December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Premail PGP Keys
by Michael L. Acklin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ralf, I hate to bother you, but I am setting up your premail program and tried the "premail -getkeys" but it never works. I tried to manually finger Matt's Pub Key area, but looks like he is down or has a different address. Is there somewhere else I can try to get the PGP Keys for the remailers, or does Matt have a different address? Any help would really be appreciated. Also does anyone have a patch for PINE 3.9X to get premail to work. I know I am kinda behind but just starting out and would really appreciate any help I can get. Again Thanks in Advance.... Mike Acklin ----------------------> hroller(a)metronet.com

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Re: Scientologys Attempts
by danisch＠ira.uka.de 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> After reading the lawyer's threatening letter I tried to check out the > two newsgroups mentioned, and was told they do not exist. (This is not a > local filter here; Eskimo does not censor newsgroups.) They still exist at our local server (E.I.S.S., University of Karlsruhe, Germany) and contain messages (even from America). Seems as they were successfull in deleting the group at some servers. > So have they been > deleted? If so, by whom and how? Find out... > What is 'rmgroup' and The usenet method to remove groups. A special message with a control line in the header. > who has the > authority to remove alt. groups? Don't know... Hadmut

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Re: Abuse and Remailer Ethics
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 17 Jan 1995 anonymous-remailer(a)xs4all.nl (Name withheld on request) said: >This comment is grossly unfair. Obviously Homer is going to a lot of effort to >operate his remailer in the best way possible. > >It's easy for others to be critical. "head on a plate" is a strong term to >use, given Homer made it clear he would not reveal the identity of an anonymous >user without a court order. Also, one wonders to what end remailers are being >put by people who are worried about being "sold out". > >It's always been a good policy to use a foreign mailer in a chain where >anonymity is critically important. That doesn't mean it's OK to make Homer the >whipping boy. I agree that it's a bit much to expect the remailer operator to heroically perform beyond what any of us would do in the same lonely spot under duress. Tim has written recently on another list that the USG grabs enemies in other domains when the national interests are at stake -- the 800-pounder can define any of its actions legal, or to hell with legal niceties as the Beast opts, the picky lawyers can sort it out later, or never. Does not Duncan and others have wisdom on this: Don't roll over out of ignorance and faint-heartedness, but do carefully protect your keister, with feet-on-ground planning, mercury-technology and out-wits. Watch for signs of sneak attack through the guy being squeezed next door, or by a cahoots-machine zipping psy-war toot-alarms to foster fearful quiescence. Some warning examples may be in the offing in the rising heat of dreaded horse-threats to civil society. If so, some will be arranged by provocateurs like past G-guy tricks. So it goes. So what. Nesta said, it's fun to lance swollen infected over-controlling heads.

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Scientology and remailers.
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Posting the truth about Scientology, in the face of harassment and threats by scientologists, is an excellent example of the legitimate use of remailers, as is alt.abuse.recovery, and talk.politics.china --------------------------------------------------------------------- We have the right to defend ourselves and our property, because of the kind of animals that we are. True law derives from this right, not from James A. Donald the arbitrary power of the omnipotent state. jamesd(a)netcom.com http://www.catalog.com/jamesd/

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Internet News: NNBC News Story moved to tonight (Tuesday) (fwd)
by Brad Dolan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Tue, 17 Jan 1995 14:23:11 -0500 From: Craig Peterson <craig(a)Mainstream.com> To: Multiple recipients of list <rkba-alert(a)gatekeeper.nra.org> Subject: INFO: NBC Nightly News Story moved to tonight (Tuesday) A story regarding the Internet, with some sort of mention of NRA.org, should be on the NBC Nightly News with Tom Brokaw tonight. Craig.

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Re: Abuse and Remailer Ethics
by cactus＠seabsd.hks.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <Pine.SUN.3.91.950116205019.7181A-100000@math>, Homer Wilson Smith <homer(a)math.cornell.edu> wrote: > I am not presently on cypherpunks, so please include me in the >replies. It's a little (not a lot) rude to start a substantive conversation and not to listen in to the list for duration. Just my O. > Does a list owner have the right to demand blocking to his list, >with or without a vote of the list readers? I would say yes. And the power. They can filter them out at the level of the mailing address. Tell 'em to do their own work. Put it gently and politely, but if they're the list admin, they can easily filter out mail from specific addresses without bugging a busy remailer operator who is, after all, doing a service to the net much as the list admin is. "Scenario them rosily with a calculated ambiguity which they will be sure to understand." - - -- Todd Masco | "life without caution/ the only worth living / love for a man/ cactus(a)hks.net | love for a woman/ love for the facts/ protectless" - A Rich Cactus' Homepage - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLxv4hRNhgovrPB7dAQFBbwP/XCzg7Zyib0ZXPDPpv/0QKR+jKYCchJ+r bcIfM4g+rP1uxyuBj1ErLhvc18Dpu/zjp5u2ZR5F9L6OYEF6YrYrUhgq1hsTNc1U lHZsCNr8ZuOpfU/dLAeLvrZLNak39eVmoMnInSNO0q7dUoMnaKz8CjZAQvy+TK4A eqle4P9fmSM= =4z27 - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLxw0MioZzwIn1bdtAQGx2AF/WUf23vWGlV6WXUfQ2BBYuEodnnUvN5GM hYLbdgZ7BO6NWpgbLSPQYCs2X4yWMqVW =m+km -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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A Reason for Privacy
by habs＠cmyk.warwick.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, I had a talk today with our Office Manager which reveals an other reason why we need anon. system. That is to say a good reason we can hold up to the press, media and other people.. The Example: Job Ads.. This are often non on an Anon. basis. For example, the new york times will function as an anon. forwarder of job resumes... The office manager needs to have both the company name and the name of the person getting the resumes to be kept anonymous...

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Does encrypted equal safe?
by marko＠millcomm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> At 10:08 PM 1/11/95 -0800, Eric Hughes wrote: Edited from response on the 'How do I know if its encrypted?' thread to get some points in the clear. >If you can't read it, it's not kiddie-porn *for you*, although it >might be for someone with the key. > So the fact that its not kiddie-porn *for me* makes it safe *for me* to be transporting or storing for others that know it is kiddie-porn? >Encryption fragments meaning subjectively. A magazine, for example, >has a fixed center of meaning for all who can read the language. A >magazine looks the same to all who look at it. An encrypted file >looks different to those who have the key from those who do not. > But why does the meaning of the data assume to change? If I take my stack of kiddie-porn and put it in a box with a big strong lock on it, in a way physically encrypting it, change the meaning of what I have? I now have a locked box that looks different from my original. >Encrypted data is fundamentally different from paper-and-ink data in >this way. The metaphor of "planting it on somebody" does not apply to >data that the "somebody" can't read. It is fundamentally a different process, but does that make it different from the locking the physical data in a box as above? > >[...] If you can't easily read it, you >can't be expected to have read it. The operator of a data service has >_zero_ motivation to cryptanalyze something. If they happen to apply >a viewer to the file (for whatever reason), they don't _want_ to see >what's inside. > It seems to me that what you are saying is that because the data is in a form that I can't understand, I'm safe from trouble. Now it seems to me that this is not all that different from changing the form or appearence of physical data and saying I'm not responsible for it. Now think of a remailer: If somebody gave me this box of stuff, stuff that I had no idea of what it was since it was *locked up*, to transport over to location X and I got busted half way there am I safe? Would the argument that I didn't know what it was hold up? I would tend to say no. If the answer was yes, which is what some current arrguments seem to indicate, what does that say about responsibility towards spamming or remailing illegal data? Can I say that even though someone is using me to spam or distribute kiddie porn, I have no reason to try and stop it since I don't know what they are doing? If I did take it upon myself to stop the abuse wouldn't I need to analyize the incomming data to stop it? Something I'm not supposed to do. A Data Haven: It is illegal to handle certain items in the physical world. I can get in some trouble if I have kiddie porn or drugs or what not in my possesion. This is true, for most things I would guess, even if I was just 'holding it for someone else.' After all, how do I prove that somebody else put illegal articles, encrypted or not, on my 'site' and it didn't atually come from me? Does 'holding it for someone else' type arguments work in net.world better than in the physical world? Once again, current arguments would say yes, it is different and I'm safe to hold onto illegal data since I don't know what it is. Lets see if I got this straight. In my own words, I'm just as responsible for the data I massage as the person I'm doing it for judging by real world parellels, encrypted or not. Now I would hope this is not the case, since being a remailer operator would mean that if somebody starts a spam using my site I would be just as responsible as the person that started it. Having kiddie porn on my DH would be illegal even if I had no idea it was present. This doesn't sound to good, since many of the uses of my services would be restricted if I wanted to stay 'safe.' After all if I wasn't as responsible for the spam and was safe from harm, or guilt, about what people used my site for I wouldn't care what went through my system, I'm not really supposed to care what people send me right? In fact I may even take pride that my system is being used so much. ;-) But this doesn't seem to be the case, nor in some regards would I hope them to be. Now I'm getting confused. There seems to be some contradictions in some of the above that need to be worked out, or at least explained to me. Some pretty serious legal problems seem to be lurking with in. It just doesn't seem as cut and dry to me as the argument that if I don't know what it is I don't have to worry about it. I'm sure others will have some comments to help me sort this out. -Mark ---------- Mark Oeltjenbruns marko(a)Millcomm.com N0CCQ SnipIt Research Finger for PGP key.

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Re: Another problem w/Data Havens...
by Johnathan Corgan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Data havens that can split data to two or more locations in seperate >jurisdictions can effectively ignore attention from authorities not >related to the site management or site preformance. Encryption mandated >sites can also take this stance, while encryption is legal in any event. It just occurred to me when reading this another method for ensuring the "I can't tell what's in it" condition with a data haven operator. Why not use a secret sharing system where the contraband data is split into a number of pieces and sent to different havens? It could be argued that the individual pieces are not the same as the whole, and there is absolutely no way the operator could recover the original from a given piece (thus providing plausible deniability.) Using M by N secret sharing, with M < N, you build in some redundancy in case one of the havens gets shutdown. Ok, Eric, go ahead and blast your holes in this argument :) == Johnathan Corgan "Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent." jcorgan(a)scruznet.com -Isaac Asimov -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLxspxk1Diok8GKihAQG4FAQAjCaFOGC+N5zjQ3zVQstv75wxBp/d0js1 2a3ecWdD/S3Sv70l9Y2N4e4vja8Pps4eR1a7Gtzq/nWcHmZXRGRgCzaaHGCNibF5 RaIJUlGGpaKe/UaQ3XfZH2guRBSUCIi4To7QWf3CzpZoWkR4gmZhhB1AcZrd6Z34 WYqZUBwuISI= =68Mc -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Netscape & future developments
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >Date: Tue, 17 Jan 1995 10:42:50 -0800 >From: wbarr(a)leland.stanford.edu (William P. Barr) >To: apple-internet-providers(a)medraut.apple.com >Subject: Netscape & future developments >Message-ID: <v01510101ab41b9ba4234(a)[36.8.0.140]> > >Hello All, > >I just attended a talk given by Marc Andreessen, co-founder of Netscape, >and he had several interesting things to say that you all might be >interested in. > >First off, Netscape plans to make the API to it's browser available to 3rd >party developers in the near future. With a list of over 1300 things users >want added to the browser, he believes that other developers will be much >more effective at filling the demand. Could this move spawn the "Visual >Basic" of the internet? Perhaps ... > >Second, Netscape has formed some key partnerships. Most notably, DEC and >Sun will be redistributing Netscape server software through its channels. >It has also created an alliance with Bank Of America and Mastercard for >secured cash transactions. Netscape is also providing all the servers for >MCI's www services. > >Third, he said that by the end of this year, secured transactions will no >longer be rare. Currently the model of a transaction is: > > Customer ---> Merchant ---> Card Issuer > >The new model will be: > > Customer ---> Card Issuer ---> Merchant > >This new model requires that you only have to trust your card issuer and >the communications link from your machine to theirs. The Card Issuer will >then verify the credit and notify the merchant of the validity of the >purchase. There are two major ramifications: First, you no longer have to >worry about the integrity of the merchant; second, this will allow card >issuers to change the rules for giving merchant status to businesses. Marc >predicted that by the end of the year, getting merchant status from several >major card issuing banks will greatly simiplified, allowing dozens of >businesses/services to spring up on the net, almost overnight. > >Finally, he said that the company is in the process of settling on a >distributor to get the browser into the retail store-fronts. > >If you have any more questions, just ask. > >Bill > >********************************************* >*William P. Barr (415) 723-6632 (work)* >*Multimedia Coordinator (415) 725-7398 (fax) * >*Stanford Computer Forum >* >*ERL 448/450 wbarr(a)cs.stanford.edu (business)* >*Stanford, CA, 94305-4055 wbarr(a)leland.stanford.edu (leisure)* >*USA "My opinion is mine and only mine* >********************************************* > ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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