December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

PGP 2.6 is outside the US
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

pauls(a)dcs.rhbnc.ac.uk: > Am I jumping the gun? Should we just let MIT's v2.6 reach an FTP site > somewhere outside of the USA and let it slowly (and cautiously) get > distributed to a small community of cypherpunks leaving the rest incompatible? > > All of those inside the USA, *PLEASE* get involved with this. It _is_ > important! As I've pointed out before, MIT PGP 2.6 _is_ outside the US. I'll list just one site: ftp.dsi.unimi.it /pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp26.zip Anyway, lucky non-US users can use the better PGP 2.6ui based on the original code which is faster than MIT PGP's RSAREF. contact mathew(a)mantis.co.uk ftp.dsi.unimi.it /pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp26ui* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in Voicemail +91 11 3760335; Vox/Fax/Data 6853410 H-34C Saket New Delhi 110017 INDIA The National Fairness to Game Animals Association says: Support your right to arm bears! --------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Where to ftp ITAR docs
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Matthew.Ghio(a)andrew.cmu.edu: > Is there anywhere I can ftp a copy of the ITAR law? ftp.eff.org /pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/ITAR_export/* (includes lots of other relevant stuff, cantwell bill etc.)

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DSS Diffie-Helman program
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jay Prime Positive <jpp(a)jpplap.markv.com>: > There exist signature standards other than RSA. Perhaps the USA's > DSS can be exported. If not, there may well be other systems out > there. Feel free to implement DSS, or others. Vouch 1.0 does DSS and encryption with Diffie-Helman key exchange. The DOS executables are at: garbo.uwasa.fi /pub/pc/crypt/vouch10.zip No ITAR problems, it's been developed by Awais Hussain in Pakistan. Freeware, no source code. Awais is not on the Net (Pakistan doesn't appear to have a gateway), and may not be aware of the need for GPL style stuff. I'm trying to get in touch with him, but the only contact info in the docs is a post box number in Islamabad, and snail mail takes time... The program itself seems ok, with decent key management etc, though we obviously don't want to rely on it without available source.

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Re: Unicorn case
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Call me a free speech absolutist, but I believe that. > > --Tim May It would be just perfect if everyone were a free speech absolutist; till then... -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in Voicemail +91 11 3760335; Vox/Fax/Data 6853410 H-34C Saket New Delhi 110017 INDIA The National Fairness to Game Animals Association says: Support your right to arm bears! --------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: NYT article
by joshua geller 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

an interesting commercial product might be software to do blaze's trick.... josh

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Re: Faster way to deescrow Clipper
by koontzd＠lrcs.loral.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: Matthew Ghio <ghio(a)cmu.edu> >Or you could just steal someone else's LEAF, by keeping a copy of it, and use >that for spoofing. Then you could have a valid IV too... Were you not to mind the adversary being able to get the session key, alice and bob could have an agreed upon modulous (XOR value) for the IV, that could be introduced by save and restore crypto state commands and xor. (assuming that a mode were used behaving isosynchronous.) Would law-enforcement carl know to ask national security bruce for help?

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Re: to The Atlantic
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>the DES algorithm it approved for commercial usage is breakable by the NSA Is this a fact or a supposition? -- Lefty [gYon-Pa] (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

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Re: to The Atlantic
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>The NSA has not admitted that it can break DES, but there is plenty >of evidence that 0.01% of its budget would be enough to build a >machine to break it. That sounds to me like a big "Yes" for supposition, then. -- Lefty [gYon-Pa] (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

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Re: LEAF forgery
by VACCINIA＠UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Perry wrote about Matt Blaze's Awesome new hack: >Matt Blaze should be commended for finding such a big hole. As with most >such ideas, its obvious in retrospect but took some good thought to come >up with. It is indeed a great achievement to best the NSA at its own game. This hack allows secure transmission and closes the LEAF backdoor. However, this only strengthens my belief that they don't really need this LEAF access, can you say trapdoor? I still wouldn't be sending anything I wanted to keep a secret using TESSERA, even with a newly generated LEAF field. I'd wager that Matt wouldn't either. Scott G. Morham !The First, Vaccinia(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu ! Second PGP Public Keys by Request ! and Third Levels ! of Information Storage and Retrieval !DNA, ! Biological Neural Nets, ! Cyberspace -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLe6rez2paOMjHHAhAQGPyAP+PJwI4Wd6C72u1hEAqSgdIGigT2dcPjR9 12Z3/dE+GBFebt3SSXxbo9FC5v5BqyIX4mHq1LwgN9eSQIpVTEGYuB3m+RkMXVS6 mApDYkzaXE0E/vdYkTsPsn6UvePu91rxtfM2gCSPgc6Ex88UHV4E2AGN0Jfn2WRK NyyoN68bOoU= =vjIr -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Partition Encrypters for OS/2
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've noticed a couple of TSRs and device drivers for DOS that will encrypt an entire partition. Does anyone know of one that will work for OS/2 2.1? Thanks.

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