December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Transparent Email
by adam.philipp＠ties.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I think it's a bad idea to require signatures on the list, or even to >penalize people who don't use them. People aren't signing their posts >because it's too much of a hassle to do it from a dial up, netcom style, >account, not because they're insufficiently committed to the cause. > >The real solution is to try to build tools which will make it so easy to >use crypto that there's simply no reason not to do it. I whole heartedly agree! Thank you Alex for pointing out the real issue. ObPlug: (I am currently writing a handbook on what intellectual property law can be used for when developing crypto systems, either to make a profit or to keep them free from commercial entanglement.) Tomorrow (San Diego Cypherpunks meet at Hops) I was planning on asking Phil Karn what Qualcomm was planning with Eudora as far as any PGP hooks, or if we need to to get of our rear-ends and design a mail application that will implement PGP for all the SLIP users on Windoze & MacN'trash systems. Sure there are those of us who can use LINUX and various scripts to bring PGP into our mailers, but a well built app that would get PGP to the lay people who want their privacy is needed. So, Cypherpunks write code. o Get off our collective asses and write something for: SLIP / PPP in windoze, mac, ( & warp?) o Make it free, widely available, and either stand alone, or compatible with Eudora. o Collectively demand that Qualcomm do something or else... o See if there are any software companies willing to take up the challenge. o Meanwhile, see what works for people... Create a contest for who has the best system for ELM, PINE, EUDORA, etc... o What about windoze scripting? PCTools for windoze scripting? Other scripts? I am willing to help, but I'm in the middle of Law school finals so any help will be delayed... Adam -- PGP Key available on the keyservers. Encrypted E-mail welcome. SUB ROSA: Confidential, secret, not for publication. -Black's Law Dictionary GJ/CS d H S:+ g? p? au+ a- w+ v++ c++ UL+ UU+ US+ P+ 3 E N++ k- W++ M-- V po- Y++ t++ 5+ jx R G' tv+ b+++ D++ B--- E+++ u** h-- f++ r+ n+ y++--

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SecureDevice/X-Windows
by Johnathan Corgan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Okay, so I'm signing my messages now. At least your proposed sign-or-delay rule has had its intended effect on one user here :) My question is: What is the group's opinion on the use of SecureDevice to store sensitive data as an encrypted volume under DOS on a PC? (I am assuming here that enough people know what I'm referring to not to explain.) I've moved all my email, sensitive data files, and PGP keyrings over to this new volume. Given all that I've read on the IDEA encryption method, I feel comfortable that the data is essentially secure from everything but a brute force attack on the key, or carelessness on my part. I'm sure that the magnetic fingerprint of the original data files still remains scattered over the rest of the hard disk, but I'm not as worried about this (yet--the more I read this list, more paranoid I seem to get :) Someone posted about using CFS under Linux to store his PGP secret keyring, without a keyring pass phrase. The idea here was that when the system was powered off, CFS provided sufficient security to protect the secret keyring. This would allow the user to automate the use of PGP with scripts to send and receive encrypted mail, without the need to deal with piping in or otherwise supplying a pass phrase. Would anyone consider this foolish? I can take the same argument here with SecureDevice--I only 'login' to the drive with my passphrase when I am using it, and when the machine is off, the encrypted volume protects the secret keyring by default. The weakness here is that should I step away from my machine and carelessly forget to 'logout' of the secured drive, my secret key is wide open for someone to steal. On an entirely different note: I use MS-Windows on the PC platform for my internet access due to the variety and relative availability of Windows Sockets based software. Call me a traitor to the cause, all Microsoft bashing aside, but I really do prefer the GUI interface to mail, FTP, telnet, and WWW than the Unix command line oriented tools to do the same. I also have Linux installed on a different machine, and am slowly learning all the neat and wonderful things one can do with it. I haven't quite gotten X Windows configured properly, but I wonder if all the same internet access tools I mentioned exist as X apps. This would allow me to get all the benefits of Unix, while retaining the ease-of-use benefits of a GUI environment. Forgive me if these are naive questions--I'm a lowly DOS/Windows user just now starting to see the light of Unix :) Another question: How feasible would it be to build a system under Linux/X Windows to automate PGP encryption and signatures in a transparent way, using an X windows mail reader? People have done this with Pine/Elm, so I assume the same techniques would work under X. Gosh, really showing my ignorance here :) - ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Johnathan Corgan "Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent" jcorgan(a)netcom.com -Isaac Asimov PGP Public Key: http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html Or send email to: pgp-public-keys(a)pgp.ai.mit.edu Subj: GET jcorgan - ----------------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLtr+6E1Diok8GKihAQFGLgP/e2BN0W+QOpRwnj7JmIVUgl0cQaNeXpTS tvSmarhiSSQy6+6uC7XdOHWlJJ8qavbwr8LguMTcFIU8LFSp0jCiQcUj5Jxt9oSV evpeZXucwXsT/kh3m97MRiwqOxkjFED1h7zjKbJrHxdI/TkGPUXUmP815Am6eVqB qwY9W3lqeSs= =n+Df -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Zimmermann interrogated without counsel
by frissell＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:57 AM 11/27/94 -0700, Philip Zimmermann wrote: > >The following is a letter from Ken Bass, who is one of the lawyers on >my legal defense team, to US Customs. It is mostly self-explanatory. >It concerns the PGP investigation. Time to start travelling via Canada. DCF

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Re: The Market for Crypto--A Curmudgeon's View
by david d `zoo' zuhn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- // You cannot make money one the net, net reputations // do not count in jobs, academic or otherwise. I disagree here -- I've gotten a couple of jobs where my net reputation preceded me and was the primary motivator for my getting an interview. I was also told at one of them to continue posting as I did because they felt that their reputation was enhanced by mine. And "cannot make money on the net"? How do you see this? Much as I hate the metaphor, I don't make money on the local highways either, but they're a part of real life. I use them to do other things to make money. Neither are an integral part of the work that I do, but both make it possible for me to do the work in a fashion that I can handle (I refuse to live in my office ever again). Just because the reputations aren't digital yet, nor is the cash, doesn't mean that the Net isn't real life. It's as real as nearby I-94. And a lot more interesting and complex. -- - david d `zoo' zuhn -| armadillo zoo software -- St. Paul, Minnesota -- zoo(a)armadillo.com --| unix generalist (and occasional specialist) ------------------------+ send e-mail for more information pgp key upon request +---------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLttyl+80ah2ymxnRAQFP3AP/VOcxV7y9EE5a8humdh51i4qMd/f/bEHS Z5lvKJS7chVTTIwBTzBui/+3JIM8WmlSveiKBYVbGAuojQS3tC0g7phqVMKHPDCC vy2+/DzIbIILUvI/AQoSJm06Frfzgh1uYTiisr47Dznx2bLHlpLgep6xwwXkvCAM vKP1r0l7l+s= =oxCh -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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PGP Enhanced Messaging (PEM)
by Rick Busdiecker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I've made my PGP Enhanced Messaging (PEM) available via anonymous FTP on H.GP.CS.CMU.EDU in /usr/rfb/pem/. This is free software available under the terms GNU Public License. I'm enclosing some information from the +Read.Me+ file for the distribution archive (ftp://h.gp.cs.cmu.edu/usr/rfb/pem/) as well as the one for the the software itself. Changes since the most recent distributed version include: - New keybindings that meet RMS specifications. - Some fine tuning related to generating and verifying `header signatures' for messages that include lines starting with either "From " or ">From ". If you pick this up, please send mail to me <rfb(a)cmu.edu> to let me know. Rick ====================================================================== This is a distribution archive for PGP Enhanced Messaging (PEM). The files contained here are: +Read.Me+ This file pem.tar.gz compressed (with gzip) archive pem.tar.gz.asc PGP signed and armored compressed archive pem.tar.gz.sig detached signature for pem.tar.gz rfb(a)cmu.edu my public key block Notes: - There is no uuencoded file. pem.tar.gz.asc can be mailed safely. - If you're concerned about tampering at this archive site, you should fetch my public key block from elsewhere. The public key server at pgp-public-keys(a)pgp.mit.edu is a good place to get it. ====================================================================== PGP Enhanced Messaging (PEM) should not be confused with the Privacy Enhanced Mail standard (PEM). Information on integrating PEM into your GNU Emacs environment is included at the end of this file. The idea behind PEM is to provide a set of Emacs Lisp functions to augment common mailers and newsreaders with PGP related operations. PEM is implemented in layers. There are customization variables defined at each level. They are described later in this document. At the highest level, each supported messaging package has a file that implements the functions that are specific to that package. Currently there are: pem-mhe.el For use with mh-e.el, and Emacs interface to the MH mailer. pem-gnus.el For use with the GNUS newsreader. Appropriate hook functions are defined which add standard function bindings to the various modal key maps. Typically, the following bindings will be in place in any message related buffer: C-c C-d Decrypt next PGP block in current message C-c C-e Encrypt current message C-c C-i Insert a public key into a message C-c C-n sign aNd encrypt current message C-c C-s Sign current message C-c C-v Verify next PGP signed block in current message C-c C-x Extract next public key from message [ Note: This is a change from previous versions where, for example, C-c d and C-c D would be defined. RMS says to do bindings this way and leave those other bindings for users ] Where possible, in buffers which are for composing messages, the standard mechanism for committing (sending or posting) a message will be augmented to support signing and/or encrypting. In buffers which are not for composing messages, the upper case versions are also defined without the C-c prefix, e. g. "D" will decrypt the current message. A notable exception to this is the GNUS *Summary* buffer which has the following default bindings: D gnus-summary-mark-as-read-backward N gnus-summary-next-article V gnus-version X gnus-summary-delete-marked-with Note that in some contexts, some of these bindings don't make sense. They are still bound, however, the function to which they are bound signals an error indicating the operation is inappropriate. For example, it does not make sense to insert your public key into the body of a news article that you are reading. However, some `obvious' restrictions are relaxed when dealing with mail. When you attempt to encrypt a mail message which you are reading, it may be `self encrypted', that is, the message body will be encrypted such that only you can decrypt it. Each of the package specific files are built on functions defined in pem.el. It contains generic message operations and deals with issues like parsing headers and addresses, and identifying PGP armored regions. At the core is npgp.el -- New pgp.el -- so named as to avoid conflicts with the pgp.el, maintained by Gray Watson <gray(a)antaire.com> and Jack Repenning <jackr(a)wpd.sgi.com>, which is available through various elisp archives. This runs PGP asynchronously and is able to deal with the erratic prompting that PGP sometimes does. For example, the first time that you use an untrusted key, PGP will prompt asking if you're sure that you want to use it. npgp.el passes the question on to you, using standard Emacs prompting to get the answer from you. PEM also uses passwd.el by Jamie Zawinski <jwz(a)mcom.com> to read passphrases. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLttV6JNR+/jb2ZlNAQF26AP/fyq+fxLEeqlpaP7bu5oBakgDhkm4pTlf ejo6kmlm052y+g+ax/5LF3ZsHZw0GFKyg4ltL2C8rDcgPo8dPOqv49GfHeeuS1lE HsL/wWBmhwWqijw1bOu0KAogL1I0mumSx+oeYP0Rlea9rRb2cyYYta7X5r0dGFuDWwGoXOIb9yc= =7/tF -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQCNAi3iH2wAAAEEAMjRQMS6OEvdPUFX0HwxA0kYGAXUOde0Kklbdj/Gsf6QCgrA vfrLlW2jIv6Gqn345NZXQ5S45z+m4YlEZV78Ln3G1alxd22lXlo8RChs8QVdxgCX dkfVKJlcpJQfNWfrNHLMtaAB9+22p8nhGjBmTnuX5K0BQgMLCZNR+/jb2ZlNAAUR tB1SaWNrIEJ1c2RpZWNrZXIgPHJmYkBjbXUuZWR1PokAVQIFEC3iIcaIwD3rAd2b uQEBF4UB/iCxzTUBT+eAJCINmk9qkZYNWFhtt12zfyPSK9Ub2ruK6PGkjqE5HQ/b a7Fz49FX9Z70LOpJz11P9pPEmQ8CW3aJAJUCBRAt4iD6Fpk0o882PjUBATWEA/wP +WGx6GKaSHmEdtfNfGQPF70FPFRYKpugAwI/wZBHjtvNnsgTcI92Oby+b9QQDzgJ oXlerHeeoqeGpi8ZiKwIXproR5JBkB/4UuVkmIS1pP5T1D6BIUH27K6k87Yvz8JW GAqHfinoN3YOW4Fx9qZdo46aoRCGcYhTzTuXwyKxTIkAlQIFEC3iIIaTUfv429mZ TQEBmo8EAIHrwdeJ9sFb6Ro4iWxlED1OEMD+KYxfB2vu39uKGXEP1SB488uR1N7z jxcFHqZPliZ0tc2DhrUPpBY85JmI1IjtXXhS8Fbqc5Dp1Pnua+XjndaRpSSD29VH CgNvkf1S35w33GBAh8bVSgjvl8kZKOoDBV4v9ZbqG39+raZ+imAVtCBSaWNrIEJ1 c2RpZWNrZXIgPHJmYkBsZWhtYW4uY29tPokAlQIFEC48n6yTUfv429mZTQEBVwwD /iXo9pv/wFISdSwNKniNcHqogQLHjnZryzvjXNkDTvi0miBlzayozl/Q21a2nMEc 1MI8K3gNv/mP98Qw7xw5FD8F5zuY3XiFYr0GK4m0bqwixUfxkjBacb67mflCvaFS h8+K2k7Db6V0/MpV9t/VOzqjF4h5CFkoWAd+1Cr21OuQ =ruN3 -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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PGP Enhanced Messaging (PEM)
by Rick Busdiecker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I've made my PGP Enhanced Messaging (PEM) available via anonymous FTP on H.GP.CS.CMU.EDU in /usr/rfb/pem/. This is free software available under the terms GNU Public License. I'm enclosing some information from the +Read.Me+ file for the distribution archive (ftp://h.gp.cs.cmu.edu/usr/rfb/pem/) as well as the one for the the software itself. Changes since the most recent distributed version include: - New keybindings that meet RMS specifications. - Some fine tuning related to generating and verifying `header signatures' for messages that include lines starting with either "From " or ">From ". If you pick this up, please send mail to me <rfb(a)cmu.edu> to let me know. Rick ====================================================================== This is a distribution archive for PGP Enhanced Messaging (PEM). The files contained here are: +Read.Me+ This file pem.tar.gz compressed (with gzip) archive pem.tar.gz.asc PGP signed and armored compressed archive pem.tar.gz.sig detached signature for pem.tar.gz rfb(a)cmu.edu my public key block Notes: - There is no uuencoded file. pem.tar.gz.asc can be mailed safely. - If you're concerned about tampering at this archive site, you should fetch my public key block from elsewhere. The public key server at pgp-public-keys(a)pgp.mit.edu is a good place to get it. ====================================================================== PGP Enhanced Messaging (PEM) should not be confused with the Privacy Enhanced Mail standard (PEM). Information on integrating PEM into your GNU Emacs environment is included at the end of this file. The idea behind PEM is to provide a set of Emacs Lisp functions to augment common mailers and newsreaders with PGP related operations. PEM is implemented in layers. There are customization variables defined at each level. They are described later in this document. At the highest level, each supported messaging package has a file that implements the functions that are specific to that package. Currently there are: pem-mhe.el For use with mh-e.el, and Emacs interface to the MH mailer. pem-gnus.el For use with the GNUS newsreader. Appropriate hook functions are defined which add standard function bindings to the various modal key maps. Typically, the following bindings will be in place in any message related buffer: C-c C-d Decrypt next PGP block in current message C-c C-e Encrypt current message C-c C-i Insert a public key into a message C-c C-n sign aNd encrypt current message C-c C-s Sign current message C-c C-v Verify next PGP signed block in current message C-c C-x Extract next public key from message [ Note: This is a change from previous versions where, for example, C-c d and C-c D would be defined. RMS says to do bindings this way and leave those other bindings for users ] Where possible, in buffers which are for composing messages, the standard mechanism for committing (sending or posting) a message will be augmented to support signing and/or encrypting. In buffers which are not for composing messages, the upper case versions are also defined without the C-c prefix, e. g. "D" will decrypt the current message. A notable exception to this is the GNUS *Summary* buffer which has the following default bindings: D gnus-summary-mark-as-read-backward N gnus-summary-next-article V gnus-version X gnus-summary-delete-marked-with Note that in some contexts, some of these bindings don't make sense. They are still bound, however, the function to which they are bound signals an error indicating the operation is inappropriate. For example, it does not make sense to insert your public key into the body of a news article that you are reading. However, some `obvious' restrictions are relaxed when dealing with mail. When you attempt to encrypt a mail message which you are reading, it may be `self encrypted', that is, the message body will be encrypted such that only you can decrypt it. Each of the package specific files are built on functions defined in pem.el. It contains generic message operations and deals with issues like parsing headers and addresses, and identifying PGP armored regions. At the core is npgp.el -- New pgp.el -- so named as to avoid conflicts with the pgp.el, maintained by Gray Watson <gray(a)antaire.com> and Jack Repenning <jackr(a)wpd.sgi.com>, which is available through various elisp archives. This runs PGP asynchronously and is able to deal with the erratic prompting that PGP sometimes does. For example, the first time that you use an untrusted key, PGP will prompt asking if you're sure that you want to use it. npgp.el passes the question on to you, using standard Emacs prompting to get the answer from you. PEM also uses passwd.el by Jamie Zawinski <jwz(a)mcom.com> to read passphrases. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLttV6JNR+/jb2ZlNAQF26AP/fyq+fxLEeqlpaP7bu5oBakgDhkm4pTlf ejo6kmlm052y+g+ax/5LF3ZsHZw0GFKyg4ltL2C8rDcgPo8dPOqv49GfHeeuS1lE HsL/wWBmhwWqijw1bOu0KAogL1I0mumSx+oeYP0Rlea9rRb2cyYYta7X5r0dGFuDWwGoXOIb9yc= =7/tF -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQCNAi3iH2wAAAEEAMjRQMS6OEvdPUFX0HwxA0kYGAXUOde0Kklbdj/Gsf6QCgrA vfrLlW2jIv6Gqn345NZXQ5S45z+m4YlEZV78Ln3G1alxd22lXlo8RChs8QVdxgCX dkfVKJlcpJQfNWfrNHLMtaAB9+22p8nhGjBmTnuX5K0BQgMLCZNR+/jb2ZlNAAUR tB1SaWNrIEJ1c2RpZWNrZXIgPHJmYkBjbXUuZWR1PokAVQIFEC3iIcaIwD3rAd2b uQEBF4UB/iCxzTUBT+eAJCINmk9qkZYNWFhtt12zfyPSK9Ub2ruK6PGkjqE5HQ/b a7Fz49FX9Z70LOpJz11P9pPEmQ8CW3aJAJUCBRAt4iD6Fpk0o882PjUBATWEA/wP +WGx6GKaSHmEdtfNfGQPF70FPFRYKpugAwI/wZBHjtvNnsgTcI92Oby+b9QQDzgJ oXlerHeeoqeGpi8ZiKwIXproR5JBkB/4UuVkmIS1pP5T1D6BIUH27K6k87Yvz8JW GAqHfinoN3YOW4Fx9qZdo46aoRCGcYhTzTuXwyKxTIkAlQIFEC3iIIaTUfv429mZ TQEBmo8EAIHrwdeJ9sFb6Ro4iWxlED1OEMD+KYxfB2vu39uKGXEP1SB488uR1N7z jxcFHqZPliZ0tc2DhrUPpBY85JmI1IjtXXhS8Fbqc5Dp1Pnua+XjndaRpSSD29VH CgNvkf1S35w33GBAh8bVSgjvl8kZKOoDBV4v9ZbqG39+raZ+imAVtCBSaWNrIEJ1 c2RpZWNrZXIgPHJmYkBsZWhtYW4uY29tPokAlQIFEC48n6yTUfv429mZTQEBVwwD /iXo9pv/wFISdSwNKniNcHqogQLHjnZryzvjXNkDTvi0miBlzayozl/Q21a2nMEc 1MI8K3gNv/mP98Qw7xw5FD8F5zuY3XiFYr0GK4m0bqwixUfxkjBacb67mflCvaFS h8+K2k7Db6V0/MpV9t/VOzqjF4h5CFkoWAd+1Cr21OuQ =ruN3 -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Re: Transparent Email
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by eric(a)remailer.net (Eric Hughes) on Mon, 28 Nov 9:54 PM >I am still considering the "sign-or-delay" proposal for >the toad.com >server, that is, sign your articles to the list or >they'll be delayed >and eventually rejected. Does not everyone get a complete header like the one below from Eric's post with incoming mail? This is presented automagically by The Pipeline's system. I had assumed that because every mail received here has such a header that everyone else could also see who sent my mail, signed or not. That is why I have not signed my posts. BTW, Pipeline does not allow anonymously-sent direct mail -- as a take it or leave it policy. So we cannot manipulate headers to forge from this Windows-driven end. John Young (redundantly, I thought) >From owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Tue Nov 29 00:01 EST >1994 > Received: from relay2.UU.NET (relay2.UU.NET >[192.48.96.7]) by pipeline.com (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP >id AAA09928 for <jya(a)pipeline.com>; Tue, 29 Nov 1994 >00:01:20 -0500 >Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP > id QQxsbj13332; Mon, 28 Nov 1994 23:59:02 -0500 >Received: by toad.com id AA15623; Mon, 28 Nov 94 >20:55:57 PST >Received: from largo.remailer.net ([204.94.187.1]) by >toad.com id AA15611; Mon, 28 Nov 94 20:55:29 PST >Received: (from eric@localhost) by largo.remailer.net >(8.6.8/8.6.6) id VAA02536; Mon, 28 Nov 1994 21:54:14 >-0800 >Date: Mon, 28 Nov 1994 21:54:14 -0800 >Message-Id: <199411290554.VAA02536(a)largo.remailer.net> >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >In-Reply-To: <199411282330.RAA00186(a)omaha.omaha.com> >(message from Alex Strasheim on Mon, 28 Nov 1994 >17:30:22 -0600 (CST)) >Subject: Re: Transparent Email >From: eric(a)remailer.net (Eric Hughes) >Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Precedence: bulk >Content-Type: text >Content-Length: 6504

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Re: "You aren't following the _rules_!"
by jrochkin＠cs.oberlin.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:58 AM 11/29/94, Lucky Green wrote: >I do not mean to belittle the work that has been done, but unless the >encryption is built into the mailer and using a remailer means clicking the >"use X remailer(s)" button, and the mailer better know which ones are >working and do the PGP envelopes, it won't happen. Have you used premail? It pretty much does all of that. People still aren't using premail, either because they can't figure out how to install it (doubtful, it's not hard to install), or because they don't have a need for it that's great enough to justify the (minimal) time neccesary to ftp it and install it, or wait the (sometimes more painful) time neccesary for the computer to encrypt and/or sign your outgoing messages. Which was admitteedlyu your main point; until there is a _need_ for crypto, it's not going to be used. Because premail makes it incredibly easy to use PGP on a unix box. And, for that matter, the Eudora/PGP applescritps make it incredibly easy to use PGP on a mac. And there are some people working on an applescript that will automate using remailers on a mac too. But ease of use appearantly isn't enough; no matter how easy it gets to use, it's still going to have some cost to the user over not using it. Even if the cost is only having to wait the 1.5 seconds it takes your machine to decrypt/encrypt a message. Unless there's a use for it, people won't be willing to spend that 1.5 seconds per message.

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"Find The Dirt On The Internet!"
by tidaore＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: We really _aren't_ paranoid :)
by Johnathan Corgan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >> Ginsburg later asked Days to cite an example of a law which Congress >> would NOT have the authority to enact under the Interstate Commerce >> Clause. Interjected Justice Scalia Don't give away anything here. >> They might want to do it. > >I'm not sure I follow. Is Scalia saying Don't give away anything here. >They[Congress?] might want to do it. ? That's what it sounds like to me. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLtt80E1Diok8GKihAQHjjwP+Ljp8nSvm14pWWirV84u+jmjsQgopi3qd 1I/v1p/jdexucfBQzUIfVGEY1FPSBX7ok6gU6bJspKJffah68uIy7D2Zu72WmNSd ywjfoAX93JKhJ5AVKvV/bGJLKxqu2jdZ2p9AwQCp74n9Y4t/NbKyDHGzDwq0YaMp renusqwd8Mo= =ZSzM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ======================================================================= Johnathan Corgan "Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent" jcorgan(a)netcom.com -Isaac Asimov PGP Public Key: http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html Or send email to: pgp-public-keys(a)pgp.ai.mit.edu Subj: GET jcorgan =======================================================================

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