows-driven end. John Young (redundantly, I thought) >From owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Tue Nov 29 00:01 EST >1994 > Received: from relay2.UU.NET (relay2.UU.NET >[192.48.96.7]) by pipeline.com (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP >id AAA09928 for <jya(a)pipeline.com>; Tue, 29 Nov 1994 >00:01:20 -0500 >Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP > id QQxsbj13332; Mon, 28 Nov 1994 23:59:02 -0500 >Received: by toad.com id AA15623; Mon, 28 Nov 94 >20:55:57 PST >Received: from largo.remailer.net ([204.94.187.1]) by >toad.com id AA15611; Mon, 28 Nov 94 20:55:29 PST >Received: (from eric@localhost) by largo.remailer.net >(8.6.8/8.6.6) id VAA02536; Mon, 28 Nov 1994 21:54:14 >-0800 >Date: Mon, 28 Nov 1994 21:54:14 -0800 >Message-Id: <199411290554.VAA02536(a)largo.remailer.net> >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >In-Reply-To: <199411282330.RAA00186(a)omaha.omaha.com> >(message from Alex Strasheim on Mon, 28 Nov 1994 >17:30:22 -0600 (CST)) >Subject: Re: Transparent Email >From: eric(a)remailer.net (Eric Hughes) >Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Precedence: bulk >Content-Type: text >Content-Length: 6504

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Re: "You aren't following the _rules_!"
by jrochkin＠cs.oberlin.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:58 AM 11/29/94, Lucky Green wrote: >I do not mean to belittle the work that has been done, but unless the >encryption is built into the mailer and using a remailer means clicking the >"use X remailer(s)" button, and the mailer better know which ones are >working and do the PGP envelopes, it won't happen. Have you used premail? It pretty much does all of that. People still aren't using premail, either because they can't figure out how to install it (doubtful, it's not hard to install), or because they don't have a need for it that's great enough to justify the (minimal) time neccesary to ftp it and install it, or wait the (sometimes more painful) time neccesary for the computer to encrypt and/or sign your outgoing messages. Which was admitteedlyu your main point; until there is a _need_ for crypto, it's not going to be used. Because premail makes it incredibly easy to use PGP on a unix box. And, for that matter, the Eudora/PGP applescritps make it incredibly easy to use PGP on a mac. And there are some people working on an applescript that will automate using remailers on a mac too. But ease of use appearantly isn't enough; no matter how easy it gets to use, it's still going to have some cost to the user over not using it. Even if the cost is only having to wait the 1.5 seconds it takes your machine to decrypt/encrypt a message. Unless there's a use for it, people won't be willing to spend that 1.5 seconds per message.

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"Find The Dirt On The Internet!"
by tidaore＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Find The Dirt On The Internet!! You will not receive any more correspondence from us!!!!! ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- We have done the research for you!!! With this power tool you can access information all over the World Wide Web about your employees, friends and rivals. We give you the access to hundreds of sites that will supply you with information about DMV records, credit profiles, medical and criminal records, most anything you would want to know. With this information you can track down phone numbers,social security info, E-mail addresses, surnames, birth, marriage, divorce, and death records. Look up a long, lost relative!! With sites like Parent-Finder and Birth-Quest, look for biological parents! Get a map of any place in the country. Find out where speed traps are in your area, get info about legal issues, Check out politics anywhere in the U.S.(access past congressional votes, campaign finance, election results, etc.) Most of these sites have links to other sites to allow you access to even more information.You will be guided to thousands of pages all over the world! The internet can be rather complicated. Take advantage of these simple, easy web sites containing tons of information. These are just a few items to look for, there are many, many MORE! You can know EVERYTHING about EVERYBODY with this information!! Your satisfaction is guaranteed, Just return the material within 30 days for a full refund! Send $11.95 to; INFOREVOLUTION 875 Lawrenceville Suwanee Rd.,N.W. Suite 310-314 Lawrenceville GA 30243-5484

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Re: We really _aren't_ paranoid :)
by Johnathan Corgan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >> Ginsburg later asked Days to cite an example of a law which Congress >> would NOT have the authority to enact under the Interstate Commerce >> Clause. Interjected Justice Scalia Don't give away anything here. >> They might want to do it. > >I'm not sure I follow. Is Scalia saying Don't give away anything here. >They[Congress?] might want to do it. ? That's what it sounds like to me. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLtt80E1Diok8GKihAQHjjwP+Ljp8nSvm14pWWirV84u+jmjsQgopi3qd 1I/v1p/jdexucfBQzUIfVGEY1FPSBX7ok6gU6bJspKJffah68uIy7D2Zu72WmNSd ywjfoAX93JKhJ5AVKvV/bGJLKxqu2jdZ2p9AwQCp74n9Y4t/NbKyDHGzDwq0YaMp renusqwd8Mo= =ZSzM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ======================================================================= Johnathan Corgan "Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent" jcorgan(a)netcom.com -Isaac Asimov PGP Public Key: http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html Or send email to: pgp-public-keys(a)pgp.ai.mit.edu Subj: GET jcorgan =======================================================================

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Crypto and Ease of Use (Was: Re: "You aren't following)
by jamiel＠sybase.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>At 3:58 AM 11/29/94, Lucky Green wrote: >Have you used premail? It pretty much does all of that. >People still aren't using premail, either because they can't figure out how >to install it (doubtful, it's not hard to install), or because they don't >have a need for it that's great enough to justify the (minimal) time >neccesary to ftp it and install it, or wait the (sometimes more painful) >time neccesary for the computer to encrypt and/or sign your outgoing >messages. I think there is still a difference between having functionality available for some effort (ftping, installing, reading the instructions) and having a menu item in Eudora. The difference is the same one that makes Macintoshes more popular than Unix boxes for the people out there who just want to get something done ("The Rest Of Us"). Full integration into mainstream products is nessessary before Your Avarage Joe out there will bother to use the various tools available. This may be somewhere in between Tim's pusher/puller distinctions - crypto-related technologies are compelling, but not enough to draw people in without ease of use. "If you build it, they will come (but only if it is pretty)." -j -- On the internet, no one knows you're a deity. ___________________________________________________________________ Jamie Lawrence <jamiel(a)sybase.com> Soon ---------> <foodie(a)netcom.com>

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Re: Brit Fascists To Track Motorists - DigiCash Obsolescent
by sar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:23 AM 7/25/97 -0400, you wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >At 02:34 AM 7/24/97 -0700, Kent Crispin wrote: >>On Wed, Jul 23, 1997 at 01:59:00PM -0700, Bill Stewart wrote: >>[...] >>> And, yes, all of this privacy loss happens because somebody decided >>> it was convenient to put a car-ownership-tax receipt on the outside >>> of a car so police can quickly decide if you've paid your taxes... >>> The rest of it's just implementation details. >> >>Of course, you could just confine your driving to private roads, and >>leave the license plate off. > >Sabotaging your plates so they weren't machine readable or using a car >registered in Slovenia or Wisconsin (both possible in the UK) would make more >sense. > remember those purple neon "chaser" lights that people used to put around thier plates to to make them harder to read and bounce lidar off of... dont see them much anymore they probably went the way of blackout windows they both make it harder for police to apprehend the dangerous criminals. In fact if you get pulled over with blackout windows in NYC you might be greeted by one of new yorks finest pointing a gun at you instead of the ususal solem "liscense and registration please". I think that if the government could make a case that mandatory brain removal would stop crime most people would be all for it.

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Re: Transparent Email
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Knumbskull Alert! On the transparent e-mail topic, I send the presumably anonymous mail headers below received here by way of The Pipeline provider. Would some kind soul verify that the headers do not disclose the true ID or true address or true path other true info that would identify the prayerfully anonymous sender? Every piece of mail coming here has such headers. Does everyone else get the same? FWIW, the mail system automagically lists the sender and the subject in a neat chart, and hides the header if commanded to do so, or reveals it to the prying mind. Thanks. John Young (signing until forbidden) PS: It's true that Pipeline was cracked last Saturday and the system shut down for a while "due to a security breach". The story in the WSJ about the "Internet Liberation Front" explained more than we clueless subscribers were allowed to know -- as the story said, corporations don't want us babes to know about our vulnerabilities, we might demand better service. ------------------- Jpunix Header: >From owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Mon Nov 28 20:14 EST 1994 Received: from relay2.UU.NET (relay2.UU.NET [192.48.96.7]) by pipeline.com (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id UAA22639 for <jya(a)pipeline.com>; Mon, 28 Nov 1994 20:14:45 -0500 Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP id QQxsau18498; Mon, 28 Nov 1994 20:13:25 -0500 Received: by toad.com id AA12541; Mon, 28 Nov 94 17:08:09 PST Received: from jpunix.com by toad.com id AA12535; Mon, 28 Nov 94 17:07:57 PST Received: (from remailer@localhost) by jpunix.com (8.6.9/8.6.6) id TAA17362 for cypherpunks(a)toad.com; Mon, 28 Nov 1994 19:07:46 -0600 Date: Mon, 28 Nov 1994 19:07:46 -0600 Message-Id: <199411290107.TAA17362(a)jpunix.com> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: RE: Cash From: nobody(a)jpunix.com (Anonymous) Comments: This message did not originate from the above address. It was automatically remailed by an anonymous mail service. Please report inappropriate use to <remail-adm(a)jpunix.com> NOTE: Mail to nobody is sent to /dev/null Finger remailer(a)jpunix.com for remailer help. Finger kserver(a)jpunix.com for PGP keyserver help. Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk Content-Type: text Content-Length: 801 ------------------- Chaos.bsu Header (spooge): >From owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Mon Nov 28 10:09 EST 1994 Received: from relay2.UU.NET (relay2.UU.NET [192.48.96.7]) by pipeline.com (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id KAA26339 for <jya(a)pipeline.com>; Mon, 28 Nov 1994 10:09:55 -0500 Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP id QQxrzg29356; Mon, 28 Nov 1994 10:03:33 -0500 Received: by toad.com id AA25960; Mon, 28 Nov 94 07:01:07 PST Received: from bsu-cs.bsu.edu by toad.com id AA25954; Mon, 28 Nov 94 07:01:03 PST Received: (from nowhere@localhost) by bsu-cs.bsu.edu (8.6.9/8.6.6) id KAA16037 for cypherpunks(a)toad.com; Mon, 28 Nov 1994 10:00:55 -0500 Date: Mon, 28 Nov 1994 10:00:55 -0500 Message-Id: <199411281500.KAA16037(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> From: Anonymous <nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com X-Remailed-By: Anonymous <nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> X-Ttl: 2 X-Notice: This message was forwarded by a software- automated anonymous remailing service. Comment: The contents of this message are neither condoned by nor approved by Ball State University. 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Re: An Attempt to Hobble SAFE Crypto Bill
by Peter D. Junger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

: http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/5492.html : : : An Attempt to Hobble House Crypto Bill : : by Rebecca Vesely : : 9:08am 25.Jul.97.PDT A Republican opponent of a House : bill that would loosen controls on the use and export of : encryption is circulating an amendment that would : effectively cripple the legislation. : : The amendment, by Representative Benjamin Gilman : (R-New York), who chairs the International Relations : Committee, would make it unlawful to "manufacture, : distribute, sell, or import any product within the United : States that can be used to encrypt communications or : information if the product does not permit the real-time : decryption of such encrypted communications or : information." Besides the first amendment issues that I raised earlier, there are certain other problems with this amendment. Say it takes 2,000 years to decrypt a message, now that is what I would really call ``real time''. And there could also be a message that could be decrypted in ten seconds, but only by someone who has the key. Obviously this draft of an amendment is very rough, incomplete, mistranscribed, or some or all of the above. -- Peter D. Junger--Case Western Reserve University Law School--Cleveland, OH EMAIL: junger(a)samsara.law.cwru.edu URL: http://samsara.law.cwru.edu NOTE: junger(a)pdj2-ra.f-remote.cwru.edu no longer exists

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