December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Lallapalooza Shakeout Tomorrow...
by lile＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi folks, I thought some of you might be interested in this hitech tent party. It is a test run / shakeout of the Lallapalooza media tent... Please feel free to invite others too... The tent opens at 1pm. Just mention that Wanda Web and Lile Elam extended the invite and you will get in... Directions: The Lallapalooza media tent will be open Friday 1pm; Intercal is throwing a party: Strawberry Field Recreation Center in Tiburon. Take 101N over GG Bridge. Exit Tiburon; turn right on Tiburon Blvd. turn right on Strawberry Drive (2nd light) turn right on Belveder (1st right) It should be easily visible from there... -lile ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Lile Elam | "Remember... No matter where you go, there you are." lile(a)netcom.com | Un*x Admin / Artist | Buckaroo Banzai ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1 0

(Fwd) What motivates Crypto-folk?
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarding message by scmayo(a)rschp2.anu.edu.au -------------------- From: scmayo(a)rschp2.anu.edu.au (Sherry Mayo) Subject: What motivates Crypto-folk? Date: 29 Jun 1994 08:14:16 GMT Organization: Australian National University The question in the subject of this thread may seem dumb to some people in this group, but I'm curious about how varied the motivations of crypto-using people are. I got PGP running on my machine a few weeks ago because I liked the idea of being able to communicate privately if I wanted, as I felt that email was much more insecure than other forms of communication. I started reading some of the crypto stuff on WWW and noticed a political trend in the motivations of many of the people who are 'big' in the crypto scene in the US. The motivation for these people's interest in cryptography seems to stem from a strong libertarian viewpoint, which incidentally often seems to coincide with strong views about the right to bear arms. It may seem that I am being particularly naive in being surprised by this but I am from the UK where libertarian views of this kind are not so widely held. I have never held a hand gun and have no desire to do so. Similarly my motivations for using cryptography come simply from a desire for privacy from Govt. and other snooping but NOT from the 'cyber-survivalist' inclinations that seem to motivate some in the US at least. I read some stuff on Vince Cate's WWW site by Tim May about how crypto was going to bring down governments due to (legal?) tax evasion by those who are computer literate . I have to say that I think this is highly unlikely (and to be fair, Vince's site included an article by Hal Finney agreeing with my view). I know that Tim May's views are considered to be extreme by some, but more moderate people seem to hold the view that crypto and also cyberspace (god I hate these buzzwords) in general herald an age of 'survival of the fittest' where those clued up about computers will be able to take advantage and do better due to paying less taxes etc. Personally I have no desire to evade tax since I quite like being able to drive on tarmac without holes, and having schooling and health care provided for all with the richer folk subsidising the poorer folk. I realise my views are anathema to the libertarian and I'm curious to know if there are other crypto users (I would NEVER call myself a cypherpunk :-) who's interest stems from a left-wing rather than right-wing viewpoint. I should point out that I consider tha libertarian/crypto-anarchist views I've outlined above to be an extreme form of the (right-wing) philosphy of individualism. I'd never come across a right-wing anarchist before reading the crypto groups - weird! Your thoughts please, SCM

1 0

(Fwd) Bidzos life threatened?
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarding message by gtoal(a)an-teallach.com -------------------- From: gtoal(a)an-teallach.com (Graham Toal) Subject: Re: Bidzos life threatened? Date: Thu, 30 Jun 1994 17:29:30 +0000 Please post who else NSA -- and its like -- has threatened besides Bidzos and PRZ. Several years ago lots of British scientists died under mysterious circumstances. They were generally described as 'defence scientists' but what a significant number of them had in common was work in the area of surveillance. Several of them were connected to UK's system X. I posted a long piece at the time (now lost, sorry) hypothesising that what was going on was internecine warfare betweem the UK and USA governments departments responsible for fitting surveillance assistance to their telephone exchanges for contracts with foreign countries. (One UK govt official was found dead in his hotel room in an arab country while there at a trade fair in an unofficial capacity helping to promotye system X). At that time the UK govt had a clear lead in selling bugged exchanges because complete surveillance capability was designed in to system X - the USA doesn't have it everywhere yet - just in exchanges from co-operative suppliers. (Hence the 'wiretap' FBI bill, to get everyone else to play ball too). The ability to remotely monitor all the phone system of a foreign country would be *extremely* valuable to an agency like the CIA or GCHQ. Personally I don't doubt it's worth killing for, in their view. It was also my view when I suggested this hypothesis some years ago that the phone systems were being sold to these countries by telling the respective governments that *they* could use them for surveillance purposes. My suspicion was that there would be extra code buried in the switches that the customers did not know about which would enable remote callers to use the surveillance options too, without the host country or telco being aware of them. This latter capability being top secret and the risk of it being made known by disaffected employees perhaps being the reason why some of them were killed by our own security agencies. Hence why the multiple suspicious deaths were never properly investigated (or at least the investigations made public - MI5 couldn't expose the USA dirty tricks without exposing their own.) This is all highly speculative and I don't stand by it, I just offer it as a hypothesis.

1 0

ACM Releases Crypto Study
by US ACM, DC Office 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Association for Computing Machinery PRESS RELEASE __________________________________________________ Thursday, June 30, 1994 Contact: Joseph DeBlasi, ACM Executive Director (212) 869-7440 Dr. Stephen Kent, Panel Chair (617) 873-3988 Dr. Susan Landau, Panel Staff (413) 545-0263 COMPUTING SOCIETY RELEASES REPORT ON ENCRYPTION POLICY "CLIPPER CHIP" CONTROVERSY EXPLORED BY EXPERT PANEL WASHINGTON, DC A panel of experts convened by the nation's foremost computing society today released a comprehensive report on U.S. cryptography policy. The report, "Codes, Keys and Conflicts: Issues in U.S Crypto Policy," is the culmination of a ten-month review conducted by the panel of representatives of the computer industry and academia, government officials, and attorneys. The 50-page document explores the complex technical and social issues underlying the current debate over the Clipper Chip and the export control of information security technology. "With the development of the information superhighway, cryptography has become a hotly debated policy issue," according to Joseph DeBlasi, Executive Director of the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), which convened the expert panel. "The ACM believes that this report is a significant contribution to the ongoing debate on the Clipper Chip and encryption policy. It cuts through the rhetoric and lays out the facts." Dr. Stephen Kent, Chief Scientist for Security Technology with the firm of Bolt Beranek and Newman, said that he was pleased with the final report. "It provides a very balanced discussion of many of the issues that surround the debate on crypto policy, and we hope that it will serve as a foundation for further public debate on this topic." The ACM report addresses the competing interests of the various stakeholders in the encryption debate -- law enforcement agencies, the intelligence community, industry and users of communications services. It reviews the recent history of U.S. cryptography policy and identifies key questions that policymakers must resolve as they grapple with this controversial issue. The ACM cryptography panel was chaired by Dr. Stephen Kent. Dr. Susan Landau, Research Associate Professor in Computer Science at the University of Massachusetts, co-ordinated the work of the panel and did most of the writing. Other panel members were Dr. Clinton Brooks, Advisor to the Director, National Security Agency; Scott Charney, Chief of the Computer Crime Unit, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice; Dr. Dorothy Denning, Computer Science Chair, Georgetown University; Dr. Whitfield Diffie, Distinguished Engineer, Sun Microsystems; Dr. Anthony Lauck, Corporate Consulting Engineer, Digital Equipment Corporation; Douglas Miller, Government Affairs Manager, Software Publishers Association; Dr. Peter Neumann, Principal Scientist, SRI International; and David Sobel, Legal Counsel, Electronic Privacy Information Center. Funding for the cryptography study was provided in part by the National Science Foundation. The ACM, founded in 1947, is a 85,000 member non-profit educational and scientific society dedicated to the development and use of information technology, and to addressing the impact of that technology on the world's major social challenges. For general information, contact ACM, 1515 Broadway, New York, NY 10036. (212) 869-7440 (tel), (212) 869-0481 (fax). Information on accessing the report electronically will be posted soon in this newsgroup.

1 0

USACM Calls for Clipper Withdrawal
by US ACM, DC Office 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

U S A C M Association for Computing Machinery, U.S. Public Policy Committee * PRESS RELEASE * Thursday, June 30, 1994 Contact: Barbara Simons (408) 463-5661, simons(a)acm.org (e-mail) Jim Horning (415) 853-2216, horning(a)src.dec.com (e-mail) Rob Kling (714) 856-5955, kling(a)ics.uci.edu (e-mail) COMPUTER POLICY COMMITTEE CALLS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF CLIPPER COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY "TOO IMPORTANT" FOR SECRET DECISION-MAKING WASHINGTON, DC The public policy arm of the oldest and largest international computing society today urged the White House to withdraw the controversial "Clipper Chip" encryption proposal. Noting that the "security and privacy of electronic communications are vital to the development of national and international information infrastructures," the Association for Computing Machinery's U.S. Public Policy Committee (USACM) added its voice to the growing debate over encryption and privacy policy. In a position statement released at a press conference on Capitol Hill, the USACM said that "communications security is too important to be left to secret processes and classified algorithms." The Clipper technology was developed by the National Security Agency, which classified the cryptographic algorithm that underlies the encryption device. The USACM believes that Clipper "will put U.S. manufacturers at a disadvantage in the global market and will adversely affect technological development within the United States." The technology has been championed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the NSA, which claim that "non-escrowed" encryption technology threatens law enforcement and national security. "As a body concerned with the development of government technology policy, USACM is troubled by the process that gave rise to the Clipper initiative," said Dr. Barbara Simons, a computer scientist with IBM who chairs the USACM. "It is vitally important that privacy protections for our communications networks be developed openly and with full public participation." The USACM position statement was issued after completion of a comprehensive study of cryptography policy sponsored by the ACM (see companion release). The study, "Codes, Keys and Conflicts: Issues in U.S Crypto Policy," was prepared by a panel of experts representing various constituencies involved in the debate over encryption. The ACM, founded in 1947, is a 85,000 member non-profit educational and scientific society dedicated to the development and use of information technology, and to addressing the impact of that technology on the world's major social challenges. USACM was created by ACM to provide a means for presenting and discussing technological issues to and with U.S. policymakers and the general public. For further information on USACM, please call (202) 298- 0842. ============================================================= USACM Position on the Escrowed Encryption Standard The ACM study "Codes, Keys and Conflicts: Issues in U.S Crypto Policy" sets forth the complex technical and social issues underlying the current debate over widespread use of encryption. The importance of encryption, and the need for appropriate policies, will increase as networked communication grows. Security and privacy of electronic communications are vital to the development of national and international information infrastructures. The Clipper Chip, or "Escrowed Encryption Standard" (EES) Initiative, raises fundamental policy issues that must be fully addressed and publicly debated. After reviewing the ACM study, which provides a balanced discussion of the issues, the U.S. Public Policy Committee of ACM (USACM) makes the following recommendations. 1. The USACM supports the development of public policies and technical standards for communications security in open forums in which all stakeholders -- government, industry, and the public -- participate. Because we are moving rapidly to open networks, a prerequisite for the success of those networks must be standards for which there is widespread consensus, including international acceptance. The USACM believes that communications security is too important to be left to secret processes and classified algorithms. We support the principles underlying the Computer Security Act of 1987, in which Congress expressed its preference for the development of open and unclassified security standards. 2. The USACM recommends that any encryption standard adopted by the U.S. government not place U.S. manufacturers at a disadvantage in the global market or adversely affect technological development within the United States. Few other nations are likely to adopt a standard that includes a classified algorithm and keys escrowed with the U.S. government. 3. The USACM supports changes in the process of developing Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) employed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. This process is currently predicated on the use of such standards solely to support Federal procurement. Increasingly, the standards set through the FIPS process directly affect non-federal organizations and the public at large. In the case of the EES, the vast majority of comments solicited by NIST opposed the standard, but were openly ignored. The USACM recommends that the standards process be placed under the Administrative Procedures Act so that citizens may have the same opportunity to challenge government actions in the area of information processing standards as they do in other important aspects of Federal agency policy making. 4. The USACM urges the Administration at this point to withdraw the Clipper Chip proposal and to begin an open and public review of encryption policy. The escrowed encryption initiative raises vital issues of privacy, law enforcement, competitiveness and scientific innovation that must be openly discussed. 5. The USACM reaffirms its support for privacy protection and urges the administration to encourage the development of technologies and institutional practices that will provide real privacy for future users of the National Information Infrastructure.

1 0

Re: ANI 800 number
by peb＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The number I have no longer works. Too bad, since I found it useful to find out what number I'm dialing out on (rarely needed, but handy when necessary). Paul E. Baclace peb(a)netcom.com

1 0

Opinions of a book requested...
by Jim choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all, Does anyone have any hands-on experience with: Contemporary Cryptology: The Science of Information Integrity Gustavus J. Simmons 656pp., 1992 ISBN 0-87942-277-7 It is listed in a catalog of books carried by Omega. I was wondering if anyone has read it (or even looked it over peripheraly for that matter)? Thanks.

2 1

NSA and CSS Computer Resources
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Earlier I mentioned the list of supercomputer installations that Gunter Ahrendt maintains and I included a few (dated) excerpts. Well, tonight I found a new version posted. I'm only including the top handful of sites. Not reported are installations in non-U.S. intelligence agencies, such as Chobetsu, SDECE, Mossad, BND, etc. They probably don't have Crays, Connection Machines, or Paragons. I'll also edit the intro material a bit. The sites are ranked in order of what I'd call "Cray equivalents," where the Cray Y-MP/1 is rated at 1. For example, the top-ranked site has the estimated equivalent of 380 Cray Y-MP/1s. --Tim May From: gunter(a)yarrow.wt.uwa.edu.au (Gunter Ahrendt) Newsgroups: comp.sys.super Subject: JUL-1994 List of the world's most powerful computing sites Date: 3 Jul 94 01:37:07 GMT Organization: The University of Western Australia Message-ID: <gunter.773199427@yarrow> 03-JUL-1994 List of the world's most powerful computing sites ============================================================= (available by fingering me, joining my mailing list or in comp.sys.super) .... Ratings are ratios to a Cray Y-MP/1 based on NASA NPB BT Size A benchmark reports. Figures prefixed '~' denote approximations usually based on comparable programs, figures suffixed '?' denote relative guesses based on Intel iPSC/860 peak Gflops ratios. The current minimum performance for inclusion is a benchmarked rating of 4 BT, or 10.56 Gflops peak for unbenchmarked systems. ... 1) 380.82 - (27-JUN-1994) [NAL] National Aerospace Lab,Chofu-shi,Tokyo,Japan, nahirose(a)asuka.aerospace-lab.go.jp 1) NAL NWT 2/140 ~357 (5.1 @ 2 cpus) 2) Intel Paragon-336 18.38 (7 @ 128 cpus) 3) Fujitsu VP2600/10 ~ 5.44 2) 196.1 - (APR-1994) [CSS] Central Security Service,National Security Agency Headquarters,Fort George G Meade,Maryland,US,postmaster(a)dockmaster.ncsc.mil 1) TMC CM-5/512 44.8 (2.8 @ 32 cpus) 2) Cray C916-1024 35.52 = 2.22 * 16 cpus 3) Cray C916-1024 35.52 = 2.22 * 16 cpus 4) Cray C916-1024 35.52 = 2.22 * 16 cpus 5) Cray Y-MP/8E-256 8 = 1 * 8 cpus 6) Cray Y-MP/8E-256 8 = 1 * 8 cpus 7) Cray Y-MP/8E-256 8 = 1 * 8 cpus 8) Cray Y-MP/8E-256 8 = 1 * 8 cpus 9) Cray M98-4096 ~ 7.01 10) Cray 3/2-64 [-4Q96] 5.73? 11) NSA SMPP-2/2M [+4Q96] 7407.05? 3) 146.41 - (10-JUN-1994) [LANL] Los Alamos National Labs,Los Alamos,New Mexico,US,iaa(a)lanl.gov 1) TMC CM-5/1056-32 [-4Q94] 92.4 (2.8 @ 32 cpus) 2) Cray T3D SC128-8/3-64 15 (12 @ 128 cpus + 1 * 3 cpus) 3) Cray Y-MP/8-128 8 = 1 * 8 cpus 4) Cray Y-MP/8-128 8 = 1 * 8 cpus 5) Cray Y-MP/8-64 8 = 1 * 8 cpus 6) Cray Y-MP/8-32 8 = 1 * 8 cpus 7) Cray M98-2048 ~ 7.01 8) TMC CM-5/1056-128 [+4Q94] 92.4 (2.8 @ 32 cpus) 4) 142.08 - (10-JUN-1994) [NSA] National Security Agency,Dallas,Texas,US,postmaster(a)dockmaster.ncsc.mil 1) Cray C916-512 35.52 = 2.22 * 16 cpus 2) Cray C916-512 35.52 = 2.22 * 16 cpus 3) Cray C916-512 35.52 = 2.22 * 16 cpus 4) Cray C916-512 35.52 = 2.22 * 16 cpus 5) Cray C916-1024 [+2Q95] 35.52 = 2.22 * 16 cpus 6) Cray C916-1024 [+2Q95] 35.52 = 2.22 * 16 cpus 7) Cray C916-1024 [+2Q95] 35.52 = 2.22 * 16 cpus 8) Cray C916-512 [+2Q95] 35.52 = 2.22 * 16 cpus 5) 112.97 - (16-JUN-1994) [CRI] Cray Research Computer Network,Eagan,Minnesota,US,root(a)cray.com 1) Cray C916-256 35.52 = 2.22 * 16 cpus 2) Cray T3D 256 24 (12 @ 128 cpus) 3) Cray Y-MP/8E-128 8 = 1 * 8 cpus 4) Cray Y-MP/8D-128 8 = 1 * 8 cpus 5) Cray Y-MP/8D-64 8 = 1 * 8 cpus 6) Cray Y-MP/8D-32 8 = 1 * 8 cpus 7) Cray M98-4096 ~ 7.01 8) Cray Y-MP8I/6-64 6 = 1 * 6 cpus 9) Cray C92A-128 4.44 = 2.22 * 2 cpus 10) Cray Y-MP/4E-64 4 = 1 * 4 cpus 11) Cray T91 [+1Q95] 4.44? 12) Cray T3D 1024A [+4Q96] 204.8 ? 13) Cray T932 [+4Q96] 142.08? 14) Cray T3D 1024B [+4Q99] 640 ? 6) 106 - (20-MAY-1994) [SANDIA] Sandia National Labs,Albuquerque,New Mexico,US,arbreck(a)sandia.gov 1) Intel Paragon-1840 98 (7 @ 128 cpus) 2) Cray Y-MP/8-64 8 = 1 * 8 cpus 7) 104.38 - (29-JUN-1994) [MSCI] Minnesota Supercomputer Center,Minneapolis,Minnesota,US,consult(a)msc.edu 1) TMC CM-5/896VU 78.4 (2.8 @ 32 cpus) 2) Cray C916/9-512 19.98 = 2.22 * 9 cpus 3) Cray T3D 64 [-4Q94] 6 4) Cray T3D 128 [+4Q94] 12 8) 98.4 - (02-JUN-1994) [ATP] Angstrom Technology Partnership,Tsukuba,Japan,sato(a)jrcat.or.jp 1) Fujitsu VPP500/32 76.8 (4.8 @ 2 cpus) 2) TMC CM-5E/128 21.6 (5.4 @ 32 cpus) 9) 83.52 - (17-JUN-1994) [PSC] Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center,Pittsburgh,Pennsylvania,US, remarks(a)psc.edu 1) Cray T3D 512 48 (12 @ 128 cpus) 2) Cray C916-512 35.52 = 2.22 * 16 cpus 10) 82.4 - (10-JUN-1994) [CALTECH] Caltech,Pasadena,California,US,goss(a)delilah.ccsf.caltech.edu 1) Intel Paragon-555 30.35 (7 @ 128 cpus) 2) Intel Touchstone Delta-513 ~28.05 (7 @ 128 cpus) 3) Cray T3D 256 24 (12 @ 128 cpus) 11) 81.55 - (21-JUN-1994) [LLNL] Lawrence Livermore National Labs,Livermore,California,US, seager(a)llnl.gov 1) Cray C916-256 35.52 = 2.22 * 16 cpus 2) Meiko CS-2/256-512VU [-4Q96] ~ 24 (1.5 @ 16 cpus) 3) Cray Y-MP/8-128 8 = 1 * 8 cpus 4) Cray Y-MP/8-64 8 = 1 * 8 cpus 5) Cray 2S/8-128 6.03? 6) Cray T3D SC128-8/3-64 [+3Q94] 15 (12 @ 128+1 * 3 cpus) 7) Meiko CS-2/1280-2560VU [+4Q96] ~120 (1.5 @ 16 cpus) 12) 77.31 - (07-APR-1994) [TSUKUBA] Uni of Tsukuba,Ibaraki,Japan,root(a)ume.cc.tsukuba.ac.jp 1) Fujitsu VPP500/30 72 (4.8 @ 2 cpus) 2) Tsukuba QCDPAX-480 5.31? 3) Tsukuba CP-PACS/1024 [+3Q96] 113.68? 13) 75.44 - (25-JUN-1994) [NAS] NAS,NASA Ames Research Center,Mountain View,California,US, jet(a)nas.nasa.gov 1) Cray C916-1024 35.52 = 2.22 * 16 cpus 2) Cray C98-128 17.76 = 2.22 * 8 cpus 3) TMC CM-5/128VU-32/256 11.2 (2.8 @ 32 cpus) 4) Intel Paragon-204 11.16 (7 @ 128 cpus) 5) IBM 9076 SP2/160 [+3Q94] ~63.8 (3.19 @ 8 cpus)

1 1

Re: Password Difficulties
by kentborg＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

lcottrell(a)popmail.ucsd.edu writes: >I make a point of using at least one non-dictionary word in every >passphase I make. Something pronouncable? Something that follows rules of some natural language, something short that could have been a word? Good, but not the whole cigar. Last I used VMS you could get it to suggest non-word word-a-likes to use as your password. Seems terrible brute forcable in 1994. Adding a non-word to a pass phrase is like increasing the size of the dictionary, and if you only do one non-word then only *that* word picks up more bits of entropy in the phrase. Yes, there are bits in where you put the word, but the whole phrase did not become made of deep bits. But my point is really that even these often-less-good-than-they-look measures are far better than what *real* people are going to do. -kb, the Kent who wonders whether real people will ever have decent security -- Kent Borg +1 (617) 776-6899 kentborg(a)world.std.com kentborg(a)aol.com Proud to claim 31:15 hours of TV viewing so far in 1994!

2 1

2D Political Spectrum (Nolan Chart)
by Vincent.Cate＠FURMINT.NECTAR.CS.CMU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As part of a Mosaic new page: ftp://furmint.nectar.cs.cmu.edu/security/cypheressay/what-is-cypherpunk.html I put together a file on the 2D political spectrum. This helps to explain why Libertarians and the "Left wing" folks are both on this list. -- Vince ----------------------------------------------------------------------- The two dimensional political spectrum was first developed by Nolan, so it is usually called the "Nolan Chart". A person gets a score on economic issues and on personal issues. This 2D plane is rotated 45 degrees so that "left" and "right" match with the old 1D spectrum. . ./ \. ./ . \. ./ . . \. ./ . . . \. ./ LIBERTARIAN \. ./ \. . . . ./ \. ./ . \.___.___.___./ . \. ./ . . ! . . . ! . . \. ./ . . ! . . ! . . \. ./ . . . ! . . . ! . . . \. 100 \. "LEFT" ! MODERATE ! "RIGHT" ./ 100 90 \. . . ! . . . ! . . ./ 90 80 \. . !___.___.___! . ./ 80 70 \. ./ . . . \. ./ 70 60 \./ . . . . \./ 60 Personal Freedom 50 \. AUTHORITARIAN ./ 50 Economic Freedom Percentile 40 \. . . / 40 Percentile 30 \. . ./ 30 20 \. ./ 20 10 \./ 10 0 0 Personal Freedom Issues (free or government controlled?): privacy, birth control, gambling, prostitution, homosexuality, drugs, pornography, censorship (even anti-American stuff), military draft, control of radio or TV content (profanity, violence, ...), etc Economic Freedom Issues (free or government controlled?): cable companies, taxi companies, licenses for businesses in general, mail delivery, stock market, minimum wages, farm prices, prices in general, banks in general, airlines, car gas-mileage, nuclear power, oil prices, money supply, current interest rate, maximum legal interest rate, exports, imports, employee hiring and firing, etc Common Agreement on Purpose of Government: All major groups on the political landscape agree that fraud and the initiation of physical force are both bad and should be punished. The con-man, fraud, swindler, or cheat, takes by trickery and deception. The "violent criminal" is someone who physically does something to someone else or their property without permission, or threatens to do so. Everyone also agrees that a government should defend the country against foreign invasion. Issues that do not fit nicely into Nolan Chart: Sort of economic: welfare, death penalty, foreign aid Sort of personal: abortion, Calibration of 2D Political Spectrum: Someone should calibrate a set of questions that break down the population by percentiles for the Nolan Chart. This could be done by someone like Gallup or maybe as a thesis project. It would be very interesting. Fun to see scores for differed countries and also how a countries score varies over time. If anyone knows of a large set of calibrated questions, please let me know. -- Vincent Cate vac(a)cs.cmu.edu This file is ftp://furmint.nectar.cs.cmu.edu/security/political-spectrum.txt

1 0