December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Key backup (was: How do I know . ..)
by Dr. D.C. Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- 'Eric Hughes' was reported to have written: > You use your friends now because off-site storage facilities are not > yet available. The software for distributed remote backup has yet to > make this operation transparent. Even when such a system becomes available, I don't think that it will obviate the need for relatively secure on-site storage. Banks and safe deposit boxes haven't completely precluded the demand for safes at home. Many people don't trust banks. Fewer will completely trust cypherbanks and distributed.net.storage systems. > I suspect that most private keys in the future will be held in PCMCIA > cards (initially) and then their smaller replacements. Backing up a > private key to these allows use of a safe deposit box. Safe deposit boxes, by virtue of their accessibility to law enforcement, are subject to search and seizure under court order and are sealed in certain cases (probate). This makes them likely to be the first place to look when the Feds decide that we can't have keys anymore. Personally speaking, I'll take my chances with secure "on-site" storage, even if I choose a location other than my own home or business. > If it's still "passphrase-protected", an attacker would a) have to know > what to look for > For scalability, most people will use some standard method, whatever > it is. This limits the search space of an opponent. If barcoding is our example, what's to prevent it from being printed in a format selected by the user? Printing on a small paper/plastic label and affixng it (in whole or in parts) to other objects effectively disguises it as a UPC label. You would have to know which labels are a part of a keyring for them to have any significance. Even George Bush now knows that every commercial product has a UPC on it somewhere. Many stores add their own UPC sticker to merchandise for inventory control purposes. Break a keyring into 4 or 5 pieces (whatever it takes to make each piece comparable in size and appearance to the standard UPC label), stick them on selected objects, and let someone who knows what they're looking for try and reconstruct your keyring from the universe of combinations of UPC labels found around your home. With an unknown number of parts, this seems like a practically insurmountable problem. This becomes a stego problem as well as a key decryption problem. With barcoding as the standard, another person prints his key on a small unmarked card and hides it somewhere deemed to be secure by him. The UPC-label attack fails because his keyring isn't disguised as UPC product labels. How does the attacker know what to look for? True Paranoids could devise some sort of "invisible ink" method, requiring UV or heat exposure before the barcode becomes visible. Now your backup key looks like a blank sheet of paper. ;-) My point is that with a regular barcode-generation program and a laser printer, an infinite number of formats and combinations can be created by individual users to suit their needs. You can print an 8.5 x 11 sheet with the title "PGP secret keyring" and put it in a frame hung on the wall, or you can print a bunch of split key pseudo-UPC labels and put one on the back of the frame to disguise it as the manufacturer's product label. One method is secure and the other is not, but the specifics are left to the user because the method is sufficiently flexible to allow a number of formats. I contend that anyone capable of running PGP properly is also capable of using a barcode printing program without difficulty (check out the back of PC Magazine). All that would need to be written is a short routine to convert the encrypted keyring into a format suitable as input for a program of this nature. Heck, there's probably a PD barcode program out there already. My question to the respected elders of this list is "how or why is this type of key backup system insecure, if it is in fact insecure?" =D.C. Williams <dcwill(a)ee.unr.edu> - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLx1VlyoZzwIn1bdtAQFT5QF+N2RGEpj37fT0iCUnPdnkaUWItbC+HHAj eFAyBU7fNOnHGwiriHnuEcYaZxBV6lst =l3PL -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Another problem w/Data Havens...
by Ben.Goren＠asu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:43 PM 1/17/95, Paul J. Ste. Marie wrote: >At 03:29 AM 1/17/95 EST, bill.stewart(a)pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204 >wrote: >> ... That way, Dave's system really only has knowledge of the headers, >>plus one line at a time of incriminating data on the fly. ... > >I don't see exactly what that is buying Dave. The entire contents were >still transmitted to him, so the ability to see the entire file was still >present, which means he could have, had he chosen to do so, prevented the >file from residing on his system, and could have screened it. It's >essentially only the word of the haven op that shows he didn't examine the >entire file. That's the main reason why I like my idea of having a trusted encryptor. Nobody's suggested that the current timestamp operators would be in Deep Doo-Doo if they timestampped some piece of thoughtcrime; why should somebody who encrypts be any different? The service could even be advertised as a different form of timestamping (or notarizing). Not only do you get the file back signed, but you get it back encrypted and signed. > --Paul J. Ste. Marie > pstemari(a)well.sf.ca.us, pstemari(a)erinet.com b& -- Ben.Goren(a)asu.edu, Arizona State University School of Music Finger ben(a)tux.music.asu.edu for PGP public key ID 0x875B059.

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Re: Abuse and Remailer Ethics
by cactus＠seabsd.hks.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <Pine.SUN.3.91.950116205019.7181A-100000@math>, Homer Wilson Smith <homer(a)math.cornell.edu> wrote: > I am not presently on cypherpunks, so please include me in the >replies. It's a little (not a lot) rude to start a substantive conversation and not to listen in to the list for duration. Just my O. > Does a list owner have the right to demand blocking to his list, >with or without a vote of the list readers? I would say yes. And the power. They can filter them out at the level of the mailing address. Tell 'em to do their own work. Put it gently and politely, but if they're the list admin, they can easily filter out mail from specific addresses without bugging a busy remailer operator who is, after all, doing a service to the net much as the list admin is. "Scenario them rosily with a calculated ambiguity which they will be sure to understand." - - -- Todd Masco | "life without caution/ the only worth living / love for a man/ cactus(a)hks.net | love for a woman/ love for the facts/ protectless" - A Rich Cactus' Homepage - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLxv4hRNhgovrPB7dAQFBbwP/XCzg7Zyib0ZXPDPpv/0QKR+jKYCchJ+r bcIfM4g+rP1uxyuBj1ErLhvc18Dpu/zjp5u2ZR5F9L6OYEF6YrYrUhgq1hsTNc1U lHZsCNr8ZuOpfU/dLAeLvrZLNak39eVmoMnInSNO0q7dUoMnaKz8CjZAQvy+TK4A eqle4P9fmSM= =4z27 - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLxw0MioZzwIn1bdtAQGx2AF/WUf23vWGlV6WXUfQ2BBYuEodnnUvN5GM hYLbdgZ7BO6NWpgbLSPQYCs2X4yWMqVW =m+km -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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A Reason for Privacy
by habs＠cmyk.warwick.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, I had a talk today with our Office Manager which reveals an other reason why we need anon. system. That is to say a good reason we can hold up to the press, media and other people.. The Example: Job Ads.. This are often non on an Anon. basis. For example, the new york times will function as an anon. forwarder of job resumes... The office manager needs to have both the company name and the name of the person getting the resumes to be kept anonymous...

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Netscape & future developments
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >Date: Tue, 17 Jan 1995 10:42:50 -0800 >From: wbarr(a)leland.stanford.edu (William P. Barr) >To: apple-internet-providers(a)medraut.apple.com >Subject: Netscape & future developments >Message-ID: <v01510101ab41b9ba4234(a)[36.8.0.140]> > >Hello All, > >I just attended a talk given by Marc Andreessen, co-founder of Netscape, >and he had several interesting things to say that you all might be >interested in. > >First off, Netscape plans to make the API to it's browser available to 3rd >party developers in the near future. With a list of over 1300 things users >want added to the browser, he believes that other developers will be much >more effective at filling the demand. Could this move spawn the "Visual >Basic" of the internet? Perhaps ... > >Second, Netscape has formed some key partnerships. Most notably, DEC and >Sun will be redistributing Netscape server software through its channels. >It has also created an alliance with Bank Of America and Mastercard for >secured cash transactions. Netscape is also providing all the servers for >MCI's www services. > >Third, he said that by the end of this year, secured transactions will no >longer be rare. Currently the model of a transaction is: > > Customer ---> Merchant ---> Card Issuer > >The new model will be: > > Customer ---> Card Issuer ---> Merchant > >This new model requires that you only have to trust your card issuer and >the communications link from your machine to theirs. The Card Issuer will >then verify the credit and notify the merchant of the validity of the >purchase. There are two major ramifications: First, you no longer have to >worry about the integrity of the merchant; second, this will allow card >issuers to change the rules for giving merchant status to businesses. Marc >predicted that by the end of the year, getting merchant status from several >major card issuing banks will greatly simiplified, allowing dozens of >businesses/services to spring up on the net, almost overnight. > >Finally, he said that the company is in the process of settling on a >distributor to get the browser into the retail store-fronts. > >If you have any more questions, just ask. > >Bill > >********************************************* >*William P. Barr (415) 723-6632 (work)* >*Multimedia Coordinator (415) 725-7398 (fax) * >*Stanford Computer Forum >* >*ERL 448/450 wbarr(a)cs.stanford.edu (business)* >*Stanford, CA, 94305-4055 wbarr(a)leland.stanford.edu (leisure)* >*USA "My opinion is mine and only mine* >********************************************* > ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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pgp.el, as shown at the last PhysMeet
by Jack Repenning 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At this weekend's Physical Meeting, I demonstrated pgp.el, an interface to PGP for use from GNU Emacs. As I mentioned, this package is available from the standard Emacs lisp archives and other places. However, the version I showed is advanced beyond those sites, most notably in the use of color to highlight various PGP messages, and in the "transparent decryption" feature that I talked about the most. If you'd like to look over this latest version, you can snarf it from: ftp.sgi.com:private/pgp-el.tar.gz This version is still under test and development (notably, I want to get the transparency working for rmail as well as mh-e, and for sending as well as receiving). Because it's not finished yet, I've put it in the private/ directory, which is protected against browsing. When that's all finished, I'll be publishing it again in the usual places.

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Re: Another problem w/Data Havens...
by Ben.Goren＠asu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:03 PM 1/17/95, Robert Rothenberg wrote: >> Doo-Doo if they timestampped some piece of thoughtcrime; why should >> somebody who encrypts be any different? >> >> The service could even be advertised as a different form of timestamping >> (or notarizing). Not only do you get the file back signed, but you get it >> back encrypted and signed. > >Hmmm.... Of course in some cases one may not want the file to be returned >with a signature and timestamp (might be incriminating evidence, depending >on what one wants stored and the overall political situation where one is, >etc....). Of course that does sound useful. Just as a notary public does not certify that a given document is truth, but rather that it is what it is and the signature belongs to the person who it appears to belong to, a public timestamp/notary/encryption service on the 'net would certify the existence of that document in that form at that time. No more, no less. If I recall correctly, a notary can certify a sealed envelope without knowing its contents, by putting a tamper-proof seal on it. Sound familiar? I'll try to find a notary to see if that's the case. If so, we're got as good a precedent as we'll ever find for just about anything. >Rob <rrothenb(a)ic.sunysb.edu> Finger for public key b& -- Ben.Goren(a)asu.edu, Arizona State University School of Music Finger ben(a)tux.music.asu.edu for PGP public key ID 0x875B059.

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What is this? Anonymous message failed
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Just got back a message from Julf's remailer that my Anonymous message failed (wrong password). Needless to say, I didn't try to send one through the remailer. The message it was refering to is the one I sent to the list earlier. Is this a repeat of the an/na problems we had in the past? Confused, - --Lucky -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Not-the-Real MacPGPv262 iQCVAwUBLxzKlQSQkem38rwFAQGaYAP+MGfUN1Vv7SWR2WX0i/XYCYbwOVPTYj1v Bkld6/rbrzW1SZ+nriQe1OP/ktuoTG5vO281brfIdNA4SQPK6MGf7JdU4AiXL/dQ UE/nuE+UN60jL1leZngG717QBUTUetfj8npilfgv74EE0QDlStItP+MntrMspl6D goePQCSfe5Q= =69Tv -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: How do I know if its encrypted?
by stig＠hackvan.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Eric Hughes wrote: > > I'll tell you one really useful facility for offsite storage, and > that's private key backup. Use a secret sharing arrangement, say 5 > out of 7 reconstruction, and send out 7 chunks. Now, give a different > pointer-to-chunk to each of 7 different people. In the case of > catastrophe, you can recover your key. > I'll second Eric on the utility of this practice. I should've done this... I lost a new pgp key when my hard disk hit the fan last month. I can't even revoke it... Stig FYI: The key to ignore is 0x31F61BA9. The new key is on a server near you. Key for user ID: Stig <stig(a)hackvan.com> 1024-bit key, Key ID 6202A715, created 1995/01/03 Key fingerprint = 58 0C 16 D5 CD 27 EE 37 BB EC 47 73 36 12 9B 96

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Good "Economist" article on Cyberspace
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[I'm getting no Cypherpunks list traffic today, only mail sent to me directly, so I apologize if this has come up already.] The Jan 14-20 issue of "The Economist" has a good article on "Who speaks for cyberspace?," which does a good job of summarizing the civil libertarian arguments and why the EFF "imploded." ... "Little wonder that many Internet pioneers thought they had stumbled upon an electronic Utopia....If a single set of beliefs can be said to dominate the politics of cyberspace, it is radical libertarianism..." About the withdrawal of the EFF from the political fray: "That leaves cyberspace's radical libertarians without a voice in Washington. They're probably delighted." I know I am. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. Cypherpunks list: majordomo(a)toad.com with body message of only: subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tc/tcmay

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