December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: On the crime bill and remailers
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:29 PM 9/19/94 -0700, Anonymous wrote: >(As for others who are as quick to damn as to praise...watch your >cholestorol!) Ah. Yes. Well. I seem to have been fried, now. <hyuk!> I'd better stand back a bit. This looks like it's going to be interesting. I may even learn something... >SOLONg Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

1 0

Re: (fwd) "Will You Be a Terrorist?"
by frissell＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:43 PM 9/20/94 +0200, Alex de Joode wrote: >Please keep in mind that the US jurisdiction doen't cover the whole earth. > >(There is life outside the US) I am well aware of that and, in fact, intend to expat myself. I was merely responding to Tim and others who were writing about the legal risks remailers face in the US under RICO, The Crime Bill, etc. I know foreign laws differ. It would be interesting for those in other jurisdictions to comment about how *their* rulers might view anonymous communications and strong crypto. DCF ************************************************************************* ATMs, Contracting Out, Digital Switching, Downsizing, EDI, Fax, Fedex, Home Workers, Internet, Just In Time, Leasing, Mail Receiving, Phone Cards, Quants, Securitization, Temping, Voice Mail.

7 10

Re: Unicorn??
by Jeff Barber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Black Unicorn writes: [ spelling errors, usage errors, grammatical errors, ill-reasoned arguments... ] This is not the same Black Unicorn we knew last spring. Has someone hijacked his account? Regardless of whether you agreed with his points, Unicorn always "spoke" eloquently and carefully, and with a distinctive style that has not been present in the posts emanating from this account in the last week or two. Uni's reputation is being rapidly squandered. Could this be Detweiler's revenge? -- Jeff

2 1

Patient Privacy at Risk (FWD)
by David Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Fwd from the Coalition for Patient Rights (CPRMA(a)aol.com) Alert Patient Privacy at Risk Contact the ACLU The ACLU appears on a list of endorsers of the Wofford/Dodd amendment which amends one of the Senate health care reform bills. Major portions of W/D would have a severely adverse impact on the confidentiality of medical records. Although W/D has been rendered partly obsolete as newer health care reform bills are advanced under new names and new coalitions, many of its principal features remain intact in the new bills. It has become a reference point. It is for this reason that the signature of the ACLU on a list of endorsers of W/D (on a document entitled "Wofford/Dodd Fact Sheet") is so troubling and so damaging. The amendment creates federal standards for the disclosure of personally identifiable health care information and establishes a framework for a national health care data network. On the surface, the goals seem good. Who wouldn't be for establishing strict federal guidelines to ensure privacy where none existed before? For that matter, why not support a data network that would allow a treating physician to have immediate access to all pertinent medical information? Clearly we have to look beyond the advertisement and into the details of the bills for the answers to these questions. For example, in Sec. 508(a) of Mitchell 3 (the bill offered by the Senate majority leader), the "health information network service" is made the agent of the provider. This means that once a third party bureaucratic agency receives the information electronically, it is deemed the same as the health care provider in making decisions about the release of the information. Sensitive medical information, including intimate psychological information, would be available electronically to an increasing number of people legally--not to mention the well-documented risks of illegal access. Among those with enhanced access would be law enforcement officials and government agencies. Even researchers could access personally identifiable health information, if an institutional review board holds that the project is "of sufficient importance to outweigh the intrusion into the privacy of the person who is the subject of the information." The patient has no right to refuse such disclosure even though it includes his or her name. There are many examples of person-identified medical information, including sensitive personal information, that have been shared with health care providers with the expectation of privacy that would now be legally accessible to many third parties. The argument is made that this kind of access already exists, so why not codify it. The logic is faulty. It is true we already have serious problems protecting the privacy of medical records in this country. Legally sanctioning medical access to an ever enlarging list of third parties is not the solution. It will only compound an already serious problem. A compelling argument has been made that the establishment of a national health care data network that requires all providers to disclose information about every patient contact would violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of "unreasonable searches and seizures" of the person. Many organizations have raised serious concerns about Wofford/Dodd, including the American Psychiatric Association, the American Psychoanalytic Association, Coalition for Patient Rights, National Organization of Women, and the AIDS Action Council. We hope that the ACLU joins us in support of genuine privacy legislation. We hope that there was an error when it appeared on a short list of supporters of Wofford/Dodd (June 10, 1994) Call your state chapter of the ACLU. It is listed as Civil Liberties Union of (your state) in the white pages. Let them know of your concern.If possible, also fax Laura Murphy Lee at the ACLU in Washington (202-546-0738) and let her know your concern regarding the position of the ACLU in supporting W/D. This alert is provided by the Coalition for Patient Rights, Massachusetts (617, 433-0114).

1 0

FOUR TIMES AROUND THE WHEEL
by Jeff Gostin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sandy Sandfort <sandfort(a)crl.com> writes: > Today is my birthday. I've circled the Chinese zodiac four > times--from Year of the Dog 1946, to Year of the Dog 1992. Happy Birthday to ya!! Here's wishing for many more!! :-) --jeff PS: How'd that PRZ get-together work out? -- ====== ====== +----------------jgostin(a)eternal.pha.pa.us----------------+ == == | The new, improved, environmentally safe, bigger, better,| == == -= | faster, hypo-allergenic, AND politically correct .sig. | ==== ====== | Now with a new fresh lemon scent! | PGP Key Available +---------------------------------------------------------+

1 0

Re: On the crime bill and remailers
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by tcmay(a)netcom.com (Timothy C. May) on Tue, 20 Sep 10:40 AM >I agree with Hal Finney's point that current remailers >are far from the "ideal mix" described by Chaum and >are basically not very good at what they are supposed >to do. [Snip] >[Hal says] >> Claims here that remailers are designed to support sedition or to >> prevent government surveillance are both wrong and harmful. This kind >> of material could show up at some future prosecution of a remailer >> operator. [Snip] [Tim says] >Maybe. This is why I brought up the "supporting >terrorists" language of the Crime Act. Hal and Tim point to the vulnerability of the person running the remailer to being threatened through the equipment owner (like John Perry's recent experience) or squeezed by government agents into playing along with surveillors. This isolation and elimination (or co-optation) of a target has worked again and again to destroy networks once they become serious threats to law and order. Hal's warning is wisely heeded until all the remailer beneficiaries are bear an equal share of the risks of being charged a "supporting terrorist". John

1 0

RE: American Survival Guide
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Stanton McCandlish writes: >Oct. issue of _American_Survival_ has an article called "Clipper >Inside". >Dunno anything else about it, might be good, might suck rocks. CLIPPER INSIDE "CLinton's Orwellian plan to bug every compute,telephone,and fax... * Does a fair job on clipper. * mentions Matt Blaze's paper but gets it wrong. * does a side blurb on the EFF. * does another side blurb on PGP. * mentions Digital Telephony but doesn't mention EFF/FBI collaboration. * essentially very Anti-clipper * picture on page 46 alone worth the price of admission hehe... Typical issue, even better is the article "Liberalism as a form of codependency." Even better was last month's article "Make mine a Shotgun!" Brian Williams Extropian Cypherpatriot "Cryptocosmology: Sufficently advanced communication is indistinguishable from noise." --Steve Witham "Have you ever had your phones tapped by the government? YOU WILL and the company that'll bring it to you.... AT&T" --James Speth -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLn79rlmp8FjpRfTVAQFgEAP+JMxaoOGcn9/nbCDwFCuSHuEmYf0ljI8I /HCkLmOOTOooVi0mLgQrSfFUA7DvwV/N9IwqkY6Th4l2Q1jw8MmOThShzL/RpRND sl/VJTbbhV/z0rdbHB2yc/DU10bBvrpQZyI0fVS5g/uouKsYEXoj0TB3ytXwo/aI dedfaVwGQOc= =+8W5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Laws Outside the U.S.
by usura＠vox.xs4all.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

tcmay(a)netcom.com (Timothy C. May) writes: : > It would be interesting for those in other jurisdictions to comment about : > how *their* rulers might view anonymous communications and strong crypto. : : I heartily agree with Duncan here! There has been very little said by : the good residents of France, Germany, Sweden, Holland, Italy, etc. : about just what the crypto-related laws of their countries are. [..] : So, I appreciate that some of our European readers may be tired of : hearing about U.S. policy or proposed laws, but the proper solution is : _competing speech_. That is, give us something new to talk about. Tell : us about what *your* country is doing. Tell us about any laws limiting : what kind of modems can be hooked up to your PTTs, as a concrete : example. Tell us about the raids on BBSs in Italy. Tell us about the : rumor that the Netherlands plans to ban unapproved crypto. There was a draft for a proposal for a law that would have outlawed crypto in the Netherlands. It would only be legal to use crypto if you had deposited the KEYs and if you had received a license. The use, trade and possesion of crypto was forbidden. It would be illegal (to dutch law) to have cryptosoftware available at some ftp-site (somewhere in the world) that would be accesable from the Netherlands (really!). (laws and enforcement of those laws are two -totally- different things in Holland :)) The draft was revoked, due to the huge amount of protest', the good thing is that we are in the proces of founding the dutch equivelant of the EFF: "de db.nl". -- Some loose thoughts any comments ? -- There are basicly four scenario's that a state can follow to regulate crypto: - outlaw it totally This was the path Holland choose briefly. - key depositing This is what the US is trying to do with Clipper et al. - try to develop a standart This is what the US did with DES and is trying to do now with Clipper. - do nothing The most prosperous scenario. Crypto use will boom, but lawenforcement agencies will be deprived from a useful tool, they can't bug phones any more. That will hinder their investigations but advancements in hardware/software could balance that: it is more easy to localise phonecalls, bugging equipment has become smaller and more powerful. Lawenforcement agencies have computerised databases that can link fingerprints, names etc in near "real-time". Large scale use of crypto could balance out some of the recent advancements in information technology that have given them a clear edge. -- Exit! Stage Left. Alex de Joode <usura(a)vox.hacktic.nl>

1 0

Re: On the crime bill and remailers
by Mike Markley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hal <hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> writes: | | Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)access.digex.net> writes: | >I believe anonymous | >remailers have some use. But they are so targeted to prevent GOVERNMENT | >observation and intercepts, that they just plain look bad. | | I strongly disagree with this. Anonymous remailers as presently constructed | will be almost completely ineffective against any significant government | attempts to surveil email traffic. The government does have the resources | today to defeat most uses of remailers. Since present-day remailers lack | padding features, the correspondence between incoming and outgoing messages, | even with encryption, is relatively easy to establish. This is made worse | by the lack of general support for reordering, which renders the task | almost trivial. | | Instead, anonymous remailers are clearly targetted against non-government | traffic analysis, generally local associates, system operators, employers, | supervisors, and so on. They allow people to communicate without | repercussions and retribution at work or at school. They let people exchange | email in an insecure environment while hiding both the message address and | its contents. They allow whistle blowers to expose malfeasance without | being punished. These are the kinds of things the remailers are good for. | | Claims here that remailers are designed to support sedition or to | prevent government surveillance are both wrong and harmful. This kind | of material could show up at some future prosecution of a remailer | operator. It is important that we understand clearly what the capabilities | and limitations of current remailers are. | | Hal | Why not make distributed remailers then? You could set up a chain using either mail or ftp or ? that would take all messages and fragment them into nice 1K blocks and then either mail or otherwise transport the blocks to other physical machines, these machines would then follow the imbedded instructions on how to reassemble the blocks into a coherent message and mail it out. Admittedly there is no sure fire method to prevent someone from monitoring all of the traffic generated but it should be possible to generate so much traffic that just wading through the volume would take more time than is practical. Also by encrypting all packets going between remailers and making the packets uniform sizes should help make monitoring more difficult. I'm not sure that I'm worried about the government monitoring my communications as much as I'm worried about individuals with bad intentions monitoring my communications. Mike. ===================================================== Mike Markley <mmarkley(a)microsoft.com> I'm not a Microsoft spokesperson. All opinions expressed here are mine. =====================================================

1 0

Scienter and all that stuff
by TOMJEFFERSON＠delphi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Re. "Scienter" and all that stuff. Not being handicapped by a legal education, let me tell you how I believe it really is: The facts and the law only matter when the government doesn't have a hard on for you. If the government wants to get you [and, perhaps, if you're not a millionaire "sports figure"] it will get you. The crime bill just makes the task a bit easier. Example 1: Branch Davidians were sentenced to long prison terms for possessing weapons during commission of a crime, even though they were acquitted of the crime they were accused of committing while being in possession of the weapons. Example 2: The jury brought in the "wrong" verdict for the L.A. cops who beat Rodney King, so the feds just stepped in and tried 'em again. The constitutional prohibition against trying people twice for the same crime didn't bother the feds a bit. I know, I know, they were convicted of "violating the civil rights of". What's the difference? Pardon me for my lack of respect for the system. It went out the window when a bunch of drug cops broke into my 71 year old father's apartment by mistake and beat him unconscious for objecting. Outside of F. Lee Bailey's circle, cops and courts can basically do what they want, ignore your protests, and *get away with it*. The only difference between a "crip" and a cop is the color of the uniform.

5 4