December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: C'punks Economist Fan Club
by frissell＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>It's witty, politically >aware, relatively technically savvy. The articles exhibit a healthy (IMHO) >cynicism about what happens and why, yet maintain some idealism about what >should happen. It's not perfect, but it's difficult to imagine surpassing it. The Economist is fully informed and funny. What domestic news magazine would include the following in one of *their* leads (editorials): Circa 1987 "It is unlikely that Gorbachev has included an invasion of Western Europe in his next Five Year Plan but his generals *have* made their preparations. Lucky Britain is in the *Polish* Army's Zone of Occupation." DCF -- Have you registered a domain today. My template worked first time and I have since registered nine domain names. Send for a free copy.

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Re: True Names
by frissell＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >--Mike, still looking for a copy himself > Boy, for people who can make the World's Governments tremble with the click of a keyboard some of you seem a bit print disabled. How to buy an Out of Print Book (c) 1995 Offshore Enterprises 1) Find an OP book search specialist 2) Ask he/she to find it for you 3) Pay for it To accomplish 1), ask at (independent) bookstores in your vicinity (those are places you may have seen around town full of processed tree carcasses), libraries, etc. DCF -- Correlation between (40 years of pack-a-day)second-hand smoke and cancer: +1.19 Correlation between having had an abortion and cancer: +1.50 Correlation generally accepted as significant for disease studies: +3.00

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Re: Remailer Abuse
by Nathaniel Borenstein 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Excerpts from mail: 5-Jan-95 Re: Remailer Abuse db(a)Tadpole.COM (1180*) > Heh. An anonymous remailer paid for by credit card... there'd > have to be an additional level of indirection for it to work, > which would make the methods for tracking those who don't pay > quite problematic. Again, this comes down to definitions of anonymity. In this case, if you start from the silly assumption that the anonymous remailer actually keeps records that correlate messages to payment mechanisms, Doug is right, but barely. To break the anonymity, you'd need collusion between the operator of the anonymous remailer AND First Virtual, because the former knows which account sent a message, and the latter knows who that account belongs to. (And before you tell me that this sounds a lot like the Clipper key escrow, I would point out that instead of two "trust us, they're independent" agencies of the US government, in this case we're talking about two independent private companies which are probably in two different countries. For my part, I figure that if the government of Finland and the government of the US can actually agree that it's so important to force the sacrifice of anonymity in a given case that they're both willing to coerce companies under their jurisdiction, they will probably have a very good reason for doing so. Maybe I'm too trusting, though.) Moreover, and perhaps most important, even THIS can only be done if the anonymous mailer keeps records of WHICH account paid for WHICH posting, and if I were to operate a for-pay remailer, I wouldn't do that anyway. It sort of defeats the whole point of the service. > Also, most remailer abuse tends to be of the hit-and-run variety, > which is still nicely enabled by FV. Only if you assume that the same people aren't responsible for multiple hit-and-run attacks. I would tend to assume the opposite. Russ Nelson saw the first point quite clearly, and wrote: Excerpts from mail: 5-Jan-95 Re: Remailer Abuse nelson(a)crynwr.com (1177) > Sure, I'll know who used it, but I'm not going to keep that > information. (Yes, yes, FV says that I have to keep records of who > bought what, but I'll label all my information with a random number, > that simply says that X bought information worth Y, not *what* > information.) And if you don't trust a remailer operator, then you > won't use it. All I'd add here is that the requirement to keep records is one that we have to pass on from the credit card world. If you didn't keep ANY records, my understanding is that all that this would really mean in practice is that there would be an extremely strong presumption AGAINST you in certain dispute-resolution situations. That's just my understanding, however, and it doesn't in any way supersede or supplement our legal terms and conditions, available from fineprint(a)fv.com. (You should try them, I find them more effective than Sominex.) Excerpts from mail: 5-Jan-95 Re: Remailer Abuse wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com (2028) > I'd be worried about a couple of issues - > one is just the transaction cost - can you successfully market remailer use > at a buck a shot or whatever you'd be charging beyond FV's 29c stamp, > or would you have some convenient way to aggregate bill? Depending on how often you aggregate, you can charge almost any amount. 20 cents might be very reasonable. If you run a cron job once a month to post aggregated billings to anyone who had two or more outstanding uses, you'd make only a small amount on the two-time users, but you'd get serious aggregation from the regular users. (You might also want to bill the really-high-volume users weekly, to prevent them from going into shock at their huge monthly bills.) > Beyond that, though, are some traffic analysis problems - > remailers require a fair bit of traffic to be useful, and unless > you receive a reasonable amount of encrypted traffic, > and support encrypted email for purchasing remailer service > and other merchandise, an eavesdropper would have a fairly good source > of traffic data on your remailer users, especially since buying and using > remailer service requires two messages within an hour or so. Well, I think low-volume remailers are always a bit vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks, aren't they? One thing you could do is build a variable time-delay into the remailer, to make it harder to correlate messages coming in with those going out. To take paranoia a step further, you could allow people to encrypt their mail TO an anonymous remailer with the remailer's public key, and let the remailer send it out unencrypted. No snooper should be able to correlate the *contents* that way, and it avoids lots of key management problems by only using the remailer's key, not the user's. > An alternative billing mechanism, which wouldn't use Chaum-patented cash, > would be to sell a bunch of one-shot random-number tokens. > When you sell the tokens, you add them to the database of valid tokens, > and when one comes in on a message you delete it. > This allows you to sell more than one message or service-period per > FV transaction, and separates the purchase and use by a longer time, > without adding the need for record-keeping based on the user's ID. > It obviously does require encrypted reply messages. I think this could work quite nicely, at first glance. This is also the kind of service for which you might want to wait until after the "yes" reply to deliver the "goods". My only concern, would be the key management issues, but they might be manageable in this case by using the equivalent of a session key, instead of a permanent personal key. I think this is a promising idea. -- Nathaniel

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Re: PATNEWS: PTO accepting USENET FAQs are formal prior art
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thought I'd pass this on... -Rishab srctran(a)world.std.com (Gregory Aharonian) writes: > !010394 PTO accepting USENET FAQs as formal prior art > > It seems that the US Patent Office is accepting Internet USENET FAQs > (Frequently Asked Questions - periodic postings on USENET groups with > questions and answers) as prior art. As you see in the following entry > from my software prior art database, one of the Other References is to > a cryptography FAQ. If any knows if the European Patent Office is accepting > USENET FAQs, and has an example, let me know. > > Thus if an examiner objects to your use of a FAQ as prior art, cite > this patent (NTIPAFCAP*). It probably would be helpful if the PTO came out > with a quick guideline to a consistent way of doing so. I suppose archiving > FAQs is one more thing I can add to my databases. > > It's nice to see the PTO embracing part of the Internet, even as it > rejects other parts of the Internet. Eventually, though, the PTO will have > to choose one or the other. > > Greg Aharonian > Internet Patent News Service > (for subscription info, send 'help' to patents(a)world.std.com ) > (for prior art search services info, send 'prior' to patents(a)world.std.com ) > (for WWW patent searching, try http://sunsite.unc.edu/patents/intropat.html > ==================== > > TYP[USPAT] > NUM[5371794] > ASS[Sun Microsystems] > CUN[USX] > ISD[19941206] > CLS[380/21] > ART[222] > LOC[] > GRG[] > TIT[Method and apparatus for privacy and authentication in wireless networks] > ORF[5] > ORFTXT[ > Authentication and Authenticated Key Exchanges, Authors: Diffie, Oorschot & > Weiner, Published by Designs, Codes & Cryptography 2, 107-125, > .COPYRGT.1992 Kluwer Academic Publishers. > The First Ten Years Of Public Key Cryptography, Author: Whitfield Diffie, > Reprinted from Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 76, No. 5, May 1988. > > Overview of Cryptology: Summary Of Internet Cryptology Frequently Asked > Questions (Oct. 1992). > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > > The Keys To Privacy and Authentication, Publication by RSA Data Security, > Inc., 100 Marine Parkway, Redwood City, Calif. 94065. (Oct. 1993). > Answers To Frequently Asked Questions About Today's Cryptography, Author: > Paul Fahn, RSA Laboratories, 100 Marine Parkway, Redwood City, Calif. 94065 > (Sep. 1992). > ] > > > ============================================================================= > > (NTIPAFCAP* = Not that issued patents are formally citable as precedent). ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "In between the breaths is rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in the space where we live" rishab(a)arbornet.org - Lawrence Durrell Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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Sorehand mailing list
by Michael Froomkin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

While I was abroad, someone from this list asked me for the address for the SOREHAND mailing list, which helps those suffering from repetitive strain injuries (RSI), including carpal tunnel syndrome. I didn't have the listserve info in England, and somehow lost the request before I got back. Figuring, however, that cypherpunks write code, that writing code causes RSI, and hence this address might be of more general interest, here it is: to subscribe, send a SUBSCRIBE SOREHAND <yourname> to Listserve(a)ucsfvm.ucsf.edu A.Michael Froomkin | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax) U.Miami Law School | MFROOMKI(a)UMIAMI.IR.MIAMI.EDU PO Box 248087 | Coral Gables, FL 33146 USA | It's warmish here, almost cool.

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Remailer anonymity
by Dr. D.C. Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Much has been said lately about maintaining anonymity for remailer users while providing some "pay to play" mechanism for the operator. Absent strong collusion between operators, doesn't remailer chaining ensure anonymity? Plenty of movie "bad guys" escape by getting on the subway because no one knows where they'll get off or change lines. It seems to me that knowing a person entered the system is far less information than knowing where they exited. As long as remailers have guaranteed access to other remailers, anonymity should be maintained. Re: collusion; I'd sooner believe the Macro$oft/RCC fable. In a gadda da vida, Billy. =D.C. Williams <dcwill(a)ee.unr.edu> - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLw12MioZzwIn1bdtAQH+XQF/RGe9sufCmL8KB2ARuyJNChmF+ZA4DRlf cCnAwpyUhRRtWdpDRx7wZxopjvPHUYDC =kVwM -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Chain letter bounced (fwd)
by Carol Anne Braddock 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Inasmuch as I sent the prior posting the way I did, (as I can only read one letter at a time), You do not speak for all the cypherpunks, neither do I. On the time cronology you are the first to complain about the account closing notice. That doesn't constitute a WE yet. So please do not send me further personal mail. I'm glad I'm not so clueless about Stalking Laws in the State of Minnesota. Now I've go to my free.org account and get my Star-Trib address archive back. Carol Anne Braddock signed 1/6/95 11:25 A.M. On Fri, 6 Jan 1995, david d `zoo' zuhn wrote: > // come through, but for now I'm kinda clueless. > > Very very true. > > And please stop including this stuff at the end of every message. WE DON'T > CARE. > > > // From carolann(a)vortex.mm.com Fri Jan 6 01:39:29 1995 > // Date: Thu, 5 Jan 1995 21:57:05 -0600 > // From: Carol Anne Braddock <carolann(a)vortex.mm.com> > // To: carolann(a)vortex.mm.com > // > // [icicle.winternet.com] > // Login name: carolann In real life: CarolAnne Braddock > // Directory: /usr2/carolann Shell: /etc/scripts/tcsh-susp > // Last login Thu Jan 5 21:38 on ttyq5 from annex3-1.wintern > // New mail received Thu Jan 5 21:16:23 1995; > // unread since Mon Jan 2 13:18:25 1995 > // Plan: > // This account has been disabled permanently. > // > // Mike Horwath - Admin - Winternet - drechsau(a)winternet.com > // > >

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Re: All I did was properly crosspost! harrassments another story
by Carol Anne Braddock 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 6 Jan 1995, david d `zoo' zuhn wrote: > Sorry, but I don't flame in public fora. I do so in email only. > > The Michigan precedent for email stalking isn't very strong (it also > included several incidents of physical contact as well), so you threats are > not really too worrisome. The last time I checked with various folks about > the Minnesota laws, it's not exactly too clear on email (prosecution in the > situation in question was declined due to lack of confidence in > conviction), so again, I'm not very worried. > > But it doesn't matter since you've just entered my global kill files. > Anything you send to me won't be seen at all. Anywhere. Anyhow. News. > Mail. Etc. Plonk! > > And as a personal note, if your concept of 'dealing' involves making legal > threats at the first possible instance of disagreement, then I think you > need a new concept of 'dealing'. > >

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TRUE NAMES FOR FREE
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Angus Patterson wrote a short while ago: S6>I've been trying to get True Names by Vernor Vinge, and have been told it's >out of print (like most good cypunk ), does anybody have it scanned? Laissez Faire Books has a stockpile and they're giving them away! LF sends you _True_Names_ free when you buy _Solomon's Knife_ by Victor Korman (a pen-name). Order FN5136, $9.95 for both + $3.25 shipping: Laissez Faire, 938 Howard Street #202, San Francisco, CA 94103, tel 800-326-0996, fax 415-541-0597. They have their own Laissez Faire Book News list, too, with previews and samples. Ask Chris Whitten for more info at <whitten(a)panix.com>. "Capt'n Bob" Correspondents: Communications went down recently when 2 remailers shut up shop. A new address will be up and running during next week.

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Re: Your HomePage at winternet.com
by Carol Anne Braddock 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear Alex, We have all the web pages. They should be moving to spring.com shortly. It's kinda sad that they bootleg off my net.web.goodwill, as My pages are are at the 200+ access count and rising level per day. The Webbittown pages will remedy this in the not too distant future. (PGP encoded HTML) They should be down by the end of the day. Love Always, Carol Anne > -- > Alex de Joode > usura(a)replay.com Hate mail appreciated, > http://www.xs4all.nl/~usura weekly contest for best death threat. > > >

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