December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

ecash-info (fwd)
by bart＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message:

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Re: PGP bastardization (fwd)
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Mike Duvos <mpd(a)netcom.com> > He has no legal comeback I'm not so sure. The code was released under the GPL. The names PGP, Pretty Good Privacy, and Phil's Pretty Good Software were not. People can make anything they want out of the code, as long as they also release it under the GPL and call it something else. Doesn't seem like a major artistic limitation. Yes, I agree with everyone who says prz has the right to insist that tr changes the name of the program. But prz's mail was *much* stronger than that and he was demanding editorial control of the code and the manner in which it was used. (Reread his letter if you missed that bit). That's what I'm saying he has lost by issuing the code under the GPV. (I'm not gloating - I wish he *could* have the right to do what he likes with his code, I'm just pointing out the facts - it's too late.) G

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How broad are PKP's patents?
by solman＠MIT.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Or more specifically, I'm interested in how broad PKP thinks they are. I understand that they claim all public-key systems, but am I correct that that claim is based entirely on the Diffie-Hellman patent expiring in April, 1997? Is Shamir's three-pass protocol as presented on page 376 in applied cryptography covered? If you you used his protocol with the RSA-like symetric algorithm suggested, is it covered under the RSA patent? Would an elliptic analog of this be secure? Are there other cryptographically secure communtative symetric ciphers that could be used in Shamir's three pass protocol? Being able to use this without infringing on any patents would effectively obviate the need for public key cryptography outside of authentication. What about probabilistic encryption using a BBS generator? Does RSADSI claim that because it too depends on the computational hardness of factoring? Thanks in advance, Jason W. Solinsky

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Probabilistic Encryption
by solman＠MIT.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

How secure do you guys think Probabilistic encryption using a BBS generator is? It looks like its every bit as good for key exchanges as RSA and somewhat better because of its speed. Would I compromise the security of the algorithm if I modified it to take the maximum number of random bits from each itteration of the BBS RNG and made the corrosponding changes in the encryption algorithm this making it faster? How dangerous is it (looking at system wide security) to generate the random bits ahead of time? Is it overkill to disable swaping from the location the random bits are held in? (keeping in mind that disabling swapping is a major pain since it is system specific). Thanks, JWS

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Why triple encryption instead of split+encrypt?
by solman＠MIT.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Why do people do tripple DES and *shudder* tripple IDEA instead of doing some form of non-redundant secret splitting and then encrypting with multiple keys. For example, instead of triple DES, why not A) divide the compressed plaintext into blocks of n*64 (where n=2 in the simple example, higher in the overkill examples) B) Split each block into n parts such that: i) The splitting can be reversed. ii) During the inverse of the splitting each bit in the plaintext is dependent on several bits from each of the parts of the splittext. iii) The total number of bits in the splittext is the same as in the plaintext. The last point will make this form of secret spliting relatively insecure, but that's OK for this application (I think, this is really what I'm asking you.) C) Now, for each n*64 bit block you have n blocks of 64 bits. Hook these together in n chains and encrypt with DES with different keys in CBC, CFB or OFB mode. D) Unencrypt on the other end. You can make the key size arbitrarily large and it takes much less time than triple DES and its immune to meet in the middle attacks. So why do we use triple DES? If I am wrong about the security of point B-iii, am I correct that by switching to a secure secret splitting algorithm and setting n=2, we still get faster performance for the same cryptanalytical hardness as triple DES? Cheers, JWS

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PGP Bastardization
by Stuart Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >>If you read the "Snake Oil" section of the PGP User's Guide, then you >>know how I feel about amateur cryptographer's encryption algorithms >>that have not been subjected to extensive peer review. >Well, It is true that I am _not_ being paid for this software. It >is my hobby. And I don't care how you feel about my hobby. >Please feel free to make any constructive comments about the >algorithm. The time for constructive comments about a new algorithm such as yours is *before* you release code. IDEA and RSA were already well respected ciphers before PGP was released. >I believe that you may by misinformed. I hope that I have made my >position clear. You relesased the pgp program under the "Copyleft" >License. I have the right to change the software or use pieced of it. >I am protected from you trying to deny me those rights. You may be correct in that Phil Zimmermann has no legal recourse, but I counldn't say for sure. I am more concerned with the ethical issues. What have you called your new super-duper pgp? If you make it abundantly clear that it is *your* hack of pgp, and not supported in any way by RSA, MIT, or prz, I personally wouldn't have a problem with it. It is my feeling that cryptographic software is an entirely different beast from other software released under such free licenses. If I improve or port some one's mail reader for instance, out of *common courtesy*, the first thing I would do is contact the author to let him know. Any bugs in such a program would make themselves readily apparent and users would quickly learn whether or not my version was really an improvement. How is a user to know that his data has less of a chance of being compromised using super-kool-pgp than prz's own version? The people reading his compromised mail certainly aren't going to tell him that his cryptographic software has a bug in it. I think a lot of this issue has less to do with the law and more to do with courtesy to fellow software authors. - -- Baba baby mama shaggy papa baba bro baba rock a shaggy baba sister shag saggy hey doc baba baby shaggy hey baba can you dig it baba baba E7 E3 90 7E 16 2E F3 45 * 28 24 2E C6 03 02 37 5C Stuart Smith <stu(a)nemesis.wimsey.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLiU/DKi5iP4JtEWBAQGpYAP+MD+AcoHHcfpOA+SFzWmOCZ1U1KVXt1zP js1vq6v3tmbA5tXBJzHptnSDIIdPWwuiNL/4rgD8eXVVdaeCVloqz38U1Gk5KWnZ N4C8X2opaiOG6azU58upqzeEnmHJXvD2K0Mr3nZZMMhvu+ANdAxdVxSNuj5WaJoH dJq596n4gpk= =716m -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: New National ID Card Proposal
by aims＠ext.jussieu.fr 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Received here in Germany. Many thanks, Olivier

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Re: ID card from hell
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Timothy C. May I basically agree with Duncan's noble sentiments. I just don't think it likely that the "What about the tourists?" argument will stop the national ID juggernaut once it begins to move. .............................................................. And I can imagine be that tourists, especially, would be the special focus for ID cards and databases, since they evoke all sorts of fears of foreigners - not only the problems which Tim mentioned, but also of international crime, espionage, terrorism, etc. It could easily become very important to establish databases to maintain records on people who have ever entered the U.S., so that that there would be a reference for any questionable activities requiring this kind of info. I know some of these things are already in existence, but not yet like the kind which would be set up if the nationalization of IDs became accepted. And if governments become very concerned about commercial protectionism, they might accept the idea of ID cards for control of traffic, from their competing national interests. This is a great interest of mine, regarding the package deals which are a part of being an automatic member of a country/political system - the national "identity" which makes one subject to whatever system of operations the ruling class decides to implement. If one could make oneself "irrelevant" to the location where one was at the time - either from having an established residence elsewhere, or from having no declared membership/citizenship anywhere, I would think this would eliminate some of the regional, political administrations of policy which would otherwise apply. But with IDs and databases and closed door protectionist policies, this appears impossible. I haven't read "The Shockwave Rider", but I shall; hopefully it will have imaginative (& realistic) scenarios on these possibilities (many sci-fi books are too remotely far off in fantasy-time than realizable in a near-future time scale.) Blanc

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Re: NATIONAL SECURITY PORN RISK
by frissell＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Is it time to move out of here? Does anyone have any suggestions of >countries where things are better, not likely to get much worse as the U.S. >decides to spread its brand of "democracy" even more universally, and which >have not closed their doors to refugees from America? > > -- sidney markowitz <sidney(a)apple.com> > [In a pretty down mood at the moment] Heinlein said it was time to move when some place instituted mandatory IDs. This month's Money mag has an article on the increase in expatriation by native-born US citizens as well as increasing interest in same. Some places are more bureaucratic than here and some are less. The best place to move to in "nowhere". That is, don't spend too much time in any one country. Local rules bite less on those who are just passing through. Slick Willy will need congressional action on a mandatory ID although he may be able to deploy a "US Card" for "Federal Benefits" administratively. The risk is that Congress is currently debating mandatory ID legislation without mentioning it. The Health Security Act (and some of the current variations) includes a mandatory "Worker's ID" card that you will need to work for someone else. Slick Willy even proudly held it up on TV. So we may get mandatory ID without any Congressional debate. The largest group of US citizens who will not be covered by any proposed health plan: non-resident US citizens. A word to the wise. DCF Desperately seeking libertarian New Hampshire resident for commercial transaction. Desperately seeking HTML expert for (paid) consulting and handholding.

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Re: Source Code
by aba＠dcs.exeter.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have myself speculatively created a PGP with 4096 bit keys, but not distributed it, I just wanted to investigate the speeds of RSA operations on 4096 bit keys. I personally think that it is time for PGP to move on to larger keys, the arbitrary limit of 1024 or 1264 or whatever seems restrictive. You should be able to use as much security as you need without having to resort to hacked versions. I have heard the figure of 3000 bits RSA being as hard to break as 128 bit IDEA, however I understand that IDEA is a relatively new algorithm and has not seen nearly as much exposure to analysis as DES. For this reason I think that the proposed 3DEA code is probably in line with going to 4096 bit keys. If you were one of the people using DES under the impression that it was good for many years you should be worried now as the cost of breaking DES has been estimated at $1m. No doubt in 10 years time this figure will be achievable for much less cost. How would you feel when it gets to the stage that your messages could be cracked overnight on a bit of spare workstation time? For this reason I think that the next version of PGP should have the ability to specify n IDEA rounds, and arbitrary RSA key sizes. That should get the problem overwith once and for all. The attitude that 1024 bits should be good for the hundreds of years seems nieve and similar to IBMs 640k limit on DOS at the time 640k no doubt seemed like a *huge* ammount of memory, I'm now typing in a text editor which has a binary of 1.8Mb, on a m/c with 80Mb main memory. One more thing, I think that it should be developed *outside* of the US, at least until that ITAR thing gets thrown out. The argument that it would take a googol years to break PGP with current hardware doesnt hold either as RSA is not proven to be equivalent to factoring, and better factoring algorithms are presumably still possible. However for the people in the US there are still problems with sorting out a license from PKP which allows unlimited key lengths, and for these reasons it may be worth waiting to see if this can be achieved. Adam

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