December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

(fwd) Re: BATF raid in North Carolina
by Jim choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Newsgroups: rec.models.rockets Path: bga.com!news.sprintlink.net!uunet!psinntp!psinntp!news From: ralphpepper(a)lesueloc.com Subject: Re: BATF raid in North Carolina Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Message-ID: <1994Jul27.031907.6182(a)nntpxfer.psi.com> Sender: news(a)nntpxfer.psi.com Organization: Performance Systems Int'l X-Newsreader: NEWTNews & Chameleon -- TCP/IP for MS Windows from NetManage References: <J+7xDKE.countdownhob(a)delphi.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Date: Wed, 27 Jul 1994 05:49:26 GMT Lines: 61 Re: > Rebecca Rohan <rrohan(a)eskimo.com> writes: > > >Yo, those of you in rec.models.rockets who are whining about the > >crosspost --- you are one action/adventure movie away from the same > >treatment or worse. > > Rebecca, > > I, for one, appreciate the information you're providing. Too many average > citizens have no idea what's going on with federal agencies. Unconstitutional > power grabs are getting bigger and more frequent all the time. If it isn't > stopped soon, we will be stopped dead in our > tracks as a free nation. > > COUNTDOWN HOBBIES > 3 P.T. Barnum Square > Bethel, CT 06801-1838 > 203-790-9010 > Kevin Nolan > NAR 16148; TRA 0943 > CTRA/NARCONN > I currently don't have any HPR motors, reloads or any such thing. I left them behind when I moved to Georgia (not knowing the legal climate down here). So I feel (relatively) safe putting forth my two cents worth as to what I would do. First, I would be rigidly legal in every respect. In fact, after hearing about them worrying about casing residue I would make sure I didn't even have so much as a spent D12-0 casing. Anything I needed would be bought enroute to any launch meet, or at the meet itself. Second, I would endeavor to be as 'safe' and 'peaceful' as possible. There would be no 'terminator 2' talk out of me. Third, if I did get attacked, everything would be 'yessir' and 'nossir'. Then, I would quietly go down to the federal courthouse and file a RICO Act lawsuit. RICO Act stands for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. This is what is commonly referred to as being charged with 'racketeering'. RICO allows individuals (as well as governments) to file against persons or organizations that commit three major offenses against one person or a major offense against three or more persons. One unique feature that makes it exceedingly lucrative for lawyers to take on contingency is that the awarded amount is TRIPLE the sum of all court costs, out-of-pocket costs, compensatory, and punitive damages. Certain agencies may be immune but not all of them. Also, you could argue that immunity only applies to their lawfully empowered duties and when they exceed that authority, that they are acting outside of government protection and become private citizens commiting acts against other private citizens. There was a church in California in 1979 that began moving to do something like that against the state Attorney General (Dukemajian at the time). The state was trying to take over all of that church's operations (under a law protecting charitable trusts - like United Way) Ex-Parte on the claim from six ex-members that money was being absconded with. California tried to impose their own people into that church's ruling hierarchy & even declared in open court that all churches in California thereafter belonged to the state. The threatened suit plus the outrageously gross misapplication of the law spooked the California legislature into repealing that law completely over the violent protestations of Attorney General Dukemajian. I believe there was a book about this called "Against the Gates of Hell" or something by somebody named Rader.

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Re: (fwd) Possible compromise of anon.penet.fi
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: barnett(a)convex.com (Paul Barnett) > Newsgroups: alt.privacy .... > Someone has been collecting email addresses, apparently from postings > to Usenet, and forging them to anonymous postings through > anon.penet.fi to alt.test. ...... > My condolences to those people that have been caught in this net. > This is one of the most despicable forms of net.terrorism that I have > encountered. It's an interesting weakness, and at least as serious as the naXXXXX / anXXXXX problem that reveals your identity if you send email to another anonym. The one anonym I've used on anon.penet.fi is already known to at least one other person (to whom I'd sent mail about the fact that they'd included their .signature in an anonymous article :-) I disagree with the "despicable" opinion, though it's certainly a serious problem and it would certainly have been nicer if the cracker had done only a limited number as a demonstration (maybe this counts; I don't know.) BUt if our tools have technical weaknesses, it's *much* nicer to find out from a non-police-agency cracker than to learn about it when they start knocking on your door. It sounds like there's a need to separate the email and news-posting parts of the anon.penet.fi software, or go to stronger anon-reply methods like the one on the newer cypherpunks remailers. Bill # Bill Stewart AT&T Global Information Solutions, aka NCR Corp # 6870 Koll Center Parkway, Pleasanton CA, 94566 Phone 1-510-484-6204 fax-6399 # email bill.stewart(a)pleasantonca.ncr.com billstewart(a)attmail.com # ViaCrypt PGP Key IDs 384/C2AFCD 1024/9D6465

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IMPORTANT: FTP DIRECTORY MOVE
by sysadm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Over the next four weeks, NETCOM will be re-organizing our anonymous ftp directory structure. In order to cut down on the number of directory entries in pub directory, we will be using a new naming scheme based on the first two letters of your ftp directory name. Thus, in the past, if your ftp directory was named: /ftp/pub/netcom it will be changed to: /ftp/pub/ne/netcom Existing symbolic links will also be moved. If you have a symlink: NETCOM -> netcom in the directory /ftp/pub, it will be changed to: NETCOM -> ../ne/netcom in the directory /ftp/pub/NE. The only directories that will exist in the toplevel pub directory are the directory entries for the two-letter combinations, which will be created as needed. All new ftp directories will also be created according to the new naming scheme. We realize that it will take some time for our customers to prepare for this transition. The actual directories will be moved over between 12:30 and 4:30AM PST Thursday morning. Symbolic links will be made from existing directories (and existing symlinks) to point to the new directory entries, so it should initially be transparent to most customers. You will then be able to start advertising the new directory name, although the old one will still work. These symbolic links will then be removed on December 26th. Any scripts, publications, HTTP references, and so on will need to be modified to point to the new directory location. If you have any questions or comments, please contact sysadm(a)netcom.com. We hope to make this switchover as smooth as possible for everyone! Bruce ___________________________________________________________________________ Systems Analyst / Systems Administration sysadm(a)netcom.com Systems Support Staff NETCOM On-line Communication Services

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Hows THIS For Some Human Interest!
by anonymous-remailer＠xs4all.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Its funny, but this girl I'm seeing will be getting some Internet training in the near future for the gov't job she holds. And in the course of talking about that this evening with her, I briefly chatted with her about cryptography privacy and PGP. But when we talked abit more on this subject, she revealed something I found to be pretty interesting. It turns out that her old man was an MI6 operative during WWII. That certainly caused me to raise my eyebrows a bit. He evidently was one of MI6's operatives in Iraq and did some pretty lethal shit. Apparently he was involved in some economic warfare (whatever the hell that means) aginast Axis interests in the area.She told me he still clams up REAL good about his wartime experiences and it takes quite abit of coaxing to get anything out of him. It sounds like his security clearance was pretty reasonable.....likely in the secret/top secret category. As somebody whose closest contact with an operative of an intelligence service has been the cover of a Len Deighton novel, I found this awful intriguing. MI6, from what I understand is one of the oldest and longest running agencies around. I think they started up (offically) in 1910, although Whitehall likely had some spooks earlier than that, given Britain's colonial exposure. And indeed, MI6 is one of the best. Maybe even THE best? Still, you can be damn sure I'm going to remain friends with this lady for some time. What her father has to tell is probably pretty enlightening, to say the least.

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(Fwd) Re: NSA seems to be lobbying against bank use of triple-DES
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarding Cyberia-L mail by: dcain(a)pioneer.uspto.gov (David Cain) on Wed, 23 Nov 7:8 AM ------------------- John Thomas writes: > It's clear that NSA is opposed to triple-DES because it cannot break it. > I'm not supprised the banks are going ahead even if triple-DES cannot be > exported; it will be trivial to develop the hardware overseas, since all > the algorithms are public. Although NSA will neither confirm nor deny <grin> one of the fundamental principles of cryptography is that any encryption system which cannot be broken is also inefficient - like the one-time-pad. NSA may be concerned with allocation of CRAY resources, but I doubt they are concerned about the viability of breaking triple-DES. One of the most important concepts of cryptography is that false security is worse than poor security, for if you are aware of a system's vulnerability, you can guard the weak points. NSA's point that layering encryptions not only doesn't strengthen the security, but may create patterning that is more susceptible to differential analysis than a single DES pass, is an important one. More is frequently less in crypto. Now, I have no more insight into NSA motivations than the next shmoe, but the objections they raise are legitimate from a security standpoint. As for independent creation in Europe, there is a component to "real" hardware DES which is classified. dc Primary Examiner USPTO Cryptography David Cain * Speaking for no one * Escape to find the shining light dcain(a)uspto.gov * Borne within evolving sight dcain(a)osf1.gmu.edu *

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Re: Remailer FAQ?
by dmandl＠bear.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim's cypherpunks FAQ ("The Cyphernomicon") covers remailers pretty thoroughly. As for actual code, there's code for several different types of remailers at ftp(a)csua.berkeley.edu. The code for Raph Levien's "premail" is also available at that site. --Dave. > Anyone know of a Frequently Asked Questions on remailers? Where is it available? > Thanks, > -R > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Reuben Halper I'm not growing up, I'm just burnin' out." > Montclair High - Green Day - > Montclair, NJ > E-mail: fhalper(a)pilot.njin.net PGP 2.6ui Public Key > available upon request > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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(Fwd) news spoke
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarding Design-L mail by: <carr0023(a)GOLD.TC.UMN.EDU> () on Nov 23 ------------------- This message revealed itself yesterday on my shell account. This could be some arbitrary law going down in the present, even worse than the McCarthy era witchunt. So much silence, even for academic concerns, and system administrators decide whom to prosecute for relevance. _________________________________________________________________ ___________ UNIX(r) System V Release 4.0 (gold.tc.umn.edu) This system is for the use of authorized account holders only. Individuals using this computer system without authority, or in excess of their authority, are subject to having all of their activities on this system monitored and recorded by system personnel. In the course of monitoring individuals improperly using this system, or in the course of routine system maintenance, the activities of authorized account holders may also be monitored. Anyone using this system expressly consents to such monitoring and is advised that if such monitoring reveals possible evidence of criminal activity, system personnel may provide the evidence gathered to law enforcement officials.

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Re: REMAILER PROPOSAL
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, Lance Cottrell wrote: ... The "Electronic Mail Forwarders Guild" is ... capable of error. You assume that [the Issuer] would appear to be untrustworthy.... If a TLA wished to infiltrate us, the traitor would seem very trustworthy, gung ho, and paranoid. Life has risks; the trick is to minimize them. Yes, the Issuer could be a weak link. This only means that the Guild has to be careful whom it chooses, which security protocols it mandates and what oversight it exercises. I have suggested that the job of Issuer could be rotated. This would help. Another step that might be taken is to separate the job of Issuer from that of Database Manager. In other words, the Issuer would take in payment and provide a list of valid Spoon-Es to the DB Manager, who in turn would cancel the Spoon-Es as they were used. Under the threat posited by Lance, such a step would make it necessary for the Issuer, the DB Manager and the first remailer to collude for their to be a problem. If your paranoia can swallow that much collusion, than the job of Issuer could be further Balkanized into three or more jobs. Beyond these solutions, Lance has proposed a couple of other ways to reduce the risk he has identified. All in all, I think my crude-but-effective suggestion is still the best proposal extant for a pay-to-play remailer system. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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re: Brad Templeton....
by ecarp＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's the "reward statement" that comes on the bottom of some of the ClariNet articles, if anyone's interested. I personally think it's pretty predatory, myself. -- C O P Y R I G H T R E M I N D E R This, and all articles in the clari.* news hierarchy, are Copyright 1994 by the wire service or information provider, and licensed to ClariNet Communications Corp. for distribution. Except for articles in the biz.clarinet.sample newsgroup, only paid subscribers may access these articles. Any unauthorized access, reproduction or transmission is strictly prohibited. We offer a reward to the person who first provides us with information that helps stop those who distribute or receive our news feeds without authorization. Please send reports to reward(a)clarinet.com. [Use info(a)clarinet.com for sales or other inquiries.] -- Ed Carp, N7EKG Ed.Carp(a)linux.org, ecarp(a)netcom.com Finger ecarp(a)netcom.com for PGP public key an88744(a)anon.penet.fi If you want magic, let go of your armor. Magic is so much stronger than steel! -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"

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CID
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

C.I.D.: [ I agree that we should take the discussion off this list. Both the original poster and myself asked for suggestions of more appropriate forums to continue in. I also asked for replies to be directed to me personally, not to list. This is only in reply to Vail's public msg.] As I understand the whole SS-7/ANI/CID thing, CO generates the field ("header") only when a previous one is not already present in the call. I'm no phrexpert, but we've done some experiments nevertheless and emperically our evidence supports this: So I will paraphrase part of an original post to make it clear. It deals with call diverters (not Telco's "Call forwarding", but the private box you put on one line at home to personally direct all incoming calls to a second outgoing line. You can also steer calls through a PBX, of course, but lets keep the example simple. Nevertheless the end result is the same.) Pay attention now. Let's say that in my home I have a call diverter installed on my incoming line (line 1), forwarding - via my outcoming line (2) - all calls to Lunatic Labs. At the Labs, we have ANI. You call my home, but I am not there. Because of the diverter, your call gets steered to the Labs instead. Sit up straight now, this is where to fun part begins. WHICH OF THESE 2 NUMBERS ARE DISPLAYED AS CALLER ID? Your home phone number? (Who made the original call) Or that of my line no.2 at home? (Who actually made the last call, the one to the Labs). Surprise: Your number! (Original poster already said so, of course). Before SS7, you would route your call through a handful of diverters and stuff if you didn't want to be traced. Now there is no escaping. The first and original Caller ID follows the call no matter how you twist it around. If it is not there, it will be created. If it is there, your CO simply acts as a substation, it seems, not inserting any ID. Again, I am no expert, but you can experiment with this yourself and you will get the same result. Interesting. *67 is merely a privacy indicator (a "P" prefix) suppressing the DISPLAYING of the information, but it is still there and still stored in the computer. Because if the system is serious enough about getting your number, it can pick the call information straight up off layer 4 o the call - in other words, your call information, instead of stopping stone cold at the diverter, was passed from node to node up to your intended system. Cute, eh? .. but only if you're BEHIND the trigger. So, what can be done about it? Like I said yesterday, if you have the skills, we can perhaps but some code together that will let us build our own counterfeit CID fields. I have my doubts that a standard modem will be up to the task, this is just a hunch, maybe we will have to put some special electronics together to get the right tones. But I am a babe in the woods, just commenting on a paper I got thrown my way (and nothing illegal, merely sort of like the 911-information which means that the bad guys don't want us to have it but that it is publicly available nevertheless if you just know where to look for it). Bottom line: We know now the exact structure (frequencies, duration, etc) of the CID. This enables us to code a tool to let us construct replicas. While you are really the originator of the call, your telco won't think so, because the call they get already has the CID header and thus they won't add their own. They will think they are merely getting an already forwarded call, not a first. Does this sound like complete hogwash? Comments wanted, please. @@@@ This message has been brought to you by @ .. @ PETE "THE WIMP" WATKINS...BASICALLY SPINELESS(tm) | __ | \__/ <---Digitized representation of Pete Watkins My e-mail address is <mg5n+alias!wimp(a)andrew.cmu.edu> -- wimp --- (Forwarded via remailer)

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