December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

data havens
by Raul Deluth Miller 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The problem with encryption, in general, is that it's an attempt to hide information -- unless the information is trivial, encryption is only a temporary measure. Believe it or not, the government (or, more properly, people associated with the government) is still trying to figure out which industries are Iraqi owned -- one technique being brought to bear is statistical analysis of company activities, with special attention to changes which occurred during the gulf war. The only way to have data havens be acceptable to the U.S. government would be to have them become acceptable to the U.S. population (or some significant fraction of them). This would imply phasing out the DEA and the IRS, at a minimum. [Newspaper article this weekend: how it's so horrible that some people deal in cash and thus are evading the IRS.] More generally, the way to keep a data haven from being located is to make sure it doesn't have a location... This is hard to do without severely impacting latency. -- Raul D. Miller N=:((*/pq)&|)@ NB. public e, y, n=:*/pq <rockwell(a)nova.umd.edu> P=:*N/@:# NB. */-.,e e.&factors t=:*/<:pq 1=t|e*d NB. (,-:<:)pq is four large primes, e medium x-:d P,:y=:e P,:x NB. (d P,:y)-:D P*:N^:(i.#D)y [. D=:|.@#.d

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Privacy markets
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

mkj(a)october.ducktown.org wrote: > Bottom line: Anonymity is the only available tool which puts control > over my own privacy firmly into my own hands, where it belongs, and > does so without infringing on anyone's freedom of speech. Certainly Some months ago I extended this to the concept of privacy markets - where individuals will be able to disclose their 'truename value' to providers of services (such as libraries, publications) whose marketing would benefit, in lieu of cash. I rather think big business is in a better position than government to exploit the 'profiling' fallout of universal use of truenames. In the hope of increasing the declining signal content on the list, I'm reposting my article: ====================== Electric Dreams Weekly column for The Asian Age by Rishab Aiyer Ghosh #35, 31/October/1994: Selling privacy as a commodity It was once said that you should never post publicly to cyberspace what you don't want to see in tomorrow's newspapers. While newspapers are rarely interested in your idle thoughts, others are. Future employers, advertisers and an army of 'user profilers' have begun to exploit the availability of huge data banks of Net traffic, just waiting to be indexed by your names and opinions. It is already possible to buy CD-ROM or tape archives of posts to newsgroups on the Internet. Collecting newsgroup posts as they arrive is trivial. Apart from ordinary Internet connections, all newsgroups are available on one- way, open-access satellite data broadcasts. As traffic flows in, it can be indexed and backed up on extremely cheap storage media such as Digital Audio Tape, for later search and retrieval. While the US National Security Agency is naturally one of the best at hunting for signs of incorrect thinking in cyberspace, several techniques to search large volumes of data by very flexible criteria are publicly available. Electronic writing is one of the best sources for employers to learn the views of prospective employees. The groups people participate in can also form useful inputs to consumer profiles. Some companies have already started offering directory services based on posts to USENET, the semi-official collection of major newsgroups. It is easy to imagine Profiles-R-Us shops that sell dossiers on any individual, detailing political, religious and sexual preferences, and other interesting tidbits - all the nasty things you ever said about Microsoft, for instance! Public discussion is of course just that, and it's ridiculous to attempt to prevent it being put to use for purposes not originally intended. The remedy to an invasion is to build walls; when the invasion is one of privacy, the walls are technological. Some pioneers are already protecting themselves through the use of encryption, digital signatures, and multiple pseudonyms - making it impossible for profilers to associate opinions with real people. In a way, the Invasion Of The Profilers is a good thing - it will make individuals realize what little privacy they have, and teach them the value of privacy. Not everyone will want to seal themselves in private cocoons. Most will not object to some loss of privacy, but in exchange for a (not necessarily monetary) share of the profilers' profits. Individuals will control their privacy and selectively reduce it when it benefits themselves. A particularly useful application of this is in an electronic public library. Once access to data is severely restricted to protect intellectual property rights, the Internet as a source of knowledge for everyone will die, unless libraries are opened to provide information free of cost. Such libraries need not survive on subsidies; rather, they can ask for a copy of any information base in cyberspace from all publishers. By limiting access to individuals who are willing to give up some privacy, the library and publishers will benefit from the sale of users' access records to advertisers. Advertisers will be delighted, as most other inputs for profiling in a privacy- aware society will be unavailable. Finally, users will get free access to information if they so choose, at a cost that they can agree to. While one can be frightened by the ease with which a multitude of Big Brothers can monitor the citizens of cyberspace, technology, as always, has something for everyone. As it becomes easier to search through electronic communications, it also becomes easier to protect privacy to varying degrees. Individuals will be forced to be aware of risks to their privacy. With the opening of markets for profiles, privacy may finally find a concrete value. Rishab Aiyer Ghosh is a freelance technology consultant and writer. You can reach him through voice mail (+91 11 3760335) or e-mail (rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in) --====(C) Copyright 1994 Rishab Aiyer Ghosh. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED====-- This article may be redistributed in electronic form only, PROVIDED THAT THE ARTICLE AND THIS NOTICE REMAIN INTACT. This article MAY NOT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES be redistributed in any non-electronic form, or redistributed in any form for compensation of any kind, WITHOUT PRIOR WRITTEN PERMISSION from Rishab Aiyer Ghosh (rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in) --==================================================================-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "In between the breaths is rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in the space where we live" rishab(a)arbornet.org - Lawrence Durrell Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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No Subject
by Anonymous User 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Pierre Uszynski writes: > Significant abuse is > that which causes significant problems for the operators: posting > secret religious technology, forging prime minister mail, harrassing a > member of any number of opposite persuasions, etc... on that note, check out this excerpt from the remailer-help file of the q(a)c2.org remailer: > Abuse/Self-Preservation Policy: > Abuse of the Q Mixmaster Remailer consists in those uses of the remailer > which endanger its continued operation. Please don't ruin anonymity > services for those people with legitimate needs for them.

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Response to CBS News "drive-by" attack on the internet
by Brad Dolan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

January 10, 1995 Eric Ober President, CBS News 524 W. 57th Street New York, NY 10019 Dear Mr. Ober: In its 1/9/95 evening news broadcast, CBS aired a segment presenting a number of people who argued that the content of school libraries, written communications, and electronic communications should be censored for the common good. Since CBS did not present anyone with an opposing point of view, I assume the position presented is believed by CBS to be correct and not controversial. At first I was concerned about your network's apparent lack of support of first amendment rights to freedom of speech and of the press. Then I realized that these freedoms are only to discuss topics which could not result in physical or moral harm to anyone. I have some friends who share your concerns. They have been trying for years to reduce availability of morally dangerous materials like _The_Catcher_In_The_Rye_ and _Heather_Has_Two_Mommies_. They will be so excited to hear that you are now on their side. Sincerely, Brad Dolan bdolan(a)well.sf.ca.us

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Re: Anonymous videoconferencing applications
by L. McCarthy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Alan Bostick writes: > I thought so too, at first; but then I thought of this obvious application: [lurid details omitted ;] "Ever seen your children bound and blindfolded from across the globe ? You will...." > Whether technology is going to be developed for the convenience of > kidnappers and terrorists is an open question. I'd answer, "Undoubtedly," but I wonder just how readily available such technology would be to, uh, the rest of us. > But there is clearly > at least this one clear use for anonymous video conferencing. Perhaps headhunters would find it handy for anonymous job interviews with candidates who prefer to remain nameless, but not jobless.... -L. Futplex McCarthy - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLxIrqmf7YYibNzjpAQGE9AQAlSGdkOEWsbXICCygoa4Sr+Gj9y91xHeS 3YpA40lODXDmvAoIxWRtpOt2k3a1G381xwxaSCh7b+Wh90V4dknS/ysvu/VLLdUG k1H/eGttn+TzcVPARc0fxExDV5yNxueDRaqil1sDnsgtVyBMzCmu6jdHKL4molku 5zN0SLh2RLY= =zmcz - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLxIstCoZzwIn1bdtAQFiIQF9Ho6rMKp+ii7kSgFalxf8j+05ZHTFkxCc /LQUDOvxy1jXK5+EpaOwP/LyI5fru7YQ =ZD2g -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Data Haven problems
by pstemari＠erinet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:25 PM 1/9/95, dfloyd(a)io.com wrote: > ... Of course, the DH will be hidden by a good remailer (anon.penet.fi), but >it is trivial to use traffic analysis to find where the DH lies. Just >monitor traffic from/to the remailer and do a series of store/retrives. >Then for confirmation, forge a mail from the dh site to the remailer with >the password (obtained from sniffing) to yourself. ... Hmm, hmm. Using c'punk remailers with encrypted send blocks fixes one problem, especially if the c'punk mailers do some sort of file splitting and reassembly along the lines of what happens to IP packets that are too large for a given link. What would also help would be a mechanism for randomly varying the encrypted send-to block. The password replay attacks can be fixed by encrypting the transmitted password along with a timestamp/sequence number. One problem that remains would be a trail left by the increased traffic to/from a DH vs a normal user. That could only be fixed by a multitude of DH sites. --Paul J. Ste. Marie pstemari(a)well.sf.ca.us, pstemari(a)erinet.com

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PRESS RELEASE - RSA Licenses Commercial Distribution Rights to RSAREF (long)
by Christopher Allen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE----- Proc-Type: 4,MIC-CLEAR Content-Domain: RFC822 Originator-Certificate: MIICRjCCAdsCBQJTAAAEMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAgUAME4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRMw EQYDVQQIEwpDYWxpZm9ybmlhMSowKAYDVQQKEyFDb25zZW5zdXMgRGV2ZWxvcG1l bnQgQ29ycG9yYXRpb24wHhcNOTQwNjI3MDAwMDAwWhcNOTUwNjI2MjM1OTU5WjCB 4DELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxEzARBgNVBAgTCkNhbGlmb3JuaWExKjAoBgNVBAoTIUNv bnNlbnN1cyBEZXZlbG9wbWVudCBDb3Jwb3JhdGlvbjETMBEGA1UEERMKOTQxMTQt MzYxNTETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBxMNU2FuIEZyYW5jaXNj bzEeMBwGA1UECRQVNDEwNC0yNHRoIFN0cmVldCCmNDE5MRIwEAYDVQQMEwlQcmVz aWRlbnQxGjAYBgNVBAMTEUNocmlzdG9waGVyIEFsbGVuMHAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEB BQADXwAwXAJVKa43Pd6AhLaYGRLMwvGGvZ7dtzK+XpsRtwKYEDQKHE8swS09ViEg MKuMa/+weQXDBpqQ6SDj/xgHGzmwGhkbeitPWr/6Du5gemMLrhhTs8eMhAXLXwID AQABMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAgUAA1YAEkQDfJmroAMZD5v1F7fPK38y4waoX0FSpdsf jcXf04URcEJc5dCFm0DzrMPMdVpNz5tpSBy0ZUeg/xqbwRfHIW34bMAVLc9kojIi AGXlHL/q8HRCIx== Issuer-Certificate: MIIB6TCCAVYCBQJBAAAKMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAgUAMFwxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMSAw HgYDVQQKExdSU0EgRGF0YSBTZWN1cml0eSwgSW5jLjErMCkGA1UECxMiQ29tbWVy Y2lhbCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0eTAeFw05NDA1MDUwMTEwMDRaFw05 OTA0MzAwMTEwMDRaME4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIEwpDYWxpZm9ybmlh MSowKAYDVQQKEyFDb25zZW5zdXMgRGV2ZWxvcG1lbnQgQ29ycG9yYXRpb24wcDAN BgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAANfADBcAlUpc+2/Ec+bydwsB6enemznB/aQwd4gp2YSI3FW PHl2tc/aa7HZFA0qCL/0Ol6ituC+yUEO3IWKQ5U8hhl1RVqmW7mzwNOr2yeHIFA5 rqXvAvMvlGpvAgMBAAEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQECBQADfgA2QEssX/nG3spHBpbkU4KV oQdVhxtQEmjuIrqBVI9jQRntacJ0tw1m5MsLV6hNMV/mD0yKmDc9ywSF7ZWIipVY tz8E52yQEprR+JxTad+/ZtTI0wEvEM5313jUF4ivF86eOuZDqHd4zbRHk6ggIAGH 86GFbMaWDaKoGUrde2== MIC-Info: RSA-MD5,RSA, J9l0zSgqnVqK8a9QQ3Ml+O6tv58PsVmCELOQTqj1i8HCQoHpJ+bEmayf4WyIbqoY y4xFecAPQfP5hpHPLVoLX4IM7kNT0UhDHW8XklfhhAVE1+Y0Og== Date: Mon, 09 Jan 1995 09:00:00 -0800 Subject: PRESS RELEASE - RSA Licenses Commercial Distribution Rights to RSAREF From: Christopher Allen <ChristopherA(a)consensus.com> Organization: Consensus Development Corporation, San Francisco, CA USA Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" X-Text-Source: ftp://ftp.consensus.com/pub/consensus/pr/RSAREF-PR.txt X-HTML-Source: http://www.consensus.com:8300/RSAREF-PR.html Summary: RSA announces that it is licensing commercial distribution rights of its RSAREF software to Consensus Development, allowing for implementation of commercial Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) applications. Keywords: press release, consensus development corporation, rsa data security, rsaref, commercial license, support, marketing, maintenance, encryption, digital signature, source code, tool kit, PEM, privacy enchanced mail RSA Licenses Commercial Distribution Rights to RSAREF ===================================================== RSA announces that it is licensing commercial distribution rights of its RSAREF software to Consensus Development, allowing for implementation of commercial Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) applications. Press Release - ------------- REDWOOD SHORES, CALIFORNIA--JANUARY 9, 1995--RSA Data Security, Inc. and Consensus Development Corporation jointly announce today at the RSA Data Security Conference that Consensus Development is licensing the commercial distribution rights of RSAREF from RSA Data Security. RSAREF (pronounced "R.S.A. reff") is short for "RSA reference implementation" and is a cryptography source code toolkit designed to allow developers to create PEM (Privacy-Enhanced Mail)software and other encryption/authentication tools. Until now, RSAREF has been an unsupported RSA product approved for use only as part of freeware and not-for-profit software applications. Consensus Development will now be able to market and license RSAREF to commercial software developers, and provide software support and future enhancements to the RSAREF source code library. This announcement is significant because it is the first program of its kind to make the RSAREF implementation of RSA's popular patented authentication technology available to commercial vendors. "Data mailed, posted, or put on servers on the Internet is inherently untrustable today, " said Jim Bidzos, president of RSA. "Tampering with electronic documents takes no special skills, and leaves no trace.With the availability of RSAREF for both free software as well as commercial software there is no need for this situation to continue." Now that a commercial license to RSAREF is available, applications may now be developed and sold that incorporate Privacy-Enhanced Mail's authentication and encryption capabilities. Christopher Allen, President of Consensus Development adds "The PEM standards have been under development for a couple of years and only now are coming to fruition. The ability to offer both freeware developers and commercial software vendors a license to RSAREF will kickstart the adoption of PEM-capable mail software." Consensus Development will be creating an email discussion list for software developers interested in RSAREF. To join the discussion, send a message to <listproc(a)consensus.com> with the body of the message requesting "subscribe RSAREF-DEV-L firstname lastname". Background - ---------- The RSA cryptosystem was invented and patented in the late 1970's by Drs. Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who started RSA Data Security in Redwood City, California, in 1982. Digital signatures are produced using the RSA Cryptosystem, which is a public-key cryptosystem. Each user has two keys - one public and one private. The public key can be disclosed without compromising the private key. Electronic documents can be "signed" with an unforgeable signature by using a document/private-key combination to produce a signature unique to the author and particular document. Anyone using an application that supports RSAREF and has the public key of the author can subsequently verify the authenticity of the document. Applications of digital signatures are endless: expense reports, electronic forms and purchase orders, contract revisions, engineering change orders, even tax returns can be electronically signed to speed electronic document flow and eliminate fraud. Furthermore, digital signatures can also be used to detect any virus before a program is executed, since any change whatsoever is detected. One reason that the paperless office has never materialized is that paper must still be printed so that handwritten signatures can be applied. RSAREF eliminates that necessity. Applications supporting RSAREF could have prevented last year's computer fraud at Dartmouth College, in which students were tricked into missing an important midterm by a fraudulent electronic mail message claiming to be from university faculty. Corporate Profiles - ------------------ RSA Data Security, Inc. <URL=http://www.rsa.com/> is the acknowledged world leader in encryption technology, with over three million copies of its software encryption and authentication installed and in use worldwide. RSA is a defacto standard for encryption and digital signatures, and is part of existing and proposed standards for the Internet, CCITT, ISO, ANSI, IEEE and business and financial networks around the globe. RSA develops and markets platform-independent software developers' kits, end-user products, and provides comprehensive consulting services in the cryptographic sciences. RSA technology has been embedded in the products of many companies, including Microsoft, IBM, Apple, Oracle, General Magic, DEC, Sun, Novell, Lotus, Motorola, Northern Telecom, AT&T, WordPerfect, General Electric, Hughes Aircraft, and many others. The company is headquartered in Redwood City, California. Consensus Development Corporation <URL=http://www.consensus.com:8300/> is a software development and consulting firm specializing in the support of organizations that need long-distance collaboration via wide-area networks and the Internet.Consensus Development has been offering consulting and software tools in the area of collaboration support since 1988 and is based in San Francisco, California. Clients include Aladdin Systems, American Information Exchange (AMIX), America Online, Apple Computer, Attain, Authorware, Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Claris Corporation, Component Integration Laboratories, Connectix Corporation, Digicash bv, Group Technologies, InterCon, ON Technology, Portfolio Systems, RSA Data Security, Ronin Publishing, Software Ventures, Visa International, and Xanadu Operating Company. Contact - ------- Kurt Stammberger RSA Data Security, Inc. 415/595-8782 <kurt(a)rsa.com> Christopher Allen Consensus Development Corporation 415/647-6383 <ChristopherA(a)consensus.com> $$ - ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ...Christopher Allen Consensus Development Corporation.. ...<ChristopherA(a)consensus.com> 4104-24th Street #419.. ... San Francisco, CA 94114-3615.. ... o415/647-6383 f415/647-6384.. ...Mosaic/WWW Home Page: .. ...Consensus Home Page .. -----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE----- Created with RIPEM Mac 0.8.5 b1

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Re: DH Traffic Volume Analysis
by L. McCarthy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Paul J. Ste. Marie writes: > One problem that remains would be a trail left by the increased traffic > to/from a DH vs a normal user. That could only be fixed by a multitude of > DH sites. Ubiquitous remailing -- having a significant portion of the net population bouncing around randomly fluctuating encrypted traffic as background noise -- should help to cover both remailers and data havens. It would be nice to have more people firing off occasional encrypted stuff to muddy the waters. (Picture yourself in Bridge over the River Kwai if it helps ;) -L. Futplex McCarthy; PGP key by finger or server - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLxIkLGf7YYibNzjpAQGZfgQAp464Szt+W1pvcHQRLH39kmato3tQaHIn mNSNjeXBwWqrgIXYoLAQfcX1qvVb0NJQikGc4P7Xo/o7Aa2LOIWTt6TRxXlUkaod gmYr6XGvoCST1eciMeMTKRjVRJgA6p4/GmQwQwmvFtTus1waS5T+RsNX0nbCu3ng eg3sZ5s7pKI= =973H - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLxIlNCoZzwIn1bdtAQFGBQF/Zl+lLTMyM55oRF2PSsA0ld13i/I1uyvW sD3C3JkqgQ9XsDjGquKXoPwDCsAEgN6E =7MWJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: for-pay remailers and FV
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- From: Pierre Uszynski <pierre(a)shell.portal.com> > Finally, I do not believe that introducing payment in the remailer > system would curb abuse in any significant way. Significant abuse is > that which causes significant problems for the operators: posting > secret religious technology, forging prime minister mail, harrassing a > member of any number of opposite persuasions, etc... Do you think for a > minute that a 5 cents postage is going to stop these messages now? And > how about when remailers do attain good reliability and untraceability, > for 3 cents? I had suggested an idea a while back where you would try to address the abuse issue directly rather than charging per message. I agree with Pierre that any reasonable per-message charge will not help in many forms of abuse, although it should address the worst spam attacks. The idea is to have a sort of digital cash token, but it is free. The key is that each person just gets one of these, but they are reusable. After a remailer sends a message, it waits and sees if it gets any complaints. If not, the token is re-blinded and made available to the original user via some kind of pool. He can then send another message. But if he commits abuse, he doesn't get his token back. Obviously there are problems with this, the worst probably being how we can keep people from acquiring lots of tokens under different names. Perhaps you could charge some small amount for them, but require VISA payment, and check the names on the VISA cards. (This doesn't hurt anonymity when the tokens are actually used because of the blinding.) To get multiple tokens a person would have to commit some serious real world name trickery, a considerably higher barrier than making up a pseudonym on the net. Another problem is that as stated above, you could only send one anonymous message every day or two. Perhaps we relax the rules and let people have a few of these tokens; they can then abuse the system a few times but each time they lose a token. A similar idea might work for the data haven problem, although I don't understand exactly what is intended there. This approach is a variation on the "is a person" credential, which attempts to make sure that each person only gets one of something. A lot of situations would benefit from such a credential, although some people don't like them. Hal -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQBVAwUBLxIw2RnMLJtOy9MBAQGWCgH6A1SFyzZDDhd/NVrMck5SAf3mS4IOl5On aJNFKUopZi4Fb7tqQfbFukDl/lF+clnBDBNh/yXAsFcABJaWaTUzZA== =pLOT -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Traffic generation
by L. McCarthy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Joe Block writes: > As an added security measure, when a valid control message is received, > an identical length stream of random garbage should then be encrypted and > passed into the remailer pool. This would be easier if remailers supported > some sort of bit sink command to trash a message rather than pass it along. Lance Cottrell's Mixmaster software supports this -- just use Anon-To: null - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLxI43yoZzwIn1bdtAQFNJwGAyLeVNnXjphXZFF9tznd4BI09+e4ec3z7 XjLgNg3qtNoxUM44ZkW0xsME+ot5B4A/ =q5OQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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