December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Social punishment 3/3: reputation systems
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Social punishment 3/3: reputation systems Social punishment works because individuals know that someone has broken rules, and _voluntarily_ cooperate with enforcing the accused's punishment. (Of course part of the reason is the risk of similar punishment for non-cooperation, but a major part, particularly in cybercrimes, is that if an individual could harm someone else, he or she could harm you too.) Social punishment works through reputation. XXX, after breaking rules, is seen to be a 'bad character'. Soon everyone knows XXX as a 'bad character' and behaves accordingly, usually by avoiding contact. Once XXX gets a bad REPUTATION (and this is how _I_ define the term, not as some centrally imposed certificate), in traditional societies it is very difficult for XXX to regain a good one. People _individually_ decide whether a 'bad character' is indeed 'bad' and depending on the stature of the individual and the bad character, may or may not cooperate with any punishment. A priest in traditional society or someone else with impeccable reputation is permitted to interact with even the worst of characters. One problem with such a wildfire reputation system is it can be _too_ effective. Once ostracized, the decentralized system makes it very difficult for someone to rejoin society, to have his/her 'reformation' recognized. The channels in traditional societies include lots of 'good work' and recommendation by 'good citizens' such as the priest etc. The other is a new identity. The most powerful illustration of a reputation system I can think of is Victor Hugo's Les Miserables, where ex-convict Jean Valjean finds himself ostracized by society despite having been released. A priest's kindness is not enough, and he later gains a very good reputation building an industry. The notable thing is that he rejoins society only when he gets a _new identity_ - and later gets back into prison when his old identity is discovered. This is a strong case for universal pseudonymity - BAN TRUE NAMES - which, together with strong voluntary reputation and social punishment systems can form the basis for cyberspatial order. I can't really say as yet how a cyberspace reputation system should be implemented. Old-timers will recognize the distinction between my proposed voluntary reputation and certification - the difference between PGP and central public key directories. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "Clean the air! clean the sky! wash the wind! rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in take stone from stone and wash them..." Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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Citizen-Unit Donald De-Certified
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To all Certified Citizen-Units, We are most disappointed to inform you of the sad fate of a bright young Citizen-Unit, James A Donald. Citizen-Unit Donald has fallen prey to the increasingly common disease of incorrect thinking. He has actually suggested the possibility that this august and universally respected Board be replaced with what he calls a 'reputation' system. In his system, Citizen-Units would not be Certified by a central Board of Credentials, but would actually have 'reputations' - semi-certificates of approval by each Citizen-Unit. These reputations would be independent of any group of Citizen-Units, and would represent the trust placed by _individual_ Units in the recipient. In such a system, a wrong-thinking Unit may have a bad reputation with most people, but a good one with others! This suggestion seems dangerously close to pre-civilization tribal society, and makes the insupportable assumption that a Citizen-Unit knows what is best for itself. As we all know, any individual's opinions are hopelessly inadequate when compared with the Collective, as expressed by this Board. It is hoped that other Units will keep themselves away from such incorrect attitudes. Citizen-Unit Donald shall henceforth be treated as De-Certified. Citizen-Unit Rishab Ghosh, Senior Certifier, Central Board of Credentials and Certification ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "Clean the air! clean the sky! wash the wind! rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in take stone from stone and wash them..." Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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ITARs around the world
by usura＠vox.xs4all.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in writes: : M.Gream(a)uts.EDU.AU (Matthew Gream): : > [quoting alt.pgp.security] : > I'm afraid I have to post a clarification to a clarification. I've just : > been in contact with the relevant people at the Defence Signals : > Directorate. It seems that regardless of advice obtained from other : > departments and documentation that points to the contrary, there are : > restrictive controls on software. : : Is the document mentioned the equivalent (with similar legal standing) of the : US ITAR? : : When the Scandinavian countries join the EU next year, what will the : implications for crypto be? France bans it, is there any EU policy proposal? : The EU has published a plan of action for how to proceed into the informationsociety. -> COM(94) 347 def. Brussels, 19.07.1994 This document only states that: (translated from dutch, lousy english I know) The Commision plans, advised by a group of officials concerning the security of informationsystems, to make a proposal in september 1994 for requirements that encryption systems and signature verification systems must follow. [..] The Community will research the possiblities for cooperation in the field of encryption with third countries, notably the US. Other relevant publications are: -> COM(94) 128 def. COD 288 Brussels, 13.06.1994 ISDN and mobile networks (cellular for US folks) -> COM(92) 422 Outline of Privacy Protection [If you are in the EU, most University Law Libraries will have these documents, in the US or elsewhere one should look for an depository Library for EU publications] EnJoY -- Exit! Stage Left. Alex de Joode <usura(a)vox.hacktic.nl>

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RE: E.C.T.
by Pierre Uszynski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dave Merriman explains: > > One thing did occur to me after reading the ECT proposal: it would seem to be > ideal for mailing lists and moderated newsgroups. Someone wanting to post an > article/message pays (say) C|10 for the privelege; if others like it, they > send the author C|1. Flamers don't make much (if any) money, and good stuff > increases wealth. You don't need any Testbed Administration to do that. You can start such a mailing list right now, based on "silly name" NetCash/NetBank. They have the advantage of being right here, right now, and they are real money (so far :-). The fact that they receive their funds only through 900 numbers does not even necessarily limit them to USA residents: others can easily buy and sell "credits" through said USA residents. After all, people have been selling software and T-shirts internationally for a while. AMIX was based on such a system, albeit somehow considering they didn't need internet access, and building a pricing schedule more in line with Dialog than with internet (read "out of this world" :-). Pierre. pierre(a)shell.portal.com

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Re: Crypto Anarchist Manifesto (location)
by Mark Grant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sat, 10 Sep 1994, Karl Lui Barrus wrote: > It is probably elsewhere too; I have an HTML version on the WWW at : http://www.c2.org/~mark/lib/ca.html feel free to add links to it from anywhere else... Mark

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Reputation credits 1/3
by Adam Shostack 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

After Rishab's posts on the uses of digital reputation credentials, I'd like to present some thoughts on how to implement them. Thoughts on creating a Reputation Capital Framework This document is split into three parts: A creating a useful, basic system of service, methods of distribution and implementation of reputation information, and possibilities for extending the system which may make the whole thing unworkably complex, but also may make it much more useful. I am going to begin by not rigorously defining reputation capital. The initial application, IMHO anyway, is magic filtering. The cypherpunks list gets up to 500 messages per week. Right now, I filter based on whose messages I like to read. This is a weak system that requires manual updating. It does not automatically respond when someone who I respect says "I've enjoyed XX's posts." I think that the framework I outline here can do magic filtering well. It also has the ability to evolve into a full fledged system for complex digital reputations in various realms. The simplest system would be where people collect statements of the form "I respect Alice. /s/ Bob." * Alice would collect statements like this, and append them to the bottom of her writings so that people who respected Bob would have a clue that they might be interested in what Alice has to say. A 'web of respect' could easily be formed, with each step away causing some reduction in value. The number would have to be large enough that reputations could spread--ie, that people could get some use out of this beyond an elaborate name for a kill/hotfile. It would also need to be small enough that reputations lines do not extend forever. Eventually, you don't care what Kim thinks of Loius. I would guess that some multiplier between .9 and .05 would work well. People you respect directly get the highest rating, people further away lose some amount of that respect until it trickles down to nothing. * the statement "I respect Alice. /s/ Bob." is analogous to "I find Alice's work interesting, informative, or otherwise worth reading. If someone would like to suggest a name other than reputation credentials for this, I'd be happy to hear it. Note that in this simple system, statements do not have any numerical value attached. Bob can not respect Alice 30% or 99% of the time, he only gets a binary statement. Its an obvious extension to let Bob say "I respect Alice 80% of the time. /s/ Bob." I only point this out because it is not mandatory that a system be constructed this way, and in fact, even a very simple system could be quite useful. With the addition of partial respect, the need for an automatic reduction in value becomes much less clear. If Alice respects Bob 50% of the time, and Bob respects Charlie 50% of the time, then Alice will probably find that a 25% respect rating for Charlie is good enough. (I'm not going to get into possible variations here; things seem to work well using percentages for reputation credentials and negative percentages for disrespect. The numbers are multiplied together, shrinking away to nothing pretty quickly, except in the case of a group of people with a good deal of mutual respect for each other.) Also, if several reputation credentials come in for one entity, they can simply be averaged together. This respect rating is relative; there is no central organization to say that Charlie's Used Cars sells great vehicles 25% of the time, its just what Alice's agents will be able to gauge how interesting Alice might consider someones work to be. Someone she occasionally respects sometimes thinks well of Charlie, so its more likely that she will be interested in what Charlie has to say, at least in comparison to someone Alice has never heard of at all. In this system, it makes sense for Charlie to spend a lot of time making his customers happy at first, and holding on to their endorsements of him, because there is no time limit on the statements, and no way to retract opinions. So, those are two natural enough extensions. Decaying reputations, based on the age of the signature, cause a reputation cred. to eventually become useless. Then there is the matter of retracting, or post-facto changing your statement of a reputation. This is more problematic. Remember right now, Alice, Bob and Charlie are simply collecting these reputation credentials, and storing them themselves. If Bob sends Alice a statement "I no longer respect Alice at all. /s/ Bob, 1 Sept 1994," Alice can simply forget to include it in her list of reputation credentials. If she commits to it through some crytpographically strong protocol based on her actions, she can probably dump it, and do business for some period of time before someone runs through all the work to confirm her reputation is as she presents it, and discovers she is lying based on outdated credentials. A solid system needs to ensure that up to date, complete credentials are available for most people most of the time. In my next message, I'll show several possible designs for systems that could exist in parallel to distribute reputation information, and explain why each would be useful. I'll also sketch out a set of programs to demontstrate how the system could be used.

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reputation credit 2/3
by Adam Shostack 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Design criterion for a reputation service: * Reliable * trustworthy * resistant to dropping unflattering credentials * decentralized * easy to use * easier to automate * needs to support distributions of pseudonyms reputations without providing information about the nym. Designing a solid credential server is not an easy task. There are many requirements that one should meet. The basic server I am considering is designed for Internet as it is today. Mostly academics, researchers and students, operating on a highly insecure internet for mostly personal reasons. There are few large transactions occurring on the net; there is not a lot at stake in the grand scheme of things. OTOH, there is an awful lot at stake; specifications, especially bad ones, tend to live forever. Remember the RISKS piece on trains and horses? Thus the server I present could work well today in conjunction with MPAs, (Mail Processing Agents, such as procmail and filter) with newsreaders, and other similar software in order to handle bright filtering (the next generation of kill & hot files should be based on a distributed idea of whose work is worth reading, and whose is not. After that, the system should expand to cover reputations in various realms, reputations for various characteristics, and other things which I'll talk about in the next message. There are three basic models for sophisticated reputation distribution. The simplest method, of each person handling their own, has too many failure modes to be useful. The sophisticated models are essentially mail, Usenet and server based. I assume all transactions are signed, and encrypted at the users request to provide some amount of security against forgeries and traffic analysis. In a server based system, some set of databases exists to collect reputation certificates. A user (better yet, their agent) asks for a reputation certificate for some entity. The server sends it back. This could be built on the send everything you know model, or the request could be for certificates of people who the requester respects. Such filtering might be better done on local CPU. The system has the advantage of carrying all information in an easily queried format. It also has the advantage of concentrating certifications. Thus you could say things like 'The well regarded spaf' or 'The often ignored Marjorie Simpson,' because the server would collect such data. The next system would be based on Usenet. People would occasionally post their opinions to a newsgroup, and people who respected those people, directly or transitively, would pull in their postings. This system has the advantage of using existing technologies, and propagating widely, probably even past most firewalls. A third system would be based on mail. People would subscribe to lists, or send mail to folks they respect saying 'please put me on your reputations list.' The folks thus honored would then respond by sending out regular lists of who they respect or disrespect. This really requires everyone to run some sort of filtering agent. It has the advantage of allowing people to set up closed lists for propagation, and only distributing information on a demand basis. Note that this mail system is not the only one that could use mail for propagation, it simply uses mail as an automatic and regular carrier of information, while a server system would only do so on request. Both the mail and news systems may fail to provide timely information about new individuals who may have a reputation, but because you never asked for it in mail anywhere, or because articles have expired on your newserver, you can not find it. This is the reason the server system would be useful. Not so much in a filtering context, but instead in a system where reputations are relied on for various semi-real time services. The expandability of the system relies on part on its ability to find arbitrary reputation information quickly and automatically. That is something that a server system does well, but a mail or news system does not. To build a mail system, you would need some sort of decent filter (such as MH filter, procmail, or mailagent) which can run programs based on a set of conditions. You would need a rule which would watch for incoming reputation cred. certificates (which would be signed, maybe encrypted). This would pipe into your assesment program, which would keep track of how you relate to each of the various people who send you reputations cred. certificates. It would turn all the information into a database. On any high volume forum, you could filter incoming mail into a set of filters which react based on the numeric scores given to a person by your assesment program. Anyone whose carries enough reputation credits to pass your filter goes into one box, everyone else goes into another. (Clearly, you can be more selective, set up several boxes, or whatever else you want.) The tough part of making this system work is in the generation of reputations credits. Hal mentioned that the Extropians built a system based on buying and selling of reputations on a market. I don't see these reputation credits as being something tangible. You can't carry your reputation credit with you; they exist as a result of your participation in a web of respect. I don't care that Homer Simpson is a well respected authority in rec.drink.brewing; his worlds and mine rarely cross. He can't pick up his reputation credit and plop down in cypherpunks, expecting to be well respected; none of us know him. Or maybe someone does, in which case, they can (automatically) tell us what they think. Becuase reputation credit is not fungible, and because it propogates itself, buying and selling it may be confusing. If someone well respected gets an additional unit of reputation, then all the people who he/she respects will also gain slightly. I expect that a system based on giving away reputation credits would work well. If you respect too many people too mcuh, your value as a link in peoples chain will decrease, and people will start disrepecting you, becuase you disturb their filter. Eventually, if you keep it up, the value of your reputation credit will drop close to zero, as no one cares about what you have to say anymore. This may fail if someone with interesthing things to say decides to disrupt the system. I'm not sure why someone with interesting things to say would think it was worthwhile to disrupt the system, but I don't like designing things on expect and oughts. Perhaps a system could be implemented that would allow you to give reputation credit in 'transferable' and 'non-transferable' forms, so you could respect what someone had to say, but pay no attention to their opinions of people. I hope, but don't know if I can expect, that a system like this would get its initial momentum from people who want to be able to use it for their own smart filtering. If the system were well designed (easy to change how much reputation credit you give someone), then making a change in your filtering would be as simple as saying "slander tcmay(a)netcom.com +50" (slander is the working name I've been using to describe the program to enter reputations, good or bad. It came from thinking of this as a Usenet based system.) If the system could build up some initial momentum from people using it for personal filtering, then it would probably accelerate from there. As more people use the system, it becomes more useful to use it, accelerating its growth. Its growth hopefully, is not constrained by the underdesign of servers, since each person serves themselves. As the software becomes more useful, it is easy to build and design alterate systems of spreading reputations because the system is decentralized. If I decide I want to build a system where each person whose first name begins with a vowel gets an extra 5% added to their reputation, and then add 10% to my perception of the reputation credits of any one who three people I give more than 75% reputation credit to, then I can implement that in my local assesment program without disturbing everyone who relies on my server. (Admittedly, the people who currently pay attention to who I gvie rep cred to may no longer do so, after strange credits start coming out, but thats a seperate problem.)

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Re: Black Cryptoanarchy (KKK, monopolies, contract killing)
by lcottrell＠popmail.ucsd.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- James A. Donald writes >Obviously if some individuals choose not to associate with some >group for irrational reasons it will harm those who so choose >more than it harms the group - but only the state can enforce >discrimination with guns, and it does, thus only state sponsored >discrimination is significant in practice. > Only the state can enforce discrimination with guns?!?!? In the South there is a long history of non-governmental groups enforcing discrimination with guns. The argument that discriminating companies will be at a competitive disadvantage is only valid if all players are rational and informed. There is good historical evidence that whole cultures are willing to assume this "disadvantage" in order to perpetuate some status quo. It could easily become the case than non-discriminating companies would be boycotted putting the disadvantage on them. I know that anarchy is near and dear to many hearts here, but there are some really nasty drawbacks to it tyranny of the majority being just one. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLnJR4VVkk3dax7hlAQGKGwP9EelH2mqmVDqQJ7k9a0ADGkJH+lkXzIBQ gImHALeHsYe5U7MKVbAyVVoRbDfUsEoRN2L1pJ7Yze1tJd3woPxpHspCmBZuYYqQ CMQSx9ly2RNtKa7hcoarHgxuLepBaMTcPE0ka8L79365kzTLplUH4N2a8QZ1tAQb BzHxy2GtRHE= =LQeH -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell who does not speak for CASS/UCSD loki(a)nately.ucsd.edu PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche

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No Subject
by nobody＠vox.xs4all.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is PGP v 2.6.1 up on any ftp sites where we poor non-US scum could get a look at it? As Sat. Sept. 10 it seems like mathew over in the UK hadn't seen the source code yet.

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PRIVACY REGULATIONS
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, Michael Conlen adding to comments by Adam Shostack and Tim May wrote: With your name and address someone can find out what your date of birth is. In many states that is enough for a drivers licens... ...name and dob... Federal agencies such as the FBI, and most if not all states, use your NAME and DATE OF BIRTH as their primary means of locating you in their databases. When it comes to being charged with giving false information to the authorities, it could be argues that you "accidentally" misremembered or forgot your SSN. It would be a real stretch, though, to assert that you got your own name or birthday wrong. If you are stopped by the police, you are required to identify yourself if asked. Is your DOB required? May you decline to answer that question if it is not relevant to the stop? (To drive a car, to buy booze, you much be of requisite age. Maybe you could say, "I'm over 21, officer.") I don't know if it's ever been tested in court. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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