December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Such a Sweetie Pie
by merriman＠metronet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Sandy: > > It was nothing. > [What a Nice Guy (tm)] > > @ @ @ @ > @ @ > @ ~ ~ @ > . * * . > . \/ . > . . . . > . . . . . . > . . > . . . >Blanc >(please, no more!) > > Will you two cool it? You're getting my monitor fogged up :-) (or at least take it off the C'punks list - you're scaring my cats :-) Dave Merriman - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Finger merriman(a)metronet.com for PGP/RIPEM public keys and fingerprints. Unencrypted Email may be ignored without notice to sender. PGP preferred. Remember: It is not enough to _obey_ Big Brother; you must also learn to *love* Big Brother.

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I ONLY SHOOT BLANCS
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, In response to my candle comment, Blanc wrote: That's not funny, Sandy. (but I'll keep it in mind, whenever I think about you) Well, I still think it was funny, but now I *AM* embarrassed. (Blanc, wipe that smug expression off your face, this instant!) S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Public key/3DES datastream software over WAN Bastions
by sdw＠lig.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone produced software (preferably Unix based) that provides a public key authenticated, DES/3DES encrypted datastream over WAN firewalls/bastions? A typical use would be to connect transaction feeds between two data centers in a secure, automated way over Internet. I can't see anything conceptually difficult with it, and it seems the PGP library could be used to create simple Unix daemons. sdw -- Stephen D. Williams Local Internet Gateway Co.; SDW Systems 510 503-9227APager LIG dev./sales Internet: sdw(a)lig.net In Bay Area Aug94-Feb95!!! OO R&D Source Dist. By Horse: 2464 Rosina Dr., Miamisburg, OH 45342-6430 Internet Consulting ICBM: 39 38 34N 84 17 12W home, 37 58 41N 122 01 48W work Newbie Notice: I speak for LIGCo., CCI, myself, and no one else, regardless of where it is convenient to post from or thru.

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Such a Sweetie Pie
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sandy: It was nothing. [What a Nice Guy (tm)] @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ~ ~ @ . * * . . \/ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Blanc (please, no more!)

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Re: art encryption...
by Pierre Uszynski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: Lile Elam <lile(a)art.net> > > [...] a way an artist can insure a viewer that the art > they are viewing is really that of the artist, the artist can *sign* their > art with their private key and others can check it with their public key. The problem is that's pretty much all that can be done so far: The viewer can *verfify* that the copy is a full un-molested copy of what the artist released, or for physical works, maybe that the object being scanned *is* the original object (maybe). But for pictures released in bitmap form, and then lossily compressed, cropped, scaled, dithered, and whatnot, the (ahem) authenticity of the copy can't be checked anymore. At least not if the signature was, for example, a signed message digest as has been mentioned. Message digests, in the form we now know them, do not resist lossy compression and such injury. That's what they are designed for. So, in particular, a magazine can still take a signed copy of a picture, creatively modify it slightly, and print it claiming this is original work by somebody else. In this case, the printing process itself is most likely enough to dispell any hope of recomputing the same message digest. Handling this case relies back on conventional evidence and juries. Other formats such as CAD drawings, text, and pictures in primitive forms (such as Postscript), and source and binary code, are susceptible to more: It is possible to hide some identifying info in them. But they also are susceptible to mechanical modification (lossless in terms of the "artwork", but lossy in terms of the steganography.) For example, by rewriting "for the same functionality" mechanically or manually. For a mechanical translation, the plaintiff may now have to identify which mechanical process was used before, maybe, having a case again (in addition of conventional legal wranglings). What would be ideal in all these cases is a steganographic process that would map to the whole as much as to the parts. Fractal steganography. In the case of architectural drawings, a signature of the original architects would be embedded in small sets of dimensions, in small sets of proportions, in ways the CAD language is used, in the background details of artwork, in the text included in drawings as well as in CAD files comments and variable names... etc... In summary in sufficiently numerous and different places that mechanical modification, or even extensive manual rework could still forget some instances of the signature. The signature still has to be specific enough to identify certainly the author, as opposed to being attributable to random luck (as in DNA matching). This means this signature requires a rather large number of bits (fewer if the signatures are registered precisely and provably before the works are released), but still enough bits that it is not so easy to hide many of them (depending on the medium: rather hard in text, rather easy in complex pictures.) The signature becomes part of the picture, it is not an afterthought anymore. Fractal message digests, whose verifiability would degrade gracefully as the original is more and more mutilated, would serve the same purpose for verification (you could check that a decompressed, cropped part of a picture is really from the artist who fractally signed the whole.) Conceivably it would be the same if the part was printed in weird colors or something: "some" of it still "is" from the same artist. But, for legal issues, how would that be different from copyright registration? Doesn't copyright registration rely on the same principle: a set of jurors will determine what the chance is that this is the same work or not. This just provides tools to fortify a court case. Enough ramblings :-) I'll stop now, Pierre pierre(a)shell.portal.com

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Nice little privacy threat...
by L. Todd Masco 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just a little tidbit for the privacy-paranoid among us. I live in NYC, while my father, H. L. Masco, MD, lives in Florida. My dad's never lived in NYC, and I've never forwarded mail from his address to mine... in fact, I haven't forwarded anything from his address since before I left Pittsburgh. I just got a mailing from Harry & David that included a pre-printed list of folks from "my" last year's orders so I could repeat order this year. They were my father's orders from last year. Masco isn't that common a surname, so I have to wonder how often this is going to happen to people with more common surnames. -- L. Todd Masco | "A man would simply have to be as mad as a hatter, to try and cactus(a)bb.com | change the world with a plastic platter." - Todd Rundgren

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art encryption...
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by pierre(a)shell.portal.com (Pierre Uszynski) on Mon, 19 Sep 6:32 PM > >What would be ideal in all these cases is a >steganographic process that would map to the whole as >much as to the parts. Fractal steganography. In the >case of architectural drawings, a signature of the >original architects would be embedded in small sets of >dimensions, in small sets of proportions, in ways the >CAD language is used, in the background details of >artwork, in the text included in drawings as well as in >CAD files comments and variable names... etc... In >summary in sufficiently numerous and different places >that mechanical modification, or even extensive manual >rework could still forget some instances of the >signature. [Snip] >But, for legal issues, how would that be different from >copyright registration? Doesn't copyright registration >rely on the same principle: a set of jurors will >determine what the chance is that >this is the same work or not. This just provides tools >to fortify a court case. Pierre, The fractal steganography sounds promising. Is this yours or has it been done? The need for authentic sigs on architectural and engineering drawings is not merely aesthetic. Right now municipal agencies will not accept digital documents because of the lack of verifiable authorship to establish responsibility, and liability, for the health and safety of the design and construction. Hard copy with original seal is required to prevent unauthorized manipulation. Beyond copyright protection, architectural and engineering documents are means to guide actual construction, rather than end products like paintings and drawings in the art world. If there could be a way for buildings themselves to convey authenticity, say, that they are healthy and safe, by a kind decryption by the public that could help prevent concealment of shoddy construction. It's not the drawings that assure safety but field verification of the end result that construction work was done right. What a great help if a building could convey its own message of authenticity about its fitness and safety for habitation and use. That might keep us architects more honest. Probably a long shot that your fractal idea could be stretched this far, but it is certainly needed in the flim flam world of New York City real estate where deception about building safety and health is all too common. Any other thoughts? John

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(fwd) "Will You Be a Terrorist?"
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cypherpunks, Not all of you like posts that mention "guns" in any form, so if this the case for you, hit "D" now. I think the recently-passed Crime Act has implications for what some are calling "terrorist speech" and that Cypherpunks remailers may be construed as "PROVIDING MATERIAL SUPPORT TO TERRORISTS" in the context of being "communications equipment." Consider this "food for thought." An excerpt, and commentary by the original anonymous poster, is included below. I know that our favorite optimists, Duncan Frissell and Sandy Sandfort, are fond of saying that it's already over, that we've already won, that the state is powerless, etc., but when I read the text of the Crime Bill (available from ftp.nra.org in pub/legislation), I just can't buy that. I see a growing police force, I see U.N. blue helmets, I see many more prosecutions for a growing list of crimes, I see my gun rights being taken away, and on and on. In the section below, read carefully the sections about providing support for "terrorists." Note that belonging to a pro- or anti-abortion group in which _one_ of the members uses violence (a fistfight, a jostling of a cop, or a shooting...) makes the group a "terrorist" group, under the new language of the Crime Act. I will not be surprised to hear that the Cypherpunks group is classified as a terrorist group, for a variety of reasons (not the least of which was the "liberation" of the RC4 code, the Mykotronx-government deal info, the debates about undermining the government, the talk of assasination markets, etc.). Sorry, but I just can't "Don't worry, be happy." --Tim May Newsgroups: talk.politics.guns From: anonymous(a)extropia.wimsey.com Subject: "Will You Be a Terrorist?" Message-ID: <199409120907.AA15385@xtropia> Date: Mon, 12 Sep 1994 02:07:16 -0700 X-Mailer: mail-news 2.0.3 Remailed-By: remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com Comments: This message was anonymously remailed. Do not reply to the address in [Check it out - Cross-posted from Fidonet:] The "Crime Bill" passed by Congress recently (truename: Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994) has a frightening provision that hides a boogeyman under its superficially appealing surface: *----------* *----------* *----------* SEC. 120005. PROVIDING MATERIAL SUPPORT TO TERRORISTS. (a) Offense.--Chapter 113A of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding the following new section: ``Sec. 2339A. Providing material support to terrorists ``(a) Definition.--In this section, `material support or resources' means currency or other financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, but does not include humanitarian assistance to persons not directly involved in such violations. ``(b) Offense.--A person who, within the United States, provides material support or resources or conceals or disguises the nature, location, source, or ownership of material support or resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of section 32, 36, 351, 844 (f) or (i), 1114, 1116, 1203, 1361, 1363, 1751, 2280, 2281, 2331, or 2339 of this title or section 46502 of title 49, or in preparation for or carrying out the concealment of an escape from the commission of any such violation, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. ``(c) Investigations.-- ``(1) In general.--Within the United States, an investigation may be initiated or continued under this section only when facts reasonably indicate that-- ``(A) in the case of an individual, the individual knowingly or intentionally engages, has engaged, or is about to engage in the violation of this or any other Federal criminal law; and ``(B) in the case of a group of individuals, the group knowingly or intentionally engages, has engaged, or is about to engage in the violation of this or any other Federal criminal law. ``(2) Activities protected by the first amendment.--An investigation may not be initiated or continued under this section based on activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution, including expressions of support or the provision of financial support for the nonviolent political, religious, philosophical, or ideological goals or beliefs of any person or group.''. (b) Technical Amendment.--The chapter analysis for chapter 113A of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding the following new item: ``2339A. Providing material support to terrorists.''. *----------* *----------* *----------* In the U.S. Title 18 Code, terrorism is defined as "engaging in any act or conspiring to engage in any act intended to intimidate or coerce the civilian population or the government" or close words to that effect. What does this mean? Suppose you organize a militia and some little jot or tittle is just that much off -- and the thugs at the BATF or FBI or NatPol decide that your militia is an "armed group"? They can now seize your house, your car, your bank account and anything else even remotely connected with the maintenance or support of the militia, and make *you* prove your innocence before the Federal thugs will grudgingly return your life to you. Suppose you participate in a demonstration against abortion and just one member of the peaceful demonstration gets into a fistfight with an escort. You had given a ride to this demonstrator -- is the fistfight "terrorism" and you a collaborator in this "terrorism" to be arrested and thrown in jail and your car seized until you can prove that you did not know that the other demonstrator did intend to fight with an escort? Suppose you demonstrate against national health care and you yell that Clinton should be thrown out of office and make a threatening gesture -- will the thugs treat this as an "attempt to intimidate the government" and take your car and perhaps your home if you used it to prepare materials for the demonstration? Suppose you quote Thomas Jefferson's words about a revolution being due every twenty years -- will you be thrown into jail for that? Note that the above section does not allow anything but "NON-violent" goals. This is another direct attack upon the First Amendment and deeply disturbing in its implications when considered as part of a set of other federal statutes scattered across Title 18 criminal law. ***end of quoted section*** -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. Cypherpunks list: majordomo(a)toad.com with body message of only: subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tcmay -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. Cypherpunks list: majordomo(a)toad.com with body message of only: subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tcmay

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Copyright enforcement through crypto
by sdw＠lig.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'd like to explore the technical problems of enforcing copyright restrictions through encryption and custom viewing software. What I have in mind is a viewer, say a spin off of Mosaic, that has a general purpose decryption engine that could be programmed with an algorythm as part of the document download process. The goal I have in mind is to make possible one time, or limited time viewing of a downloaded document The document would be encrypted with the selected method and keyed with a timestamp. The client would need access to a timeserver and a session key, etc. to decrypt as close as possible to the display hardware. This could be prototyped as a user process, but securely implemented as an extension to X, MS-Windows, etc. I haven't worked out all the problems, but see quite a few already. Obviously, the goal would be to get really good copyright material on the net, like first run movies, when we have the bandwidth. Just wondering what minimum collection of hardware, software, and infrastructure would be needed. Of course, this is related to the pay-per-use software paradigm (vs. current unlimited license). sdw -- Stephen D. Williams Local Internet Gateway Co.; SDW Systems 510 503-9227APager LIG dev./sales Internet: sdw(a)lig.net In Bay Area Aug94-Feb95!!! OO R&D Source Dist. By Horse: 2464 Rosina Dr., Miamisburg, OH 45342-6430 Internet Consulting ICBM: 39 38 34N 84 17 12W home, 37 58 41N 122 01 48W work Newbie Notice: I speak for LIGCo., CCI, myself, and no one else, regardless of where it is convenient to post from or thru.

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REMAIL: scripts
by Karl Lui Barrus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Recently, somebody mentioned writing scripts to assist in using the remailers (I deleted the message and can't remember who it was). I used to keep a remailer list, and generated simple unix Bourne shell scripts and DOS batch files to do exactly this; however, I'm cleaning up my account and now defer to superior products: (Matt Ghio's and Raph Levien's remailer lists are better, and Hal Finney's chain program is more functional than the scripts). But, if they may be of some use to somebody, I just made available the various PERL scripts, makefiles, etc. I once used to generate the above mentioned scripts. It is available via anonymous ftp at chaos.bsu.edu in pub/cypherpunks/incoming as klb.scripts.tar.gz. The remailer data file included is fairly old and will need updating if somebody wants to toy with the scripts, etc. -- Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu 2.3: 5AD633; D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5 3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 2.6: 088C8F21; 97 73 9E 8B 98 3E DD B5 E8 97 64 7E 20 95 60 D9 "One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" - K. Cooper

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