December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Quantum cryptanalysis thread on sci.crypt
by Sherry Mayo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Constraints of time mean I've been skimming thru' c'punx a bit lately, but I was wondering if anyone here has any views on the quantum crytanalysis thread that has been gracing sci.crypt of late. I haven't noticed it here but maybe I missed it (in which case - sorry guys). I first read about it in New Scientist (24 Sept 94) No 1944, p 21. the upshot being that if there is any mileage in the quantum computing idea, then it may lead to computers that can rapidly factorise primes (not good news for RSA). The main objections of skeptics are that noise/defects of manufacture make such quantum computers unfeasible. On the other hand, the New Scientist Article suggests that the technology for making a quantum computer may not be that far away. This may be just sensationalism, but even if its only a dim possibility in 25 years time its got to be worth a mention. Given the recent developments in materials science I don't think the possibility of manufacturing such things can be ruled out as some suggested on sci.crypt. The matter of being swamped by noise may be an insurmountable problem, and anyway is not something I am qualified to comment on. Any well informed people out there with any comments? Sherry

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Majordomo sigh
by pstemari＠bismark.cbis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Gee, it was awfully quiet this AM.... Return-Path: <Majordomo-Owner(a)toad.com> Date: Tue, 27 Sep 94 08:51:03 PDT To: psmarie(a)cbis.com From: Majordomo(a)toad.com Subject: Majordomo results: ping Reply-To: Majordomo(a)toad.com -- >>>> who cypherpunks Members of list 'cypherpunks': glowell(a)thorn.wpd.sgi.com cypherpunks-local(a)bb.com sebaygo(a)sibylline.com michael.shiplett(a)umich.edu cypherpunks(a)umich.edu Rolf.Michelsen(a)delab.sintef.no adwestro(a)ouray.Denver.Colorado.EDU Andreas.Elbert(a)gmd.de doug(a)OpenMind.com jeffb(a)sware.com ksackett(a)cs.uah.edu collsc(a)snowbird.aud.alcatel.com koontzd(a)lrcs.loral.com trollins(a)debbie.telos.com matthewn(a)uiuc.edu

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Re: Anonymous Long Distance Phone Calling
by GRABOW_GEOFFREY＠tandem.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>You send a $50 or $100 blank Cashier's check, or cash, to the address >stated below. I have purchased a pile of PIN cards and I randomly selec >and send it to you. The company I buy these cards from, keeps no record The aforementioned method provides only hides who paid for the call. Couldn't you do the same with a pocket full of coins? True anonymous phone calls would have to be routed through several long distance companies. Since MCI, Sprint & AT&T don't talk to each other, that ought to be the best way to hide the caller and callie. BTW, does anybody have the access phone numbers for any other long distance companies? G.C.G. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | Geoffrey C. Grabow | "What we demand are rigidly defined | | Oyster Bay, New York | areas of doubt and uncertainty!" | | | -------------------- | | grabow_geoffrey(a)tandem.com | Clipper, SkipJack & Digital Telephony | | | JUST SAY NO!!! | |----------------------------------------------------------------------| |PGP 2.6 fingerprint = AA 9E 35 12 F8 93 72 8D 1C E5 D5 BC 74 BE 49 D3| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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test/ignore
by RGRIFFITH＠sfasu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is a test to see if the new addressing scheme at my site has messed up my ability to post to this list as it has some.

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No Subject
by L. Todd Masco 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

who cypherpunks

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test
by pstemari＠bismark.cbis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

just a test

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test
by pstemari＠bismark.cbis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

just a test

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test
by chen＠intuit.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Another test. My mail server went down and I just wanted to make sure that everything was kosher again. -- Mark Chen chen(a)netcom.com 415/329-6913 finger for PGP public key D4 99 54 2A 98 B1 48 0C CF 95 A5 B0 6E E0 1E 1D

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Mandatory email verification
by Dr. D.C. Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Greetings: Is anyone aware of a way to modify sendmail to require a verified digital signature for all mail sent? This subject came up after a discussion of the possible repercussions of forged email through port 25. Even a good PGP user can't use manual encryption on a message-by- message basis as a defense for false mail attribution. For example, someone forges a defamatory message and signs your name to it. The recipient brings it to public attention and you try to claim "it doesn't have my PGP sig, therefore I didn't send it". The obvious counter is that you purposely failed to sign it to preserve your plausible deniability. The only way this would work is if the system you're on won't accept mail unless accompanied by a digital signature, which would allow the user to claim innocence if it wasn't his sig. The mailer would also have to check the sig to ensure that it belongs to an authorized user on the system to prevent people from creating one-time keys just to appease the mailer and prevent their real sig from being used. Running this version of "SIGmail" (<-- note flashy new marketing name) on your system would seem to be a reasonable defense against claims of false attribution. Has anyone done any work along these lines? Is there an obvious fault with a system which would operate in this manner? Please don't misconstrue this as an attack on anon mail, which obviously needs to be preserved. What I'm interested in avoiding is mail forged with another user's name. All that's required to do a convincing job now is an account on the user's home system and some knowledge of ESMTP. Seems to me like this is a potential disaster waiting to happen. Maybe the H.E.A.T. crew can solve this one . . . Fabio, we need you! =D.C. Williams <dcwill(a)ee.unr.edu>

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Why did the cypherpunk cross the road?
by jamiel＠sybase.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I dunno, but I do know the list seems dead again... -j -- "It's a question of semantics, and I've always been rather anti- semantic." -Gene Simmons ___________________________________________________________________ Jamie Lawrence <jamiel(a)sybase.com>

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