December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: TIS, SKE, & CyberCash Inc.
by merriman＠metronet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Timothy C. May <tcmay(a)netcom.com> wrote: > >> A "voluntary" software key escrow system is of course OK (useful for >> people afraid of forgetting their keys, for companies that don't want >> the death of employees to cut them off from corporate secrets, etc.). >> But any system in which the escrow key holders are *not* freely >> selectable from a list one generates one's self (where the agents may >> be the company lawyer, one's mother, one's priest, the bit bucket, the >> machine down the hall, or nothing at all, etc.) is *not voluntary*. > > > > > "To amend the National Institute of Standards and Technology > Act to provide for the establishment and management of > voluntary encryption standards to protect the privacy and > security of electronic information, and for other purposes." ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Government-ese for "here, bend over this barrel". > > >Then in the Findings and Purposes section it starts to get at the >crux of the real agenda: > > > "(2) The proliferation of communications and information > technology has made it increasingly difficult for the > government to obtain and interpret, in a timely manner, > electronic information that is necessary to provide for > public safety and national security." ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Grab your vaseline, > > >This primary agenda is restated in the Requirements subsection >under Federal Encryption Standards: > > > "(C) shall contribute to public safety and national security; > big dude named "Bubba" and his frinds are gonna pay you a conjugal visit; > (E) shall preserve the functional ability of the government > to interpret, in a timely manner, electronic information > that has been obtained pursuant to an electronic surveillance > permitted by law; > no condom. > (F) may be implemented in software, firmware, hardware, or > any combination thereof; and > Assume the position, > (G) shall include a validation program to determine the > extent to which such standards have been implemented in > conformance with the requirements set forth in this paragraph." > and *smile*. > >Later on, in the Definitions section, the term "electronic >information" for the purposes of the legislation is defined in what >I find to be an ominously expansive way: > > > "(8) The term 'electronic information' means the content, > source, or destination of any information in any electronic > form and in any medium which has not been specifically > authorized by a Federal statute or an Executive Order to be > kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign > policy and which is stored, processed, transmitted or > otherwise communicated, domestically or internationally, in > an electronic communications system..." > Oh, yeah - you get charged barrel rent, too. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Finger merriman(a)metronet.com for PGP/RIPEM public keys and fingerprints. Unencrypted Email may be ignored without notice to sender. PGP preferred. Remember: It is not enough to _obey_ Big Brother; you must also learn to *love* Big Brother.

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Last few messages never arrived
by lcottrell＠popmail.ucsd.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, looks like I am part of the growing company of people having trouble mailing to this list. I thought the traffic looked very light lately. -------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell who does not speak for CASS/UCSD loki(a)nately.ucsd.edu PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche

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SUFFERANCE remailers
by Gary Jeffers 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

SUFFERANCE REMAILERS Definition of SUFFERANCE REMAILER: A remailer that exists only so long as the U.S. Feds get around to outlawing it.; a sitting duck remailer. ; a remailer whose physical location may easily be found.; a remailer whose operator is vulnerable to the State's gun argument.; currently, the only kind of remailer there is. Definition of FORTRESS REMAILER: A remailer whose physical location cannot be found. ; a remailer that does not require the consent of the State. ; a Freedom remailer. Anybody got any idea at all how to build a Fortress remailer? PUSH EM BACK! PUSH EM BACK! WWWAAAYYY BBBAAACCCKK! BBBBEEEAAATTTT STATE!

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Mighty quiet lately
by unknown＠example.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Today I received four whole messages from the cypherpunks list. Is it my system or are things mighty quiet lately. Maybe the roundup of us chronic dissidents has begun. <grin> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fido: Sam Kaplin 1:282/1018 | "...vidi vici veni" - Overheard Compuserve: 75240,131 | outside a Roman brothel. samuel.kaplin(a)warehouse.mn.org | 75240,131(a)compuserve.com | Change is the only constant in the For confidential communications use PGP | Universe..."Four quarters, please." ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAgUBLokINwpnimeWAf3FAQELDQP/SMoIlXiVk69ulJlYegYvO4FbLgC5Xiou 2PQuMs7eRgEX0Qko+VBXVQw2zU1Fd+MLGsDCTzLJEyduPQtTSXsBFHjFfIJ7ecsV 55iZ3gi1r+aafO6MhzMQ2UIRUVrOiRrFmAG8hAAxurSuSpFn6YoEB61rvY5YUhdQ RkvFj92lnEU= =2PaT -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Anyone seen the 'quantum cryptanalysis' thread on sci.crypt?
by Sherry Mayo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hi all, Sorry if this has already been brought up (I've been skimming through c'punx lately and may have missed it) but does anyone have any comment on this thread (see title). I first read about this in New Scientist (Sept 24th, No 1944). To summarize: Shor came up with an algorithm that could use quantum effects to rapidly factorise large primes. To build such a quantum computer requires manufacturing techniques not yet available, although two other researchers (one is called Eckart) streamlined Shor's algorithm and proposed a design for a "factorization engine" using quantum dot technology. You'd need to put a lot more quantum dots on a chip than is currently possible to build such a device, but the suggestion could be possible in a few years time. the article hinted that Hitachi were already hard at work on the problem. Detractors of the proposed technique say problems of noise and sensitivity to mechanical defects are insurmountable and the technique could never work. I was wondering if anyone here has any comment. After reading the New Scientist article I immediately checked it out in sci.crypt and saw a few articles there (but they weren't on the whole any more enlightening that the New Scientist article). I was wondering if anyone here had any views (informed or otherwise :-) I suppose cypherpunks should keep up with the latest developments (or even possibilities), and where there's quantum cryptanalysis presumably there's also quantum cryptography :-) Sherry ps if anyone is interested I'll try and dig out the references. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLokdq+Fu4n6w1qeBAQEnQgP+Mcu2NV89WuaZ9gJu5tluDzDDj0eZTj41 fWl/Opdw7mY+EqE+RZyWCHKXCx5ibgupZiAoliOfH9VoACd3aoAFJWb+4sMbPwKS ycb6IhKHKhQQA7Q/wnVUGBb4G4B1ozC/2spCmLM83Nv2mcIzXfo5OlPU6ppg4oRU pIfJzpcB7hM= =iG+g -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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SUFFERANCE remailers
by unknown＠example.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- :Definition of SUFFERANCE REMAILER: A remailer that exists only so :long as the U.S. Feds get around to outlawing it.; a sitting duck :remailer. ; a remailer whose physical location may easily be found.; :a remailer whose operator is vulnerable to the State's gun argument.; :currently, the only kind of remailer there is. : Definition of FORTRESS REMAILER: A remailer whose physical location :cannot be found. ; a remailer that does not require the consent of :the State. ; a Freedom remailer. How about locating it in a recalcitrant country e.g. North Korea, Libya, Iraq, Iran. During the Gulf war scuttlebutt has it that Iraq used encrypted communications on the Internet to keep its C3 functions up. (Command, Control, Communications) If they can't get at the remailer its pretty hard to shut it down. Use satellite communications instead of copper and it would be real hard to shut down. Disclaimer: This post is hypothetical, it has NO basis in reality, O.K. NSA ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fido: Sam Kaplin 1:282/1018 | "...vidi vici veni" - Overheard Compuserve: 75240,131 | outside a Roman brothel. samuel.kaplin(a)warehouse.mn.org | 75240,131(a)compuserve.com | Change is the only constant in the For confidential communications use PGP | Universe..."Four quarters, please." ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAgUBLokcVQpnimeWAf3FAQETQgQAmPmokZfX3N1boq1V8w3hlQBaBCyUmDtY 6n8yMhbEKJULDxr9eGr1N+kqdGfVG5XksgBsIyvyrAsuLyPHRxkYuBokqMd7g38m pXdN1i63XH/0ZFluDf+QSywgu0hKOuJf1QgvRhMW9IhzalmyvAnWIJfEa/DkvfNY 8U3m5YMsuQQ= =K7xv -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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alt.fan.tv-serial.bikinis
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

merriman(a)metronet.com (David K. Merriman): Subject: Beach Clash first edition review Sandy's H.E.A.T was hard enough on my poor 'D' key; I hope the Cypherpunks list is not mutating into alt.fan.tv-serial.bikinis... ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "Clean the air! clean the sky! wash the wind! rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in take stone from stone and wash them..." Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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Comic relief from patents
by rms＠gnu.ai.mit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lots of patents are so absurd they would be funny, if they weren't so dangerous. Being sued for patent infringement isn't funny. If you think there may be a problem with the system of software patents, I hope you will read the League for Programming Freedom position papers. You can find them on ftp.uu.net in /doc/lpf. The principal position papers are look-and-feel.text and patents.text. If you decide you agree with the LPF position, please join. Joining is easy and doesn't take much of your time. You can find a membership form in the file lpf.join.

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MAIL: sufference remailers
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Gary Jeffers makes a post about "sufference" and "fortress" remailers. > SUFFERENCE REMAILER: > a remailer whose operator is vulnerable to the State's gun argument.; > FORTRESS REMAILER: A remailer whose physical location cannot be > found. ; a remailer that does not require the consent of the State. ; Sure there are fortress remailers, just become a government and run one yourself. Maybe I'm missing the point, but I don't see the use of discussing such far flung unrealistic remailers. In the "sufference" case: there is no such thing as a remailer that isn't vulnerable to the State's gun argument, unless you are a Highlander, or otherwise immortal (don't lose your head ;) And even then, your equipment isn't indestructible. As for not requiring consent, moving to another country is similar to chaining mail: now several governments have to collude to shut you down, and you hope that this offers more protection (much like hoping remailer operators don't get together to trace your steps). Sure, you could place a computer with satellite hookups and a power supply on a raft in the middle of the pacific and run your remailer from there - this kind of stuff may work for internal activities - but remailing implies communicating with the world: somebody has to supply you a feed, and they can be pressured if it is inconvenient to pressure you. I can however see (in the future) people running remailers on their personal net-connected machines, requiring digital postage. Hopefully the net good usage will outweigh the net bad, and thus remailers will be grudgingly tolerated. But this isn't any "fortress" remailing system. Thoth -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLol3avFYvlqvuKtBAQFnowQAwbfOP45kwvo1qrri5IbraJ5P4JUmGJdr zMvbmMup8rjLxuZKGoGYmAWQQfXK03j/UdmHr7RV6hvQ5Z7Jpd5Zf88CFrMcl/HP UWUjXys6ZXqs0Q9FQAsITeCHJFDAIpk5UTRdrxu0BmQqfRSrX2+7Kim02D7Iatm7 E3krhjzupaQ= =vHXe -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Sufferance remailers
by dwomack＠runner.utsa.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Great idea, but IMHO going offshore is a bit difficult... it might be easier to arrange with a `useful idiot` to get an extra phone installed in their closet, which would then call forward to a local (and changeable) phone number, where the computer would be physically located. The computer itself would be transportable, and ideally everything would be enclosed in a self-contained unit with just two outlets...one for electricity, and one for the telephone connection. A further security step would be to trap the box such that if it were opened improperly, the disk drive would be physically destroyed. The local phone calls don't create toll records, nor will a tap or pin register, since the forwarding occurs in the phone co. central office. An important element would be to move the machine around, both physically and electronically, so that there was a moving target...and, if you were willing to accept the phone costs, you could set up offshore. Comments? Any flaws in this? Regards, Dave

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